Civil Rights Cases

delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the above language he continued:

It is obvious that the primary and important question in all

The sections of the law referred to provide as follows:

“'Sec. l. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.

“ Sec. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall also, for every such offence, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, thereof, shall, be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year: Provided, That all persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid, or to proceed under their rights at common law and by State statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal law of any State: And provided further, That a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively.”

Are these sections constitutional? The first section, which is the principal one, cannot be fairly understood without attending to the last clause, which qualifies the preceding part.

The essence of the law is, not to declare broadly that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,

Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? Of course, no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments. The power is sought, first, in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the views and arguments of distinguished Senators, advanced whilst the law was under consideration, claiming authority to pass it by virtue of that amendment, are the principal arguments adduced in favor of the power. We have carefully considered those arguments, as was due to the eminent ability of those who put them forward, and have felt, in all its force, the weight of authority which always invests a law that Congress deems itself competent to pass. But the responsibility of an independent judgment is now thrown upon this court; and we are bound to exercise it according to the best lights we have.

The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment (which is the one relied on), after declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, and of the several States, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the States. It declares that:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, but, in order that the national will, thus declared, may not be a mere brutum fulmen, the last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correc

An apt illustration of this distinction may be found in some of the provisions of the original Constitution. Take the subject of contracts, for example. The Constitution prohibited the States from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This did not give to Congress power to provide laws for the general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by State legislation might be counteracted and corrected: and this power was exercised. The remedy which Congress actually provided was that contained in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85 , giving to the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction by writ of error to review the final decisions of State courts whenever they should sustain the validity of a State statute or authority alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. By this means, if a State law was passed impairing the obligation of a contract, and the State tribunals sustained the validity of the law, the mischief could be corrected in this court. The legislation of Congress, and the proceedings provided for under it, were corrective in their character. No attempt was made to draw into the United States courts the litigation of contracts generally; and no such attempt would have been sustained. We do not say that the remedy provided was the only one that might have been provided in that case. Probably Congress had power to pass a law giving to the courts of the United States direct jurisdiction over contracts alleged to be impaired by a State law; and under the broad provisions of the act of March 3d, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 , giving to the circuit courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is possible that such jurisdiction now exists. But under that, or any other law, it must appear as

And so in the present case, until some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority. Of course, legislation may, and should be, provided in advance to meet the exigency when it arises, but it should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the amendment was intended to provide against; and that is, State laws, or State action of some kind, adverse to the, rights of the citizen secured by the amendment. Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole, domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take the place of the State legislatures and to supersede them. It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty and property (which include all civil rights that men have), are by the amendment sought to be protected against invasion on the part of the State without due process of law, Congress may therefore provide due process of law for their vindication in every case; and that, because the denial by a State to any persons, of the equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress may establish laws for their equal protection. In fine, the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may

An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States. It is not predicated on any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed offences, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States; it does not make its operation to depend upon any such wrong committed. It applies equally to cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the amendment. In other words, it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authorities.

If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why may not Congress with equal show of authority enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty, and property? If it is supposable that the States may deprive persons of life, liberty, and property without due process of law (and the amendment itself does suppose this), why should not Congress proceed at once to prescribe due process of law for the protection of every one of these fundamental rights, in every possible case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances, and theatres? The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this manner is based

We have not overlooked the fact that the fourth section of the act now under consideration has been held by this court to be constitutional. That section declares “that no citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not more than five thousand dollars.” In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , it was held that an indictment against a State officer under this section for excluding persons of color from the jury list is sustainable. But a moment’s attention to its terms will show that the section is entirely corrective in its character. Disqualifications for service on juries are only created by the law, and the first part of the section is aimed at certain disqualifying laws, namely, those which make mere race or color a disqualification; and the second clause is directed against those who, assuming to use the authority of the State government, carry into effect such a rule of disqualification. In the Virginia case, the State, through its officer, enforced a rule of disqualification which the law was intended to abrogate and counteract. Whether the statute book of the State actually laid down any such rule of disqualification, or not, the State, through its officer, enforced such a rule: and it is against such State action, through its officers and agents, that the last clause of the section is directed.

