Russell v. Lefrançois

fay 2,3. PIERRE LEFRANQOIS et al...............RESPONDENTS ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

the judgment of the Supreme Council for leave to- appeal from

Court of Canada was refived. a37 1st That Russell was not of sound mind when he made this will.

2nd. That the will did not express his true intentions, . but was the result of undue influences exercised by Julie Morin, one of the respondents, who, taking advantage of the testator's mental and physical weakness and incapacity, caused this will to be made in her favor. 3rd. Because the will was made through error as to the quality of the universal legatee, Julie N1iorin, who was not the wife of IRussell but a married woman who lived with him in adultery.

4th. That the will was against good morals.

5th. That the formalities required by law had not been observed.

After the petition of the appellant to be permitted to intervene had been received, Julie Morin, the sole universal legatee named in the will, was made a party to the action, and both she and Lefrancois separately contested the intervention by a general denial of all the allegations of the appellant's petition.

A great number of witnesses were examined in the cause as to the condition of the testator's mind when he made his will, and the Superior Court came to the conclusion that the will was valid, and dismissing the petition of the appellant, it ordered the defendant Austin to render an account of his administration of the testator's estate and property. The will was as follows: " I will and direct that all my just debts be paid and satisfied as soon as possible after my decease.

" I give and bequeath unto reverend J. P. Sexton, priest of St. Roch of Quebec, to be used as he may deem fit and proper for the benefit of the poor inhabitants of the city of Quebec, the sum of two thousand dollars. " And as to the rest and residue of my said estate of which I may die possessed, I give and bequeath the same unto my beloved wife, Julie Morin, as her own absolute property.

.

" I hereby nominate and appoint Pierre Lefrancois, of Levis, culler, as executor to this my last will and testament, in whose hands I do hereby divest myself of the whole of my said property, giving him power to prolong and carry out the execution of this my said last will beyond the term allowed by law, hereby revoking all former wills and codicils at any time heretofore by me made, and declaring the present to be my only true will and testament."

The evidence is reviewed at length in the judgments hereinafter given.

The points relied on and cases cited, appear sufficiently in the judgments.

O.J.:- I have given to this case very considerable and anxious consideration, and having had an opportunity of reading the judgment of Mr. Justice Strong, with which I entirely concur, I have come to the conclusion that this appeal ought to be dismissed.

I cannot discover anything to justify this court in reversing the judgment of the Superior Court and of the Court of Queen's Bench. On the contrary, I concur with Mr. Justice Strong that, on the whole evidence taken together, the balance of that evidence is in favor of the capacity of the testator to make the will at the time and in the manner in which he did. I cannot discover from the evidence that the testator was under any delusion that could have influenced the testamentary disposition he made of his estate. by his will, nor anything to show that at the time he directed the preparation of the will, and at the time he executed it, he was incompetent to manage his own affairs, or that he didL not fully understand the character and effect of what he was doing, nor can I discover any evidence that Julie Morin exercised any undue control over him, or that he was in any way unduly influenced or intimidated; on the contrary, the evidence, I think, satisfactorily shows that the making of the will, and the disposition of his property as contained therein, were his own spontaneous acts, and I think that the strong evidence of the notaries before whom the will was executed (they performing a public duty in the preparation of wills), and the evidence of the other transactions before other notaries and with other persons with whom the testator transacted important business involving large amounts before, about the time and after the making of the will, very conclusive.

On this point the case has been so fully discussed and the evidence so thoroughly analyzed, that I have only a few words to add.

I cannot but think that the learned Chief Justice in the Appellate Court below attaches too much weight to the consideration which seems also to have impressed Chief Justice Mlieredith, viz. :- that this will was a very unjust will towards the niece.

They do not, it appears to me, give sufficient consideration to the position of Julie Morin in reference to the testator. I think there is nothing in this case which could lead the mind of any party to the conclusion that, at the time Julie llorin contracted marriage with the testator, either she or the testator had any idea that she was not in a position, free from her previous marriage engagements and in a position to enter into an honest bond fide and legitimate marriage contract with the testator. I think also they have not thoroughly appreciated the condition of the testator-that he was a man in years and afflicted with a serious cutaneous disorder of a very ag- Lan os gravated, painful character--some of the witnesses speaking of his sufferings as intense and his sores something horrible to look at--necessarily therefore requiring a great deal of care and attention at the hands of those with whom he was residing They also do not appear to have considered the fact, that when he made his marriage settlement on Julie Morin, he only provided for her receiving $400.

I think it not unreasonable to assume, in accordance with what is mentioned in several cases, that this small amount was, in all probability, fixed with a view, considering the respective ages of the parties, that the wife might be dependent upon the will he would make and not be altogether independent of her husband, with a view of securing that attention and care he so much needed.

I think also the learned Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench, for whose opinion I have the most profound respect, did not consider sufficiently the just claims of the wife, on the one hand, and on the other, that the conduct of the niece to this old man was not such as to secure a continuance of his favor, but that, on the contrary, he had ceased to retain his affection for her ; and while there is not a particle of evidence in this case to show that there was the slightest unfair control used by Julie Morin over the testator, the evidence of the parties as to the execution of the will in favor of the nie6e shows the direct opposite. The niece on that occasion was received kindly by the uncle, who evidently had, if the testimony is true, just cause of complaint against her, because she had, contrary to his commands, introduced into his house, as an associate, a person towards whom, he, rightly or wrongly, thought he had cause to entertain feelings of great hostility, and who also, no doubt, felt much annoyed at her opposition to his marriage-notwithstanding which, when she comes to him he receives her kindly, gives her $500, and then seeks that she shall become reconciled to Julie Lees. Morin, who was living with him and believed by him to be his wife.

Instead of responding to the wishes of her uncle, she, on the contrary, exhibits the greatest hostility and reluctance to any compromise or any terms of friendship with Julie Morin, and while apparently willing to make a will in her favor, he did not wish to do so without the consent of his wife.

Naturally enough, she, for whom provision had been made only to the extent of $400 by the marriage settlement, does not appear to have approved of the contemplated will, but though disapproving, she does not appear to have interposed any obstacle to the execution of the will, or attempted in any manner to control or intimidate the testator.

111iss Russell's account of what then occurred is as follows:said: Robitaille. mit that Austin that Je

Defeaunont.

After it was executed, he again tries to bring about a reconciliation between his wife and his niece, but the niece shows no disposition to conciliate the old man, but actually refuses to shake hands with Julie Morin. Miss Russell's description of the last scene of that interview is as follows:

side of Robitaille. He asked me to into the kitchen E

Robitaille Robitaille It is not wrong for a person in Julie Morin's position, by reasoning or persuasion, to obtain a will to be made in her favor, if she does not coerce the testator, she has a right to exercise legitimate influence by persuasion to induce him to make a will in her favor, though there is no evidence that such took place in this case.

And was it not more reasonable that a will should be made in her favor, than that a will should be made to cut her off with a nominal sum, she who for days, nights and years cared for him when suffering from that grievous, loathsome disease, not only painful to him, but trying and offensive to the nurse?

Can it be said that a -v ill in favor of a wife so situated was unnatural or unreasonable ? Who had the most claim on him, the niece or the wife ? If there is any balance, in my opinion, the weight is decidedly in favor of the person who believed herself, and whom he believed to be, his wife, and who appears to have faithfully discharged towards him the duties of a wife. I think, under all the circumstances, considering the way in which the will was made, not made when she was present, but made before men whose sworn duty it was not to permit the testator to execute a will if they saw the least sign of insanity or incapacity to make the will, or had any reasonable grounds for M43 supposing that such insanity or incapacity existed, and considering that, although the appellant is now setting up that the testator was incapable to make a will in favor of Julie Morin, she is contending, notwithstanding, that a few days previous he had perfect capacity to make a will and give his property to the niece, when all this evidence, on which they now seek to establish incapacity, was just as patent and known to them as it is to-day; the will may have been the result of regard for Julie Morin, or of gratitude for the care and attention bestowed on him by her, or it may have been the result of persuasion on her part, or possibly all combined; but I can discover no evidence of illegitimate influence or pressure, overpowering controlling the will of the testator, nor any kind of coercion or fraud practiced on him. On the contrary, he appears to have acted freely and independently, as his own will and pleasure dictated, and while his niece may have had strong claims on his affection and bounty, the disposition in favor of his wife to her exclusion was certainly a will in favor of one having a primary legitimate claim to his gratitude and testamentary consideration and bounty, and, as Chief Justice Meredith suggests, may be fairly attributable to the care and devotion with which it is proved she nursed, night and day, for a period of more than a year, a person sick and suffering, and whom she regarded as her husband; and such a will cannot be said to have been made to the exclusion of the natural object of the testator's bounty. I can come to no other conclusion than that, upon the whole testimony, there was evidence of a disposing papacity, and that, at any rate, there is no such overwhelming evidence of incapacity as would warrant this court, under the authorities, in reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, confirmed, as it is, by four out of the five judges of the Court of Queen's Bench.

In addition to this, I agree entirely with my brother -R u,

Strong, in his view of the law which should govern this case.

I think, also, if there was " error," it is not competent on the record in this case for this court now RitchieCJ.to reverse the judgment on that ground.

I am sorry to differ with the majority of the court, on a case of this kind, but I must conscientiously express the honest conclusion to which my mind has been brought, after a careful consideration of all the circumstances.

I do not feel it necessary, as I said before, to refer to any of the other evidence, because it has been so elaborately gone into in the courts below, especially by the learned Chief Justice of the Superior Court.

