La Ville St-Michel v. Shannon Realties Ltd.

'Oct.

AND

SHANNON REALTIES LIMITED R

(PLAINTIFF)......................

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Per Davies C.J. and Brodeur J.-Moreover, the respondent's right to take a direct action before the Superior Court, if existing, would have been prescribed, as not having been exercised within three months from the date the roll had been in force.

(Art. 5624 R.S.Q. (1909) ). Anglin and Mignault JJ. contra.

Per Duff J.-Although article 5696 R.S.Q. (1909) expressly provides that taxable property shall be assessed "according to its real value," a departure from this statutory mandate does not constitute legal incompetency rendering the acts of the corporation ultra vires and ab initio null, as the statutory law provides a means for complaining against such a valuation and correcting it. Judgment of the Court of King's Bench (Q.R. 32 K.B. 520) reversed, Anglin and Mignault JJ; dissenting.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec (1), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, Maclennan J., and maintaining the respondent's action.

The appellant had instituted a suit, on the 18th of September, 1917, in the Superior Court, to recover from the respondent the taxes in arrear for the years 1913, 1914, 1915 and 1916, making, with interest thereon, the sum of $9,697.60.

On the 20th of Feb. ruary, 1920, the respondent instituted the present action whereby it seeks to have the first action joined and that the assessment rolls and collection rolls for the years 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1918 and 1919 be held illegal, irregular, null, ultra vires, quashed and annulled. At the trial, the case as to the rolls for the years 1913 and 1914 was abandoned, as the taxes for these years had been prescribed.

For the year 1917 the respondent had taken an appeal to the Circuit Court against the valuation roll and had succeeded in obtaining a reduction of the valuation.

(1) [1921] Q.R. 32 K.B. 520.

48976-28

L. E. Beaulieu K.C. for the appellant. The valuation of the respondent's property was not excessive. Assuming that the property was over-valued, the espondent having neglected to avail itself, within the time prescribed, of the statutory remedy by way of appeal to the Circuit Court, was debarred from complaining by way of a direct action before the Superior Court under Art. 50 C.P.C. Bain v. City of Montreal (1); Municipality of Macleod v. Campbell (2). Respondent's only available remedy was the setting aside of the collection rolls as regards its own property. G. H. Montgomery K.C. and A. Mailhiot K.C. for the respondent. The finding of fact as to overvaluation is unanimous in the courts below.

The collection rolls are ultra vires and in violation of 5 Geo. V., c. 109, s. 28; and further as resting upon valuation rolls themselves ultra vires and made in violation of Art. 5696 R.S.Q. (1909).

THE JUsTIcE.-I am of the opinion that this appeal should be allowed with costs here and in the Court of King's Bench and the action dismissed with costs.

Had I been able, as one of my colleagues has, to reach the conclusion that the valuation of the plaintiff's lands in question for the years 1915, 1916, and 1919 were merely "fictitious valuations" and fraudulent exercises of the power to make assessments conferred on the assessors, I might have reached the conclusion that the Superior Court had the power, under Art. 50 C.P.C. to set them aside as void and illegal. But I have not, on the record before me, been able to reach any such conclusion.

On the contrary, I think such valuations were made honestly and without fraud in the light of the boom which existed with ^ regard to lands within the municipality of St. Michel during the years mentioned, and before that boom * had actually, as it is said, "burst."

A long experience in this court in dealing with the "real value" of lands in towns and municipalities where a boom in land prices had existed has taught me how difficult it is to reach a conclusion of what the "real value" is. Experts giving their evidence on the question differed widely and their various opinions were reflected frequently in the opinions of the several courts called upon to review the assessments made by those whose duty it was in the first instance to make them. These differences of opinion were very pronounced and very great and convinced me that it is difficult indeed during the existence of boom periods, and before the boom has "burst" to reach anything like a unanimous opinion.

In the case now before us I think it fair, on the facts, to conclude that notwithstanding an appeal was made successfully by the plaintiffs in one year, 1917, to reduce the valuation in that year; and as in each and all the years 1915, 1916, 1918 and 1919 no action at all was taken by the plaintiff's respondents to call the valuations for those years in question, they may well be held to have acquiesced in those valuations on the ground that it would or might assist them in selling their lots to prospective purchasers at a very high figure. However that may be the facts are that in all those years, and until the present action wag taken, no steps at all were taken by the plaintiff respondent to appeal from the valuations or to call in question the fairness or unfairness of these valuations.

The law has provided a very simple method of their doing so, first, by an appeal to the municipal council and then from the determination of that body to the Circuit Court whose judgment was to be final binding.

As I have said, no such appeal was ever taken in the years I have mentioned.

Subject to what I have said in the foregoing reasons, I think the Superior Court had no power under art. 50 C.P.C. to entertain the plaintiff respondents' application to set aside the valuations.

I concur generally in the reasons and conclusions of Brodeur J.

J.-The respondent is the owner of a farm of nearly eighty acres which was subdivided, in 1913 or thereabouts, into lots each of about a tenth of an acre in size and possibly by reason of the subdivision having proved an unprofitable venture, for only some thirty lots were sold, the tenant who had long carried on the farm has been induced to continue farming there despite the subdivision.

The market value of the property seems to have increased so rapidly for some years that from having been bought in July 1911 for the price of $1,000 per arpent, it passed to the respondent in May, 1914, for the price of $2,200 per arpent.

The assessor or succession of assessors seem to have been induced thereby, and by the price list of the respondent, to raise the assessed value of the whole to the total sum of $528,104.00, in the years 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918.

The respondent never, until 1917, took any of the regular and proper steps provided by statute for complaining against over assessment.

In 1917 it did take some steps provided, but what is not clear, for there is nothing relative thereto presented in the case before us, save a certificate of judgment in the Circuit Court, whereby it appears that the learned judge had reduced the assessment to $500.00 per arpent.

As the result of that it is argued that the said assessors should have adopted that very low figure for the rolls of 1918 and 1919.

A very obvious answer seems to be that, as to 1918, the roll probably was completed by the assessors before the 9th July, 1918, when that judgment was delivered. I am unable to say why, under such circumstances, the respondent did not avail itself of the 'means provided by law for appealing to the court of revision for the roll was not homologated until the 11th September, assessment roll of the assessor for 1919 fixed the entire valuation of said property for that year at $347,578.

The respondent does not seem to have taken any appeal against that assessment.

The appellant had instituted a suit on the 18th of September, 1917, in the Superior Court, to recover from respondent the taxes in arrear for the years 1913, 1914, 1915 and 1916, making, with interest thereon, the sum of $9,697.60.

I On the 20th February, 1920, the respondent instituted this action whereby it seeks to have said action lastly referred to joined and that the assessment rolls and collection rolls for the years 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1918 and 1919, be held illegal, irregular and null, ultra vires, and be quashed and annulled.

When the case came before Mr. Justice Maclennan for trial in the Superior Court, the case as to the rolls for the years 1913 and 1914, was abandoned, and after hearing the evidence adduced, he maintained the action and adjudged and declared that the valuation and collection rolls of the defendant, appellant, ""ALTims for the years 1915, 1916, 1918 and 1919 are, and each of them is and always has been illegal, irregular, null and ultra vires and are set aside and annulled.

Upon appeal therefrom the Court of King's Bench by a majority upheld the said judgment in its entirety, though Mr. Justice Guerin, one of that majority, seems to have had some doubts as to going further than dealing with the claim of partial exemption of the respondent, by reason of the lands in question being farm lands.

The said courts seem, as to the facts, to found said judgments upon the excessive valuation by the assessor and as to the law upon the power given by article 50 of the Code of Procedure.

As to the facts I cannot, after a perusal of the entire evidence, agree that there is therein anything to support such a drastic judgment which if upheld must lead to great confusion; indeed so great as probably to require legislation to carry on the affairs of the appellant as is intimated by the learned Chief Justice. I, with respect, cannot agree that the article 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows applies where there is a specific power given elsewhere, in the statutes relevant to the subject matter involved, supplying an adequate remedy, and indeed evidently intended to be the only remedy to rectify any wrong doing on the part of the assessor of a municipal corporation in the way of under or over valuation. cannot think that in such like cases resort to this article was ever intended, unless possibly in the cases 9* of actual fraud or ultra vires.

And especially would that seem to be the case when, as here, the roll is declared binding when homologated, presumably after hearing any appeals tendered, as they were in some other cases, and the more so when that homologated roll in turn seems to be subject to an appeal to the Circuit Court.