These sections, in the objectionable features before referred to, are different also from the law ordinarily called the “ Civil Rights Bill,” originally passed April 9th, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 , ch. 31, and re-enacted with some modifications in sections 16, 17, 18, of the Enforcement Act, -passed May 31st, 1870, 16 Stat. 140 , ch. 114. That law, as re-enacted, after declaring that all persons within the- jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every -State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, proceeds to enact, that any. person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any rights secured or protected by the preceding section (above quoted), or to different punishment, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to fine and imprisonment as specified in the act. This law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and -proceedings, and customs haying the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified.- In the Revised Statutes, it is true, a very important clause, to wit, the words “any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding,” which gave the declaratory section its point and effect, are omitted; but the penal part, by which the declaration is enforced, and which is really the effective part of the law, retains the reference to State, laws, by making the penalty apply only to those who should subject

In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect' his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress. An individual cannot deprive a man. of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness or a juror; he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the right m a particular case; he may commit an assault against the person, or commit murder, or use ruffian violence at the polls, or slander the good name of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy or injure -the right; he will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment; and amenable therefor to the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed. Hence, in all those cases where the Constitution seeks to protect the rights of the citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of the State by prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offences, but abrogation and

Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which Congress'is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, the coining of money, the establishment of post offices and post xéads, the declaring of war, etc. In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in respect thereof. But where a subject is not submitted to the general legislative power of Congress, but is only submitted thereto for the purpose of rendering effective some prohibition against particular State legislation or State action in reference to that subject, the power given is limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in the matter must- necessarily be corrective in its character, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited State laws or proceedings of State officers.

If the principles of interpretation which we have laid down are correct, as we deem them to be (and they are in accord with the principles laid down in the cases before referred to, as well as in the recent case of United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 ), it is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative power .made to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment prohibits the States from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, and declares that Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the amendment. The law in question, without any reference to adverse State legislation oh- the subr

We have discussed'the question presented by the law on the assumption that a right to enjoy equal accommodation and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, is one of the essential rights of the citizen which no State can abridge or interfere with. Whether it is such a right, or not, is a different question which, in the'view we have taken of the validity of the law on the ground already stated, it is not necessary to examine.

We have also discussed the validity of the law in reference to cases arising in the States only; and not in reference to cases .arising in the Territories or the District of Columbia, which are subject to the plenary legislation of Congress in every branch of municipal regulation. Whether the law wpuld be a valid one as applied to the Territories and the District is not a question for consideration in the cases before us :• they all being cases arising within the limits of States. And whether Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another, is also' a question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in any such view.

This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom. Still, • legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary .servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.

It is true, that slavery cannot exist without law, any more than property in lands and goods can exist without law: and, therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment may be regarded as nullifying all State laws which establish or uphold slavery. But it has a reflex character also, establishing and. decreeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States^ and it is assumed, that the power vested in Congress tp enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all .badges and incidents'of slavery in the United States: and upon this assumption it is claimed, that this is sufficient author-' ity for. declaring by law that all persons shall have equal accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement; the argument being, that the denial of such equal accommodations and privileges'is, in itself, a subjection to a species of servitude withiii the meaning of the amendment. Conceding the major proposition to be true, that

In a very able and learned presentation of the cognate question as to the extent of the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens which cannot rightfully be abridged by state laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, made in a former case, a long list of burdens and disabilities of a servile'character, incident to feudal vassalage in France, and which were abolished by the decrees of the National Assembly, was presented for the purpose of showing that all inequalities and observances exacted by 'one man from another were servitudes, or badges of slavery, which a great nation, in its effort to establish universal liberty, made haste to wipe out and destroy. But these were servitudes imposed by the old law, or by long custom, which had the force of law, and exacted by one man from another without the latter’s consent.' Should any such servitudes be imposed by a state law, there can be no doubt that the law would be repugnant to the Fourteenth, no less than to the Thirteenth Amendment ; nor any greater doubt that Congress has adequate power to forbid any such servitude from being exacted.

