Majority
Headnote
' Mortgage. Foreclosure.—Where a deed is given as security for a loan and one half of the loss of a joint enterprise, and a subsequent unsigned agreement is made, on a sufficient consideration giving the grantor the right to redeem at any time within five years from its date, the contract is valid, and an action prior to the expiration of such time is premature, though the enterprise was, by mutual consent, previously abandoned.The main question on this appeal relates to the validity and effect of that portion of the agreement of June, 1887, which specifies the object and terms upon which the real estate in question was conveyed by Loomis to the plaintiff. That agreement, as well as the original one of November, 1886, provides for the payment by Loomis to Allison of the $1,300 loan and of one-half of any loss that Allison shall sustain on his advances or stock in case the enterprise proves unprofitable. The property in question is conveyed by Loomis to Allison for the purpose of securing the loan and such half of the loss. Notwithstanding the conveyance Loomis is to have the use of the property free of charge during the time that' Allison holds it. as security. So far, both contracts are alike. Then comes, in the latter contract, a new provision under which Loomis claims he has the right to redeem at any time within five years from its date. If that be so, and the contract is valid, then this action cannot be now maintained. The claim of the plaintiff, in substance, is that the contract itself is not valid, and the provision for security to the plaintiff was intended to be absolute and enforceable at the final determination of the enterprise, and that the fact that in the fall of 1887 the enterprise was by mutual consent abandoned made the security then complete and due.
We must, I think, assume that, as far as the question at issue here is concerned, the contract though unsigned was valid.
Homer v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 481 . It was supported by a sufficient consideration. Under it there
Was there an extension of time ? The first contract left the time of payment indefinite except as it might be fixed by the time at which the loss, if any, should be ascertained. The condition was “ in case the enterprise proves unprofitable.” This event might occur before the expiration of the five years, as the funds were limited. Very likely the expectation avus that the enterprise AArould continue for the term of the corporation. It Avas not a certainty, as the result showed. In the neAV contract the proviso Avas that if at the end of five years the profits were insufficient to pay Allison, then the right of Loomis to a reconveyance should cease, unless before that time he should pay Ins share of the loss. Tins gaAre Loomis five years in which to ascertain what the loss, if any, Avas. This, in substance, said the deed shall be absolute unless Avithin five years Loomis should pay. Clearly the intention Avas to give Loomis five years in which to perform his contract and save his property. The expression is “ unless said Loomis shall before that time tender, etc.” This contemplated the contingency that the loss might be ascertained before the end of the five years. It did not provide that the loss should be paid as soon as ascertained. The circumstance, therefore, that the business was, by mutual consent, abandoned before the end of the five years, would not make the mortgage immediately due. It would indicate that both parties concluded to consider the enterprise a failure ; it would not shorten the time within which Loomis must pay his share of the loss and exercise his right of redemption.
It must, I think, be held that Loomis had five years within which to redeem, and that no waiver of this right was shown. It follows that the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed upon the exceptions, and new trial ordered before another referee, costs to abide the event.
Hardin, P. J., and Martin, J., concur.