I cannot help thinking that this specific code, as it were, eliminates any ground for the interference of the Superior Court under Art. 50, unless in the possible exceptions I have referred to, and by no means do I hold that these exceptions either in law or fact apply to such a case as presented herein.

There is no evidence herein to support any charge of fraud relative to the assessment of respondent's property, much less that the whole of these rolls as to every ratepayer were fraudulent.

Indeed fraud is not seriously argued.

Illegality may cover that or, in a sense, over or under assessment.

I will deal presently with the other of said possible exceptions confining myself to the only one that appears herein arguable on the facts.

I find the cases relied upon by the court below and counsel before us are as follows:- The case of La Corporation Archidpiscopale Catholique de St. Boniface v. The Town of Transcona (1), was an ordinary appeal to us from the courts below in due course of executing the specific remedy given for just such cases as presented here,

If that course had been followed herein, possibly the essence of all involved might have come here if not duly and properly settled by the court of last resort in the province.

La Compagnie d'Approvisionnement d'Eau v. La Ville de Montmagny (1); Rivard v. Corporation de Wickham(2), are, so far as I can see, the only cases in which the court below has ever acted upon such ground as exists herein. In the former case the course of events was rather provoking, for the party aggrieved pursued his specific remedies without desirable results, but that furnishes no foundation for the assertion of a jurisdiction which a court has not.

In the latter case the reasoning in the judgment of Pouliot J., who dismissed the application and rested upon a long line of authorities followed up to that time, has my assent as correct.

And when we come to the case of Laberge v. La Cit de Montrial (3), we find another basis of right asserted by the appellant, namely the general exemption. In joining in that judgment the late Mr. Justice Cross expressly excludes the case of a mere error in the amount of assessment, and rests his judgment upon the case therein presented of partial exemption created by a statutory provision for a term of years which seems to have arisen out of circumstances very similar to those which gave rise to the partial exemption in question herein.

These three cases being all so recent as five or six years before the respondent launched this case, and no prior decisions expressly in point having been cited, has induced me to try and tiace, if possible,_any previous exercise of the power asserted in them, but I have been unable to find any.

I find many cases asserting authority over municipal corporations in many ways, by virtue of said article 50 C.P.C., reaching back for fifty years or more, but nothing analogous to what is involved in that presented by this appeal.

The excessive valuation in question herein reminds me of a recent case before us in which judicial authorities passing upon valuation by assessors of a certain property in a city suffering from the same causes as appellant, were found to differ as much as four or five times in regard to the value to be placed upon a certain property.

One court thought one hundred dollars an acre excessive, and another thought four or five hundred dollars an acre was not.

I cannot, for my part, accept such excessive valuations even if they are the aftermath of a mad race in speculation.

But it comes with an ill grace, I submit, on the part of those who have done their part to develop the situation, to refrain from discharging the duty of trying to rectify the results apparent in the assessor's roll year after year and then seeking to overturn the whole basis of the financial structure upon which the affairs of the municipality rest.

I do not think, even if the supervising jurisdiction of the courts could be extended so far, it should be exercised under such circumstances as presented. Unless in the cases of fraud or what falls properly within the ultra vires rule, no relief should, I submit, be given to suitors so acting, for in such cases a wise discretion may be properly exercised.

However all that may be, I still adhere to the principles upon which we proceeded in the case of Municipality of Macleod v. Campbell (1), cited in argument herein. In that case I expressed my own view that to hold a mere excess of value an illegality such as to render a roll void is quite impracticable.

Indeed it would surprise a great majority of rural municipalities to be told that taxes could not be collected because the assessor had assessed far below the actual value. Yet that is, in strict law, quite as illegal as assessing too high.

The doing so in either case does not give rise to any application of the doctrine of ultra vires unless in the case of him entitled to claim an exemption. The duty of him claiming it is to bring the claim before the courts entrusted with the jurisdiction of settling the roll or correcting it.

But if he fail to do so I am of the opinion that he can resist the collection of taxes imposed in violation of his exemption and that he does not need such relief as sought herein for his protection.

The respondent has, I think, on the evidence before us, shewn it is entitled to be taxed on the basis of such exemption, and can insist thereon without being given any such relief as sought herein.

I was at first inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Rivard's suggestion in his well considered judgment, if I may be permitted to say so,- with which I almost entirely agree, but on reflection I do not think the application of his solution of the problem is necessary herein, though the principle thereof must be observed in determining the amount the appellant is entitled to recover in the suit it has taken.

I would therefore allow this appeal and dismiss the respondent's action with costs throughout.

J.-The finding of the learned trial judge is in the following words:

I am not quite sure whether the learned judge means that for ulterior purposes the assessors and the municipal council had deliberately combined to assess the property in the municipality at a grossly excessive valuation.

If this is the proper construction of the finding then I think the evidence is inadequate to support it. There is nothing to shew that either the assessors or the council were actuated by any specific improper motive, such for example, as that suggested in the pleadings, namely, that the statutory limit of the municipal indebtedness should be illegally elevated. An inference that there was such wrongdoing would necessarily be an inference based upon the conclusion reached by the learned trial judge that the valuation was grossly excessive.

I am not sure that in this sense the finding is concurred in by more than one of the learned judges of the Court of King's Bench; but assuming that in this sense there are concurrent findings of two courts I should still be forced to the conclusion from a perusal of the evidence and the reasons that there are no adequate grounds for such a conclusion. The question whether or not there has been such impropriety must always be a very delicate one. We have had in this court a very wide experience of the divergent views which people honestly entertain (valuators and the professional men of unquestioned integrity charged with official responsibilities in the matter of valuation for taxation purposes) as to the proper method in particular circumstances of ascertaining "actual value;" and it must be obvious to anybody who gives the matter a moment's thought that the whole subject, both in theory and in practice, is beset with difficulties. The questions, is current price an exclusive test? is a great augmentation or diminution in the number of transactions a merely temporary aberration or the result of factors likely to be permanent? and others of a like nature are questions which may well give officials trying to do their duty the most anxious concern. Everybody knows how tenaciously at the close of a period of inflation people cling to their faith in a restoration of price levels after all legitimate grounds for such faith have disappeared. The respondent's property was in a suburb of Montreal which began to receive the attention of speculators in land as early at least as 1911. Prices had risen with great rapidity and during the years in respect of which the questions agitated in this litigation arise, lands were assessed by the municipality at values based largely upon an estimate made in the years 1913 and 1914.

The evidence is that the prices fetched from time to time by sales of small areas formed a starting point from which the valuations were made. It now seems to be quite clear that everybody (the respondent and other speculators and those who purchased lots from them, as well as the officers of the municipality) was over-sanguine and held absurdly extravagant ideas as to the value of the property. But while it may very well be that, as a result of the evidence now offered, the proper conclusion is that $500 an acre was the real value of the property assessed at the rate of $6,000 an acre, it would be quite unfounded to suppose that anybody, the respondent or anybody else, had a suspicion that there was any such disparity between the real value and the assessed value. Indeed property which is now said to have been worth $500 an acre was admittedly sold in 1914 at the price of about $2,500 an acre. A circumstance to which I think weight has not been sufficiently attached in the court below is the circumstance that these valuations which are now attacked were not during all these years impeached by the ratepayers affected by them in appeal to the Circuit Court as provided by the statute. The Court of King's Bench, it may be observed, has concurred with the trial judge in setting aside the rolls in toto. They have proceeded, so the respondents argue, upon the assumption that conscious and intentional overvaluation and violation of duty governed the municipal officers in respect of all the valuations in the municipality.

No appeal has been taken against these valuations which are now attacked. No evidence was given of such appeals and I assume that the decisions of the Circuit Court are not impugned. It is not only a fair deduction, it is I think the only legitimate inference, that the views of the municipal officers as indicated by the valuation were not grossly inconsistent with the values which would have been ascribed to the properties affected by the general opinion of those most concerned, namely, the owners who by statute were made personally responsible for the payment of taxes. I do not suggest that it would be fair to infer that a particular assessment was always accepted as a perfectly just assessment but the inference is, I think, a plain one that there was no such disparity between the general opinion as to value and the assessment of the properties as in itself would justify the inference that the municipal officers were consciously departing from their duty and improperly fabricating an assessment roll with fictitious valuations for an ulterior improper purpose. I repeat, that having read with care the evidence and the reasons given by the learned judges in the court below I see no escape from the conclusion that (if the respondents rightly construe the findings of fact) the consideration which in my opinion is the predominant consideration arising from the undisputed facts of this case is one to which sufficient weight has not been attached. It might be that a case of actual fraud would afford an answer to an action for the recovery of taxes. I desire to make it quite clear that I reserve entirely any question as to the right of the respondents if such a case of actual fraud had been established. I observe only that if such a question were raised it would be necessary to consider whether, by the law of the province of Quebec, a plaintiff who had declined to avail himself of the statutory remedy by way of appeal could lie by for years while all sorts of rights were being created on the faith of the assessment roll and then demand as of right that the roll should be set aside in toto without any sort of excuse or explanation of his quiescence. For the present I give no opinion upon the point, nor upbn the question whether a finding of actual fraud such as that suggested might not afford an answer to a claim for the payment of taxes.