But is there any similarity between such servitudes and a denial by the owner of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, of its accommodations and privileges to an individual, even though the denial be founded on the race or color of that individual? Where does any slavery or servitude, or badge of either, arise from such an act of denial ? Whether it might not be a denial of a right which, if sanctioned by the state law, would be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, is another question.. But'what has it to do with the question of slavery ?

It may be that by the Black Code (as it was called), in the times when slavery prevailed, the proprietors of inns and public

* The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents. Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his movements except by the master’s will, disability to hold property, to make contracts, to" have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities, were the inseparable incidents of the institution^ Severer punishments for crimes were imposed on the slave than on free persons guilty of the same offences. Congress, as we have seen, by the Civil Rights' Bill of 1866, passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment, before the Fourteenth was adopted, undertook to wipe out these burdens and disabilities,-the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its substance and visible form; and to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. "Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment alone, without the support which it afterward received from the Fourteenth Amendment, after the adoption of which it was re-enacted with some additions, it is not necessary to inquire. It is referred to for the purpose of showing that at that time (in 1866) Congress did not assume, under the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust • what may be called the social rights of men and races in the community; but only to. declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the* essence of-citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential- distinction between freedom and slavery.

The only question under, the present head, therefore, is, whether the refusal to any persons of the accommodations of an inn, or a public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, by an individual, and without any sanction or support from' any State law or regulation, does inflict upon such persons any manner of servitude, or form of slavery, as those terms are understood in this country % Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibitions ’ of the Fourteenth Amendment which are not, in any just sense, incidents or elements of slavery., - Such, for* example, would be the taking of private property without due process of law; or allowing persons who have committed certain crimes (horse stealing, for example) to be seized and hung by the posse comitatus without regular trial; or denying to any person, or class of persons, the fright to pursue any peaceful

. Now, conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the admission to an inn, a public conveyance, or a place .of public amusement, on equal terms with all other citizens, is the right of every man and all classes of men, is it a.ny more .than one of those rights which the states by the Fourteenth Amendment are forbidden to deny to any person 2 And is the Constitution violated. until the denial of the right has some State, sanction or authority 2 Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the Ann,the public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an. ordinary civil injury, properly, cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears 2

■ After giving to these .questions all the consideration which their importance demands, w;e are forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing tp do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought under the laws of the State; or if those laws are adverse to his- rights and do not protect him, his remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of State laws, or State action, prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. (It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make .it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see .fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in

When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere-citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and 1 when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s.rights.aie protected.1' There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential fights of life, liberty and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery. If, since that time, the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respects has become established by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the Thirteenth Amendment (which merely abolishes slavery), but by force of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

On the whole Ave are of opinion, that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned.

This conclusion disposes of the cases now under consideration. In the cases of the United States v. Michael Ryan, and of Richard A. Robinson and Wife v. The Memphis & Charles

dissenting.

The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism.' “ It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul.” ' Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging ;'to American citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental law. By this I do not mean that the determination of these cases should have been materially controlled by considerations of mere expediency or policy. I mean only, in this form, to express an earnest conviction that the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full, effect be given to the intent with which they were adopted.

The purpose of the first section of the a'ct of Congress of March 1, 1815, was to prevent race discrimination in respect of the accommodations and facilities of inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement. It does not assume to define the general conditions and limitations under -which inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement may be conducted, but only declares that' such conditions and limitations, whatever they may be, shall not be applied so as to work a

There seems to be no substantial difference between my brethren and myself as to the purpose of Congress; for, they say that the essence of .-the law is, not to declare broadly that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and theatres; but that such enjoyment shall not be subject to conditions applicable only to citizens of a particular race or color, or who had been in a previous condition of servitude. The effect of the statute, the court says, is, that colored citizens, whether formerly slaves or not, and citizens of other races, shall have the same accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement- as are enjoyed by white persons; and vice versa,.

