p. 329the loyal States or elsewhere, 13,435 bales of cotton bwned by them in said State, and that permits be given them for that purpose by the-acting collector of customs at New Orleans:
“ It is ordered that all cotton moving in compliance with such direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, or permits granted in pursuance theréof, shall be free, from seizui’e or detention by any. officer of the government, - and commandants of military departments, districts, posts, and detachments, naval stations, gunboats, flotillas, .and fleets will observe this order, and give the said J. S. Clark and E. Fulton, their agents and transports; proper facilities and "passes for the purpose of getting said cotton through the lines, and safe conduct within our lines whilé the same is moving in strict compliance with the directions of the Secretary of the Treasury and permits, above referred to.
Mr. Samuel Shellabarger and Mr. John J. Weed for the appellants.
The appellants might have recovered of the provost-marshal-general at NeW Orleans the money which he received from them- to secure the release of their cotton and the indorsement of the permit and executive order. His wrongful and fraudulent extortion of the money which was ultimately taken from him.and deposited in the treasury did not divest them of their title to it, nor bar their right to recover it' of the United States.Ah action may be maintained wheriever the defendant, who has /received money belonging to the plaintiff, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity, to refund it. Carey v. Curtis, 3 How. 236 ; Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 689 ; Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005; Clark v. Shee, Cowp. 197; Butler v. Harrison, id. 565; Chilton v. Braiden’s Administratrix, 2 Black, 458 ; Castle, et al. v. Bullard, 23 How. 172 ; Olmstead v. Hotaling, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 318; Bank of Boston v. United States, 10 Ct. of Cl. 519.The appellants paid the money to the provost-marshal-general to. procure the release of their property which he had illegally seized; and to obtain the possession of it which he unlawfully detained from them. It is well settled that a party paying money for such a purpose may recover it in an action
p. 330for money had and received. Atlee v. Backhouse, 6 Mee. & W. 633, 650; Chase v. Dwinall, 7 Me. 134 ; Oates v. Hudson, 6 Exch. 346; Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 Barn. & Cress. 73; Joyner v. Egremont, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 567 ; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 7 ; Boston Sandwich Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Mich. 181 ; Riply v. Gelston, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 201 ; Clinton v. Strong, 9 id. 370; Baltimore v. Heffernan, 4 Gill (Md.), 425; Forbes v. Appleton, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 118 ; Storer v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 213 ; 1 Parsons, Contracts, 395, 5th ed.■ The right of the appellants to recover , in this action cannot be defeated, upon the maxim,. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.The evidence does not establish such a state of facts as renders this principle applicable. The appellants’ cotton had been seized previously to the payment' of the money, and the executive order of the President of the United-States, exempting it from seizure by the military authorities, was ignored and treated with contempt. The acts of the p'rovost-marshal- ' general were illegal and oppressive, and the appellants were obliged to pay the money extorted by.that officer or submit to those acts. It was' nót a case of par delictum. It was oppression on one side and submission- on the other.' It can never be predicated as par delictum, when one holds the rod and the other bows to it. Smith v. Cuff, 6 Man. & Sel. 160; Alsoqer v. Spalding, 4 Bing. N. C. 407; Horton v. Riley, 11 Mee. & W. 492; Browning v. Morris, Cowp. 790.The Solicitor-General, contra.
delivered the opinion of. the court.
Upon the facts found the court below was right in treating this as a case of bribery rather than' extortion. The claimants undoubtedly held an executive license to transport by way of New Orleans, notwithstanding the act of July 2,1864 ( 13 Stat. 377 , sect. 9), any cotton they had bought in the parishes of East Feliciana and West Feliciana, under the authority of the special agent- of the treasury'at New Orleans, if they gave the required bond and presented to the acting collector of customs' at that-' port the original authorities or permits under which
p. 331they acted, or copies thereof certified by the officer with whom they were filed, with proof to the satisfaction of the acting, collector that the cotton was actually purchased in good faith under and by virtue of such authorities. By the express terms of this licence any cotton transported, or attempted to be trans-, ported, under it, without the original permits or authorities or certified copies and proof required, was subject to seizure and condemnation. It is not pretended that when the seizure was made the claimants had in their possession any evidence of their right, under this authorization, to transport the cotton which was seized. While it has been found that the bond was executed and delivered to the acting collector on the 16th of November, 1864, the findings are entirely silent as to the presentation of the original permits or the required proof before the transportation was entered upon. Neither did the executive license .have upon it the prescribed certificate that the bond had been executed and delivered. Under such, circumstances the seizure could not have been wrongful in the first instance. It was the duty of the military authorities at that point to eee that nothing passed out from the enemy’s country under this authority until the requisite evidence was furnished. New Orleans was a military post, and Congress had seen fit to restrict materially the power of the President to permit commercial intercourse with the inhabitants of the insurgent territory. The executive license, when construed in' connection with this new congressional action, wás evidently intended .only to protect such rights as had become vested under previous authorities or,permits rightfully-issued. Therefore, nothing could pass except what the collector had been satisfied by proof was “ actually purchased in good faith under and by virtue of said authorities.”
The claimants, when the seizure was made, did not attempt to secure a release by producing the necessary evidence of their rights, but by tempting á subordinate .officer in the military service by a liberal offer of money.. He > made no demands, but accepted what they voluntarily gave him. Tn this way the executive order was evaded and a pass through the lines secured by corrupting an officer. Clearly this' was bribery, and placed the claimants and the man'they corrupted in pari
p. 332delicto. They could not recover back from him the money they paid, neither can they from the United States after it has been taken, from him as a punishment for his. faithlessness to his trust.
It is insisted, howfever, that when the claimants presented to the inilitary authorities the executive license, with the certificate of the acting -collector indorsed to the effect that the requisite bond- had^been delivered to him, they had- done all that was required to get, their property back and proceed with the' transportation; They evidently did not so understand the effect pf what they had done, for they voluntarily offered and' paid more money to secure .what they wanted, and that they interpreted, the instrument. correctly is, to our minds, clear. The execution of the bond is one thing, and the production of the original permits and proof anóther. It is true that in the ■ license the provision as to the bond follows that as to the per.mits and proof; but the delivery and acceptance of the bond were no more evidence of the.presentation of the permits than the presentation of the permits would have been of the" delivery of the- bond. The certificate of the bond on the license was evidence of the performance of that condition,-but nothing more. The execution of the bond was not at all dependent on the presentation of the permits and proof. The penalty of the bond was fixed in Washington and. specified ini the license .itself, and it was entirely immaterial, so far as the requirements of the license were concerned, whether the. bond was delivered before ' or after anything else was done. Before, therefore; the commanding general could be required to release, the seizure,- it must have been shown to him that the acting. collector was satisfied ■ that the original permits had been given,.and the purchases in good faith made, as alleged by the. claimants. Instead of attempting to make such a showing, bribery was resorted'to, and in that way the necessary order obtained.
Beyond all doubt, the judgment below was right, and it is. consequently,' -
'Affirmed.