I am, however, unable to say that there is not evidence to support the conclusion of the learned trial judge that the assessors have not observed the principle laid down by the statute, and by that I mean this. I think there is evidence to justify the conclusion that the valuation was so excessive that if competent valuers and a competent municipal council applied their minds to the question of the actual value of the property with anything like a correct appreciation of what is implied in "actual value" they would not have made an assessment in the figures actually J. arrived at. That is a result quite consistent with the assumption of an absence of bad faith. Such being the state of the facts it is convenient first to address oneself to the question whether you have here a case of legal incompetence. The "Cities and Towns Act," secs. 5256 to 5288 includes provisions dealing with the subject of the values and assessments.

Secs. 5696, 5707 and 5708 deal with the authority of the assessor and of the counsil in relation to the valuation roll. To the assessors is committed the duty of assessing the taxable property of the municipality and to the municipality is committed the duty of hearing and deciding all complaints against valuations made by the assessors and to consider whether or not the roll should be maintained or altered, and authority to revise the same whether complained of or not. It is clearly within the authority of the assessors and the council to consider and to decide upon the valuation of property for the purposes of taxation and to record the result in the valuation roll. Now the Act by art. 5696 expressly provides that the taxable property shall be assessed "according to its real value."

It is argued that where there is a departure from this statutory mandate there is a case of want of competence, that the acts of the assessor and the council are ultra vires and ab initio null. That is a conclusion to which I cannot agree.

All through the law there runs a distinction between incompetent acts and acts which though competent are wrongful or it may be illegal. Where you have authority to do a certain class of acts coupled with a rule prescribing the manner in which the act is to be done or prohibiting the doing of it in a given way, you may always have the question whether the rule imports a limitation of authority; and whether it does or does not import a limitation of authority is a question to be decided on the construction of the instrument creating the authority viewed in light of the circumstances and the object and purpose for which the authority is given.

Now it is quite clear that this statute does not treat as a nullity (it is almost too obvious for remark) a valuation which in fact is not based upon the actual value of the property. The statute does not treat it as a nullity because the statute provides a means for complaining against such a valuation and correcting it. First, there is the right to complain before the municipal council and then from the decision of the municipal council there is a right of appeal to the Circuit Court.

If the valuation were a nullity there would be nothing upon which either appeal could operate. I think this applies whatever be the circumstances under which the irregular and wrongful valuation is made. Even if it were shewn that an assessor had overvalued property in consequence of corrupt influence I cannot doubt that it would still be open to the municipality to correct the valuation by resorting to the statutory appeal. It is not conclusive of course on the point of competency or no competency to say that such a vahiation is not a nullity because an incompetent act may be only relatively null. For the present I am concerned only in making it clear that there is no case of nullity ab initio, and that, I think, is plain. I think it is also quite clear that there, Js no case of incompetency because it was the duty of the assessor in the first place to enter the valuation in the valuation roll and in the second place it was the duty of the council to revise it; that is the very thing committed to them by statute. If in performing that duty the statutory rule were consciously disregarded. that would be an illegality of a very grave kind. If there is incompetence or negligence such that in effect the statutory mandate is disregarded there may be illegality also, but in neither of these cases is there for that reason alone incompetency in the legal sense. I can entertain no doubt that giving due weight to the provisions for correcting wrong and improper valuations it is quite impossible to hold that in any of these cases there is either legal incompetency or nullity ab initio. The point has been the subject of so much discussion that I think it worth while to refer to a single case to shew the view which heretofore has been taken upon this distinction between incompetency and illegality as these words are found embodied in Quebec legislation. In Dichdne v. City of Montrial the Privy Council had to consider a resolution of the corporation of Montreal under sec. 101 of the Montreal charter which authorized the corporation to make an annual appropriation of an amount necessary to meet the expenses of municipal administration during the current year.

The self same clause which authorized the appropriation imposed a restriction that such appropriation should never exceed an amount to be ascertained in a manner prescribed by the section. The council of the corporation made an appropriation in excess of the maximum fixed by the section. Proceedings were taken to set aside the resolution and the corporation answered that the proceedings were prescribed in three months by force of a certain statutory provision, sec. 12 of 42-43 Vict., c. 53, which gave to a sL municipal elector the right in his own name to procure a judicial annullment of municipal proceedings on the ground of illegality and imposed a prescription of three months where the proceeding was within the competence of the corporation.

It was contended among other things that the resolution in question being incompetent the prescription did hot apply. The promoters of the litigation insisted that the resolution was incompetent at least in so far as the amount of the appropriation exceeded. the statutory maximum. By both the Quebec courts and the Judicial Committee it was held that the complaint was a complaint of illegality and not of incompetence. Lord Watson said at p. 644 of the report that the resolution was plainly within their competence, seeing that it exclusively relates to matters committed to the council by statute.

In the Court of Queen's Bench Mr. Justice Blanchet, delivering the judgment of the court (1), said:- L'appelant a pr6tendu de plus, que la prescription de trois mois ne s'applique pas au cas actual parcequ'en adoptant sa rdsolution l'intim6 avait exc6d6 sa jurisdiction.

L'article suscit6 de la charte dit, en effet, que le droit de se plaindre sera prescrit par trois mois et que la resolution sera tenue pour valide pourvu qu'elle soit de la comp6tence de la corporation.

II ne faut pas confondre ici la question de pouvoir avec la question de compdtence; le conseil avait 6videmment le droit de fixer son budget, en y portant les sommes n~cessaires pour les d6penses de l'ann6e alors prochaine.

Ce sujet 6tait entibrement de sa comp6tence. De ce qu'il aurait inclus une somme qu'il n'avait pas le droit d'y mettre, il ne s'en suit pas que la resolution n'est plus de sa comp6tence. Il y a bien une ill6galit6 qui permettrait au tribunal d'intervenir et de retrancher ce qui est illtgal de ce qui est 1Igal, mais non pas de mettre de cot6 toute la resolution. Les ill6galit6s ou les irr~gularitds commises A ce sujet peuvent 6tre attaqu6es par les contribuables dans les trois mois fix6s par le statut, A I'aide d'un mode sp6cial de procddure; mais ce ddlai pass6, ces derniers sont absolument d6chus de ce. droit. La loi leur a donnd un control sommaire et efficace sur les (1) Q.R. 1 Q.B. 206 at pp. 214 and 215.

I come now to article 50 C.P.C. This article is one that confers jurisdiction, a jurisdiction which, by the terms of the article itself, is to be exercised subject to the special provisions of the law.

It does not profess to give, and it would be an unwarrantable extension of its purport to read it as giving, an unrestricted and unqualified right to any subject of the realm to require the Superior Court to review the proceedings of public and private corporations; nor can it properly be read as giving to each elector or ratepayer in a municipality without regard to the qualifications and conditions laid down by the statutes deqiling with municipal institutions the right to invoke such jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings of the municipality; and I think that where in relation to a given municipal proceeding or even a given class of municipal acts a special recourse is given to a specified class of persons as affording a remedy for error or illegality then the Superior Court, in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 50, is governed by the conditions and the qualifications attached by law to that right of recourse.

At all events I think it is quite clear that where a special remedy is given by statute if that remedy sufficiently appears, either from the express terms of the statute creating it or from the nature of the case, to be intended to be the exclusive remedy for those to whom it is given then the juris-diction of the Superior Court is limited accordingly. is not necessary, as I have already said, to consider what the remedy of the aggrieved owner may be in a case of actual fraud and I put that case aside. In all other cases whether the valuation be the result of error of judgment or of negligence or of reckless inattention or incompetence the statutory remedy is, in my judgment, the exclusive remedy unless it be, and that is the point to which I will come in a moment, that a right to impeach the assessment is given under Art. 5591 R.S.Q.

I think this follows from a consideration of the nature and objects of the procedure itself. The object is to get a valuation of the taxable property of the community for the purpose of enabling the tax rate for special taxes as well for general municipal taxes to be struck as the school rate.

