Candee v. Haywood

No exception was taken to the legal conclusion of the referee, that the lands, for the recovery of which this action was brought, had become liable to resale by the State, by reason of the non-payment of the residue of the purchase-money agreed to be paid therefor by Barnes and Phelps, to whom a certificate for said lands was issued April 10th, 1852, pursuant to the statute; nor the findings of facts upon which such conclusion was based. The only question as to the resolution of the Commissioners of the Land-office, directing a resale of the lands, is, whether it was regularly passed, pursuant to statute. That fact was proved. Whether it was introduced and moved by the Lieutenant-Governor, while presiding at the board, or whether, while so presiding, it was in order for him to make a motion, i wholly immaterial.

The paper in the county of Onondaga was sufficiently designated by the board for the publication of the notice of resale. That designation was “ The Central City Courier.” The paper which published the notice, upon the first page was named “ Central ’City Daily Courier,” and in the editorial column, on the second page, and in the local column, on the third page, “ Central City ’Courier.” It thus appears that the paper was used and was

These facts .left no doubt.-but that the'paper in question was the one intended to be designated by -the board. This was all that was requisite. . It is.claimed by the Appellant’s counsel that the holder of the certificate issued to Barnes and Phelps was entitled to redeem -.the land .from.-Deniso.n, at any time .within three months after its purchase .-from the State - by. him,, and the issuing of letters-patent to him therefor.

If the counsel is right in this, the judgment appealed from is erroneous,-as the facts .found-,show: that all was , done by .such holder necessary to redeem within that time, if such right existed. From the facts found,- it .appears that at the public--sale.--.of. lands, conducted by the State-Engineer on behalf of the .State, pursuant to the statute and the instructions of the Commissioners, no one bid for the.lot in .question the- minimum,price fi-xed thereon by the Commissioners, according to the statute, and it was, therefore, according to statute,bid in for-the State. , That after .the lapse of more than three months from such purchase by the State, the State- sold the land to the Plaintiff Denison,.and issued.letters-patent to him therefor—no application having -been made in the meantime to purchase the same by the holder of .the certificate.Section 55, p; 549,- vol. 1, R. S., provides. that the -original .purchaser of any land so resold by thé. State-Engine.er, his heirs or. assigns, may-redeem the'same at • any -time wdthin three, months after such sale. - This evidently refers to a sale -made pursuant to section 53. Section 54 provides that on every such resale the State-Engineer shall give a certificate - to the effect,' among other things, that the lands are subject to redemption, -pursuant to the act, and that in case of . redemption the sale shall be void and of no effect; Section 61 provides that the State-Engineer.-,may sell lands purchased by him for the State, pursuant to the act, to any person who may-apply to .purchase the same; always giving a preference to the last owner, provided he shall apply, to purchase the same within three- months after the sale, for the amount at which the same was purchased for the State. It will-, thus be

It will be seen that this preference to the former owner effectually suspends the power of the State-Engineer to sell to any one other than such original purchaser, during the time such purchaser has the preference; otherwise, such preference would be rendered nugatory. After the expiration of three months from the sale this preference ceases, and the State-Engineer is at liberty to sell to any one who may wish to purchase.

In the event of such sale, the statute is entirely silent as to any right of the original purchaser to redeem therefrom. 3STo such right is required to be specified in the certificate of sale. In short, no such right exists, and the holder of the original certificate acquires no right by his attempted redemption from the sale to Denison. Section 65, p. 550, provides that whenever the Commissioners direct a re-lease pursuant to the act, they shall cause notice to be given to every occupant of such land to remove therefrom ; and that, together with the two succeeding sections, provides a summary mode of removing such occupants in case of neglect or refusal to comply with such notice. It is manifest that a compliance with these provisions by the Commissioners is not made a condition precedent to the power of sale, and that the validity of the sale is not dependent upon a compliance therewith. There is nothing in these sections including such an intention. The design of the Legislature was merely to furnish to the Commissioners a remedy for the speedy removal of the occupants from the land, and not to require notice to those interested, to enable them to protect their interest.

■ It is further insisted that the above mode provided for the removal of the occupants by the Commissioners must be pursued, and that, therefore, an action for the recovery of possession cannot be maintained. There is nothing in the statute • making the

There are two answers to this—First, section 160, p. 149, 2 R. S., does not apply to the State. Second, the land was not held adversely to the State.

It is found that the occupants held under the original purchaser from the State. That was not a holding under an adverse title within the meaning of the above section (Webb v. Bindon, 21 Wend. 99 ; Cook v. Travis, 20 N. Y. 400 ).

The judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.

All affirm.

JOEL TIFFANY,

State Beporter.