J.:- I am unable to concur in the judgment of the majority of the court. The learned and experienced judge before whom this cause was heard in the court of first instance, and in whose presence several of the witnesses were examined, found that the testator, Willian Russell, when he made the will of the 27th November,

878, which has been impugned by the appellant, was possessed of sufficient mental capacity for the performance of that act, and that the will he then made was not the result of any fraudulent practices, solicitations, or suggestions.

In the Court of Queen's Bench that judgment was affirmed by four of the five judges of whom that court was composed

The question regarding the testamentary capacity of the testator being entirely one of fact, and depending altogether on the appreciation of the evidence of witnesses whose testimony was conflicting; I am of opinion that we ought not, sitting in a second Court of Appeal, to disturb the finding of the primary court, confirmed, as it has been, by a large majority of the first Court of Appeal. In the case of Gray v. Turn. bull, (1) Lord Chelmsford most distinctly affirms this principle as one applicable to appeals to the House ofLuN9gos. Lords in cases from Scotland. He says:

If there is to be an appeal on questions of fact (and I regret that there should be such) I think this principle should be firmly adhered to, namely : that we must call on the party appealing to show us irresistibly that the opinion of the judges on the question of fact was not only wrong, but entirely erroneous.

In Ilay v Gordon (2) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recognise the same rule as applicable to that jurisdiction.

They say:

Their lord-hiis are riot unmindful that they have on more than one occasion laid it down as a general rule, subject to possible exceptions, that they should not reverse the concurrent findings of two courts on a question of fact.

In Lambkin v. S. Eastern R. Co. (3), the Judicial Committee re-affirm the same principle as follows:

With respect to the verdict being against evidence, it appears to their lordships, as indeed they have before intimated, that the question of negligence being one of fact for the jury, and the finding of the jury having been upheld, or at all events, not set aside, by two courts, it is not open under the ordinary practice to the defendants. In the case of the Picton (4), the learned Chief Justice of this court in giving judgment states the rule just adverted to with approbation, and applies it in a case not nearly so strong as the present. In that case the Chief Justice also refers to several authorities collected from English reports in admiralty and other appeals, affirming the rule in question.

Santacana Y Aloy v. Ardevol (5) ; Reid v. Steamship Co.(6) ; Penn v. Bibby (7); Ball v. Ray (8) ; The Glannibanta (9) ; Bigsby v. Dickson (10).

And in the same case the judgment of Mr. Justice Gwynne contains the following passage: (1) L. R. 2 Sc. App. 53.

(6) L. R. 2 P.

(2) L. R. 4 P. C.

(7) L. R. 2 Ch. App. 127.

(8) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 467.

(9) 1 Prob. & Adm.

(10) 4 Ch. Div. 24,

Such an interference upon a second appeal cannot be justified by any presumption that the second appellate Jcourt is in any better position to give a judgment than were the two preceding courts, for that presumption is, as regards the original court at least, entirely the other way, and therefore the policy of the law should be to discourage appeals on questions of fact, where there is anything like a balance of testimony, as useless and vexatious.

Speaking for myself, I recognise in the rule laid down in the cases referred to in the Privy Council and House of Lords, one binding upon this court, and one which I shall feel comp lied to follow, until the court of last resort adjudges otherwise. The unsatisfactory consequences which a contrary practice may lead to, are sufficiently exemplified in the result of the present appeal. The effect of the judgment now pro. nounced by this court being that this cause, the decision of which depends altogether on the credit to be accorded to one set of witnesses rather than to another, is ultimately decided for the appellant by the judgments of five judges against those of seven (including the judge who presided at the trial) whose finding is in favor of the respondent.

V hilst relying on the rule I have adverted to, I quite agree that there may be cases of gross error in drawing inferences from facts established by evidence beyond dispute, in which even second courts of appeal may be warranted in reversing, but it is only in sach a class of cases that the jurisdiction should be exercised. A case, like the present, depending entirely on the weight of evidence, when there is anything like a balance of testimony, can never be said to form an exception to the general rule, which has for its support the great weight of authority already mentioned,

Further, I am of opinion, after the most attentive consideration which I have been able to give to the facts of the case as they appear in proof, taken in con-Lrn . nection with the law, as laid down in the passages from Laurent and Demolombe referred to in the judgment of Mr. Justice Cross, and in the case of Banks v. Goodfellow in the English Court of Queen's Bench (1), that the conclusion of the learned Chief Justice of the Superior Court was entirely right, and if I were compelled to try over again the issues of fact, which he had to dispose of, I should unhesitatingly find, as he has done, that the appellant has wholly failed in establishing the testamentary incapacity of William Russell, at the time he made the impeached will of the 27th November, 1878.

But, entertaining the opinion already expressed, that we ought not to disturb the judgment of the two courts which have already dealt with the questions of facts involved in the appeal, I do not feel called upon to enter upon any analysis of the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating the correctness of these decisions, for I prefer to rest my judgment entirely upon the inadmissibility of any further controversy in this court on the question of the testator's sanity.

It is said, however, that independently of the testator's incapacity, the disposition in favor of the respondent as universal legatee is void upon the ground of error or false cause, inasmuch as the testator describes her as " Julie Morin, his dear wife," when she was in truth at that time the wife of another man. This point does not appear to have been seriously urged before the Chief Justice of the Superior Court, though it was taken in the Court of Queen's Bench, where all the learned judges, except the Chief Justice, agreed in repelling it. I am of opinion in the first place, that it is inadmissible in the present state of the pleadings.

The declaration filed by the appellant, does Lan os.not libel this as a ground for invalidating the legacy to her, neither does it take any conclusions founded upon sto J.this pretension of error or false cause, and at this stage of the action I do not think we ought to permit an amendment of the record for the purpose of raising the objection. Further, it appears to me that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench was, for the reasons stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ramsay, entirely correct. The great preponderance of authority appears to be in favor of the law as stated by Furgole (1), who founding himself upon the Digest (2), De Con. et Demonstr. " sed plerumque doli exceptio locum habebit si probetur alias legaturus non fuisse," says that when a testator gives a legacy to a legatee or institutes as heir a person whom he describes as a relation, (other than in the case of the institution of a son as heir,) it is not to be presumed that the relation or quality of the person was the final or determining cause, and that, therefore, the disposition is not to be considered as null if the person named afterwards turns out not to be related to the testator in the manner described, though it is open to the parties opposing the will or legacy to prove that the erroneous supposition of relationship was the sole determining cause, or, in the words of the text cited, " alias legaturus non fuisse." The case of the institution of a son as heir is said to stand on a different ground This distinction of the case of the son is, I apprehend, to be explained by the consideration, that the Roman Law, which was the law of the " pays de droit 6crit " with reference to which Furgole wrote, required for the tit. validity of the testament that an heir should be instituted, and further made the testament inofficious, if a son was passed over without being instituted, or in express words and for cause disinherited. It is true that Menochius, in his treatise, " de Presumptionibus," to Strong, which my brother Taschereau has referred, says presumption of error is applicable in a case exactly like the present, where the testator gives to a person described as his wife who afterwards appears not to have been his wife, but the commentators and writers both on the Roman and French law, who state the rule the other way, including Muhlenbruch Warnhoenig (2), Demolombe, Trait. des Donat. & Test. Duranton (4), and Troplong

(who all agree with lurgole), are so clear and decisive in the contrary opinion, and the reasons they give are so strong that, founded as they are on the clear words of the text in the digest, the single authority of Menochius ought not to outweigh them. These writers show that it is not to be presumed from the mere statement of the quality of the legatee that it was the sole and determining cause of the disposition, or, in the words of the law cited from the digest, that otherwise the legacy would not have been given, and further that if the quality is not to be considered as the final cause of the testator's liberality, but if that may have been influenced by personal affection or other causes the error is not to be considered fatal. They further establish that in case of doubt the presumption is to be such as will uphold the disposition ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

Troplong, particularly in his Commentary on Donations and Testaments, puts this very clearly in the folowing extracts:

No. 503:

[VOL. VIll. 3fais si la qualit6 navait pas t la soule consid6ration d6terminante, si l'affection personnelle s'6tait n160 A la lib6ralit6, on no R E pourrait plus dire qu'il y a en erreur fondamentalo dans la dispositioD.

Strong, J.

No. 384:

A[enochius semble croire qu'il suffit que la cause soit exprimbe pour qu'elle doive 6tre consid6r6e comine finale. Gette opinion est avec raison repouss6e par Furgolequi s'appuiesurles termesmamues de la loi 7280 dejA cit6e. I'ailleurs, dans le doute it faut toujours se d6cider pour la parti qui tend A faire valoir la dispos i in. Or, Ta cause impulsive est plus favorable puisque malgr6 sa fausset elle ne porte pas atteinte aux legs. II semble done que la cause doit 6tre r&put~e impulsive, & moins qu'il ne r~sulte clairement qu'elle est finale. Applying these principles of interpretation to the present case we must presume that the proposed relationship was not the sole cause which induced the testator's liberality, but that he was also influenced by his personal affection for the respondent. I come therefore on this part of the case also to the same conclusion as that arrived at by the Court of Queen's Bench. Although I admit English authorities ought not to be decisive on this head, so far as any question of law is involved (for, in that respect, it must of course depend entirely upon the rule of the French as derived from the Roman law,) yet, as it has been shown to be a question of interpretation, rather than one of law, it is not immaterial to notice that the English Court of Chancery has adjudged the question which arises here, the legacy to a person described by the testator as his wife and afterwards proved not to be his wife, in the same way as Troplong decides it, namely: that error is not to be presumed and the legacy is not vitiated by the false description of the legatee.

This was the decision of the Master of the Rolls in the case of Re Pett's Will (1); See also Schloss vs. Stiebel (2) ; Giles vs. Giles (3); Theobald on Wills (4).

27 Beav. 576.

1 Keen 685.

(2.) 9 Sim. 1.