Once the roll is complete, that is to say, once all appeals and complaints provided for by statute have been disposed of, the roll becomes the foundation upon which the levying and the collecting of taxes proceeds. It is also that basis which determines the limit placed by the law upon the municipal indebtedness.

Now if it be open to any owner of property who has allowed the roll to be closed without taking advantage of the statutory procedure to complain of excessive valuation it is obvious that a very wide door to uncertainty and confusion is opened up.

Cases of fraud being eliminated if an assessment is open to attack upon the ground that the assessor "has proceeded upon a wrong principle" it will in practice be a hopeless task to assign a limit to the class of cases which might be entertained by the courts. I think when the legislature provides for the making of a valuation roll and a special procedure for disposing of complaints and then makes the valuation roll the basis of taxation it is implied that all questions of valuation as such are, .92 as between the owner and the municipality, to be s considered set at rest when the express statutory * remedies made available have been exhausted. I come now to Art. 5591.

I am disposed to think than an overvaluation or an undervaluation made through sheer negligence in the sense of neglect on the part of the assessors and of the council to give any consideration to the question of actual value might not improperly be described as an instance of "illegality."

I do not think, however, that in such a case of improper valuation the remedy given by Art. 5591 is available to an aggrieved owner because his remedy is explicitly provided for by the section of the "Cities and Towns Act" already referred to and the operation of 5591 for his benefit is excluded impliedly by those provisions.

If I am wrong in this however I concur with my brother Brodeur in thinking, as I have already said, that the complaint preferred is a complaint of illegality rather than incompetency and that in so far as the respondent prefers its complaint qua ratepayer that article applies.

The conditions governing proceedings under that article would not, however, affect any right the aggrieved owner might otherwise have to resist a claim for taxes on the ground of fraud nor would non-compliance with such conditions be an answer to a proceeding by the Crown in the public interest on the same ground.

There remains the argument based upon the municipal charter, s. 28. This section deals with the subject of taxation rather than the subject of valuation. It can afford no basis for impeaching the assessment roll. Nor do I think it is a ground for impeaching the collector's roll except as an answer to a claim for taxes.

The contention now raised will -.

be open to the respondents in answer to such a claim. The appeal should be allowed and the action dismissed with costs.

J. (dissenting)-I have had the advantage of reading the carefully prepared opinions of my brothers Brodeur and Mignault. After full consideration of the record, factums and oral argument I am satisfied to accept my brother Mignault's conclusions that the valuations of properties on the impugned assessment rolls were purely fictitious and were made in utter disregard of real value.

The case presented is not one merely of excessive valuation, the result of mistake of judgment in endeavouring to exercise the powers conferred by the law. It is a case of flagrant and wilful abuse of those powers for an ulterior purpose. It is not a case of mere irregularity but one of absolute nullity ab initio, resulting from the attempt to do what the statute not only does not permit, but clearly forbids. The evidence fully warrants this view which prevailed in the Superior Court and with a majority of the judges in the Court of King's Bench.

On this aspect of the case I cannot usefully add to the opinions of my brother Mignault and of the learned Chief Justice of Quebec and Mr. Justice Martin in the Court of King's Bench.

I also accept the statement of my learned brother as to the scope and operation of Art. 50 C.C.P. Its purview and the limitations upon its application were stated by the Chief Justice of Quebec in the passages quoted by my brother from his judgment in La Tuque v. Desbiens and were briefly reiterated s by Mr. Justice Greenshields in the recent case of Neville v. School Trustees of New Glasgow (2).

I agree that the remedies afforded by Arts. 5707 Ann J. and 5715 and by Art. 5591 R.S.Q. are not, under the circumstances of the case, exhaustive, and that the right to invoke Art. 50 C.P.C. remains unaffected by the three months prescription which Art. 5634 R.S.Q. imposes. Where an assessment is void ab initio, the tribunals provided by Arts. 5707 and 5715 have no jurisdiction to deal with it.

They can neither amend nor confirm it or give it validity.

Toronto Railway Co. v. City of Toronto (3).

No doubt it is in the public interest that ratepayers should ordinarily be restricted to the method prescribed by the "Cities and Towns Act" for obtaining redress in cases of over assessment or of irregularities.

But this is not an ordinary case; it is a most extraordinary case of deliberate abuse of a statutory power amounting to a fraud 'upon such power.

The supervising control conferred by Art. 50 C.P.C. on the Superior Court is designed to provide for such cases.

I do not overlook the restrictive words "in such manner and form as by law provided," which are appended to "the superintending and reforming power, order and control of the Superior Court" conferred by Art. 50 C.P.C.

But those concluding words of the article do not import that resort to it cannot be had wherever a special means of redress of limited scope is afforded by the statute which confers the power the exercise of which the court is asked to supervise-at all events where, as here, it is established that the impugned act was beyond the sMILEL competence of the corporation.

Dich&ne v. La Citd VaN de Montreal (1).

No question of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' interest under Art. 77 C.P.C., such as was dealt with in Robertson v. City of Montreal (2), arises in this case. I cannot assent to the suggestion that in every case of ultra vires action under Art. 50 C.P.C. must be at the instance of the Attorney General. The only serious difficulty that I perceive arises from the plaintiffs' delay in seeking relief, which, it is urged, warrants an inference of acquiescence by them in the assessment of which they complain. But such an inference should not be drawn merely from failure to take advantage of the special means afforded by the "Cities and Towns Act" for obtaining relief against irregularities in the preparation of the rolls or in a case of mere overvaluation.

If it should, Art. 50 C.P.C. could never be invoked in such cases.

Apart from the failure to proceed either under Arts. 5707 and 5715 or under Art. 5591 I do not find in the record anything to sustain the plea of acquiescence.

While high assessments may have tended to improve the plaintiffs' prospects of selling their lots, there is no proof of such collusion on their part as might have amounted to a fin de non recevoir, or have precluded them from averring that the defendant had committed an abuse of its statutory power or a fraud upon it. An absolute nullity does not acquire life and vigour because it is not attacked.

Enforcement of it may be successfully resisted when the attempt to enforce it is made.

To allow mere delay without proof of collusion or acquiescence to defeat the plaintiffs' demand for action under Art. 50 C.P.C., which neither rests on equitable grounds nor involves the exercise of discretionary power, would be to introduce s a prescription for which the law does not provide. But, with respect for the contrary opinion of my learned brother Mignault, I prefer the view, which prevailed in the Court of King's Bench, that the relief to be granted the plaintiffs should not be restricted to avoidance of the assessments of their own properties. Their claim rests on nullity of the assessment roll resulting from the utter disregard of the requirement of the statute that property shall be assessed at its true value (Art. 5696), which the evidence, notably that given by the appellant's secretary-treasurer, Joseph A. Pesant, and by Frangois C. Laberge, shows prevailed generally in the preparation of it by the municipal authorities. Excessive valuation in violation of Art. 5696 renders futile the provision limiting the annual rate of taxation to 2% (Art. 5730 R.S.Q.) La Corporation Archidpiscopale Catholique Romaine de St. Boniface v. The Town of Transcona (1).

If the excess in valuation had merely affected the plaintiffs' subdivision I should have had some difficulty in holding that the case did not fall exclusively within Arts. 5707 and 5715, or within Art. 5591 R.S.Q., .and that it was not merely a case of mistaken overvaluation.

It is because gross overvaluation is shewn by the defendant's plea and by the evidence to have been systematic that a case of flaunting restrictions on a statutory power such as results in absolute nullity has been clearly established.

In such a case a plaintiff in my opinion is entitled to invoke the supervising control conferred by Art. 50 C.P.C.

As put by Lamothe C.J. in La Tuque v. Desbiens (2), "c'est l'action populaire."

The collection rolls, of course, fall with the assessment rolls. I also concur, however, in the view that as to the respondents the collection rolls are invalid because clearly in contravention of Art. 28 of the statute, 5 Geo. V., c. 109.

I would for these reasons dismiss the appeal with costs. J.-Par son action institude le 25 fivrier 1920, l'intimbe, la compagnie

Shannon Realties, .demande que les rbles d'6valuation et de perception pour les annaes 1915, 1916, 1918 et 1919 qui ont t homologu6s par le conseil municipal de la ville de St-Michel soient d6claris irriguliers, illigaux et ultra vires.

La ville de St-Michel plaide la 16galit6 de ces rbles et elle all~gue que la compagnie Shannon y a acquiesc6 et que cette action est institude trop tard.

