Majority — Waite J.
Syllabus
In ejectment, where A., B., and the other defendants were respectively in the separate possession of specific parcels of the land, judgment was rendered against them for the recovery thereof and costs of suit, and i also against each for damages for withholding the parcel whereof he was in possession, which exceed in the aggregate^ $6,000. A writ of error was sued out by all the defendants. A. and B., to render it a supersedeas of the judgment against them, severally gave a bond, which was duly approved and accepted. The’ court below thereupon ordered that the proceedings on the judgment as to A. and B. be stayed, and that a writ of restitution and execution be issued against the remaining defendants. Held, that a mandamus directing that the judgment be carried into execution against all the defendants would not lie.stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court.
The argument in- support of this petition is, that as when the judgment or decree is for the recovery of money- not otherwise secured, the rule of this court (Rule 29) requires the bond for stay of execution to be for the whole amount of the judgment or decree-; and as in this case the writ of error was sued out by all the defendants, and the aggregate of all the money judgments against them severally is more than $6,000, the bonds that have been executed are insufficient, and therefore no stay of execution has been lawfully perfected. The object of the.rule, which was made to put into form the practice that had prevailed before its promulgation, is to secure the eventual payment or performance of the judgment or decree, the execution of which is stayed by the supersedeas, in case the appeal or writ of error is not prosecuted to effect. Here, although the writ of error has been sued out to obtain the reversal of the entire judgment, a stay of execution is sought only as to certain specified parts. The judgment is severable as between the defendants, and has actually been severed by the court below for the purposes of the stay of execution. We see no impropriety in this, as in legal effect the judgment as it stands is against each of the several defendants for the lands they
It is said, however, that if the judgment is separate, so that each defendant is entitled to a stay independently of the others, each must sue out his separate writ of error. To this we do not agree. The writ and tfie supersedeas are two separate things, and the writ can be sustained without a supersedeas. All the defendants want the judgment reviewed, but a part only desire to have the execution against them stayed; and we see no reason why they may not all join in the writ, and separate when they ask for a stay. There is certainly no settled practice against it, and very strong reasons can be found in its favor. The whole question is one of practice and not of statutory law. “ Good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in error or the appellant . . . shall answer all damages and costs,” “if he fail to make his plea good,” is all the statute (Rev. Stat. sect., 1000) requires; and the rules of practice are satisfied if the indemnity is commensurate with the damages that may follow from the stay which is effected. But if the writ is informal, the remedy is by motion to vacate the writ, and not by mandamus to have the judgment carried into execution.
Petition denied.
Cases cited
- Stafford v. Union Bank 17 How. 275 p. 3, p. 4
- Jerome v. McCarter 21 Wall. 17 p. 4, p. 5
- Postmaster General v. Trigg 11 Pet. 173 p. 4