The court adjudges, I think erroneously, that Congress is without power, under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment, to establish such regulations, and that the first and second sections of the statute are, in all their parts, unconstitutional and void.

Whether the legislative department of the government has transcended the limits of its constitutional powers, “ is at all times,” said this court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 128, “ a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to bo decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case. . . . The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibihty with each other.” More recently in Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 718 , we said: “It is our duty when required in the regular course of judicial proceedings, to declare an act of Congress void if not within the legislative power of the United States, but this declaration should never be made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is

Before considering the language and scope of these amendments it-will be proper to recall the relations subsisting, prior to their adoption, between the national- government and the institution'of slavery, as indicated by the provisions of the Constitution, the legislation of Congress, and the decisions of this court. In this mode we may obtain keys with which to open the mind of the people, and discover the thought intended to be expressed. -

In section 2 of article IV. of the Constitution it was provided that “ no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” Under the authority of this clause Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1193, establishing a mode for the recovery of fugitive slaves, and prescribing a penalty against any person who should knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder the master, bis agent, or attorney, in seizing, arresting, and recovering the fugitive, or who should rescue the fugitive from him, or who should harbor or conceal the slave after notice that he was a fugitive.

In Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 , this court had occasion to define the powers and duties of Congress in reference to fugitives from labor. Speaking by TVTr.Justice Story it laid down these propositions:

That a clause of the Constitution conferring a right should not be so construed ás to make it shadowy, or unsubstantial, or leave the citizen without a remedial power adequate for its protection, when another construction equally accordant with the words and the sense in which they were used, would enforce and protect the right granted;

That Congress is not restricted to legislation for the execu

That the'Constitution recognized the master’s right of property in his fugitive slave, and, as incidental thereto, the right of seizing and recovering him, regardless of any State law, or regulation, or local custom whatsoever; and,

.That the right of the master to have his slave, thus escaping, delivered up on claim, being guaranteed by the Constitution, the fair implication was that the national government was clothed with appropriate authority and functions to enforce it.

The court said: “ The fundamental principle, applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem to be that when the end is required the means are given, and when the duty is enjoined the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the functionary to whom it is entrusted.” Again: “ It would be a strange anomaly and forced construction to suppose that the national government meant to .rely for the due fulfilment of its own proper duties, and the rights which it intended to secure, upon State legislation, and not upon that of the Union. A fortiori, it would be more objectionable to suppose that a power which was to be the same throughout the Union, should be confided to State sovereignty which could not rightfully act beyond its own territorial limits.”-

The act of 1793 was, upon these grounds, adjudged to be a constitutional exercise of the powers of Congress.

It is to be observed from the report of Priggs’ case that Pennsylvania,, by her attorney-general, pressed the argument that the pbligation t'o surrender fugitive slaves was on the States and for the States, subject to the restriction that 'thfey should-not pass laws or establish regulations liberating such fugitives; that the Constitution, did not take from the States the right to determine the status of all persons within their respective jurisdictions; that it Avas for the State in Avhich the alleged fugitive Avas found to determine, through her courts or in such modes as she prescribed,'whether the person arrested Avas, in fact, a freeman or a fugitive slave; that the sole power

We next come to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the constitutionality of which rested, as did that of 1793, solely upon the implied power of Congress to enforce the master’s rights. The provisions of that act were far in advance of previous legislation. They placed at the disposal of the master seeking to recover his fugitive slave, substantially the whole power of the nation. It invested commissioners, appointed under the act, with power to summon the posse comitatus for the enforcement of its provisions, and commanded all good citizens to assist in its prompt and efficient execution whenever their services were required as part of the posse comitatus. Without going into the details of that act, it is sufficient to say that Congress omitted from it nothing which the utmost ingenuity could suggest as essential to the successful enforcement of the master’s claim to recover his fugitive slave. And this court, in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 , adjudged it' to be “ in all of its provisions fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States.”