L'action de la compagnie Shannon a 6t6 maintenue par les tribunaux inf6rieurs, les honorables juges Allard et Rivard 6tant cependant dissidents en cour d'appel. La ville de St-Michel est rigie par la loi des cites et villes (Art. 5256 et suivants, S.R.P.Q. 1909). Elle est aussi r6gie par une charte sp6ciale il est d6cr6t6 que les terres en culture seront taxdes sur la base d'un quart de la valeur port6e au r6le d'6valuation. Les 6valuateurs de la municipalit6 ont pour les annies en question pr6par6 annuellement le role d'6valuation (art. 5696 S.R.P.Q.).

Les avis requis ont

6 donn6s, mais la demanderesse n'a pas jug6 A propos de porter plainte et n'a pas non plus appel6 A la cour de circuit qui avait juridiction, suivant les dispositions des articles 5715 et suivants des statuts refondus de la province de Qu6bec, pour faire modifier l'6valuation qui frappait ses propri~ts.

Elle a laiss6 6couler plusieurs ann6es sans payer ses taxes; et maintenant, aprbs avoir t poursuivie par la Ville de St-Michel pour ses taxes, elle prend la prisente poursuite pour faire annuler tous ces rbles d'6valuation et de perception, en disant que les Broer estimateurs et le conseil municipal ont surdvalu6 les propri6t6s de la municipalit6 et que les rbles de perception n'ont pas respect6 cette disposition de sa charte qui exige que les terres en culture ne soient pas taxies pour un montant plus 6lev6 qu'un quart de leur valeur.

La question qui se pr6sente est de savoir si la compagnie demanderesse peut exercer maintenant ce droit d'action et s'il n'est pas prescrit.

Si nous consultons la loi des cit6s et villes, nous voyons que le 16gislateur a indiqu6 avec soin la marche 1 suivre pour la confection des r~les d'6valuation et pour la sauvegarde des droits des int6ress6s. Les estimateurs sont tenus de faire au temps ordonn6 par le conseil le rble d'6valuation des biens imposables (art. 5696 S.R.P.Q.).

Apris que le rble est termin6, ils le d6posent au bureau du conseil, avis public de ce depot est donn6 par le greffier dans les deux jours suivants, et les int6ress6s sont avertis que ce rble restera ouvert A leur examen durant les trente jours qui suivent celui du d4p6t (art. 5705 S.R.P.Q.). Alors si quelqu'un a A se plaindre du rble, il peut en appeler au conseil durant ces trente jours (art. 5706 S.R.P.Q.), et le- conseil, A sa premibre assembl6e g6n6rale, entend ces plaintes et les d6cide (art. 5707). Cependant les plaignants peuvent se pourvoir en appelant devant la cour de circuit contre la d6cision du conseil. Et devant la cour de circuit, la proc6dure doit 4tre faite avec la plus grande c616rit6 (art. 5715-5716-5717-5720).

Comme je 'ai d6ji dit, la demanderesse-intim6e se plaint que ses propri6tis ont it4 6valu6es A un prix trop 41ev6, et c'est le motif qui l'a incit6e A instituer sa prisente action en cour sup6rieure; et elle invoque A cette fin Particle 50 du Code de Proc6dure Civile, que les corporations sont soumises

Ce pouvoir de la cour sup6rieure n'est pas absolu, car L'article 48 du code de proc6dure nous d6clare que la cour sup6rieure

L'article 54 du code de procedure qui parle de la juridiction de la cour de circuit, nous indique certaines causes oft la cour de circuit

La juridiction de la cour sup6rieure n'est done pas absolue; d'ailleurs Particle 50 C.P.C. 6nonce formellement que ce droit de surveillance et de contr6le sur les corporations et les tribunaux inf6rieurs doit s'exercer Dans la cinquibme partie du code de procddure nous trouvons les proc6dures relatives aux corporations et aux fonctions publiques.

L'article 978 donne au procureur-g~ndral le droit de poursuivre une corporation qui viole les actes qui la r6gissent.

L'article 987 donne A toute personne int6ress6e le droit de porter plainte lorsqu'un individu exerce ill6galement une charge publique.

Les tribunaux inf6rieurs qui exc~dent leur juridiction sont soumis au bref de prohibition (art. 1003 C.P.C.).

Le chapitre 65 nous donne les moyens de se pourvoir contre la proc6dure et les jugements des tribunaux inf6rieurs et dit les cas oil le bref de certiorari Broer peut etre 6mis (art. 1292 et suivants, C.P.C.).

VoilA comment au code de proc6dure le 16gislateur a dtermin6 la juridiction de la cour sup6rieure. Nous avons cependant dans notre droit statutaire des dispositions formelles sur la juridiction des tribunaux.

Ainsi, par exemple, la loi des cit6s et villes donne en matiare d'evaluation municipale juridiction au conseil municipal et A la cour de circuit (art. 5706, 5709, 5715 S.R.P.Q.).

Cette juridiction est-elle exclusive et la cour de circuit a-t-elle le droit d'en 'connaitre en dernier ressort et privativement A la cour sup6rieure?

Cette question de la juridiction respective de la cour sup6rieure et de la cour de circuit a fait le sujet de nombreuses discussions devant nos tribunaux, surtout au sujet des municipalitbs rurales qui, comme on le sait, sont r6gies par le code municipal.

La cour de circuit avait, sous les dispositions de l'article 100 du vieux code municipal, le droit de casser tout r~glement ou toute r6solution.

Mais cet article ajoutait:

Cette derni~re disposition a donn6 lieu A une grande incertitude dans la jurisprudence.

Mais tout de mgme il ne peut pas y avoir de doute que Sous le code municipal la Cour Sup~rieure et la Cour de Revision ont juridiction sur les r6solutions du conseil municipal.

On a dans la pr6sente cause cit6 grand nombre de ces d~cisions. qui ont 6t rendues sous le code municipal.

Je crois qu'elles ne doivent pas 4tre invoqu6es, pour l'excellente raison que notre loi des cit6s et villes n'a pas la m~me disposition que celle que nous trouvons dans 'article 100 du code municipal.

Dans la cause qui nous est soumise, la compagnie Shannon avait le droit, sous les dispositions de l'acte des cit6s et villes, de porter une plainte contre le r6le d'6valuation dans les ddlais d6terminds par les statuts refondus. Elle pouvait 6galement appeler de la d6cision du conseil A la cour de circuit. Elle n'a pas jug6 A propos de le faire.

Cette juridiction qui est donn6e par le statut A la cour de circuit me parait 4tre absolue et ne peut pas faire l'objet d'un litige devant la cour sup6rieure, sous les dispositions de l'article 50 du code de proc6dure civile. Il me parait 6vident que la proc6dure qui est indiqu6e dans l'acte des cit6s et villes pour l'6valuation des propriftis et pour la contestation du rble d'6valuation demande A 8tre aussi sommaire que possible afin de ne pas paralyser le prdlivement des impots et la marche r6gulibre de 1'administration municipale.

me paralt 6vident aussi que dans le cas actuel l'acte des cit6s et villes, en donnant A la cour de circuit la juridiction qu'elle lui a donn6e quant A l'6valuation de la propri6t6, manifeste clairement 1'intention du l6gislateur d'enlever A la cour sup6rieure sa juridiction de droit commun pour la donner A la cour de circuit.

La demanderesse, la compagnie Shannon, se plaint que sa propri6t6 est surivalu6e. Elle aurait alors porter sa plainte devant le conseil municipal et ensuite en appeler A la cour de circuit.

Or n'ayant pas fait cela, elle se trouve priv6e du droit de saisir la cour supdrieure de son grief.

Il est de principe que la juridiction de la Cour Sup6rieure n'est pas enlevie par un statut, A moins d'un texte positif ou par des expressions qui manifestent clairement I'intention du l6gislateur ou par la creation d'un nouveau tribunal dont la juridiction serait incompatible avec la juridiction de droit commun. J'en suis done venu A la conclusion que la Cour Sup6rieure n'avait pas le pouvoir de rouvrir cette question d'6valuation de terrain qui 6tait du ressort exclusif de la cour de circuit.

Mais la demanderesse plaide en outre que le rble d'6valuation et le r6le de perception n'ont pas t6 faits suivant la loi et qu'alors elle a le droit de s'adresser A la cour superieure pour les faire casser.

Il est incontestable que si les r6les sont illigaux la demanderesse aurait pu demander A ce qu'ils soient cassis et qu'elle aurait pu s'adresser a la cour sup6rieure A cette fin.