(4.) Ed. 2, p. 214.

Further, the appellant, Elizabeth Russell, sueing as she does, not as one of the testator's co-heirs, but merely as a particular legatee under the will of the 8th Octo- L . ber, 1878, is not qualified to raise this objection. A , decision in favor of the appellant founded on this pre- Strong J. tence of error or false cause alone, of course supposes the will of the 27th November, 1878, to be in other respects a good will, for, on no principle that I can understand could it be said that the invalidity of the disposition in favor of Julie Morin, as universal legatee, contained in the will of the S7th November, on the ground of false cause or error, rendered the whole of that will null, so as to avoid the legacy to the Rev. Mr. Sexton and the clause of revocation contained in it; certainly the whole will could not for this reason be set aside in the absence of the Rev. Mr. Sexton, who is not a party to the action. And if this be so, it revokes all foimer wills, thus leaving this pretension one which can be only set up by the heirs ab intestato. Then it does not appear of what persons this class of heirs is composed, and at all events they are not all before the court as they ought to be, before we could declare the nullity of the legacy to the respondent for the cause alleged.

I am of opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

FouRNiER, J., concurred with Taschereau, J.

HENRY J. :

After a full consideration of the circumstances in evidence in this case, I have arrived at the conclusion that on two issues raised, the appellant is entitled to the judgment of the court.

I had some difficulty in arriving at that conclusion during the argument ; but, after a very careful consideration of the evidence, I think that it sustains the position, which has been Otaken by my brother Gwynne, as to the incapacity the party to make the will in favor of Julie Morin, which is set up in this action. I need not repeat what my learned brother has so well and so exhaustively stated in regard to the position of Russell at and before the time when he made the will.

Although on the occasion he appeared to the learned gentlemen in whose office the will was made, as being perfectly sound, he made a remark before he got to his own house, to a party, which would show clearly that he was not at all right in his mind. He was asked, had he made his will? He said he had. He was asked why he had made it, and he answered that, if he did not do so, his life was not safe. Here is a fact stated immediately on his making the will, which to a certain extent, goes to confirm the testimony that is given to sustain the position that when he made it he was not in his right mind, or that he was acting under coercion from fear of personal consequences. I take the same view precisely in regard to his conduct in his dealings with St. Michel that my learned brother has taken, and, taking it in all its bearings, I think that he was not, at the time making his will, in his right mind. Now, if the evidence ended here, we might possibly entertain some doubt, but when in a very short time afterwards, we find that, on the application of Julie Morin, he was himself taken up as a lunatic and confined as such, we can easily trace back from that circumstance to the transactions whieb he was concerned in previously, and come to the conclusion that, at the time he made the will, he was not in his right mind. It is a principle in the law of evidence, that, if it is once shown that a party is not in his right mind, in reference to a future transaction, the onus is thrown upon the party who wants to sustain the validity of that transaction to show L . that, although not at one time in his right mind, he had recovered and was compos mentis. Now, the evidence J. on behalf of Julie B1lirin, not only does not show this, but shows the very opposite. I need not repeat what has been so well said in regard to the evidence which has been given on this point.

In reference to the other point, viz. : admitting Russell was in his right mind when he made the will, is that will binding, and did it convey to Julie Morin the property which she claims under it? It appears to me, from a reference to the authorities, both those that are binding in Quebec and those that have been considered binding in France, and even going back to the Roman authorities, that a legacy made to a. party whom the testator considered to be his wife at the time, but who was not, is not valid in law. We are not called upon to decide this case upon any principles of English law, but according to the law in force in Quebec; and I have arrived at the conclusion that, according to that law, even if the testator were in his sound mind when made his will, and bequeathed a legacy to one whom he honestly believed to be his wife at the time, but who was not, such legacy is void.

For these reasons, I think the appeal should be allowed, and that the judgment of this court ought to be in favor of the appellant.

There are'equities in the case in favor of Julie Morin, and a great deal might be said why it would be desirable that our decision should be otherwise, but we are not entitled to take them into consideration, if we come to the conclusion that the law prevents our consideration of them.

L'action en cette cause fut institu6e par l'intimbe Franfois, en sa qualit6 d'ex6cuteur du testament du dbfunt William Russell, en date du 27 Nov. 1878, r~clamant la succession du dit Russell contre Inry Charles Austin, curateur A la personne et aux biens du dit Russell qui avait 6t0 interdit pour insanit6 d'esprit. Aprbs le retour de cette action en Cour, la pr6sente appelante obtint la permission d'intervenir pour contester la validit6 du dit testament, et mit en cause par son action Julie Morin, une des intimbes, qui 6tait institube 16gataire universelle par ce testament.

Le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure rejeta la contestation de la prbsente appelante et d6clara le dit testament bon et valide.

Ce jugemient fut confirm6 par la Cour du Bano de la Reine.

Le Juge en Chef, Sir A. A. Dorion, diffrant.

Les raisons invoqu6es devant nous, contre ce testament et le legs universel fait A Julie Morin par icelui sont virtuellement r~duites a deux, savoir: 10 L'insanit6 d'esprit du testateur; 20 L'erreur du testateur quant A Julie Morin, Russell la croyant, lors de la confection de ce testament, son 6pouse 16gitime, tandis qu'en fait elle nel'6tait pas, le premier mari de la dite Julie Moi in 6tant alors encore vivant.

Le legs universel fait par ce testament du 27 Novembre 1878, (et le testament lui-m6me peut-6tre) sont-ils nuls par erreur ? C'est-A-dire Russell a-t-il test6 en faveur de Julie Morin parce-qu'il la croyait sa femme'?

A-t-il test6 en faveur de madame Russell son 6pouse, on bien en faveur de madame Robitaille ? A-t-il sciemment donn6 ses biens A ]a femme de Robilaille, commune en biens avec son mari, c'esta-dire, a-t-il voulu donner ses biens i Robitaille ? Efit-il, lui, Russell, test6 en faveur de cette femme, si Robitaille, son mari, fut survenu le 27 Novembre au matin ? Ou, en d'autres mots, quand Ru-sell dit dans son testament: " Je donne A mon 6pouse bien aim6e, Julie Morin " doit-on voir IA appos~e A sa lib6ralit6 la condition que cette

Julie Morin est vraiment 8on 6pouse ? Peut-on dire que si cette Julie M1lorin n'6tait pas alors et n'a jamais k6 son 6pouse 16gitime, Russell aurait ainsi test6 en sa faveur ? II me semble que ces questions doivent se r~soudre en faveur de l'appelante. Sans doute comme le disent Furgole et Demolonbe, sur 1'erreur comme cause de nullit6 des testaments, on ne peut 8tre trop prudent et trop r6serv6 pour 1'admission de cette cause de nullit6, et il faut d6montrer que le disposant n'aurait pas fait la lib6ralit6 s'il n'eftt pas t dans cette erreur.

Mais, ici, il me-semble qu'il ressort de toute la cause, et du testament lui-mbme, que Russell ii'a fait cette lib6ralitC A Julie Morin qu'uniquement parce qu'il la croyait sa femme. Et le fait que lui et elle 6taient, lors de la date du testament, de bonne foi, ne me parait ici d'aucune cons~quence.

La question do fait h 6tablir par l'appelante est 1'erreur de Russell sur la qualit6 de Julie Morin, et qu'il a fait ce testament parce qu'il la croyait sa femme.

Le fait que Julie Morin 6tait alors aussi dans l'erreur, ne pout affecter la cause sons notre droit civil, les autorit6s sont unanimes A enseigner que, si, on fait, il est tabli que le testateur n'a 16gu6 A une personne qu'en consid6ration d'une qualit6 qu'il lui supposait, qu'il apparaisse que le testateur 6tait dans 1'erreur quant & cette qualit6 de la personne en faveur de qui il a test6, la disposition est nulle (1).

Dans Merlin (2), la doctrine sur la matibre est clairement r6sum~e comme suit.

Apres avoir 6tabli, qu'en g6n6ral, un legs, accompagn6 d'une fausse d6monstration du lkgataire, n'est pas 2, 4.

3'55 SUPREME COURf OP CAlADA.

[VOL. VIII. rendu nul A cause de cette fausse d6monstration, 1'article RUSSEU, ajoute

La fausso d6monstration pourrait cependant emporter la nullit6 du legs, si elle avait sa source dans une erreur du testateur, et Taseereaue'il existait de fortes raisons de croire que celui-ci aurait dispos6 autrement dans le oas ou i eit6t6 mieux instruit. Par exemple que Titius, dans la fausse opinion que Mdvius est son fils, lui fasse un legs conqu en cette forme: "Je donne et 1gie telle chose A Mvius "mon cher fils ;" il est certain que le 16gatairene pourrarion pr6tendre, parceque le testateur n'a t6 port6 I disposer en sa faveur, que par la persuasion que o'6tait son fils, et que cette qualit6 n'existe pas. C'est la d6cision expresse de la loi 5, C. de testamentis, et de la loi, 4 C. De Aceridibus instituendis. La loi 7 de ce dernier titre dispose de mme par rapport & celui qui a institu6 conmme sin frare une personne qui ne 1'4tait point; et, ce qu'il y a de remarquable, elle prouve que l'erreur de droit vicie, aussi bien que la simple erreure de fait, le legs dans lequel elle a caus6 une fausse d6monstration de personne.

