tiff. That’ on or about the 20th of April, 1865, the defendant, as such commission merchant and agent of plaintiff, sold those tobaccos for about the value thereof, and received the proceeds thereof, ’ amounting to about $18,964, and thereby became liable to account for and pay over, the same to plaintiff, less defendant’s reasonable and proper charges in and about receiving, storing, heeping and selling said tobticco, amounting to about the sum of $3,000.
The answer set up payment and settlement in full. The case was noticed for trial at the January term, 1872, and was on the 29th of January, 1874, reached in its order on the calendar and was set down for trial on the 17th of February following and subsequently set down for the 24th of March. Before that day plaintiff served motion papers for a motion to amend the. complaint by setting up that the defendant as a warehouseman had in his possession, on or about the 10th day of December, 1864, on storage, 21,175 pounds of tobacco, the property of the plaintiff, which tobacco the defendant sold, without the consent, authority or Icnowl-. edge of the plaintiff, in separate lots, and on divers days between the 10th day of December, 1864, and the 2d day of March, 1865, and by such wrongful act became indebted to plaintiff for the value of the tobacco.
This motion being denied, plaintiff appealed.
Edward Fitch, for appellant.
John E. Ward, for respondent.
It is insisted by the respondent’s counsel that, as the order asked for was one which rested in the discretion of the justice who heard the motion at the special term, it is not -the subject of review by the general term. We are of opinion that under the recent decisions of the court of appeals, in Gray v. Fisk, 53 N. Y. 630 , and in Livermore v. Bainbridge, 47 How. 354 , the order can be properly reversed by the general term..
An examination of the motion papers and of the affidavits read in opposition has, however, failed to convince us that the justice at special term erred in the conclusion reached by him: The transaction out of which the alleged cause of action arose, -took place in 1865. When the action was commenced the plaintiff must have known whether the defendant sold the tobacco referred to in the