L'article 5591 des statuts refondus dit: du Les articles 5623 et suivants des statuts refondus de la province de Quebec indiquent la maniare dont on peut contester ces r6glements, et 'article 5624 d6clare positivement que le droit de faire cette demande se prescrit par trois mois.

La demanderesse n'a pas jug6 A propos de se plaindre ViLE dans ce ddlai que lui indiquait le 16gislateur.

Je suis m6me port6 A croire qu'elle 6tait satisfaite que son 6valuation municipale f~t port~e A un prix aussi Brodeur J 6lev6 que possible afin de lui permettre de vendre cette propri~t6 plus cher. Mais maintenant que le "boom" qui existait dans le temps pour les immeubles a cess6, elle veut mettre de 'c6t6 les r6les d'6valuation dont elle se servait probablement dans le temps pour trouver des acheteurs A un prix trs 6lev4.

Cette question de prescription a fait l'objet d'une d6cision importante dans la cause de D6ch~ne v. La Cit de Montrial (1).

Le conseil priv6, appel6 dans cette cause A examiner la disposition de la charte de la cite de Montr6al qui d6clarait qu'un 6lecteur municipal pouvait demander l'annulation d'une appropriation pour d6pense d'argent dans les trois mois pour cause d'illigalit4 mais qu'apris ce d6lai le droit 6tait prescrit et I'appropriation 6tait valide, a jug6 that on the expiration of the three months the elector's statutory right was at an end, and could not be extended by any procedure clause (see sec. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code) which presupposed an existing right of action and regulated its exercise.

Lord Watson, en rendant le jugement, dit de ces dispositions de la loi:

They confer upon each and every municipal elector the right, which he had not at common law, to challenge on the score of illegality, any corporate appropriation of money to meet the expenses of the current year, subject to the condition that the right shall prescribe, if not exercised within three months from the time when the appropriation comes into force. They also confer upon the corporation an absolute immunity from liability to have the legality of the appropriation questioned, at the instance of any person whatsoever, after the lapse of these three months.

(1) [18941 A.C. 640.

Voice que dans la cause actuelle la loi des corporations de villes d6clare express6ment que des s r6les peuvent tre contest6s pour ill6galit6 dans les trois mois qui suivent leur mise en force.

La demanderesse a done exerc6 tardivement son action qui aurait J. tre renvoybe.

Le droit de faire une chose et 1'exercice de ce droit ne doivent pas 6tre confondus. Lorsque la loi dit qu'un droit sera perdu faute de 1'exercer dans le d6lai qu'elle fixe, elle 6tablit une d6chiance.

Dalloz, R6pertoire, verbo D61ai, no. 63. Merlin, R6pertoire, verbo Prescription, sect. 16re, par. 1, no. 3.

Cette question de prescription a donn6 lieu A une jurisprudence assez incertaine.

Ainsi en 1907 la cour de revision, compos6e des honorables juges Tellier, Hutchison et Lafontaine, a confirm6 le jugement de

'honorable juge Curran dans la cause de Emard v. Boulevard de St-Paul (1), et a d~cid6 que 'action en nullit6* ne peut 6tre intentie trente jours apris la mise en force d'une r6solution d'un conseil municipal que par un contribuable ayant un int6rit direct et sp&cial.

En 1909, dans la cause de Allard v. Ville de St- Pierre (2), quatre juges de la cour sup6rieure se sont 6galement divisbs sur cette question, la majorit6 de la cour de revision 6tant d'opinion que tout contribuable peut demander par action directe la cassation d'un riglement municipal ultra vires nonobstant le recours sp6cial par voie de requ~te pr~vu dans l'acte. Dans une cause de Aubertin v. Ville de Maisonneuve (1905) les juges se sont aussi 6galement divis6s sur la question de savoir si l'action directe pouvait s'exercer par un contribuable.

La cour d'appel a dans ces derniers temps d6cid6 que la cour sup6rieure avait juridiction dans une action pour faire d6clarer ill6gaux les r6les d'6valuation, m~me apris les ddlais, et que cette action 6chappe A la prescription de trois mois 6dict6e au sujet des requbtes en cassation pour cause d'ill6galit4.

La Compagnie d'approvisionnement d'eau v. La ville de Montmagny (1); La ville de La Tuque v. Desbiens (2); Northern Lands Co. v. La ville de St-Michel (3); Laberge v. Citd de Montr4al (4).

Cette jurisprudence rdcente de la cour d'appel me paraft contraire A la d6cision qui a t rendue dans la cause de Dichine v. Cit6 de Montr4al (5).

Il est n~cessaire, dans l'intir~t de I'administrAtion municipale, que ceux qui ont A se plaindre des decisions des conseils municipaux le fassent dans les ddlais prescrits par la loi.

Ils ne doivent pas attendre des ann6es et des annies avant de demander aux. tribunaux d'intervenir. Je considbre que l'action intentde par la demanderesse dans la pr~sente cause est tardive et que le jugement qui l'a maintenue doit 4tre renvers4 avec d6pens. J. (dissenting) .- Peu de dispositions 16gislatives sont invoqu6es plus souvent que l'article 50 du code de proc6dure civile, surtout en matibres tombant sous 'empire soit du code municipal, soit de 'acte des corporations de ville.

Dans une d6cision r6cente (La Ville de La Tuque v. Desbiens (2)), l'honorable juge-en-chef Lamothe a fait une d6claration de principes qu'il est important de citer textuellement:

Deux grands principes ont 6t affirm6s dans des decisions antirieures; ce sont les deux phares qui doivent nous guider. Quand il s'agit a d'une nullit6 absolue, on peut toujours recourir A 1article 50 C.P.C. Quand il s'agit d'ill6galitds provenant d'informalit6s, ou d'irrigu- * larit6s, il faut recourir au mode special indiqud par la loi.

Plus loin, l'honorable juge-en-chef dit:

Mignault J. Les tribunaux ont souvent annul6 des d6cisions municipales comportant une injustice criante A l'6gard d'un ou de plusieurs contribuables; le fait qu'une d6cision apparaft arbitraire, oppressive et abusive, peut porter les tribunaux A la consid6rer comme nulle ab initio. La tendance de la jurisprudence a 6t6 de consid6rer un abus criant de pouvoir comme dquivalent A un exchs de pouvoir.

Les mots ultra vires ont regu par IA une signification plus large.

L'article 50 C.P.C. est toujours le texte que Yon invoque lorsque l'on attaque de telles d6cisions.

Pour se pr6valoir de Particle 50 C.P.C., faut-il qu'un demandeur d6montre un int6r~t special, diff6rent de l'int6rat des autres contribuables?

Si la d6cision attaqude est atteinte de nullit6s absolues, le demandeur n'a pas A all6guer ni A d6montrer un intdrat spdcial. C'est l'action populaire.

Si cette d6cision est oppressive, injuste et abusive A l'6gard de quelques contribuables, il faut que ce soit l'un de ces derniers qui se plaigne.

Tout ce que je dis ci-dessus a 6t6 sanctionn6 par maints arrits. La jurisprudence 4tablie par ces arr6ts n'est plus contestable. A ne consid6rer que la jurisprudence de la cour d'appel, je crois que la d6claration de principes de l'honorable juge-en-chef r6sume fiddlement cette jurisprudence.

Je ne mentionnerai que quelques causes; on en trouvera beaucoup d'autres dans une note A l'opinion de l'honorable juge Martin dans Les Commissaires d'dcoles de St-Filicien v. Hdbert (1).

Voyez aussi; Carpentier v. La Corporation de St-Pie (2), oA on a fait la distinction entre la nullit6 relative et la nullit4 absolue des actes municipaux.

(1) Q.R. 31 K.B. 458, at p. 461.

(2) Q.R. 31 K.B. 335. Dans deux causes que l'intimbe nous cite, La Compagnie d'approvisionnement d'eau v. La ville de Mont- 'prvsonmn magny et Rivrd v. La Corporation de Wickham- (2), ii a 6t6 juge qu'un r6le d'6valuation municipal dans lequel les propridt6s imposables sont dans leur ensemble 6valudes au-dessous de leur valeur rielle, est ill6gal et nul; que le pourvoi dans ce cas est l'action en cassation et non l'appel A la cour de circuit; et que tout contribuable, A ce seul titre, a un int6rt suffisant pour intenter l'action.

