demeure-Arts. C. C. 1,022, 1,067, 1,478, 1,536, 1,537, 1,538, 1,550. On the 7th December, 1874, T. G. by a promise of sale, agreed to sell a farm to D. M., then a minor, for $1,200-of which $500 were paid at the time, balance payable in seven yearly instalments of $100 each with interest at 7 per cent.
. fails, neglects, or refuses to make such payments when they come due, then said D. A. will forfeit all right he has by these presents to obtain a deed of sale of said herein mentioned farm, and he will moreover forfeit all monies already paid, and which hereafter may be paid, which said monies'will be considered as rent of said farm, and these presents will then be considered as null and void, and the parties will be considered as lessor and lessee."
After D.
. became of age he left the country without ratifying the promise of sale, he paid none of the instalments which became due, and in 1879 T. G. regained possession of the farm. In October, 1880, D.
. returned and tendered the balance of the price, and claimed the farm.
Teld,-Reversing the judgment of the court below (Strong and Taschereau, JJ., dissenting,) that the condition precedent on which the promise of sale was made not having been complied with within the time specified in the contract, the contract and the law placed the plaintiff en demeure, and there was no neces, sity for any demand, the necessity for a demand being inconsistent with the terms of the contract, which immediately on the failure of the performance of the condition ipso facto changed the relation of the parties from vendor and vendee to lessor and lessee.
PREsENT-Sir William J. Ritchie, Knt., C.J., and Strong, Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gywnne, JJ.
Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) confirming the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the respondent.
This action was to compel the appellant to grani io the respondent a deed of sale of a farm situate in the parish of St. Theodore, in compliance with a promise of sale made before Legris, a notary public, on the 7th December, 1874.
The appellant pleaded, that the respondent had not fulfilled the conditions of the promise of sale which had thereby become inoperative.
The Superior Court however, maintained the action and condemned the appellant to give to the respondent a deed of sale in due form and to deliver over to him the property claimed, and this judgment was affirmed with costs by the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (appeal side). The appeal is from this latter judgment.
The circumstances which have given rise to the suit are as follows:
By a deed passed before Legris, a notary public, on the 7th December, 1874, the appellant promised to sell the farm in question in this cause to the respondent, then a minor, but assisted by Roderick McLennan, his father, who promised to have the transaction ratified by his son, when he should have attained the full age of twenty-one years.
This promise of sale was made for the sum of $1,200, of which $500 were paid at the time, and as to the balance of $700, the respondent promised to pay it to the appellant in seven yearly consecutive payments of $100 each, the first of which would fall due on the first day of October, 1875, with interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, to reckon from the first day October, 1874.
The deed contains the following provision, which has given rise to the present litigation:
It is eppecially covenanted ,and -,agreed upon between the said parties hereto, that if the said.Duncan McLennan makes regularly the said payments of one hundred dollars said currency, when they will fal due respectively, together with the interest, till the full payment of said sum of seven hundred dollars, then and in that case the said Thomas Grange wil be bound, as he doth hereby bind himself, to give the said Duncan McLennan a free and clear deed of sale of said farm; but on the contrary, if the said Duncan McLennan fails, neglects or refuses to make the said payments when they come due, then the said Duncan McLennan wil forfeit all right he has by these presents, to obtain a deed of sale of said herein mentioned farm, and he will moreover forfeit all monies already paid and which might hereafter be paid, which said monies will be considered as rent of said farm, and these presents will then be considered as null and void, and the partieshereto will be considered as lessor and lessee.
At the date of this promise of sale, Roderick McLennan was living on the farm with the respondent and the other members of his family. The respondent became of age in the month of January, 1875, and continued to live on the farm with his father for about a year after he had become of age. He then left to reside in the United States, and has not come to Lower Canada since, except once, on a visit of three or four days, in the fall of 1880.
The respondent never ratified the promise of sale, as he was bound to do, on his coming of age, and neither he, nor his father Roderick McLennan, has paid to the appellant any portion of the principal and interest accrued on the balance of $700 due on the price stipulated in the said promise of sale. The appellant has moreover been obliged to pay the municipal and school taxes and the seigniorial charges due on said property. After waiting for several years without receiving either principal or interest, the appellant sought to get back the possession of his property, and on the 6th day [VOL. lX. of May, 1879, Robert McLennan, who was still in possession of it, and who, it seems, had furnished the $500 which had been paid to the appellant, when the promise of sale was passed, consented to resiliate the same and to give up to the appellant possession of the farm, 6h condition that he should be allowed to occupy the house till the 1st of November following (1879). A deed was passed to that effect.
Subsequently, Robert McLennan refused to give up the possession of the house, and the appellant obtained a judgment of ouster, and finally recovered the possession of the house also.
It was not till the 23rd of October, 1880, after the appellant had been in possession of the farm for nearly eighteen months, and of the house for about a year, that a tender was made to him in the name of the respondent of the sum of $997.31 as the balance in principal and interest of the price stipulated in the promise of sale of the 7th of December, 1874.
This tender was made through a notary, and was accompanied by a demand on the appellant to grant to the respondent a deed of sale in the terms of the promise of sale.