The only .other case, prior to the adoption of the recent amendments, to which reference will be made, is that of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Flow. 399. That case was. instituted in a circuit court of the .United States by Dred Scott, claiming to be a citizen of Missouri, the defendant being a citizen of another State. Its object was to assert the title of himself and family to freedom. The defendant pleaded in abatement that Scott — being of African descent, whose ancestors, of pure African blood, were brought into this country and sold as slaves — was not a citizen. The only matter in issue, said the court, was whether the descendants of slaves thus imported

In determining that question the court instituted an inquiry as to who. were citizens of the several States at the adoption of the Constitution, and who, at that time, were recognized as the people whose rights and liberties had been violated by the British government. The result was a declaration, by this court, speaking by Chief Justice Taney, that the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, showed “ that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that instrument; ” that “ they had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior race, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the Avhite man Avas bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit; ” that he Avas “ bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, AvheneATer a profit could be made by it; ” and, that “ this opinion Avas at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the Avhite race. It Avas regarded as an axiom in morals as Avell as in politics, Avhich no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, Avithout for a moment doubting the correctness of this opinion.”

The judgment of the court was that the words “ people of the United States ” and “.citizens ” meant the same thing, both describing “ the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives; ” that “ they are what we familiarly call the £ sovereign people,’ and

Such were the relations'which formerly existed between' the government, whether national or state, and the descendants, whether free or in bondage, of those of African- blood, who had been imported into this country and sold as slaves.

The first section of the Thirteenth Amendment provides that “ neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Its second section declares that “ Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” This amendment was followed by the Civil Rights' Act of April 9,1866, which, among other things, provided that “ all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared ■ to be citizens - of the United States.” 14 Stat. 27 . The power of .Congress, in this mode, to elevate the enfranchised race to'national citizenship, was maintained by the supporters of the act of 1866 to be as full and complete as its power, by general statute, to make the children, being of full age, of persons naturalized in this country, citizens of the United States without going through the process of naturalization. The act of 1866, in this respect, was also likened to that of 1843, in which Congress declared “ that' the Stockbridge tribe of Indians, and each and every one of them, shall be deemed to be and are hereby declared to be, citizens of the United States to

((The terms of the Thirteenth Amendment are absolute and universal. They embrace every race which then was, or might thereafter be, within the United States. No race, as such, can be-excluded from the benefits or rights thereby conferred. ) Yet, it is historically '.true that that amendment was suggested by the condition, in this country, of that race which had been declared, by this court, to have had — according to the opinion entertained by the most civilized portion of the white race, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution — “ no rights Avhich the Avhite man was bound to respect,” none of the privileges or immunities secured by that instrument to citizens of the United States. It had reference, in a peculiar sense, to a people which (although the larger part of them were in slavery) had been invited by an act of Congress to aid in saving from overthroAV a government which, theretofore, by all of its departments, had treated them as an inferior race, Avith no legal rights or privileges except such- as the Avhite race might choose to grant them.

These are the circumstances under which the Thirteenth Amendment Avas proposed for adoption. They are now recalled only that Ave may better understand Avhat was in the minds of the people when that amendment was considered, and what Avere the mischiefs to be remediéd and the grievances to be redressed by its adoption.

"We have seen that the poAver of Congress, by legislation, to enforce the master’s right to have his slave delivered up on claim was implied from the recognition of that right in the national Constitution. But the. poAver conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment does not rest- upqn implication or

The .Thirteenth Amendment, it is conceded, did something more than to prohibit’ slavery as an institution, resting upon distinctions of race, and upheld by positive law. My brethren admit that it established and decreed universal emit freedom throughout the United States. But did the freedom thus established involve nothing more than exemption from actual slavery? Was nothing more intended than to forbid one man from owning another as property? Was it the purpose of the nation simply to destroy the institution, and then remit the race, theretofore held in bondage, to the several States for such-protection, in their civil rights, necessarily growing out of freedom, as those States, in their discretion, might choose to provide j) Were the States against whose protest the institution was destroyed, to be left.free, so far as .national interference was concerned, to make or allow discriminations against that race, as such, in the enjoyment of those fundamental right's which by uriiversal concession, inhere in a state of freedom ?