Dans Laberge v. La Cit6 de Montrial (3), on a d6cid6 que la cour sup6rieure a juridiction dans une action pour faire d6clarer ill6gale l'6valuation municipale d'un immeuble par les estimateurs de la cit6 de Montrial, lorsque l'objet de l'action n'est pas seulement de faire diminuer le montant. port6 au r6le d'6valuation, mais aussi de faire d6clarer que le principe de l'6valuation elle-mi6me est errond, comme dans le cas les estimateurs municipaux ont mis de c6t6 le droit que le propri6taire avait d'avoir son immeuble 6valu6 comme terre en culture et l'ont 6valu6 comme lots A bitir.

Dans Northern Lands Co. v. Ville St-Michel (4), la cour d'appel a jug6 que le recours donn6 par la loi des cit6s et villes contre un r6le d'6valuation n'est pas limitatif et que la cour suprieure a juridiction pour annuler un r6le d'6valuation lorsque dans son ensemble il est fait sur une base ill6gale.

Enfin, dans La Corporation de St-Alexis des Monts v. McMurray (5), on a 6cart6 la prescription de trois mois (art. 433 C.M.) dans le cas d'une poursuite devant la cour sup6rieure pour faire annuler un r6glement municipal intent6e par une personne qui avait un intir~t sp6cial et direct h attaquer ce r6glement, et on s a pos6 le principe suivant que je cite du sommaire s Volih assur6ment une jurisprudence solidement assise et elle ne faisait doute A personne lorsque je pratiquais comme avocat au barreau de Montr6al. Reste A savoir si elle est conforme A la loi.

L'article 5591 des statuts refondus de Qubbec (Acte des cit6s et villes) dit que les proc6s-verbaux, r0les, r6solutions ou autres ordonnances du conseil peuvent 6tre cass6s par la cour sup~rieure, pour cause d'illfgalit6, de la meme manitre et dans le mime d6lai et avec les m~mes effets qu'un r~glement du conseil. Et Particle 5623 porte que tout 6lecteur municipal peut, par une requbte pr6sent6e en son nom A la cour sup6rieure, ou A un juge de ce tribunal, demander et obtenir,-pour cause d'illfgalit6, la cassation de tout raglement de conseil avec d6pens contre la municipalit6.

Le droit de demander cette cassation se prescrit par trois mois A compter de l'entrde en vigueur du r~glement (art. 5643).

Si nous comparons ces dispositions a celles du code municipal, nous trouvons que c'est A la cour de circuit du comt6 ou du district ou A la cour de magistrat de district qu'on demande, "pour cause d'ill6galit6," la cassation des r~glements ou autres actes municipaux (art. 430).

La poursuite pour obtenir la cassation est institude par action ordinaire, et tout 6lecteur ou tout int6ress6 est habile I l'intenter (art. 431). Le droit de poursuite se prescrit par trois mois A compter de la passation de l'acte ou de la procdure que l'on attaque pour ill6galit6 (art. 433, al. 1), et le recours SLIL" sp6cial donn6 par ces articles n'exclut pas l'action en nullit6 dans les cas ot elle peut avoir lieu en vertu de l'article 50 du code de proc6dure civile, mais les frais de l'action en nullit6 ne peuvent, en aucun cas, 4tre plus 6lev6s que ceux d'une action de quatri6me classe en cour sup6rieure (art. 433, al. 2).

La disposition du deuxiame alin6a de l'article 433, qui vient de l'article 100 de l'ancien code municipal, ne se trouve pas A l'Acte des cit6s et villes, mais la cour sup6rieure, dans le cas des cit6s et villes comme des autres municipalit~s, a toujours accueilli l'action en nulliti, en s'autorisant de l'article 50 C.P.C., sans 6gard A la prescription de trois mois, lorsqu'il s'agissait d'un acte municipal radicalement nul, ou adopt6 sans juridiction, ou constituant un abus de pouvoir ou une oppression. Et bien que l'Acte des cites et villes et le code municipal parlent de la cassation pour cause d'ill6galit6, on a entendu par des vices qui n'entrainent qu'une nullit6 relative et partant susceptibles d'6tre couverts par l'inaction pendant le d6lai.prescrit pour le recours en nullit6.

II me paraitrait impossible de condamner cette jurisprudence sans miconnattre la port~e g6ndrale et absolue de l'article 50, qui mentionne, entr'autres personnes sujettes au droit de surveillance et de contr6le de la cour sup6rieure, les corps politiques et corporations dans la province.

II est vrai que le droit de contr6le s'exerce, aux termes de cet article, "en la manibre et forme que prescrit la loi," mais cela ne veut pas dire, dans le cas des corps municipaux, qu'il n'y a d'autre recours que la requite en cassation. Ce pouvoir de contrble, je le crois, vise cependant les cas non pr6vus ou non suffisamment couverts par les dispositions spiciales que j'ai cit6es, mais s'il y a nullit6 absolue, s'il y a d6faut ou exc6s de juridiction, s'il y a abus de pouvoir ou oppression, la cour sup6rieure sera dans les limites de sa juridiction en accueillant l'action en nullit6, et lui d6nier ce droit 6quivaudrait mAms A biffer du code de procedure civile P'article 50 qui, avant ce code, et il remonte au 12 Victoria, ch. 38, art. 7 (1849), 6tait toujours regard6 comme une r~gle fondamentale de la juridiction de la cour supdrieure. Je puis ajouter que dans la cause de Dichne v. La citd de Montrial (1), bien qu'on n'ebt pas cit6 l'article 2329-S.R.Q. (1888), maintenant P'article 50 du code de proc6dure civile, le conseil priv6 a reconnu que les dispositions de la charte de Montreal permettant A un 6lecteur municipal d'attaquer, dans les trois mois, pour cause d'ill6galit6, un vote d'argent

Je n'ai pas perdu de vue la d6cision de cette cour dans Robertson v. City of Montr6al (2).

s'agissait lI d'une demande en nullit6 d'une risolution adoptde par le conseil municipal de Montreal et qui autorisait la passation d'un contrat avec une compagnie d'autobus lui conf6rant le privilge exclusif de faire circuler ses autobus dans certaines rues de la cit6.

Cette r6solution 6tait attaqu6e par un contribuable qui pr~tendait avoir le droit d'intenter l'action par le fait qu'on lui avait transport6 quelques actions dans la compagnie des tramways pour lui permettre de l'instituer, mais qui, au cours de l'instance, avait renonc6 A se pr6valoir de sa qualit6 d'actionnaire de cette compagnie. fut jug6, confirmant en cela la decision des cours provinciales, qu'en 'absence de preuve d'un int6ret sp6cial par la resolution attaqu6e, Robertson ne pouvait intenter l'action.

Dans cette cause, l'opinion a 6t exprim6e qu'un remde efficace dans un tel cas serait une poursuite prise par le procureur g6ndral en vertu de 1'article 978 du code de proc6dure civile. Je ne crois pas que cette d6cision suffise pour mettre de c0t6 la jurisprudence que j'ai cit6e. Et en supposant que I'article 978 C.P.C. autoriserait le procureur g6n6ral A poursuivre une corporation qui agirait contrairement A sa charte ou qui abuserait de ses pouvoirs corporatifs-et cet article n'a jamais, que je sache, 6t6 invoqu6 dans la pratique pour obtenir l'intervention de la cour sup6rieure dans les cas que prbvoit larticle 50-rien ne me parait empicher une personne diment int6ress6e de demander elle-m~me A la cour sup6rieure d'exercer le pouvoir de surveillance et de contrble qui lui appartient aux termes de l'article 50. Et certainement la d6cision dans Robertson v. City of Montreal (1) ne condamne pas la jurisprudence solidement 6tablie de la provinde de Qu6bec que j'ai rapport6e plus haut. J'ai cru que cet expos6 de principes serait utile pour mieux juger l'esp6ce qui nous est soumise. La demanderesse intimbe, s'autorisant de son titre de propri6taire d'immeubles dans la cit6 de St-Michel, a saisi la cour sup6rieure, en 1920, d'une action se plaignant de l'6valuation, dans le r6le d'6valuation municipal, de ses immeubles pour les ann6es 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1918 et 1919, et elle a all6gu6 de plus que cette 6valuation avait 6t6 faite contrairement A l'article 28 de la loi 5 Geo. V., ch. 109, les propri6t6s de l'intim6e 6tant des terres en culture ou afferm6es ou servant au pAturage des animaux; que dans le but de se cr6er un pouvoir d'emprunt que la loi lui diniait et de tromper les porteurs de ses obligations comme ses autres cr6anciers, I'appelante avait porte l'6valuation g~n~rale des propri6t6s dans la municipalit6 au multiple de leur valeur rdelle, contrairement A l'article .5696 9v S.R.Q., A tel point que les tribunaux avaient r6duit les 6valuations faites A $6,000.00 et $3,000.00 l'arpent A $500.00, et que la confection des r6les suivant cette m6thode 6tait un abus et un excis de pouvoir de la part de 'appelante.