The appellant having refused to comply with this request, the respondent brought this action whereby he renewed his tender and claimed that the appellant be ordered to give a regular deed of sale of the property in. question, and to deliver him the possession of the same. Mr. Doutre, Q.C., and Mr. Joseph, for appellant, and Mr. Laflamme, Q. and Mr. Cross, for respondent. The points and authorities relied on by counsel are reviewed in the judgments hereinafter given.
RITCHIE, C. J.:
I think that article 1478 which says that " A promise of sale with tradition and actual possession is equivalent to sale," means that where there is a contract of sale and tradition is made, and actual possession given " with a view of there and then consummating such sale by such tradition and actual possession, such a contract of sale and such tradition is equivalent to a sale, but not as in Noel v. Laverdure where the contract provided that the tradition and actual possession should not be equivalent to the sale, or as'in this case where such an operation would be inconsistent with the stipulations of the contract of sale, or as likewise in this case where a fair construction of the contract of sale leads to the irresistible inference that it was not the intention of the parties that actual possession should be equivalent to a sale, in other words does not apply to such a case as this where the terms of the contract of sale show clearly that it was not the intention of the parties that the sale should be brought to a completion or considered a complete sale. The tradition and actual possession in like manner as the contract of sale was, in my opinion, to be subject to the condition that if the payments were not made, and conditions complied with, such tradition and actual possession was to be a tradition and possession not under the contract of sale, but to be considered as the possession of a lessee holding under the vendor as lessor, for the contract expressly provides that :- "The said Duncan R. McLennan will take possession of said farm and appurtenances immediately, and will enjoy the same on the following conditions." the tradition and actual possession only became such a tradition and actual possession as contemplated under Art. 1478 on fulfilment by the vendee of the conditions of the contract of sale, that then and from thenceforth only was the tradition and actual possession such a tradition and actual possession a4 within the q.
promise of sale would be equivalent to a sale; in other words, that until the conditions were fulfilled, the occupier of the property was in no better position than a tenant, whether it Was R. McLellan, on his own behalf, (for it would appear that the propeity' a in reality bought for him, and, so far as paid for, paid'for with his money) or on behalf of his son, mentioned in the contract of sale as the vendee.
On conditions being fulfilled the sale was then consummated, and then for the first time the plaintiff became entitled to the property as his own, or to claim a deed of sale. That it was not a real sale, subject to a revocatory condition, but, to my mind, it was in every sense of the word a conditional sale, and until the conditions were complied with there was no intention that there should be a complete sale, or that the property should be transferred. The authority from Aubry c Rau (1), cited by the learned Chief Justice in the court below, seeins to cover the case:
A et facto, I therefore have come to the same conclusion as the learned Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, viz., that the condition precedent on which the promise of sale was made, not having been complied with within the time specified in the contract, the contract and the law placed the plaintiff en demeure, and there was no necessity for any demand, the necessity for a demand being entirely inconsistent with the terms of the contract, which immediately on the failure of the performance of the con.- 4ition ipso facto changed the relation of the parties (1) Vol, 4, sec. '5,see, p vendor and vendee to lessor and lessee, and therefore the respondent not having fulfilled his obligation, is GAOE not in a position to insist on the appellant granting and vexecuting to.,him a deed of . the property in question, ay) tlyrefore that this. appeal should be allowed, theR judgment of the court below reversed, and the action of the respondents dismissed.
J.:- Was of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for reasons given by Taschereau, J., in his judgment, with which he concurs.
J.
L'action de l'Intim6 (demandou en cour inf6rieure) 6tait fond6e sur une promesse de vente en date du 7 d6cembre 1874 et avait pour but de forcer l'appelant A lui livrer la propri6t6 mentionn6e dans cette promesse de vente et de lai en passer titre, sinon que le jugement de la cour en tiendrait lieu.
Cette promesse de vente fat faite en consid6ration de la somme de $1,200, dont $500 furent pay&s comptant et la balance stipul6e payable A raison de $100 par ann6e avec int6r~t A sept p. c.
Le demandeur 6tait alors mineur, mais son pore comparut A l'acte pour accepter pour lui. L'Intim6 s'obligea de ratifier cet acte A son Age de majorit6.
Le diff6rend qui s'616ve entre les parties est au sujet de l'effet A donner A la clause suivante:
if the R. of the R. but the pgnR, rchen, then Jwlch J. rent Le jugement de la cour Sup6rieure, confirm6 par celui de la majorit6 de la cour du Banc de la Reine, a refus6 de donner effet il cette convention.
Les principaux motifs de cette d6cision se trouvent dans les consid6rants du jugement prononc6 en cour Sup6rieure par 1'honorable juge Papineau. Quant aux raisons du jugement de la majorit6 do la cour du Bane de la Reine, on ne les trouve ni days les factums ni dans le dossier, qui ne contient que celles de 1'honorable juge en chef sir A. A. Dorion qui diff6rait d'opinion.
Pour en arriver A cette conclusion l'honorable juge Papineau parait s'6tre fond6 sur les raisons suivantes: lo d6lai accord6 pour le paiement des sept cents piastres, balance due sur le prix convenu; 2o que le d6fendeur (1'appelant) n'a jamais fait annuler la dite promesse de vente vis-A-vis du demandeur, (l'Intim6); 3o que le paiement de la dite balance du prix n'a jamais t6 demand6.
Il y a encore plasieurs autres consid6rants donn6s par l'honorable juge que je me dispense d'indiquer ici, car je suis d'opinion, pour les raisons d6velopp6es dans les notes de l'honorable sir A.