That there are burdens and .disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and servitude, and that' the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the Thirteenth Amendment may be exerted by legislation of a direct and primary character, for the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its bádges and incidents, are propositions which ought to be deemed indisputable. They lie at the foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Whether that act was authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment alone, without the support which it subsequently received from thé Fourteenth Amendment, after. the adoption of which it was re-enacted with some additions, my brethren do not consider it necessary to inquire. Bút I submit, with all respect to thorn, that its constitutionality is conclusively shown by their opinion. They admit, as I have said, that the Thirteenth Amendment established freedom; that there are burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, which constitute its substance and visible form; that Congress, by the act of 1866, passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment, before the Fourteenth was adopted, undertook to remove certain burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, and to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enfore contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property as is enjoyed by white citizens; that under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has to do with slavery and

To test .the correctness of this position, let us suppose that, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State had passed a statute denying to freemen of African descent, resident within its limits, the same right which was accorded to white persons, of making and enforcing contracts, and. of inheriting, purchasing, leasing, selling and conveying property-; or a statute subjecting colored people to severer punishment for particular offences than was prescribed for white persons, or excluding that race from the benefit of the laws exempting homesteads from execution. Recall the legislation of 1865-6 in some of the States, of which this court, in the Slaughter

What has been said is sufficient to show that the power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment is not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the liberated race against discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen, where such discrimination is based upon race.

It remains now to inquire what are the legal' rights of colored persons in respect of the accommodations, privileges and facilities of public conveyances, inns and places of public amusement ?

First, as to public conveyances on land and water. In New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344 , this court, speaking by Mr.. Justice Nelson, said that a common carrier is “ in the exercise of a sort of public office, and has public duties to perform, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the parties concerned.” To the same effect is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 . In Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 , it was ruled that

, “ The establishment of that great thoroughfare is regarded as a public work, established by public authority, intended for the public use and benefit, the use of which is secured to the whole,community, and constitutes, therefore, like a canal, turnpike, or highway, a public easement. . . . It is true that the real and personal property, necessary to the establishment and management of the railroad, is vested in the corporation ; but it is in trust for the public.” In Erie, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287 , thecourt, referring to an act repealing the .'charter of a railroad, and under which the State took possession of the road, said: “ It is a public highway, solemnly devoted to public use; When the lands were taken it was for such use, or they could not have been taken at all. „ . . Railroads es

tablished upon land taken by the right of eminent domain by authority of the commonwealth, created by her laws as thoroughfares for commerce, are her highways. No corporation has property in them, though it máy have franchises annexed to and exercisable within them.”

In many courts it has been held that because of the public interest in such a corporation the land of a railroad company cannot be levied on and sold' under execution-by a creditor. The sum of the adjudged cases is that a railroad corporation is a govermnental agency, -created primarily for public purposes, and subject to be controlled for the public benefit. Upon this ground the State, when unfettered by contract, may regulate, in its discretion, the' rates of fares of passengers and freight. And upon this ground, too, the State may regulate the entire management of railroads in all matters affecting the convenience and safety of the public; as, for example, by regulating speed, compelling stops of prescribed length at stations, and prohibiting discriminations and favoritism. If the corporation neglect or refuse to discharge its duties to. the public, it may be coerced to do so by appropriate proceedings in the name or in behalf of the State.

Such being the relations these corporations hold to the public, it would seem that the right of a colored person to use an improved public highway, upon the terms accorded to freemen of other races, is as fundamental, in the state of freedom established in this country, as are any of the rights which my brethren concede to be so far fundamental as to be deemed the essence of civil freedom. “Personal liberty consists,” says Blackstone, “ in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatever places one’s own inclination may direct, without restraint, unless by due course of law.” But of what value is this right of locomotion, if it may be clogged by such burdens :as Congress intended by the act of 1815 to.remove? They are burdens which lay at the very foundation of the institution of slavery as it once existed. They are not to be sustained, except upon the assumption that there is, in this land of universal liberty, a class which may still be discriminated against, even in respect of rights of a character

