Fitch v. Snedaker

On the 14th of October, 1859, the Defendant caused a notice to be published, offering a reward of two hundred dollars “ to any person or persons who will give such information as shall lead to the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons guilty of the murder of a certain unknown female.”

On the 15th day of October, before the Plaintiffs had seen or heard of the offer of this reward, one Fee was arrested and put in jail; and though not in terms so stated, the case warrants the inference, that by means of the evidence given by the Plaintiffs on his trial, and their efforts to procure testimony, Fee was convicted.

This action is brought to recover the reward so offered. On the trial, the Plaintiffs proved the publication of the notice, and then proposed to prove that they gave information before the notice was known to them which led to the arrest of Fee. This evidence was excluded. The Plaintiffs then offered to prove that, with a-view to this reward, they spent time and money, made disclosures to the District Attorney, to the Grand Jury, and to the Court on

The Court thereupon directed a nonsuit.

It is entirely clear that in order to entitle any person to the reward offered in this case, he must give such information as led to both apprehension and conviction; that is, both must happen, and happen as a consequence of the information given. Flo person could claim the reward whose information caused the apprehension, unless conviction followed; both are conditions precedent. Flo one could therefore claim the reward who gave no information whatever until after the apprehension, although the information he afterwards gave was the evidence upon which conviction was had, and however clear it may be that had the information been concealed or suppressed there could have been no conviction.

This is according to the plain terms of the offer of a reward, and is held in Jones v. The Phoenix Bank ( 8 N. Y. Rep. 228 ); Thatcher v. England (3 Com. Bench R. 254). In the last case it was distinctly held that, under an offer of reward payable “ on recovery of property stolen, and conviction of the offender,” a person who was active in arresting the thief, and finding and restoring part of the.stolen property, giving information to the magistrates, tracing to London other of the property, and producing pawnbrokers with whom the prisoner had pledged it; and who incurred much trouble and expense in bringing together witnesses for the prosecution, was not entitled to the reward, as it appeared that another person gave the first information as to the party committing the robbery.

In the present case, the Plaintiff, after the advertisement of the Defendant’s offer of reward came to his knowledge, did nothing toward procuring the arrest, nor which led thereto, for at that time Fee had already been arrested.

The cases above referred to therefore establish that if no information came from the Plaintiffs which led to the arrest of Fee, the Plaintiff’s are not entitled to recover, however much the in

The question in this case is single; a murderer having been an* rested and imprisoned in consequence of information given by the Plaintiff before he is aware that a reward is offered for such apprehension, is he entitled to claim the reward in case conviction follows %

The ruling on the trial, excluding all evidence of information given by the Plaintiffs before they heard of this reward, necessarily answers this question in the negative.

The case of Williams v. Carwardine (4 Barn. and Aldolph. 621), and same case at the assizes (5 Carr and Payne, 566), holds that a person who gives information according to the terms of an offered reward is entitled to the money, although it distinctly appeared that the informer had suppressed the information for five months, and was led to inform not by the promised reward, but by other motives.

The Court said the Plaintiff had proved performance of the condition upon which the money was payable, and that established her title : that the Court could not look into her motives. It does not appear by the report of this case whether or not the Plaintiff had ever seen the notice or handbill posted by the Defendant, offering the reward; it does not therefore reach the precise point involved in the present appeal.

I perceive, however, no reason for applying to an offer of reward for the apprehension of a criminal any other rules than are applicable to any other offer by one, accepted and acted upon by another, and so relied upon as constituting a contract.

The form of action in all such cases is assumpsit. The Defendant is procéeded against as upon'his contract to pay, and the first question is, was there a contract between the parties ?

To the existence of a contract there must be mutual assent, or,

How, then, can there be consent or assent to that of which the party has never heard ? On the 15th day of October, 1859, the murderer Fee had, in consequence of information given by the Plaintiffs, been apprehended and lodged in jail. But the Plaintiffs did not, in giving that information, manifest any assent to the Defendant’s offer, nor act in any sense in reliance thereon ; they did know of its existence.

The information was voluntary, and in every sense (material to this case) gratuitous. The offer could only operate upon the Plaintiffs after they heard of it. It was prospective—to those who will in the future give information, &o. ■ An offer cannot become a contract unless acted upon or assented to. Such is the elementary rule in defining what is essential to a contract. (Ohitty on Conts., 5th Am. Ed., Perkins’ notes, p. 10, notes a and 2, and cases cited.)

Hothing was here done to procure or lead to Fee’s apprehension, in view of this reward. Indeed, if we were at liberty to look at the evidence on the first trial, it would appear that Fee was arrested before the Defendant offered the reward. I think the evidence was properly excluded, and the nonsuit necessarily followed.

The judgment should be affirmed.

JOEL TIFFAHY, State Reporter.