La condition cit~e plus haut est-elle suspensive de 1'effet de la promesse de vente jusqud l'accomplissement de la condition de paiement ? La peine de d6ch6ance stipul6e en cas de d6faut de paiement doit-elle avoir son effet de plein droit, saus atitre mise en dempme que celle r6sultant de la convention et sans 1'intervention des tribunaux ?
Ces deux questions n'en doivent faire qu'une seule, car, si Ia convention doit en loi produire 1'effet convenu, il ne saurait tre question de mise en demeure et d'intervention des tribunaux.
La pr6tention de l'Intim6 est que la promesse de vente dont il s'agit, ayant 6t6 suivie de tradition et de possession, elle doit 8tre, en vertu de l'art. 1478 C. C., consid6r6e comme 6quivalente A la vente, et ne pouvait ktre annul6e par un jugement pronongant d6ch~ance contre lui.
L'Appelant pr6tend au contraire que cette promesse ne pent avoir d'effet qu'A 1'accomplissement des conditions de paiement, qu'A d6fant de paiement la promesse de vente, en suspens jusque-15, se trouve an6antie. Comme le fait justement observer l'honorable jugeen-chef Dorion, 'art. 1478 ne peut aucunement appuyer la pr6tention de 'Intim6, que la promesse dont il s'agit ici 6quivaut A la vento. Car dans cet article il ne s'agit que d'une promesse de vente pure et simple, et non pas d'une promesse de vente accompagne do conditions sp6ciales.
Ici les parties sont formellement convenues que l'Intim6 n'aurait pas droit A un titre de vente, A moins d'avoir pay6, aux termes convenus, la balance des $700 sur le prix do vente, et que dans le cas de non paiement la. promesse de vente deviendrait nulle et se transformerait on un bail de la proprist6, et que les $500 pay6es iraient en d6duction du loyer. Est-il possible, en pr6sence d'une declaration de volont6 aussi clairement formulke, de pretendre que cette promesse est 6quivalente A la vente ? Les parties out pr6cis6ment dit le coutraire; elles ont effectivement dit: s'il n'y a pas de paiements, il n'y aura pas de vente mais bail de la proprit6 en question. Il ne pout pas, dans ce cas, y avoir de r6solution de cette promesse, parce OF
[VOL. IX. que la condition n'ayant pas t accomplie, la promesse n'a produit aucun effet.
Aucun droit h la propri6t6 McL*Ax. n'est pass6 A l'Intim6, son occupation aprbs le d6faut de .paiement devant 6tre continu6e A titre de bail.
Cette transformation de la promesse de vente en un bail, ou d'un contrat en un autre peut se faire en vertrt de Particle 1022 CO. :
C'est en vertu de ce principe que la Cour de Cassation a admis la validit6 d'une condition par laquelle des parties en se mariant avaient stipul6 que la communaut6 de biens, limit6e par leur contrat de mariage, deviendrait une communaut6 g6n6rale A 1'ouverture des successions respectives des phres et m6res des contractants (1).
Qu'une promesse de vente puisse 6tre 16galement faite avec des conditions suspensives on resolutoires, cela ne saurait 6tre mis en doute d'aprbs les autoritbs suivantes. Ces autorit6s reconnaissent qu'une promesse de vente est susceptible des memes conditions que la vente. Troplong, (2) commentant
'art. 1589, du code Napoldon, dit:
Ala Et au n 134 1'auteur ajoute:
la t A Pathier (1) dit:
Les promesses de vendre se font de deux manibres : Avec ou sans limitation de temps.
Lorsque quelqu'un s'est oblig6 de vendre une chose dans un temps dtermin6, il est d6charg6 de plein droit de son obligation par le laps de temps..........
...................
Fournier, J. Laurent, (2) parlant de la promesse de vente conditionnelle, dit
La promesse de vente peut-elle tre faite sous condition ? L'affir. mative n'est pas douteuse : Part. 1854 le dit de la vente, et la promesse bilatkrale vaut vente.
II faut en dire autant de la promesse unilatkrale, elle forme aussi un contrat; done elle pent 6tre faite sans condition. On applique, dans ce cae, les principes qui r6gissent la condition.
........................................... La promesse de vendre se trouve souvent ajout~e A un bail comme promesse de vendre sans que le preneur promette d'acheter ; la promesse peut aussi tre bilat6rale, soit pure et simple, soit sous condition
................................................... Si la promesse do vente 6tait bilat6rale, et pure et simple, quoi. qu'ajourn~e A la fin du bail, par exemple, il y aurait vente et translation de proprit6. Partant l'indemnit6 (due pour expropriation) appartiendrait A l'acheteur. Mais que faut-il d~cider si la promesse est conditionnelle ? La vente conditionnelle ne transfre pas Ia' propri6t6, tandis que la vente A terme la transf6re. Tout d6pendra done do l'interpr6tation du contrat. Est it conditionnel, l'indemnit6 sera due, et I'acheteur ne peut la r6clamer parce qulil n'y a pas encore de vente.