. Second, as to inns. The same general observations'which have, been made as to railroads are applicable to inns. The word ‘ inn ’ has a technical legal signification. It means, in the act of 1875, just what it meant at common law. A mere private boarding-house is not an.inn, nor is its keeper subject to the responsibilities, or entitled to the privileges of a common innkeeper. . “ To constitute one an innkeeper, within the legal force of that term, he must keep a house of entertainment or lodging for all travellers or wayfarers who might choose to accept the same, being of good character or conduct.” Redfield on Carriers, etc., § 575. Says Judge Story:

“ An innkeeper may be defined to be the keeper of a common inn for the lodging and entertainment of travellers and passengers, their 'horses and attendants. An innkeeper is bound to take in all travellers'and wayfaring persons, and to entertain them, if he can accommodate them, for a reasonable compensation ; and he must guard their goods with proper diligence. . . . If an innkeeper improperly refuses to receive or provide for a guest, he is liable to be indicted therefor......They (carriers of passengers) are no more at liberty to refuse a passenger, if they have sufficient room and accommodations, than an innkeeper is to refuse suitable room and accommodations to a guest.” Story on Bailments, §§ 475-6.

In Rex v. Ivens, 7 Carrington & Payne, 213, 32 E. C. L. 495, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Coleridge, said:

“An indictment lies against an innkeeper who refuses to receive a guest, he having at the time, room in his house ; and either the price of the guest’s entertainment being tendered to him, or such circumstances occurring as will dispense with that

tender. This law is founded- in good sense. The innkeeper is not to select his guests. He has no right to say to one, you shall come to my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants, they having in return a kind of privilege of entertaining travellers and supplying them with what they want.”

These authorities are sufficient to show that a keeper of an inn is in the exercise of a quasi public employment. The law gives him special privileges and he is charged with certain duties and responsibilities to the public. The public nature of his employment forbids him from discriminating against any person asking admission as a guest on account of the race or color of that person.

Third. As to places of public amusement. It may be argued that the managers of such places have no duties to perform with which the public-are, in any legal sense, concerned, or with which the public have any right to interfere; and, that the exclusion of a black man from a place of public amusement, on account of his race, or the denial to him, on that ground, of equal accommodations at such places, violates no legal right for the vindication of which he may invoke the aid of the courts. My answer is, that places of public amusement, within the meaning of the act of 1815, are such as are established and maintained under direct license of the law. The authority to establish and maintain them comes from the public. The colored race is a part of that public. The local government granting the license represents them as well as all other races within its jurisdiction. A license from the public to establish a place of public amusement, imports, in law, equality of right, at such places, among ah the members of that public. This must be-so, unless it be — which I deny — that the common municipal government of all the people may, in the exertion of its powers, conferred for the benefit of all, discriminate or authorize discrimination against a particular race, solely because of its former condition M servitude.

I also submit, whether it can be said — in-view of the doctrines of this court as announced in Munn v. State of Illinois,

“ Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in- that (usé, .and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.”

The doctrines of Munn v. Illinois havq never been modified by this court, and I am justified, upon the authority of that case, in saying , that places of public amusement, conducted under the authority of the law, are clothed with a public interest, because use'd in a' manner to make them of public consequence and to affect the community at large. The law may therefore regulate, to some extent, the mode in which they shall be conducted, and, consequently, the public have rights in respect of such places, which- may be vindicated by the law. It is consequently not a matter purely of private concern.

Congress has not, in these matters, entered the domain of ¡State control and supervision. It does not, as I have said, assume to prescribe the, general conditions and limitations under which inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, shall be conducted or managed. It simply declares, in effect, that since the nation has established universal freedom in this country, for all time, there shall be no discrimination, based merely upon race or color, in respect of thé accommodations

I am of the opinion that such discrimination practised by corporations and individuals in. the exercise of their public or quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment; and, consequently, without reference to its enlarged power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the act of March 1,1875, is not, in my judgment, repugnaht to the Constitution.

