People ex rel. Fiedler v. Mead

This is an appeal from the judgment of the General Term affirming a judgment of the Special Term denying a writ of mandamus. The alternative writ was issued in September, 1856, and the issues of fact formed was tried at the Cayuga Circuit in January, 1858, before Mr. Justice Welles, who directed judgment for the Plaintiff.

This judgment was affirmed at the General Term, hut on appeal to this Court was reversed.

The cause was re-tried at the Cayuga Circuit in 1863, before Mr. Justice Welles, without a jury, and the Justice rendered judgment in favor of the Defendants, which on appeal was affirmed at the General Term, and the relator now appeals to this Court. The case of Starin v. The Town of Genoa ( 23 N. Y. Rep. 439 ), and the decision of this case by this Court ( 24 N. Y. 114 ), definitely settled that no action could be maintained upon these bonds against the town issuing them, even by a bond, fide holder. A contrary ruling has been made by the Supreme Court of the United States, and it has held that these bonds, in the hands of a bond fide holder, are legal and valid obligations of the town issuing them, and can be enforced. We must adhere to the law as laid down by this Court in the two cases referred to, and therefore hold that this Plaintiff cannot enforce these obligations against the town. A majority of this Court, on the previous hearing of this case, held

The judge who tried this action the second time has found as facts, that the written assent of two-thirds of the resident persons taxed in said town of Genoa, as appearing on the assessment roll of said town-made- next previous to the transfer of said alleged bonds of the said railroad company,' as aforesaid, has never- been obtained by the said Supervisor and Commissioners, or either of them,'nor by any other person or persons, corporation or body politic, in their behalf, or in behalf of any one or more of them, to the effect that such Supervisor and Commissioners had power to do the act authorized by said act of the Legislature, therein referred to, as provided in and by the first section thereof; and that the written assent of'two-thirds of the resident persons taxed in said town has never been obtained • by any Supervisor and Commissioners- of said town of Genoa, or by any or either of them, nor by any other person-or persons, corporation or body politic, in their behalf or the behalf of any or either of them, as provided and contemplated by the said first section of said act.-

That before said alleged interest warrants or coupons became due, as hereinbefore stated,' a sum of money-equal to and sufficient to pay the same, when they should become due and payable respectively as aforesaid, had been levied and collected, as in said writ is stated and set forth, but against the report of the Supervisor of said town' of Genoa, and against his vote, and the same had been paid to the Treasurer of the County of Cayuga, for the purpose of paying the said interest warrants or coupons so becoming due

The facts now found by the Court in the re-trial of this action, are certainly not more favorable to the relator than those before this Court on' the former hearing. It may with truth be said, that in all essential particulars they are identical.

We do not think it seemly to review and reverse the former judgment of this Court in this action, upon the same facts. This Court solemnly adjudicated, that a mandamus had been improperly awarded by the Supreme Court to these Defendants.

We are now asked to do the same thing which was then refused, upon the same state of facts, which, if done, would be a reversal of the previous judgment of this Court in this transaction. We cannot do this. It is claimed that we should now award this writ, to harmonize or conform to the decision of this Court in Murdock v. Aikin and Eoss v. Curtiss ( 31 N. Y. 606 ), decided since this case was before this Court on the previous occasion. An examination of the opinions in these cases will show that there is nothing in them conflicting with the cases of Starin v. Town of Genoa, and the judgment of this Court in this action. The cases in 31 N. Y. were actions against certain ofiicers who had received moneys and had the sums in hand, for the purpose of paying the interest due on certain coupons held by the Plaintiffs in these actions.

It was said in Murdock v. Aikin, that the Defendant in that action had received the sum of money claimed for a specific purpose, named to pay the interest due, or to become due, to those holding the bonds of the town. If the town thought proper, as it did, through the instrumentality of the law and by the collection and payment of this money to the Defendants in that suit,

He had nothing else to do but to pay the same in the manner directed. If so, his only duty was to ascertain who were the real' owners of the bonds issued, and to pay to them the money so placed in his hands for that purpose. That was the extent of his authority; and when he undertook to review the legality of the acts of the Board of Supervisors in raising the money, or of the officers authorized to issue the bonds, he exceeded his powers, and assumed to do acts for which he had no authority. An agent has never a right to review the legality of acts done by his principal; but where he receives money to apply as directed by the principal, he has no other duty but to comply with such orders. It was claimed on the argument of Ross v. Curtiss that this case differed from that of Murdock v. Aikin. The answer to this suggestion was, that that case was an application for a mandamus to compel the officers, who had money raised by tax, to pay the same to the object for which it was provided, and the decision of the Court was that a mandamus was a proper remedy. The questions which were decided in Murdock v. Aikin, and in Ross v. Curtiss, did not properly arise in The People v. Mead. The latter case was decided in the same manner as if the action had been against

This examination of these cases shows that there is no conflict in the views expressed in them, or the points adjudicated therein, and that this Court has so held and declared. It is thus seen that the two cases decided by this Court, since this present action was under review by it, announce no new doctrine, or any new principle that conflicts with the opinions there expressed.

We see, therefore, no reason for a departure from the views then enunciated, and it follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court now appealed from, being in harmony with the opinion of this Court, should be affirmed with costs.

It was not contended upon the argument but that a mandamus was the appropriate remedy in this case, if the Plaintiff was entitled to any. That is too plain for discussion. But for the previous adjudications of this Court, I should have held that the affidavit filed with the clerk of Cayuga County, pursuant to the second section of chapter 315 of Laws of 1852, was conclusive evidence of the assent of the taxpayers of the town, required by the act in favor of a bon& fide holder of bonds issued under its provisions. But those decisions have settled the law of this State otherwise. (Starin v. The Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 ; The People ex. rel. Fiedler v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 114 .) The affidavit must, in accordance with these decisions, be regarded as

furnishing no evidence upon that point. The finding of the

■ It-is insisted that Ross v.-Curtiss ( 311 N. Y. 606 ), and Murdock v. Aildn, decided by this Court, not reported, show-that the Plaintiff is-entitled to the money raised by the-town, for the purpose of paying the interest upon the ■ Plaintiff’s bonds. These-were actions brought by the holders of bonds against the officers of the town, to recover money in their hands which they had received for the express purpose of-paying the same to the Plaintiffs to be applied thereon.

-■.Judgment in each case was given for the Plaintiff, upon the plain familiar principle, that an agent or trustee, receiving money to be paid .over to his principal or cestui que trust, is not permitted to dispute the right of the party for whose benefit he received it; and cases, establishing- this doctrine were cited by the Court. But this-does not show that the Court, by mandamus, at the suit of a party having no right, will-compel ah officer .to go and demand and receive from another officer money, and pay the same over to him. -The plain answer is, you have no right to the money, and therefore the. Defendant owes no duty to you to perform these acts. In Elmore v. Ross the Plaintiff proved a good-title to

It is said, if the town does not dispute the Plaintiff’s title no one else can. The town has no power to recognize these bonds, or in any manner to raise money to pay them.' The bonds being invalid, the Plaintiff is in the same position he would be if he had no bonds at all, and the money was raised as a donation for him. In such a case, I apprehend no one would insist that a mandamus would lie to compel officers to do acts to enable the Plaintiff to get the-money. The Legislature can, and probably will, relieve the Plaintiff and others similarly situated upon equitable terms; but I am unable to see how the Courts can furnish a remedy without a violation of principle. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

All concur. Affirmed.

Porter, J., takes no part in the case.