Une promesse de vente contenant des conditions analogues A celle dont il s'agit a 6t0 reconnue comme 16gale. Dans la cause do Noel vs Laverdure (3) il a 6 d6cid6 que la condition dans une promesse de vente, m6me suivie de possession,-que telle promesse ne serait pas 6quivalante A la vente, 6tait valable. Il y avait une convention sp~ciale A cet effet, afin d'bviter au cas de d6faut de paiement du prix, la n6cessit6 et les frais d'une vente par le sh6rif. La 16gitimit6 d'une pareille condition a 6t6 admise.
Dans le cas actuel, la condition changeant la pronje 5p (1) Vente, No. 480.
(2) Vol. 24, No. 25,
(3) 4 Q. L. R. 247.
de vente en un bail a aussi pour but d'&viter les frais de poursuite et d'expropriation.
11 est plus facile et E.
moins dispendieux d'expulser un locataire que de prendre une action en r6solution de promesse de vente Fournier, J.pour rentrer en possession de sa propri6t.
L'appelant avait int6r~t i faire cette stipulation et il avait le droit de la faire.
Mais ici d'aprbs la nature de la condition il ne peut pas y avoir n6cessit6 de demander la r6solution, car il n'a pas exist6 d'obligation, la condition y faisant obstacle. Voici ce que dit A ce sujet Demolombe (1) La condition vient-elle A manquer?
Rien de plus simple.
Le contrat est A consid6rer de plein droit, ab initio comme s'il n'avait jamais exist6.
Quod si sub conditione res venierit, del Paul, ei quidem defecerit conditio, nulla est emptio, sicuti nec stipulatio. (L. 8 ff. De Perii et comm. rei venditaw.)
D'oi nos anciens ont d6duit cette maxime.
'cActu conditionales, defectu conditione nihil est."
386. Le plus souvent quand la condition manque, tout est dit de plein droit comme nous venons de le remarquer, et il n'y a rien A faire de part ni d'autre. S'il 6tait arriv6, par exception, que Ia chose qui faisait Pobjet de lobligation edt 6t0 livr6e au cr6ancier conditionnel, il serait tenu de Ia rendre avec tous ses accessoires, et mbme dans le cas, g6n6ralement aussi, avec les. fruits qu'elle aurait produit; car aucun contrat no s'est form6, et ii n'y a aucune cause d'oa puisse r6sulter un appel juridique quelconque (comp. infra, Nos 409-410.
Toullier t. III, No 548; Zacharie, Aubry & Ran, t. III, p. 51; Bufnoir, p. 315.
Aubry 4- Rau (2) disent:
La condition suspensive venant A d6faillir, lobigation et le droit qui y est corr6latif, sont ipso facto, A consid6rer comme n'ayant jamais existS.
Ainsi, par exemple, Facqu6reur qui aurait tk mis en possession de la chose par lui acquise sous condition, serait oblig6 de la restituer avec tous ces accessoires et avec les fruits qu'elle a produits.
Larombiare, vol. 2, p. 118, Nos 1, 2 et 3, or art. 1176 & 1177, C. N. et p. 120, No. 6.
(1) Code Napolbon, No. 375.
(2) Vol. 4, § 302, p. 75-sect. B. Laurent (1) dit:
Les parties, en traitant sous conditions, font d6pendre I'obligation de P'accomplissement de la condition; done si Ia condition d6- MoLENNAN. faillit, il n'y a pas d'obligation. I'ordinaire, les parties ne font aucun acte d'ex~cution tant que la condition est en suspens; dans ce cas Fournier, J. le contrat n'a jamais produit d'effet, les parties sont cens6es n'avoir jamais trait&.
Si le cr6ancier avait t& mis en possession, il devrait restituer la chose avec tout ce qu'il en a perqu.
Les conditions impos6es par l'appelant sont aussi conformes A l'article 1079 de notre code qui les permet en ces termes :
L'obligation eat conditionnelle lorsqu'on la fait d6pendre d'un 6vnement futur et incertain, soit en la suspendant jusqu'A ce que I'v6nement arrive, soit en Ia r~siliant, selon quo 1'6v6nement arrive ou n'arrive pas.
La condition stipul6e par I'Appelant suspend 1'ex6cution de la promesse jusqu'A ce qu'il y ait en paiement; en cons6quence, il ne peut pas y avoir r6siliation parce qu'il n'y a pas eu d'obligation. C'est en consid6rant la condition dont il s'agit non comme suspensive, mais simplement comme r6solutoire d'une obligation complite que la Cour du Banc de la Reine a crn devoir faire application, au cas actuel, des principes concernant la r6solution des contrats en France, matire sur laquelle il existe une diff6rence notable entre notre code et celui de France.
On pent encore citer comme s'appliquant 6galement 'a l'effet de la condition suspensive, ce que Laurent (2) dit an sujet de la condition r6solutoire expresse:
Ce qui la caractbrisc et la distingue de la condition r6solutoire tacite dont nous parlerons plus loin, c'est qu'elle op re de plein droit. En effet, Part. 1183 dit que la condition r6solutoire expresse " op6re la revocation de l'obligation."
La loi n'ajoute pas que Ia revocation se fait de plein droit, mais c'est bien le sons des expressions qu'elle emploie; c'est le soul accomplissement de la condition qui r~sout le contrat, il ne faut pas autre chose, ni sommation, ni demande judiciaire. La raison en est trbs simple: c'est que telle est Ia volont& (1) No. 100, vol. 17, p.
(2) Vol. 17, No. 114.
des parties contractantes formellement exprim6e, et la volont6 des parties faitbien loi (art. 1134).