Pour concilier ces textes avec ceux qu'on a pr~c6demment cit6s, il faut, dit Voet, distinguer le cas oh le testateur a appeler son fils ou son frbre, un 16gataire qu'il savait bien n'6tre point tel, et qu'il aimait n~anmoins comme s'il eit t r6ellement, d'avec celui oil, tromp6 par de fausses apparences, il a gratifi6 comme son fils ou son frdre, une personne qui n'avait point cette qualit6 et qu'il aurait pass6 sous silence s'il avait qu'elle lui tait trangre. C'est au premier cas qu'il faut appliquer les loi 58 § 1, de Heredibus instituendis, et 33 D. De conditionibuts et demonstrationi'us; et c'est au second qne s'adaptent les lois 5 C. de testanentis, 4 et 5, 1 C, de Heredibus instituendis.

Furgole des Testaments (1) ; Troplong (2).

II me semble clair que d'apres cette autorit6, le testament de Russell en faveur de Julie lorin ne peut tre maintenu.

Si la disposition d'un testateur qui, tromp6 par de fausses apparences, donne A quelqu'un, le croyant son fils on son frbre, uniquement parcequ'il le croyait son fils on son frare, est nulle et sans effet, pourquoi la disposition de Russell en faveur de Julie Morin ne serait-elle pas aussi nulle et sans effet ? Pent-on douter, en face des termes de ce testament et des faits de la (1) Ch. 5, sect. 4, 7 et 15.

cause, que c'est ' sa femme, et a sa femme seulement que Russell entendait 16guer, et que s'il est que Julie lorin 6tait la femme de Robitaille et non la sienne, non-seulement il ne lui aurait jamais fait cette disposition le 27 nov. 1878, mais 1'aurait chass6e de chez lui et n'aurait plus voulu la voir.

Mr. Sexton n'aurait pas voulu lui administrer les sacrements, eut-il su que Robitaille 6tait vivant, avant que cette femme eut t6 6conduite de la maison. Une autorit6 dans le m~me sens se trouve dans 1Monivalon, Trait6 des successions

L'auteur y cite un arr~t de 1727, un legs, conu en ces termes: " Je lgue A "Frangois Benoit, mon petit neven et filleul " fut d6clar6 nul, il apparaissant que le testateur s'6tait tromp6 en croyant que Franpois Benoit 6tait son filleul. La d6monstration de filleul fut pr6sumbe la cause finale du legs.

Et Menochius dit que, si la cause finale d'un legs, celle en consid6ration de laquelle il est fait, se trouve tre fausse ou ne pas exister, on ne peut douter que la disposition tombe. Menochius, de Presumpt. (2). plus loin il ajoute, qu'une cause finale d'un legs est quand le testateur 1'a fait A cause de la parent6 ou de l'affinit6 du lgataire avec lui; et que s'il est d~couvert que cette cause est fausse et n'existe pas, le legs tombe. Ainsi, si quelqu'un, croyant un tel son fils on son frare, on son neveu, l'iustitue son 16gataire, et qu'il se d6couvre que le testateur 6tait dans 1'erreur, et que le 16gataire n'est pas ou son fils, on son frere, on son neveu, la disposition tombe.

A la premiere page, au par. 8., Menochius cite, en 1'approuvant, le passage suivant de Balde, qui est d~une application remarquable A la pr6sente cause.

" Quod si testator legavit uxori, vel eam instiluit, credens esse legitimam uxorem, si apparet deinde matrimnonium nullun, ler dispositio corruit ; nam prcesumitur quod si scivisset ean non fuisse uxorem legitimam, non ita legasset, vel heeredem fecisset."

'est bien le cas actuel, le cas entre Russell et Taschcreau'Julie Morin. lui a 16gu6, ]a croyant sa femme l6gitime " cre lens esse legitimam uxorem."

Il 6tait dans 1'erreur, et elle n'6tait pas sa femme, le legs qu'il lui a fait est donc nul, car il est pr~sum6, et c'est d'aprbs Menochius et les autres auteurs cites, une pr~somption qui ressort des mots "Je 1gue A mon 6pouse bien-aim6e" qu'il ne lui aurait pas 16gu6, s'il e-ht si qu'elle n'6tait pas vraiment son 6pouse. I ressort d'ailleurs ici, non-seulement des termes du testament lui-m6me, mais aussi de toute la preuve dans la cause, que c'est A sa femme 16gitime que Russell entendait 16guer.

Un article de Claude Henrys, avec des observations par Bretonnier, adopte enti6rement cette doctrine (1). Comme exemple, l'auteur dit que l'institution oi\ le legs fait par le testateur A un 6tranger qu'il croyait 6tre son frbre n'est pas valable, quand 'erreur est d6couverte, comme le dit Godefroi: " institutus ul frater a fratre errante, recti non est inltitutus."

Et Duranton dit (2) :

Les lois 4 C. de Hered. Inst. et 5 C De Testamentis, nous offrent des exemples de ces cas le legs est nul, et Icur d6cisioa serait incontestablement applicable dans notre droit.

Dans ce sens, un arrit do 1812, dans la succession Pitiof, cit6 A Dalloz (3), a jug6 quo le testateur, Iisp. qui a institu6 pour son h~ritier un enfant aprbs l'avoir 16galement reconnu, est cens6 n'avoir agi ainsi que parce qu'il croyait que c'6tait son enfant naturel, et que, par suite, I'institution n'est pas valable s'il est reconnu que 1'institu6 n'est pas 1'enfant e a naturel du testateur.

" Mais," dit 1'intimse, "suivant Particle 18 C C, ie mariage, quoique nul, produit les effets civils, s'il a 6t contract6 de bonne foi, et, en cons6quence, j'ai droit an legs h moi fait par le testament de Russell." C'est il me somble, une erreur grave. Sont-ce les effets civils de son mariage dont il s'agit ici ? Le testament de Russell est-il un des effets civils de son mariage? Indubitablement non. Or, ce sont seulement les effets civils du mariage, cest-A-dire, ceux que lui donne son contrat de mariage, on en l'absence da contrat de mariage, ceux que lui donne la loi, ceux en considration desquels le mariago putatif a 6t6 contract6, qui sont donn6s A la femme putative par P'article du Code. Toullier du mariage (1); Boileux (2); Pothier (3); .Marcadd (4).

Mais ici, son mariage n'est pas son titre, son contrat -de mariage n'est pas on question. Ce tesiament, Russell pouvait le r~voquer, s'il n'eut pas perdu la raison, quand il lui aurait plu de ce faire, et ceci, que Julie Morin on lui fussent de bonne foi on non sur leur mariage. s'il 1'ent r6voqu6, Julie Morin pourrait-elle dire " Je r6clame ce legs, Russell n'avait pas le droit de le rVoquer parce que c'est un des effets civils de monjmariage putatif avec lui ? "

Je vois que Brelonnier (5), adoplant l'opinion d'un commentateur du nom de Mlantica, est de 1'avis que la femme putative-, a, dans ce cas, droit au legs A elle fait Comunaut6, par son mari, quoique celui-ci l'ait fait par erreur. Mais je ne puis en venir A cette conclusion.

Pour moi, il me semble clair, qu'6tant 6tabli en fait, que Russell n'aurait pas 16gu6 ! Julie Morin s'il etit sfi ja

'qu'elle 6tait la femme d'un autre, en droit la disposition ainsi faite par erreur tombe, et doit etre traitae comme non avenue.

On pourrait peut-8tre remarquer dans le cas actuel que, comme par 'article 838 0. C., la capacit6 de recevoir par. testament se considbre au temps du d606s du testateur, Russell ayant 16gu6 A sa femme, et Julie Morin n '6tant pas sa femme, m~me putative, loraque lui, Russ. est mort, ce legs pour cette autre raison est nul. Si Julie Morin efit cess6 d'Atre sa femme par sa mort naturelle, arriv6e avant celle de Russell, le legs serait indubitablement nul. Art. 900 C. C. Elle a cess6 d'6tre sa femme mime putative et de bonne foi, par le retour de son premier mari, avant la mort de Russell. Sur le mime principe, le legs A elle fait par Russell est nul. La dissolution du mariage putatif a eu lieu lors du retour du v6ritable mari de Julie Morin

Lorsque Russell est mort, elle n'6tait done pas m~me sa femme putative.

Mais il n'est pas n~cessaire dans cette cause de considrer la question sous ce rapport; ce legs serait nul quand bien m~me Robitaille ne fit revenu ou d6couvert qu'aprbs la mort deRussell. Ce legs, je le r6phte, ne peut pas tre un des droits civils resultants A Julie Morin de son mariage, un droit acquis par son mariage, puisqu'il ne s'ouvre et n'est un droit qu'apras la dissolution de son mariage.

Les droits r6sultants du mariage sont cr66s par le mariage meme, quoiqu'ils ne s'exercent qu'A sa dissolution.

Celui-ci a-t-il 6t6 cr6 par le mariage, lors du mariage?

Indubitablement, non.

Comment pout-on I'appeler un droit civil du mariage, s'il n'a pas 6t cr66 lors du mariage, s'il n'a pas 6t6 co-existant avec le mariage, s'il n'a d&pendu, durant le mariage, que de la volont6 de Russell seul.

Si Russell eft dit tout simplement: " Je 1gue A ma veuve," Julie Morin eftt-elle jamais pu se pr6tendre 16gataire en vertu de ces mots ? . ' Voir Morin vs. La Corp. des Piloles (1).

O s'il edt seulement dit : " Je 16gue A ma femme " sans la nommer, Julie Morin efit-elle pu r~clamer le legs ?

Je ne fais pas allusion au fait que le mariage putatif de Russell avec l'intime n'a pas t6 d6clar6 nul par une cour de justice, parce que cette objection n'a pas t6 souleve par l'intimbe en cette cause. Elle n'aurait d'ailleurs pu 1'tre. Mr. le Juge Casaull a d&montr6 clairement, dans la cause de la pr6sente intim6e contre la Corporation des Pilotes ci-dessus cithe, pourquoi elle ne peut invoquer un tel moyen, et ce qu'en dit le Juge Casault s'applique entibrement h la pr6sente cause, oi dbs avant la mort de Russell, et ce A la poursuite de l'intimbe elle-m6me, la preuve de la constatation judiciaire de 1'existence de son mari a t aussi prodnite. D'ailleurs, c'est encore comme 6pouse de ce mime Robitaille qu'elle est en cause et qu'elle se d6fend ici; et elle-meme, dans cette instance traite son mariage avec Russell comme nul, et n'ayant jamais exist6.

