Majority — Miller J.
Syllabus
1. The tax on interest paid by corporations under sect. 122 of the internal-revenue law, as amended by the act of .July 13, I860 ( 14 Stat. 138 ), is an excise tax on tiieir business, to be paid by them out of their earnings, income, and profits.delivered the opinion of the court.
As the sum involved in this suit is small, and the law under which the tax in question was collected has long since been repealed, the case is of little consequence as regards any principle involved in it as a rule of future action. . .
The tax was assessed under sect. 122 of the internal-revenue law, as amended by the act of 1866. What is pertinent to this case reads as follows : —
“Any railroad, canal, turnpike, canal-navigation, or slack-water company, indebted for any money for which bonds or other evidence •of indebtedness have been issued, payable in one or more years
after date, upon which interest is stipulated to be paid, or coupons representing the interest, or any such company that may have declared any dividend in scrip, or money due or payable to its stockholders, including non-residents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings, profits, income, or gains of such company, and all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund, or used for construction, shall be subject to and pay a tax of five per centum on the amount of all such interest or coupons, dividends or profits, whenever and wherever the same shall be payable, and to whatsoever party or person the same may be payable, including non-residents, whether citizens or aliens; and said companies are hereby authorized to deduct and withhold from all payrnents on account. of any interest, or coupons, and dividends due and payable, as aforesaid, the tax of five'per centum; and the payment of the amount of said tax so deducted from the interest, or coupons, or dividends, and certified by the president or treasurer of said company, shall discharge said company from that amount of the dividend or interest, or coupon on the bonds, or other evidences of their indebtedness so held by any person or party whatever, except where said companies have contracted otherwise.” 14 Stat. 138 .
The agreed statement on which the case was tried shows that the tax was for interest paid by the company on sterling bonds in. London, which bonds were issued long before the internal-revenue law was enacted, and it is perhaps fairly to be inferred from the statement that the bonds were held at the time by foreigners.
It is on this latter feature of the case that resistance to the tax is founded. It is urged that it is a tax on the property —if property it may be called — of persons not subject to the jurisdiction of this government, and therefore beyond the power of Congress to levy or enforce.
That the tax was actually collected without resistance, and the present suit'is' brought to recover it back, is sufficient answer to the assertion that it could not be enforced. '
Whether Congress, having the power to enforce the law, has the authority to levy such a tax on the interest due by a citizen of the United States to one who is not domiciled within our limits, and who owes the government no allegiance, is a question which we do not think necessary to the decision of this case.
Manifestly, such a mode of ascertaining the net earnings of the company would not be complete unless the sums paid as interest on their bonded debts were taken into the account.
Of course it was competent for Congress to tax only the earnings'after deducting this interest paid on their debt, or to treat the sum so paid as part of the net earnings, and paid out of them as dividends were. It adopted the latter policy.
It results from this course of observation that the tax was not laid on the bondholder who received the interest, but on the earnings of the corporation which paid the interest.
It is very true that the act went further, and declared that, except when the company had contracted otherwise, it might deduct this tax from the amount due the bondholders. And where the bondholder was subject to congressional legislation, by reason of citizenship, residence, or situs of the property taxed, it ufas within the lawful power of Congress to do so. Whether, as a question of international law, this declaration
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Haight v. Railroad Co. 6 Wall. 15 p. 596
- Railroad Co. v. Rose 95 U. S. 78 p. 596
- Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania 15 Wall. 300 at 325 p. 596
- Murray v. Charleston 96 U. S. 432 p. 596