Voir aussi les Nos 115, 117, 118. E.
Je citerai encore du m~me auteur au sujet de la condition r6solutoire son opinion sur 1'effet de cette condi- Fournier,.T. tion. Elle doit avoir d'autant plus d'importance dans son application a l'effet de la condition suspensive que l'auteur dit que la condition r6solutoire implique une condition suspensive; l'acheteur sous condition r6solutoire, dit-il, est d6biteur sous condition suspensive. Au No. 129, meme volume, Laurentdit encore : Si Ia condition r6solutoire stipulde par les parties ophre de plein droit, c'est que telle est leur volont6, et leur volont6 tient lieu de loi.
Apras avoir donn6 les raisons pour lesquelles dans le cas de la condition r6solutoire tacite, i n'en est pas de meme, l'auteur continue an No. 130 les d6veloppements sur 1'effet de la condition r6solutoire expresse :
De suit que dans le cas de r6solution expresse, le juge r~gulibrement n'intervient point. C'est le contrat qui d'avance a prononc6 la r6solution si tel &v6nement arrive; d~s 1'instant oi
Ia condition s'accomplit, le contrat est r6solu, Il n'y a rien A demander, it n'y a done pas d'action & intenter. Quant il y a une contestation sur le point de savoir si r6ellement la condition s'est accomplie telle que les partie 1'avaient stipul6e, le d6bat doit naturellement Atre port6 devant les tribunaux, mais la seule question que le juge aura & d~cider, c'est la question de fait. Co n'est pas lui qui prononcera la r6solution, il se bornera A d6clarer que Ia condition 6tant accomplie, le contrat est r6solu en vertu d9 la volont6 des parties contractantes. Le juge n'aurait m~me pas besoin de faire cette d6claration, il suffit qu'il soit constat6 que la condition s'est r~alis~e; das lors la volont6 des parties regoit son ex6cution et le contrat est r6solu. A plus forte raison le juge ne peut-il pas d~cider que le contrat ne sera pas r6solu quoique la condition r6solutoire soit accomplie. Ce serait violer Part. 1134, d'apr6s lequel la convention tient lieu de loi, et cette lot oblige le juge aussi bien que les parties contractantes.
Au No. 151, le m~me auteur dit encore:
La condition r6solutoire expresse ne donne pas lieu A une action en r~solution, puisque le contrat est i6solu de plein droit en vertu COU1Tt
OF CANADA.
A
D'aprbs ces autorit6s il est clair que ni la mise en demeure ni 1'action en r6solution ne sont nbcessaires. pour faire produire A la conditiQn r6solutoire les cons6quences dont les parties sont convenues.
A plus forte raison en doit-il Atre de m~me dans le cas de la condition suspensive il n'a pas exist6 d'obligation. Ainsi que l'a observ6 1'hon. juge en chef Dorion, avant la publication de notre code civil les tribunaux ne donnait pas A ces conditions leur plein et entier effet. Ils avaient pour habitude de les modifier suivant certaines ragles d'6quit6, dont ils faisaient application suivant les circonstances de la cause. Toutefois, m6me avant le code, la jurisprudence A cot 6gard avait 6t6 chang6e par un jugement du 30 septembre 1854, dans la cause de Richard vs. La Fabrique de Notre-Dame de Qudbec, (1) rendu par la Cour du Bane de la Reine, alors pr6sid6e par sir L. N. Lafontaine, Bart., juge en chef, et compos6e des juges Panet, Aylwin, et C. Mondelet ; dans cette cause il fut d6cid6 " que dans un bail d'un banc dans une 6glise, par laquelle il est stipul6 qu'A d6faut de paiement du loyer aux termes et 6poques fix6s, d~s lors et a 1'expiration des dits termes le dit bail sera et demeurera nul et r6solu de plein droit, et que le bailleur rentrera en possession du dit bane, et pourra procder A une nouvelle adjudication d'icelui, sans 6tre tenu de donner aucun avis on assignation an preneur, n'est pas une clause qui doit tre r6put6e comminatoire, mais qui doit avoir son effet." D'apr~s le rapport do cette cause, un des arguments, de 1'honorable juge Duval, qui prit part au jugement, en premibre instance, est rapport6 comme suit:
which are not contra bonos mores, or against law. Such being the rule it is difficult to understand, as it has been pretended by the Plaintiff why this covenant should not be enforced.
McLENAN.
L'hon. juge 1Meredith, actuellement juge en chef de Fournier, J.1a Cour Sup6rieure de la province de Quebec, aprbs avoir cit6 les remarques de Toullier au sujet du refus des tribunaux de donner effet aux conditions rbsolutoires, dit :
This jurisprudence has been condemned as arbitrary and unjust by our most eminent jurists; and I have no hesitation in saying that I think it so.
II cite A 1'appui de son opinion un grand nombre d'autorit6s auxquelles je r6f~re.