L'intim6e a soulev6 devant nous 1'objection que toutes les parties int~ress~es ne sont pas en cause. Cette objection vient trop tard. Comme le dit le juge Loranger, dans la cause de Guyon dit LeMoine contre Lyonais (2): mettre Et cette objection doit Stre prise in linine. Aprbs avoir lutt6 contre l'appelante seule pendant deux Lg.

StJPREME COURT OF CANADA.

[VOL. VIII. ans, devant deux cours, l'intim6e a mauvaise grAce A vouloir aujourd'hui empicher cette cour de juger le fond de la contestatiun entre elle et 1'appelante, sur une objection technique de cette nature. Elle a bien voulu T h engager cette contestation avec l'appelante seule, elle ne peut maintenant se plaindre de l'absence des autres parties int6ress~es. Il est sans doute regrettable que, dans une affaire de cette nature surtout, on n'ait pas vu A faire une cause telle que tout litige ult6rieur sur ce testament fut impossible.

6tait, il me semble, du devoir de l'ex~cuteur testamentaire de ce faire, et de voir A ce que toutes les parties int6ress6es fussent en cause. Faute par lui de ce faire, l'intim6e pouvait elle-mime les y appeler.

Enfin la cour de premibre instance aurait peut-6tre dix elle-m8me 1'ordonner.

Nous avons cependant A prendre la cause telle qu'elle nous est soumise, et telle qu'elle a t6 devant les deux cours inf6rieures.

Les parties souffriraient une criante injustice si nous refusions maintenant d'adjuger sur le litige pour un tel motif. Dans la cause de Richer v. Yoyer (1), le Conseil Priv6 disait sur une objection semblable prise devant lui:

Ici, il n'est pas absolument n~cessaire que toutes les parties int6ress6es A cette succession soient pr6sentes pour que nous d6cidions de la contestation que le demandeur, l'intervenante et la d6fenderesse Morin, ont bien voulu lier ensemble en l'absence des autres.

Notre jugement ne pourra, il est vrai, affecter'en loi ceux qui ne sont pas en cause; mais il est A esp6rer, cependant, qu'il mettra virtuellement fin A toute contestation sur ce testament.

L'objection a 6t6 prise de la part de 1'intim6e que, si le legs A Julie Morin est d6clar6 caduc, la r6vocation du testament du 8 octobre, fait par le testament du 27 novembre, n'en subsiste pas moins, et qu'alors 1'intervenante appelante, Elizabeth Russell, n'a pas de locus standi dans cette cause, parce qu'elle ne repose, dans son intervention, ses droits A la succession de Russell que sur le testament du 8 octobre.

Ceci est encore une objection que cette cour ie peut que voir que d'un mauvais ceil A cet 6tage de la cause.

serait bien malhemreux qu'aprbs une contestation si longue et si coitense, le litige entre les parties fit tout A recommencer par suite d'une objection de cette nature prise au dernier moment par Julie Morin. Dans la Cour du Banc de la Iteine, on semble avoir cru, qu'en fait, c'6tait et A titre d'h~ritibre et A titre de l6gataire, que l'intervenante demandait la nullit6 du testament du 27 novembre.

Ceci a 6 ni6 devant nous par 1'intimbe, et, en r6f6rant A 1'intervention et A ]a d6claration de 1'appelante, il me parait de fait incorrect.

Ce n'est qu'A titre de 16gataire, par le testament du 8 octobre, que l'appelante est en cause.

Si n~cessaire, il faudrait done lui donner le droit d'amender son intervention et sa d6claration contre Julie Morin, de manibre A la mettre dans la cause comme h6ritibre en loi de Russell. On bien encore, il serait possible pour elle de pr6tendre que 1'erreur de Russell quant A Julie Morin rend le testament du 27 novembre nul en son entier, et que Russell n'a r6voqu6 son testament du 27 novembre, quo parce qu'il croyait que cette Julie Morin 6tait son 6pouse 16gitime.

Voir Demolombe

Cependant, comme j'en suis venu A la conclusion que ce testament du 27 novembre est aussi nul sur 1'autre chef, c'est-Adire pour cause d'insanit6 du testateur, je ne crois pas n6cessaire de chercher A pr6voir quelles seraient les cons6quences dans l'hypothbse ori il serait conclu que le legs A Julie Morin est nul, mais non lea autres parties de ce testament du 27 novembre.

Une autre objection soulev6e par l'intimbe est que I'appelante dans son intervention, ses moyens d'intervention on sa d6claration, n'a pas all&gu6 l'erreur de Russeli sur la qualit6 de l'intimbe comme sa femme, et n'en a pas faite dans ces documents un de ses griefs contre le testament du 27 novembre 1878.

Cette objection ne peut pr6valoir ici.

Devant la Cour Sup6rieure, (c'est l'intimbe elle-mime qui nous le dit,) 1'appelante a invoqu6 ce moyen d'erreur.

Pintimbe Ist ..................

......

Julie II appert aussi, par les notes du savant Juge en chef

Meredith, que ce moyen de nullit6 contre le testament a Rt pris devant lui, et il prononce sur ce moyen. Devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine, le factum de l'appelante, page 107 du dossier ici, invoque aussi clairement ce moyen.

Le factum de 1'intim6e, devant la m8me cour, r6pond i ce moyen, sans objecter qu'il n'est pas invoqu6 dans les documents 6crits. La majorit6 des juges de la Cour du Bane de la Reine donnent aussi leur jugement sur ce moyen d'erreur. y a plus: ici meme, devant cette cour, l'intimbe, dans son factum, le traite comme un des points dans la cause, et le discute sans aucune objection a son admissibilit6. Il n'y a qu'A 1'audition finale que l'intimse a la mauvaise foi de soulever l'objection que ce moyen n'est pas invo. qu6 par l'appelante dans son intervention et sa d6claration.

Si cette objection eut 6t6 prise devant le juge en chef Meredith, 1'appelante aurait certainement obtenu VOL. VIll.] SUPREME COURT OF CAINADA.

la permission d'amender son intervention et sa d6claration de manibre A couvrir ce point. Et en vertu du statut qui r6git cette cour en pareille matibre, nous devons ordonner maintenant an amendement dans ce sens, et traiter la cause comme si tel amendement 6tait fait. L'intim6e ne pent avoir ici une cause diffrente de cello qu'elle a eue devant les autres cours. Elle a obtenu un jugement sur ce chef d'erreur des deux cours provinciales, elle ne pent s'objecter A ce que cette cour aussi prononce sur ce chef. Ce serait encourager la mauvaise foi dans les prochs que de permettre A une partie de surprendre son adversaire de cette manibre.

n'est pas question, je l'ai d~ji remarqu&, de la bonne foi ou de Russell ou de 1'intim6e sur leur mariage. Que Russell fut de bonne foi, c'est clair, qu'il fut dans l'erreur, est aussi clair.

Maintenant, si 1'intim6e eut t6 de mauvaise foi, si elle euit su que son premier mari 6tait vivant, il n'y aurait plus lieu A contestation sur ce chef: elle n'aurait droit ni aux droits civils resultant de son mariage, ni a un testament qui alors aurait 6t obtenu par fraude. Mais je la traite comme si elle avait 6pous6 Russell, croyant vraiment que son premier mari 6tait mort; et, je dis que m~me, sur ces circonstances, le testament de Russell est nul, parce qu'il ne 'a fait que parce qu'il eroyait que 1'intim6e 6tait son 6pouse. Je traite ce testament comme s'il eut dit: "Je 14gue AL Julie Morin, parce qu'elle est mon 6pouse 16gitime, on si elle est mon Apouse-l6gitime." Or, il appert que Julie Morin n'6tait pas son 6pouse 16gitime.

Le fait qu'elle croyait l'8tre ne pett affecter le r6sultat de la cause. Je le r6p6te, c'est parce que Russell 6tait dans 1'erreur, et ne lai aurait pas l6gu6 s'il n'eut 6 dans l'erreur que l'appelante d'it r6ussir, et le fait que Julie Morin 6tait aussi dans 1'erreur n'affecte pas cette cause.

Si d'un autre c6t,

Russell Iui, n'eut pas 6th dans 1'erreur, s'il efit s que Robitaille vivait, il n'y aurait non plus lieu A litige. il aurait bien eu droit de l6guer A Madame Robitaille et de l'appeler sa femme, quoiqu'il sikt qu'elle ne 1'6tait pas, et personne ne pourrait s'en plaindre.

Je passe maintenant A la question de 1'insanit6 du testateur, invoqu~e par l'appelante contre la validit6 du testament en litige.

A la page 641 du dossier, je remarque que 1'un des savants juges de la Cour du Banc de la Reine dit sur cette question d'insanit6:

Et cite, A 1'appui de cette proposition, deux arr6ts de la cour de Cassation, ofi il a 6t6 d6cid6 qu'en France un arret qui d6cide, en fait, qu'un testateur 6tait, ou n'6tait pas, sain d'esprit lors de la confection de son testament, ne donne pas ouverture A cassation. Je crois que c'est une erreur de comparer dans cette cause la juridiction et les devoirs de la Cour du Banc de la Reine et ceux de cette cour A ceux de la Cour de Cassation, pour la simple raison, qu'en France la Cour de Cassation n'est pas une cour d'appel sur le fait, mais bien seulement sur le droit, tandis qu'ici, et A la Cour du Bane de la Reine et A cette cour, appel est donn6, et sur le fait et sur le droit.

