p. 194which I stated to you in the outset of my charge to you. Your verdict should be either for the plaintiff, giving the amount which you shall say from the evidence the life of Shaw was fairly worth to the next of kin, or it should be a. general verdict for the defendants.
“ The defendants thereupon excepted to that part of the-charge in which the court left it to the jury to determine whether, when Shaw entered upon defendants’ employment the last time, when he was employed before the accident, he accepted the risks occasioned by the known absence of the boards in front of the couplings or rolls.
“ The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,500,. and thereupon the judge presiding at the trial, upon the application of defendants, did direct an order to be entered that the exceptions taken by defendants on said trial be heard at the first instance at the general term and that judgment be suspended in the meantime; and such order was thereupon duly made and entered.”
Richard C. Steele, for appellant.
Louis Marshall, for respondent.
The majority of the court are of opinion that this judgment should be reversed, for the reason that-the facts established beyond dispute that the injured employee entered the service and remained in it with a full knowledge and appreciation of the risk and danger resulting from leaving the couplings uncovered. The fact was entirely obvious, the resultant peril plain at a glance, and the injured servant a skilled workman, a foreman of the rollers, accustomed to the machinery and the service, and having the capacity and ability to fully appreciate the consequences of leaving the couplings uncovered. Within the rule applicable to such cases the plaintiff’s intestate took upon himself the risk of injury from the observed and obvious, omission.
p. 195The court are also of opinion that the trial judge erred in charging the jury that if they believed the evidence of the-superintendent that he asked the deceased if he wanted the couplings covered, and the latter declined the precaution, it' was a circumstance for them to consider upon the question; of the assumption of consequent dangers by the deceased.
If the fact sworn to was true, it conclusively proved that the servant took upon himself the risks of the omission and freed the employer from responsibility. The jury should have been so charged. The principal doubt among us on this branch of the case has been whether the defendants’ exception was sufficient to bring up the question.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted costs to abide the event.
All concur, except Ruger, Ch. J.; Danforth and Finch, JJ., dissenting.