Le principe sanctionn6 par ce jugement reput l'approbation des codificateurs de notre code civil, comme on peut s'en convaincre par les remarques suivantes que 1'on trouve dans leur premier rapport, p. 19, (1865). Les inconv6nients qui r6sultent de la ragle qui regarde certaines clauses des contrats comme seulment comminatoires et cons6quem. ment ne devant pas 6tre ex~cut~es, sont indubitables et se pr6sentent chaque jour. Sous la jurisprudence qui s'4tait form6e, les tribunaux modifiaient les stipulations des contrats, ou sans en tenir compte, substituaient, A la volont6 6crite des parties, une 6quit6 douteuse pour ajuster leurs droits. Dans ce pays cette intervention n'a peut-Atre pas 6 pousse aussi loin, mais en principe elle est 6galement sujette & objection, et quoique soutenue de l'autoritO do Dumoulin et de Pothier, elle ne parait pas devoir son origine au code Justinien, ni justifie par aucune 16gislation positive de la France. Les raisons donn&es par les deux 6minents jurisconsultes sont certainement peu satisfaisantes.
Toullier qui discute la question au long, d6clare que les tribunaux se son t arrog6 ce pouvoir qui, par la suite, est pass6 en usage. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est certain que la doctrine de l'intervention judiciaire alors que le sens du contrat est clair, est d6sapprouv6e par les juristes modernes. Deux des commissaires sont d'opinion de sugg6rer un changement de la loi en force par projet d'amendement soumis.
De Pautre c6t6, M. le commissaire Morin croit plus sr et plus 6quitable de s'en tenir A Ia rigle en force. En consnquence le sujet est respectueusement soumis." La l6gislature a adopt6 la suggestion de la majorit6 des commissaires. Mais on fait observer que cet article n'est pas indiqu6 dans le code comme 6tablissant un droit nonveau. La raison en est claire, c'est que les codificateurs eux-m~mes n'ont consid6r6 1'usage 6tabli par les cours que comme un abus contre lequel ils se sont prononc6s Fournier. J. comme 6tant contraire A la loi.
Ce qu'ils ont d6clar6 c'est que la loi pr6vaudrait contre 1'usage des cours. Lorsqu'ils ont fait cette d6claration 1'usage 6tait deji r6pudi6 par le jugement de la cour du Banc de la Reine. II s'agit done dans cette cause de consacrer un principe d6ji admis.
On pr6tend aussi que la condition, soit suspensive soit r6solutoire, ne pent produire son effet qu'apris la mise en demeure. La r6ponse A cette objection est d6jA donn6e par 1'autorit6 cit6e plus haut de Laurent. J'ajouterai celle de Merlin (1).
retard qu'il ait par stipulation remplira us stipulation faisant partie la peut rir la peine retard l'on
Il est 6vident qu'en pareil cas la mise en demeure r6sulte du caractbre mome de la stipulation,-on que le d6biteur y a renonc6 en adoptant une condition qui la rend impossible. En effet, dans le cas actuel, McLennan avait d6lai jusqu'au ler octobre pour faire le premier des sept paiements qui lui restaient A faire. En vertu de l'art. 1090 C. C., " cc qui n'est dii qu'A terme ne peut Ltre exig6 avant 1'6ch6ance."
Done, jusqu'au ler octobre, l'Appellant n'avait rien A demander; mais le lendemain, la d6ch6ance 6tant arriv6e quelle mise en demeure pouvait-il faire ? Demander paiement c'eit 6t6 renoncer au b6n6fice de la d6ch6ance.
Lui demander de rsilier la promesse de vente ? Elle 1'6tait par l'effet de la convention.
Il n'y avait done qu'd! demander possession de la propri6t6, et, an cas de refus, la contestation, comme le dit Laurent, ne devait reposer que sur la question du fait de savoir si la condition a 6t accomplie on non. La mise en demeure, dans ce cas, n'6tait pas n6cessaire,-si elle 1'6tait, elle a eu lieu en vertu de l'art. 1067. " Le d6biteur, dit cet article, pent tre constitu6 en demeure soit par les termes mmes du contrat, lorsqu'il contient une stipulation que le seul &coulement du temps pour 1'accomplir aura cet effet." C'est ce qui a 6t6 convenu entre les parties de la manibre la plus claire et la plus positive. Cette mise en demeure est suffisante pour pouvoir exiger 1'ex6cution du contrat. Demolombe, en parlant de la mise en demeure lorsqu'on vent exiger non pas l'ex6cution du contrat, mais des dommages et int6r~ts r6sultant de sa non-execution, dit: (1)
part, dit,
La convention dont il s'agit repousse toute id6e d'une pr6somption accordant un dlai-puisqu'il est stipul6 que l'obligation scra imm6diatement an6antie et transform6e en un bail."
Pour mieux 6tablir la proposition que la mise en demeure n'est pas n6cessaire dans le cas de stipulation expresse de r6solution, je citerai encore un arrAt de la cour de Cassation que l'on trouve dans Dalloz (2). art. et permettent auait D'aprs les autorit6s et les d6cisions ci-dessus cit6es, il r6sulte bien clairement que les motifs adopths par I'honorable juge Papineau fond6s sur le terme de paiement, la n6cessit6 de la mise en demeure et de l'intervention des tribunaux ne sout pas fond6s, et qu'une condition expresse de la nature de celle dont il s'agit doit avoir son effet de plein droit sans aucune mise en demeure et sans 1'intervention des tribunaux.