Sans doute, et c'est j'en suis certain, ce que le savant juge de la Cour du Banc de la Reine, dont j'ai cit6 les paroles, a voulu dire:

but

Mais ce dictum, et autres du m~me genre, ife veulent Tarnbull

VOL VIII.] SUPREME COURT OF 0,AlA)A.

pas dire que, sur une question de fait, une cour d'appel, devra toujours suivre l'opinion du tribunal de premiere instance.

La loi e-ht t6 absurde, si tout en donnant ** droit d'appeler du jugement du tribunal de premiere instance sur une question de fait, elle eut dit ou suppo aschereau, que la Cour d'Appel, sur toute question d.e fait, W'en rapportera a la d6cision du juge a quo. Aussi, le Conseil Priv6 disait dans une cause de Canepa v. Larios (1): The judicial committee is not bound by the decision of the court below upon a question of evidence, although in general it will follow Et dans " The Glannibanta (2)," la Cour d'Appel disait:

That the parties were entitled to have the decision of the Court of Appeal, on questions of fact as well as on questions of law, and that the court could not excuse itself from the task of weighing conflicting evidence and drawing its own inferences and conclusions. Though it should always bear in mind that it has not heard nor seen the witnesses, for which due allowance should be made. The court added that, as a rule, a court of appeal will be disinclined to interfere, when the judge hearing the witnesses has come to his decision upon the credibility of witnesses as evinced by their demeanor, but otherwise, in cases where it depends upon the drawing of inferences from the facts in evidence.

Et dans Bigsby v. Dickinson (3), la cour d&cide que: Although the Court of Appeal, when called on to review the conclusion of a judge of first instance after hearing witnesses vivd voce, will give great weight to the consideration that the demeanor and manner of the witnesses are material elements in judging of the credi. bility of the witnesses, yet, it will in a proper case act upon its own view of conflicting evidence.

Pans cette derni~re cause James, L. J., disait: Of course, if we are to accept as final the decision of the court of first instance in every case where there is a conflict of evidence, our labours would be very much lightened, but then that would be doing away with the right of appeal in all cases of nuisance for there never is one brought into court in which there is not contradictory evidence.

Et Bramwell, L. J., ajoutait:

The legislature has contemplated and made provision fbr our V* reversing a judgment of a Vice-Chancellor where the burden of proof has been held by him not to have been sustained by the plain tiff and Taschereau, where he has had the living witnesses and we have not. If we.were ..

to be deterred by such considerations as those which have been presented to usrfrom reversing a decision from. which we dissent, it would have been better to say at once that, in such cases, there shall be no appeal.

Et dans Jones vs. Hough (1),

Bramwell et Cotton L. JJ. disaient:

First, I desire to say a word as to our jurisdiction. If, upon the materials before the learned judge, he has, in giving judgment, come to an erroneous conclusion upon certain questions of fact, and we see that the conclusions are erroneous, we must come to a different conclusion, and act upon the conclusion that we come to and not accept his finding.

I have not the slightest doubt such is our power and duty. A great difference exists between a finding by the judge and a finding by the jury. Where the jury find the facts, the court cannot be substituted for them, because the parties have agreed that the facts shall be decided by a jury i but where the judge finds the facts, there the Court of Appeal has the same jurisdiction that he has, and can find the facts which ever way they like.

I have no doubt, therefore, that it is our jurisdiction, our power and our duty: and if, upon these materials,judgment ought to be given in any particular way different from that in which Lindley, J., has given it, we ought to give that judgment.

Dans la pr~sente cause, aucun des t6moins de Pappelante n'a 6t6 entendu devant le savant juge qui a rendu le jugement en cour de premibre instance, et il lui a fallu former son opinion, comme nous avons A le faire, sur la simple lecture des d6positions de ces t6moins. Sous ces circonstances surtout, cette cour si6geant ici en appel de ce jugement, serait, il me semble, oublieuse de ses devoirs, si elle n6gligeait de former son opinion sur les faits de la cause d'aprbs la preuve qui se trouve au dossier.

Car, il ne s'agit pas ici de la cr6dibilit6 on non cr6dibilit6 des t6moins, (1) 6 Ex. Div. 122.

mais seulement d'une inf6rence de fait des faits prouv6s, c'est-A-dire que, sur cette issue, la question A r6soudre est : Faut-il inf6rer des faits prouv6S le fait que Russell n'6tait pas compos menlis lorsqu'il a fait le testament attaqu6.

Nous ne devons pas manquer de T J. prendre en consideration, sans doute, que, sur cette question, 1'intim6e a, en sa faveur, 1'opinion du savant Juge en Chef de la Cour Sup6rieure et de quatre des savants Juges de la Cour du Banc de la Reine. Nous ne pouvons oublier, non plus, qu'il ne suffit pas A l'appelante de cr6er des doutes dans notre esprit, mais qu'il lui faut nous convaincre qu'il y a erreur dans le jugement dont elle se plaint.

Mais il n'est pas moins certain, que si, d'aprbs nos propres lumibres, et d'aprbs l'examen de la preuve produite, nous en venons A la conclusion qu'il y a erreur, l'appelante a droit A un jugement en sa faveur de notre part. Le fait que deux tribunaux ont dbjA d6cid6 contre elle ne peut nous exempter de la responsabilit6 de d6cider d'aprAs notre propre jugement.

La loi nous en impose le devoir, en d60r6tant que, sur une question de fait, il y aura appel A la Cour Supr6me des jugements de ces deux tribunaux, m~me lorsque tous deux ils en seront venus A la m~me conclusion.

E1le nous ordonne de rendre ici, sur cette question de fait, le jugement que, dans notre opinion, form6e d'aprbs la preuve produite par les parties, la Cour du Banc de la Reine aurait dd rendre, quand bien mme 1'on trouverait dans la cause contre l'appelante le jugement du juge de premi&re instance. Sur cette question de 1'insanit6 du testateur, lors de la confection du testament en litige, je me contenterai d'adopter en son entier le raisonnement du savant Juge en Chef de la Cour du Banc de la Reine

L'exposh des faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ressortent de la preuve, et des principes de droit qui r6gissent la matiere, est donn6 si compl6tement par le savant Juge que ce que je pourrais en dire ne serait qu'une r~p6tition oiseuse. Je n'ai donc que quelques remarques A faire sur cette partie de la cause.

Juge en Chef Meredith dit en terminant L. savant Jg nCe eeihdte emnn son jugement :

that Robitaille that that Robitaille the If Robilaille attempt that part part there L'intimbe, en faveur de qui le savant juge a rendu sonjugement quoique avec tant de regret et d'h6sitation, ne peut plus invoquer ce jugement pour se donner un caractbre de droiture et d'honnftet6, et sur l'autorit6 du savant juge, " Her adversaries are able to say that they formed a truer estimate of her character than he, the learned Judge, did."

L'intimbe a voulu soutenir devant nous, pour affaiblir le t6moignage d'Ellen Russell, que quand ce t6moin jure que Russell et l'intim6e ont v6cu en concubinage avant son mariage putatif elle a jur6 ce qui est faux et n'est pas corrobor6.

Pour ma part je crois que ce que le t6moin a dit 1A-dessus est parfaitement vrai.

Il est de principe que si quelqu'un, int6ress6 A contredire un fait prouv6 dans la cause par son adversaire, n6glige d'amener un t6moin qui a n6cessairement une connaissance personnelle de ce fait s'il existe, il admet que ce t6moin prouvera aussi ce fait, tel que son adversaire 'a prouv6, surtout quand ce t6moin est son ami on lui est favorablement dispos6.

Ici le demandeur sur 1'issue entre lui et I'appelante pouvait amener Julie Morin comme t6moin, et l'examiner sur le fait jur6 par EllenLEFR VOIS. Russell. Si Julie Morin etit pu jurer qu'elle n'avait pas vecu en concubinage avec Russ. Lefranpois 1'aurait

J., entendue comme t6moin. C'est parce qu'clle se sentait coupable qu'elle n'a pas 6t amen6e. L'intimbe a voulu aussi diminuer la force du t6moignage d'Ellen Russell en essayant A d6montrer qu'elle 6tait contredite sur plusieurs points par Mr. Sexton.

A la simple lecture du t6moignage de M. Sexton 1'on voit que ce t6moin a si peu de m6moire, tout respectable que soit son caractare, que son t6moignage ne pent 6tre d'aucun poids dans la cause. Il suffit de remarquer qu'il ne se rap.

pelle pas A qui il a donn6 le certificat qui se trouve annex6 au testament du 27 Novembre, et qu'il jtire, A un endroit, qu'il

6tait au confessional dans la sacristie quand on 1'a appel6 pour lui demander ce certificat, et qu'en un autre endroit, il jure qu'il 6tait en haut, c'est-A-dire, chez lui, dans le presbytbre, puisqu'il dit :

Puis, la raison qu'il donne pour jurer que ce n'est pas A 1'intimbe A qui il a donn6 ce certificat pent bien tre appel6e pour le moins extraordinaire.

Question.-Is Robitaille that it

Answer.-No.

Question.-Will that

Answer.-I it it?

Answer.-Yes.

Dans tout son t6moignage, cc t6moin no pent que r&pondre " Je ne me rappelle pas."

Tant qu'au t6moin St. Michel, l'on comprend quel intrit ii a, pour sa propre reputation, A ce que Russell soit pas dit avoir t6 fou avant d6cembre 1878. Cet int6r~t perce dans tout son t6moignage, et le frappe J.

d'incr6dibilit6.