L'intim6e a conclu A 'annulation des rbles d'6valuation et de perception.

L'6valuation des immeubles de la municipalit6 dans le but de faire le role d'Ovaluation rentre dans les attributions de la corporation municipale et doit se faire d'apris la valeur r6elle (art. 5696 et suiv.).

Le conseil municipal revise le rble d'6valuation et entend les plaintes des int6ress6s (art. 5707), et de sa d6cision il y a appel A la cour de circuit du comt6 ou du district ou A la cour de magistrat de district (art. 5715).

L'intimbe a pris un semblable appel contre l'6valuation de ses propri6t6s en 1917 et a r6ussi A faire r6duire cette 6valuation A $500.00 l'arpent, mais la valeur mentionn6e au rble, dans les ann6es suivantes, n'en a pas moins 6t port6e A un chiffre exc6dant de beaucoup ce montant. Il convient d'ajouter que l'intim6e s'est d6sist6e de son attaque contre les rbles d'6valuation et de perception de 1913 et 1914, pour la raison, nous a-t-on dit, que les taxes de ces ann6es 6taient prescrites.

La cour supdrieure en est venue A la conclusion quel'dvaluation des propri6t6s de l'intim6e 6tait une

6valuation fictive (fictitious valuation).; que les estimateurs avaient 6valu6 ces propri~t6s "upon a wrong principle", m6connaissant leur valeur r6elle, et avaient ainsi exc6d6 leurs pouvoirs; et que les roles d'6valuation de 1915, 1916, 1918 et 1919 avaient 6t0 faits en exchs et par abus des pouvoirs de 'appelante, et 6taient ultra vires, illigaux, nuls et non avenus.

Ce jugement a t6 confirm6 par la cour du Banc du Roi, les honorables juges Allard et Rivard 6tant sO dissidents quant A l'annulation des rbles d'6valuation, mais 6tant d'avis que le role de perception devait . etre cass6 A 1'6gard de l'intime pour cause de violation de la r6gle de l'article 28 de la loi 5 Geo. V., ch. 109. S'il est vrai que 'valuation de l'immeuble de l'intim6e est fictive, je n'aurais aucune hisitation A dire que la cour sup6rieure pouvait I'annuler. Pour d6terminer ce fait capital, j'ai lu bien attentivement toute la preuve.

Se basant sur la subdivision de cet immeuble en lots de ville, bien que sa destination agricole n'ebt pas 6t0 chang6e, les estimateurs de 'appelante, avec l'approbation du conseil qui a homologu6 le ont 6valu6 des lots de 25 pieds de front par 95 pieds de profondeur A des prix variant de $365.00 A $600.00, ce qui fait pour toute la propri~t6 une 6valuation d'environ $6,685.00 l'arpent. A part de cela, les estimateurs ont 6valu6 les rues montr6es sur le plan de subdivision A 10 cents du pied et les ruelles A 5 cents du pied. L'6valuation pour 1919 est un peu moindre, soit $347,578.00 pour toute la propri6t6, alors que dans les annies pr6c6dentes elle 6tait 6valude A $528,104 pour 1918, $523,529.00 pour 1917, $526,085.00 pour 1916 et $528,011.00 pour 1915. Cette propri6t6, lorsque la sp6culation immobilibre 6tait A sa plus forte hausse, avait 6td achetbe, avec une partie vendue depuis quelques ann6es aux commissaires d'6coles, au prix de $207,- 500.00. IL est prouv6 que depuis plusieurs ann6es on ne trouve pas d'acheteurs pour les lots de subdivision; A part la partie vendue aux commissaires d'6coles, il n'y a eu que six lots, sur neuf cents environ, qui aient 6t6 vendus A des acqu6reurs qui paient le prix d'acquisition.

Les rues et ruelles montrdes sur le plan 6taient, depuis deux ou trois ans avant I'action, cultivdes comme le restant de la terre, car le tout, l'exception de ce qui a vendu, est lou6 au fermier, S**' q un nomm6 Scott, qui l'occupe et le cultive depuis une trentaine d'ann6es, pour un loyer annuel de $225.00. Dans ces circonstances, 6valuer une terre en culture, bien qu'elle ait 6t sub-divisde au temps de la hausse sp6culative et purement fictive, A plus de $6,000.00 1'arpent, ce n'est pas faire une 6valuation rielle comme le veut 'article 5696 S.R.Q., c'est faire une 6valuation purement fictive et qui n'a aucun rapport quelconque avec la valeur r6elle.

La cour de circuit a r6duit 1'6valuation de 1917 A $500.00 l'arpent, et l'ann6e suivante, en 1918, les estimateurs et le conseil reviennent A l'6valuation fantastique de plus de $6,000.00 l'arpent. Je ne crois pas qu'il soit possible de trouver dans la jurisprudence un abus de pouvoir et une oppression aussi flagrante.

Si dans les circonstances la cour sup6rieure ne peut exercer le pouvoir de surveillance et de contrble que lui donne 'article 50 du code de proc6dure civile, il vaudrait autant, je l'ai dit, biffer cet article du code. On objecte que l'intimbe aurait pu faire en 1915, 1916, 1918 et 1919 ce qu'elle a fait en 1917, en appeler & la cour de circuit.

La preuve constate qu'il y a eu des n~gociations entre les parties pour tacher d'en arriver A une entente, mais ces n6gociations ont 6chou6.

I n'y a certainement pas eu d'acquiescement de l'intim6e. Et le recours de l'appel A la cour de circuit suppose qu'il y a eu une 6valuation serieuse, on all~gue qu'il y a eu erreur de jugement des estimateurs.

Mais si on s'est moqu6 de la loi, si, au lieu d'6valuer s6rieusement l'immeuble de l'intim6e, les estimateurs lui ont attribu6 une valeur purement fantastique et arbitraire, s'ils ont abus6 de leurs pouvoirs, je ne puis, pour ma part, laisser subsister cet abus de pouvoir et cette 6valuation fictive pour la raison qu'il n'y a pas eu d'appel A la cour de circuit. Dans de telles circonstances, c'est A la cour sup6rieure Migt J qu'il appartient de prot6ger les citoyens contre l'oppression et I'arbitraire.

Comme je l'ai dit, la jurisprudence de la province de Qu6bec depuis de nombreuses ann6es reconnatt cette juridiction A la cour supdrieure, et je crois tris respectueusement que cette jurisprudence doit 6tre accept6e par cette cour.

. D'ailleurs il y a eu violation de l'article 28 de la loi 5 Geo. V., ch. 109, dont la premier alin6a se lit comme suit:

L'immeuble en question est indubitablement une terre en culture ou servant au piturage pour les animaux, et on ne pouvait taxer les intim6s pour une valeur de plus de $150.00 l'arpent.

On dit que cela n'entrainerait la nullit6 que du r6le de perception. Pour les raisons que j'ai donn6es, je crois que le r6le d'6valuation lui-mime doit 6tre mis de ot6.

Cependant je n'annulerais ce rble qu'en tant que l'intim6e est concern~e.

Celle-ci a pris son action A titre de propriftaire d'immeubles dans la municipalit6 et son int6r~t se borne A faire r6duire l'6valuation de sa propri6td.

Elle ne me palait pas exercer l'action populaire, malgr6 ses conclusions qui d6passent son int6rit, et les autres propri6taires de la municipalit6, dont quelques-uns ont pris des appels & la cour de circuit, ne sont pas en cause et ne se plaignent pas des rbles d'6valuation.

Nous n'avons pas devant nous les r6les d'dvaluation de l'appelante, mais seulement des extraits qui concernent I'intim6e, et les J. 616ments de preuve quant aux autres 6valuations ne me paraissent pas suffisants pour annuler tout le r6le. Je modifierais done le jugement de la cour sup6rieure et je n'annulerais que l'6valuation des propri6tis de l'intim6e; et il s'ensuit que les r6les de perception qui imposent des taxes A l'intimbe bas6es sur cette 6valuation doivent 4galement 6tre annulds A 1'6gard de l'intimbe.

Ce changement est assez important pour donner k l'appelante la moiti6 de ses frais en cette cour et dans la cour du Banc du Roi. L'intim6e a droit A tous ses frais dans la cour sup6rieure. Appeal allowed with costs.