I a 6t6 soulev6 et discut6 plusieurs autres questions, mais 6tant d'avis que le d6faut d'accomplissement des conditions express6ment stipul~es a eu pour effet d'an6antir la promesse de vente, il serait tout A fait inutile de les examiner. D'ailleurs, sur les questions incidentes, comme sur la question principale, je concours pleinement dans les raisons donn6es dans son jugement sur cette cause par Sir A. A. Dorion, J.C. En cons6quence, pour les raisons qu'il a si habilement d6velopp6es et pour les motifs ci-dessus expos6s, je suis d'opinion que 1'appel devrait Ctre allou6 avec d6pens. HENRY, J.:- The only difficulty that presented itself to my mind in the argument on this case was the objection presented as to mis en demeure. On looking at the authorities I have come to the conclusion that that proceeding was unnecessary.
The parties themselves provided by their agreement, one to sell for a certain sum of money the land to the other, by paying so much down and the balance by instalments, and there was a provision in the agreement that if he did not meet these instalments, he should become the lessee of the party who sold the land, and, not only that, but he should forfeit the amount he had already paid. If the matter stopped there, possibly the party might find a necessity to resort to legal proceedings, but the plaintiff himself went to the United States, and I believe only lately returned. E
This agreement was entered into six or seven years ago. The father paid the money and was the real party to the transaction, but the contract was made out in the name of the son. The son being away, the father went into possession, and after being in possession and failing to make any payment he became the actual tenant of the party who sold the land, and, after remaining some time in possession, an action for ejectment was brought against him, and he was dispossessed. It appears to me all these proceedings, the agreement of the parties and all that was done afterwards, are sufficient to satisfy any reasonable mind that there was no necessity for taking any proceedings to put this party in default. The son went away and left the father in possession and never looked after the property since; the father enters into all these arrangements, and afterwards be becomes a tenant. Six or seven years afterwards the son says: " You did not put me en demeure, and therefore at the end of this time I will come and offer you the amount that was due and simple interest." It would be an act of injustice to require the party to take simple interest for his money and lose the opportunity of investing these amounts as they became due. should say under the circunistances it was not even an equitable offer.
I think if he came into any English court and claimed specific performance of the agreement, it would be a matter the court would take into consideration if they at all allowed him to set that as a case against the party. They would say to him: " No you have not paid this as you should have done by instalments, and if you ask us to enforce this agreement, we will enforce the adoption of equitable principles, and not only payment of simple interest but interest on each instalment as it fell due."
Under the lX.]
SUPREME circumstances I do not see any equity in favour of the respondent in this case; the equities are all in favour of the appellant, and besides that, this was simply conditional sale, a sale to be fully effected only on the full payment of all the instalments.
The party having allowed himself to be put out of possession, I do not think he has a right to come in at this time and ask the other party to give him a specific performance of the contract.
I amof opinion to dismiss this appeal for the reasons contained in the considerants of the judgment of the Superior Court, whose judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, upon these same reasons, I presume, as we have no notes (in the case) from the learned judges of that court who formed the majority.
That there was a sale by Grange to McLennan can admit of no doubt. There was res, pretium, and consensus. There was the translation of the actual possession, and such a complete transfer to McLennan of a full title and of all rights to that property that McLennan gave upon it, and Grange accepted, a mortgage for the security of the balance due on the price of sale.
This sale was unaccompanied with a clause resolutoire -in default of payment at the dates agreed upon-not at all in default of ratification by McLennan, when he would become of age, as has been said. This would, however, be immaterial, as McLennan did in fact ratify the said purchase by his continuing to keep the property sold to him, when, a few weeks after this deed, he became of age, and as fully as possible, though impliedly only.
Sir A.
With greatest deference for the learned Chief Justice, whose opinions have always such weight, I think that this is a mis-interpretation of the contract between the parties.
How can it be said that they in effect declared that McLennan would be only a tenant until he paid the balance of the stipulated price of sale, when by the very deed McLennan gives and Grange accepts a mortgage on that property for that balance of the price of sale?
Grange evidently could not take a mortgage on the property if the title of that property had continued to be vested in him, and the fact that he accepts a mortgage from McLennan upon that same property is to me the most complete evidence that he, then and there, divested himself in favour of McLennan of the title to it.
Then, as to that clause stipulating forfeiture of the payments made and a lease, in default of the payments to be made.
For how long was that lease to be ? There is nothing in the deed about it. Could Grange have taken advantage of this to eject McLennan from the ground, when he failed to make the first paymentnot a year after the deed-and yet keep the $500 paid, thus getting a yearly rent of $500 for a property he sold for $1,200.
I believe not ; yet this is what he really contends for.
Then, suppose McLennan had paid $1,100, that is to say, all the instalments up to the last, but had failed to make this last one, can Grange contend that he could have kept these $1,100, and yet consider McLennan as hip tenant, and eject him at his, Orange's, will, as no length for the lease is fixed?
Keep both the $1100 and the land ? I say, undoubtedly, no. Yet, that is what bis propositions would inevitably lead to.
This deed is, as I have said, nothing else but a deed of sale with a clause resolutoire in default of payment. And, it being so, an action was necessary to have the dissolution of the said deed declared.
The code has made no changes in the old law on this point, arts. 1536, 1537, 1538, 1550. It has, as new law, decreed that a special stipulation as to dissolution for non-payment is necessary; it has made changes as to prescription of action in such cases. It has also decreed, as new law, that the stipulation is not to be considered as comminatory, but that the judgment of dissolution is pronounced at once, adding that: " Nevertheless the buyer may pay the price with interest and costs at any time "before the rendering of the judgment."