I me parait impossible de mettre de c6te le t6moignage du IDr. Russell, le Juge en Chef Dorion me semble l'avoir d6montr6 clairement, et ce t6moignage, 6tant admis, la cause est claire et l'insanit6 de Rossell, et avant et aprbs et le jour m6me de la confection de ce testament, est entibrement 6tablie.

C'6tait d'ailleurs clairement aux intimbs A prouver que Russell 6tait compos mentis le jour en question. Qu'il ait 6t6 fou auparavant, qu'il ait t6 fou peu de temps apris, ne laisse pas de doute.

Or, sous ces circonstances, il doit tre pr6sum6 avoir t fou ce jour-lA jusqu'A preuve du contraire.

La ragle en pareil cas, en Angleterre comme pour nous, est que:

If it at Telle est aussi la rbgle du droit frangais: "Toutefois si le demandeur prouvait que soit avant, et surtout peu de temps avant la disposition, soit apris, et surtout peu de temps aprds, le disposant n'6tait pas sain d'esprit; notre avis est quel'espace interm6diaire s'y trouverait compris; car enfin, on ne doit pas non plus exiger 1'impossible, et la v6rit6 est qu'il kerait souvent impossible au demandeur de prouver 1'insanit6 d'esprit du disposant au moment pr6cis et rigoureux, oix i1 a fait la disposition." Et dans ce cas c'est au d6fendeur qni soutient la validit6 de la disposition qu'il incombe de prouver qu'elle a t6 faite par le disposant dans un intervalle lucide. Demnolombe (2), et autorit6s y cit6es. Non-seulement les intim6s n'ont pas, tel que le d6montre le Juge en Chef Dorion, prouv6 que Russell fut compos mentis le jour de la confection du testament en question, mais I'appelante a 6tabli positivement qu'il 6tait n -n conpos Th mentis ce jour-14.

street Or, ce. sont hi pr6cis6ment les sympt6mes qui d'aprbs la preuve existaient en grande partie chez Russell d~s avant le 27 novembre prec6dent l'interdiction. semble d'ailleurs qu'un homme qui se prombne dans les rues avec un certificat dans ses poches qn'il n'est pas fou, ou qui a recours i un tel certificat pour faire ses transactions, tel que Russell a fait le 27 novembre mme, est un fou. Je n'ai rencontr6 que dans une visite A un asile d'ali6n6s, quelqu'un qui m'ait offert un tel certificat. C'6tait A Brattleboro, d'un interne qui me suppliait de le faire mettre en libert6, et appuyant sa supplique d'une douzaine de certificats qu'il n'6tait pas fou.

Comme le juge Dorion le remarque, un fou peut bien faire un acte de sagesse, et peut bien dissimuler son insanit6. Le fait que les notaires ne se sont pas apergus que Russell 6tait fou lors de la confection du testament en question n'a pas l'importance que l'intimbe voudrait nous y faire voir.

" Les notaires n'ont pas requ de la loi l'attribution, le pouvoir, de constater la sanit6 d'esprit du disposant " Suffit-il done, pour tre sage," disait d'Ag uesseau "d'avoir fait un acte de sagesse."

L'intimbe irait jusqu'A dire que parce qu'un homme met son chapeau sortir dans la rue, il u'est pas fou.

Quand au testament du 27 novembre, comme le Juge Tase Chef Dorion, et le Juge en Chef Meredith, lui-m~me l'ont d6montr6, loin d'Atre un acte de sagesse, c'est un acte d'inique cruaut6 envers Ellen Russell; c'est un acte si contraire aux intentions si souvent exprim6es de Russell qu'on ne peut 'expliquer que comme il 1'a expliqu6 lui-mime au t6moin Brown, quand il dit : "I could not help it, because I was frightened she was going to poison me."

" Ceci 'est pas vrai," dit I'intim6e, " et il u'est nullement prouv6 que j'ai jamais fait aucune menace a Russell pour en obtenir ce testament." Sans doute il n'y a rien de tel prouv6, mais le fait que Russell le croyait, le fait que ce pauvre homme avait dans 1'esprit que sa femme voulait 1'empoisonner, quand absolument rien n'6tait intervenu pour lui mettre une telle chose dans l'id6e, ne d6montre-t-il pas qu'il 6tait fou hallucin6, " non compos mentis." Et ce t6moin Broton, un pilote comme Russell, un de ses amis, un homme qui le connaissait parfaitement bien, est un des t6moins les plus respectables entendus dans la cause, un tbmoin d6sint6ress6, qui lui n'a pas, comme St. Michel, profit6 de la faiblesse d'esprit de Russell pour s'enrichir. Tout ce que ce t6moin jure je le crois entibrement. J'en dis autant du docteur Russell. Leurs t6moignages sont intelligents, clair6s, d6sint6ress6s, vraisemblables, et d'ailleurs parfaitement corrobor6s. Une autre remarque, Brown jure que Russell a appel6 1'intimbe: " a damned prostitute," et ceci le 27 novembre meme.

Russell (tait alois sobre et ne buvait pas depuis longtemps. L'intim~e peut-elle nier que pas autre chose que l1'hallucination et la folie ont pu faire dire une telle chose a Russell ?

me parait futile d'essayer .1 faire croire que c'est parce que la conduite d'Ellen Russell avec Gilchen lui avait d6plu qu'il l'a d6sh6rit6e, puisque longtemps apr~s les faits qui auraient pu lui d6plaire, savoir le 8 octobre 1878, il a test6 en sa faveur.

Ceci dmontre -schereau, qu'il lui avait bien pardonn6 ce qu'elle pouvait avoir J. fait pour lui d6plaire.

Les t6moignages des Lefranpois ne peuvent peser dans la balance.

11s se sont ligues contre 1'appelante en faveur de cette Julie Morin. Le pbre n'a de fait pris la pr~sente action que pour Julie Morin et dans son int6ret. L'intim6e a cit6 l'article 335 du Code Civil et pr6tend que ce testament ne peut tre annul6 parce que l'insanit6 de Russell n'existait pas notoirement lorsqu'il a fait ce testament. Ceci est une erreur. Cet article ne s'applique pas au testament n'y a aucun doute 1A-dessus. En consquence je suis d'avis, avec la majorit6 de cette cour d'infirmer le jugement dont est appel. L'action de Lefranpois sera d6bout6e, et celle 'Elizabeth Russell contre Julie Morin maintenue. Quant aux frais, Julie Morin devra tre condamn6e A payer A Elizabeth Russell, ceux faits sur les issues entre elles: comme de raison, ceux de Julie Morin elle-m me restent A sa charge. Quant A ceux d'Elizabeth Russell contre Lefranpois, ce dernier n'y peut tre condamn6 qu'en sa qualit6 d'ex6cuteur testamentaire, et comme il serait inutile de prononcer une telle condamnation en cette qualit6, puisqu'il n'a pas et n'aura pas les biens de la succession Russell entre ses mains, c'est contre Austin, Ps qual., que la condamnation A ces frais doit avoir lieu en faveur d'Elizabeth Russell.

Ceux faits par Lefranpois liiim6me, et de son ct6, devront aussi tre pris sur la succession, et nous avons cru devoir aussi entrer une condamnation contre Austin, es qual. pour iceux : il sera par condamn6 A les payer A Lefranpois on A ses sib procureurs.

Les frais d'appel, et dans la Cour du Bane de la Reine et ici, doivent tre consid6rbs comme faits moiti6 par Julie Morin et moiti6 par Lefrangois, et aussi comme faits par Elizabeth Russell, moiti6 contre Taschereau lie Morin, et moiti6 contre Lefrangois.

Nous avons accord6 la distraction des frais demand~e en Cour Supbrieure suivant Morency et Fournier (1). GWYNNE, J. :- To the judgment of my brother Taschereau, which I have had the opportunity of carefully considering, and in which I entirely concur, and to the admirable analysis of the evidence, and to the application of the law to that evidence, appearing in the very able and exhaustive judgment of the learned Chief Justice, Sir A. A. D.urion, I find it to be impossible for me to add anything. desire, however, in connection with some observations appearing in the judgment of one of the learned judges of the Court of Queen's Bench in appeal, to say: that in my judgment this is a case in which there can be no doubt that it is not only competent for us, but that it is a duty imposed upon us to form and express our own independent judgment upon the questions of fact involved and upon the evidence given in relation to those facts; and if that evidence leads our minds to a different conclusion from that arrived at by the learned Chief Justice of the Superior Court, it is our duty to give full expression to our opinion.

This is not a case which, in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the Superior Court, who rendered the original judgment in the case, turned upon the credibility of any of the witnesses;.indeed all of the witnesses were not examined before him. The case before him turned, and still turns, upon a question as to the proper inference to be drawn from all the evidence, as to the mental Q.

capacity of the testator to make the will of the 27th March, 1878, which is impeached. In such a case, to hold that we should be concluded by the judgment of o0. the learned Chief Justice of the court of first instance, or by the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in appeal, affirming his judgment, would be in effect to declare that in such a case there is no appeal.

So to hold would have relieved us from much labor and anxiety in this case, but would deprive the parties of a right which the law confers upon them. The fact, that a majority of the learned judges constituting the Court of Appeal, in the province of Quebec has affirmed the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the Superior Court, only enhances the gravity of the duty imposed upon us to take care not lightly to reverse those judgments, nor without a thorough conviction in our own minds that they are erroneous.