Meaning clearly that though the dissolution had been stipulated, though the date fixed for the payment has lapsed, though the vendee had not paid, though even the vendor has taken an action to have the sale dissolved, yet the vendee at any time, before judgment on the action, can go up to the vendor and force him to accept the price of sale, and so relieve himself from the stipulated consequences of his default.
And adds art. 1550 (as new law), " If the seller fail to bring a suit for the enforcement of his right of dissolution within the stipulated term, the buyer remains absolute owner of the thing sold "
So that here, by an express provision of the code, Grange having failed to bring a suit for the dissolution of the sale, McLennan remained so far absolute owner of the property sold. But, says the appellant, by the very terms of the deed no summons of any kind was necessary, and McLennan was en demeure by the very terms of the Act: Art. 1067 0. C.
This cannot help the appellant. The price here was gr6vable and non portable, that is to say, payable at Mc- TaschrLennan's domicile, art. 1152 C. (and at date of first payment, he was in the country.)
6quivalent, 6tait
And all the authors agree on this.
So that, even taking the appellant's own interpretatation of this deed as to this, the respondent was never legally put en demeure to pay the amount of his purchase.
Of course, that the payment of it is a condition precedent to his getting a full deed, he does not deny. He has offered the full amount before instituting his action, and even before it was all due, and has deposited it in court.
If the appellant had taken an action to have this sale dissolved, the respondent would clearly, according to the code, have been in time, at any period of the case before judgment, to pay the price of sale and prevent the dissolution.
Because he paid before the appellant instituted any action at all, the appellant would have us declare that he is too late. With the two courts below, I cannot reach that conclusion. Then art. 1184 of the code Napoleon, expressly enacts that the party who has to complain of the default by the other party to fulfil his engagements has the choice either to demand a specific performance of the obligation, if possible, or that the contract be dissolved; but that the dissolution must be asked by an action in MCEn. justice. That is what art. 1065 of our code expressly - (except as to the last part) says, and the Codifiers say J. that they have not expressly re-enacted this art. 1184 of the code Napoleon because its enactments, so far as consistent with other articles of our code, are contained in this art. 1065, of our own code.
And though, under art. 1088, with us, as in France under art. 1183, a resolutive condition effects of right, when accomplished, the dissolution of the contract, yet, when this condition depends on the act of one of the parties, tient droit: These authorities, and the general principle of law, demonstrate that an action in justice is necessary to ask the dissolution.
If not taken, the creditor is supposed to have waived his right to ask it, and to have granted delay to his debtor for the payments due. Arts. 1537 and 1538 of our code I have already referred to, make this as plain as possible as to sale. See also Delvincourt (3) and authorities cited in Code Civil annot6 par Lahaye (4).
It is clear that this right to ask the dissolution of the sale for non-payment, is a right given to the vendor and not to the vendee, who," according to all authority, would be estopped from invoking his non-execution of this contract to ask the rescision of it.
The vendor has an action for the price sale, though the contract stipulated that the sale would be rescinded by non-payment on the part of the vendee
Here the appellant was bound Taschereauto notify McLennan by some act that he intended to avail himself of his right to have this sale rescinded, and to hold him, 1VMcLennan, as his tenant only. The appellant had to make or declare his option to ask the dissolution, if he intended to avail himself of his privilege. The lease provided for in the deed never began, never was in existence.
If the appellant had sued the respondent for the price of sale, this one could never have contended that the contract.had ipso fure lapsed, that he was only a tenant, and on t-hese grounds have refused to pay the price of sale.
As to moveables, the code has thought it better that the dissolution of the sale for non-payment should take place without the necessity of a suit, but it has declared so, in express terms, by art. 1544, so giving it here again clearly to be understood that for immoveables, a suit is necessary.
In fact, the law, under art. 1536, 1537, 1538 and 1550, is now clearly that " No sale of immoveables shall be rescinded for default of payment of price, unless there is an express clause to that effect, and not then, until judgment of rescision is pronounced, and the judgment may be prevented if the buyer pays the price, with interest and costs, after action is commenced, at any time before judgment."
This being so,
McLennan having duly offered the price of sale to Grange, even before an action of dissolution, he surely must have been in time to do it, since he would have been in time after an action had been brought.
For these reasons, I am of opinion that the judgment of the two courts below maintaining the plaintiff's (1) Art. Q. C, action is right, and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
J.:
I find it difficult to put upon an instrument, so inartistically and equivocally expressed as that upon which this case turns, a construction which can be said to be clearly free from doubt. I think, however, it does appear to have been a very prominent, and, indeed, the most prominent, feature in the intention of the parties to the instrument, that in case of default in payment of any of the instalments of the purchase money agreed upon, the instrument should operate only as a lease, and that the payments already made should, in such case, be treated as paid on account of rent. Now, this important feature in the intention of the parties would be wholly frustrated, if by reason of the clause which speaks of the vendor having an hypothec on the property for the purchase money the instrument should be construed as a completed sale. The construction therefore which has been put upon the instrument by the learned Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench in Montreal, in appeal,'appears to my mind to be most in accordance with what was the real intention of the parties to the instrument, and effect, I think, should be given to such intention, although not very felicitously expressed by the notary who prepared the deed. I am of opinion, therefore, that the appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed with costs.