Fully sensible of the great gravity of the duty thus imposed upon me, I am bound to say that the evidence which has been so exhaustively analysed by the learned Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench in Appeal, has convinced my mind that, at the time of the execution by the testator of the will of the 27th November, 1878, he had not that sound and disposing mind and understanding which are necessary to make a good will and valid in law; indeed, I am convinced that his mental incapacity dates back to a period anterior to the transaction between the testator and St. Michel of the 2nd October previous, but as there is no issue before us, in this case, as to the validity of the wills of October, 1878, and as judgment against the validity of the will of November cannot set up, as valid, any previous will, it will be only necessary for us to treat here of the will of the 27th November, but in so doing we cannot lay out of our consideration evidence of the acts and conduct of the testator evincing the state of his mind in the month of October. If the testimony of Dr. Russell, the only medical man who has been examined upon the subject -for his father only speaks of a much later period-be at all reliable, there seems to me to be no doubt of the testator's incompetency at the time of the execution by him of the impeached will. The learned Chief Justice Meredith, in him, does not treat the certificate given by Dr. Russell, on 11th November, for the purpose of giving effect to the St. Michel transaction, as detracting from Dr. Russell's credibility upon the ground of its being inconsistent with his oral evidence as to the testator's mental incapacity to make the impeached will; he rather, as it seems to me, accepts the doctor's explanation of the circumstances attending his giving that certificate and the object of giving it, and proceeds to refer to various business matters transacted by the testator during the month of November and to the impressions as to his capacity formed in the minds of divers persons during that month, and especially in the minds of the notaries who drew and attested the execution of the impeached will for the purpose, as it seems to me, of justifying the conclusion which the learned Chief Justice arrived at, that at the time of the execution of that will upon the 27th November, the testator had a sufficiently sound and disposing mind. The learned Chief Justice, after referring to the certificate and to the Doctor's explanation of the circumstances under which it was given, says:

at The learned Chief Justice then proceeds to draw attention to the other matters which led his mind to YOt. VIII.] SUPREME COURT OF CANADA.

the conclusion, that on the 27th November, the testator was of a sound and disposing mind, but he admits that, notwithstanding this being his opinion, the case is still L . not free from difficulty.

Some of the Judges constituting the majority of the Court of Queen's Bench in Appeal, seem to have wholly set aside Dr. Russell's oral evidence, treating it as so contradicted by his certificate as to be wholly unworthy of belief. Mr. Justice Ramsay, upon this head, says:

From this remark of that learned Judge I conclude that he enteitained the opinion, which I confess I entertain myself, that unless the testimony of Dr. Russell be wholly set aside and eliminated from the case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the validity the will.

Before wholly eliminating from the case the only medical evidence given upon a subject, which is peculiarly within the range of the studies of the medical profession, we should be well satisfied of the necessity of shutting our eyes to evidence coming from a quarter from which we should naturally expect most light: while we must admit that as a point of casuistry the doctrine that the end justifies the means is unsound, and while viewing the question in that light, as a matter of conscience, it may appear to us, that it would have been better if the doctor had not given this certificate, even though his withholding it might, under the circumstances, have hopelessly embarrassed the case beyond all possibility of being rectified, and might have so affected the weak mind of his patient as to have aggravated his disease and have precipitated his death, still before we wholly reject the oral testimony of the doctor, as so incredibly inconsistent with the certificate, and so contradicted by it, as to make him unworthy of belief, we should put ourselves in his and, judging the matter from his point of view, enquire whether the rejection of all the doctor's evid- ence as to the testator's mental incapacity is in reality the reasonable and logical sequence of his having given the certificate.

Upon the threshold of this enquiry, we find the doctor's reason, for interfering at all in the St. Michel transaction was his confirmed belief in the mental incapacity of his patient, and in the fact that such incapacity had been taken advantage of by St. Michel. The doctor gives his reasons for his belief in the then mental incapacity of his patient Russell, and these reasons are confirmed by very many other persons intimate acquaintances of Russ'll, of whom St. Michel himself is one.

Thoroughly convinced in his own mind that advantage had been taken of his patient's mental incapacity, the doctor spoke freely upon the subject among Russell's friends and acquaintances, saying:

The rumor of the transaction, and of the doctor's observation upon it, having got abroad, brought St. Michel to him, and to an enquiry by St. Michel whether he considered Russell to be in a fit state to transact business, the doctor replied: "No, that house is not yours."

Thereupon St. Michel said that he had paid upwards of $1,000.00 on the building of the house, that it was worth about $1,100.00, and he added,

In reply to this proposition the doctor assented to give the certificate, upon condition that Mr. Austin, Russell's own notary, should be employed, because the doctor knew that Russell's interest would be safe in his hands. He felt, no doubt, that Austin would not assent to the transaction being confirmed, unless the amount to be paid by St. Michel should be the fair value of theGwynne, J. property. The doctor accordingly went to Russell and told him of St. Michel's offer, and that he would give $400.00 to Russell, if he, the doctor, would give the required certificate.

Russell, as the doctor says, was very anxious to get the $400, and that the doctor should give the certificate, and he seemed then clearly enough to understand the particular matter so explained to him, by his medical adviser, although for the transaction of business generally, the doctor says, he was not at all sane, and could be easily led in any direction.

The papers to give effect to the St. Michel transaction having been prepared by M. Austin, and the $400 paid by St. Michel, the doctor, for the sole purpose of enabling that particular transaction to be perfected, gavethe certificate.

I confess that it appears to me rather singular that a man, so perfectly sane, as to be fit to transact any business, should be exceedingly anxious to get the doctor's certificate of his being sane, in order to get a particular transaction completed, which transaction consisted in the enforced rectification in the interest of Russell, brought about by the doctor, of a contract of sale, a few days previously entered into by Russell, whose mental capacity was not then sufficient to enable him to look after and protect his own interests. Now, from this evidence, which we must look at for the purpose of seeing under what circumstances the certificate was given, it is apparent to my mind, that notwithstanding what is contained in it, the doctor was well satisfled that his patient's mind was very seriously diseased, and that he was quite incompetent for the management of his affairs generally, and that he gave the certificate for the special purpose of enabling a transaction to be LF consummated so as to secure to Russell the full value of the property in question, and which could not have J. been consummated without the certificate, and which, if not consummated, would have been attended with very great pecuniary loss to St. Michel, and might have involved Russell in a litigation which in his then state of health, might have been disastrous.

These then being the circumstances attending the giving the certificate, although in the minds of casuists, and when examined into, in foro conscientice, the doctor's conduct may be open to censure, I find it impossible to hold, as a legal proposition, that certificate asked for because of a pretty generally prevailing belief in Russell's mental incapacity, and because of his doctor's remonstrances, that such his mental incapacity had been taken advantage of by St. Michel, and given to prevent St. Michel incurring the risk of losing the $1,000 already paid by him to the builder, or some portion thereof, and the costs of a possibly protracted litigation, and given, too, upon the express promise and condition that he should pay to Russett, the further sum of $400, which, with the $1,000 was considered the fair value of the property, should be taken as conclusive evidence the then perfect mental capacity of the person whose alleged mental incapacity and the wrongful advantage taken of such incapacity constituted the moving causes for giving the certificate, and that we. should therefore reject all the evidence given by the medical man who gave that certificate having a tendency to establish the mental incapacity of Russell to make the will which is impeached, made a fortnight subsequently to the day upon which the certificate was given.

The doctor in his evidence proceeds to say, that immediately after the day on which the certificate was given Russell got worse daily, and that on the 27 th November he was quite incompetent to make a will, that R uSSELL he continued growing worse, until early in January fol- . lowing he was interdicted and confined in an asylum as insane, the evidence of the doctor himself, that the 3wynne, J. symptoms of his insanity dated back three months, having been used by Julie Morin (the party maintaining the will of the 27th November) for the purpose of procuring the interdiction.

It is not, however, upon the evidence of the doctor alone, that my judgment is based.

The evidence given by him, confirmed by numerous witnesses, relates to acts and conduct of the testator, betraying unmistakable symptoms of an enfeebled mind, such acts and conduct being identical with those which, in works treating of general paralysis of the insane, are declared to be invariable and unmistakable symptoms of the presence of a mental disease which in comparatively modern times has been termed and known as paresis, a disease which in its early stages may easily escape the observation of non-professional men, and even of professional men, who have not had much experience of it, and which, although for short periods, and for isolated matters, the patient suffering under it may be able to apply some trifling degree of mental faculty, nevertheless, so enfeebles the mind as to deprive it of that comprehensive grasp of subjects, that power of concentration and of continuous thought, the power of comparing, compounding and uniting the severAl parts of any subject under consideration, in short of that integrity of the mental faculties which is essentially necessary for the conduct of the general business of life, and more especially for the sane execution of that last great act of life, the disposition of property by will.

The evidence in the case does not appear to have been given with the view of determining, with scien- [VOL. VIIf. tific accuracy, what is the particular medical term for the mental disease under which Russell was suffering -its symptoms singularly correspond with those laid down as unerring symptoms of paresis, but whatever J. may be the appropriate scientific name of the disease, the evidence leaves no doubt upon my mind, that from at least the period of the St. Michel transaction, the mental capacity of Russell was so enfeebled as to render him quite incapable of managing his affairs, as a sane man, and of making the will which is impeached. The evidence relating to matters transacted by Russell, during the month of November, has no effect upon my mind, some of those transactions are quite consistent with the existence of that feeble condition of mind to which the doctor and oth-er witnesses bear testimony, while as to the moneys relied upon as received by him during the month, we know nothing of their disposition.

I am more impressed with the significance attaching to the giving to Russell of Mr. Sexton's certificate by the person who obtained it from him. That it was obtained for the purpose of being delivered to Russell to be used in the precise manner in which it was used, we can, I think, have little doubt, and such use of it appears to me rather to indicate the act of a person under an influence which his feeble mind feared to thwart or resist, than of a person in the full possession and enjoyment of his mental faculties unimpaired. Appeal allowed with costs out of Estate.