It remains now to consider these cases with reference to the power Congress has possessed since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Much that has been said as to the power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment is applicable to .this branch of the discussion, and will not be repeated.

Before the adoption of the récent amendments, it had become, as we have seen, the established doctrine of this court that negroes, whose ancestors had been imported and sold as slaves, could not become citizens of a State, or even of the United States, with the rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens by the national Constitution; further, that one might have all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State without being- a citizen in the sense in which that word was used in the national Constitution, and without being entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. S.tül, further, between the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and the proposal by Congress of the Fourteenth Amendment, on June 16, 1866, the statute books of several of the States, as we have seen, had become loaded down with enactments which, under the guise of Apprentice, Vagrant, and Contract regulations, sought to keep the colored race in a condition, practically; of servitude. . It was openly announced that whatever might.be the rights which persons of that race had, as freemen, under the guarantees of the national Constitution, they could not become citizens of a State, with the privileges belonging to citizens, except by the consent of such State; consequently, that their ciyil rights, as citizens of the State, depended entirely upon State legislation. To meet this new peril to the black race, that the

Remembering that this court, in the Slaughter-Mouse. Oases, declared that the one pervading purpose found in all the recent amendments, lying at the foundation of. each, and without which none of them would have been suggested — was “ the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made'freeman and citizen from the oppression-of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominión over him that each amendment was addressed primarily to the grievances' of that race — let us proceed to consider the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Its first and fifth sections are in these words:

“ Sec. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State'wherein they reside. - N-o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

“ Sec. 5. That Congress shall have power .to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

It was adjudged in Strauder v. Vest Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 , and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , and my brethren concede, that positive rights and privileges were intended to be secured, ánd are in fací secured, by the Fourteenth Amendment.

But when, under what circumstances, and' to what extent, may Congress, by meads of legislation, exert its power to enforce the provisions of this amendment? The theory of the opinion of the majority of the court — the foundation upon which their reasoniilg seems to rest — is, that the general government cannot, in advance of hostile State laws or hostile State

In illustration of its position, the court refers to the clause of the Constitution forbidding the passage by a State of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. That clause does not, I submit, furnish a proper illustration of the scope and effect of the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment. No express power is given Congress to enforce, by primary direct legislation, the prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Authority is, indeed, conferred to enact all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the enumerated powers of Congress and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof. And, as heretofore shown, there is also, by necessary implication, power in Congress, by legislation, to protect a right derived from the national Constitution. But a prohibition upon a State is not a power in Congress or in the national government. It is simply a denial of power -to the State. And the only mode in which the inhibition upon State laws impairing the obligation • of contracts can be enforced, is, indirectly, through the courts, in suits where the parties raise some question as to the constitutional validity of such laws. The judicial power of the United' States extends to such suits for the reason that they are suits arising under the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment presents' the first instance in our history of the investiture of Congress .with affirmative power, by legislation, to enforce an express prohibition upon the States. It is not said that th% judicial power of the nation may be exerted for the enforcement of that amendment; No enlargement of the judicial power was required, /for it is clear

The assumption that this amendment consists wholly of prohibitions upon State laws and State proceedings ,in hostility to its provisions, is unauthorized by its language. The first clause of the first section — “ All -persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State Wherein they reside ” —is of a distinctly affirmative character. In its application to the colored race, previously liberated, it created and granted, as well citizenship of the United States, as citizenship of the State in which they respectively resided. It introduced all of that race, whose ancestors had been imported and sold as slaves, at once, into the political community known as the “ People of the United States.” They became, instantly, citizens of the United States, amd of their respective States. Further, they were brought, by this supreme act of the nation, within the direct operation of that provision of the Constitution which declares that “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” Art. 4, § 2.

The citizenship thus acquired, by that race, in virtue of an affirmative grant from the nation, may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the government, but by congressional legislation of a primary direct character; this, because the power of Congress is not restricted to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laWs or State action. It is, in terms distinct and positive, to enforce “ the provisions of this article ” of amendment; not simply those of a prohibitive character, but the provisions — all of the provisions — affirmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. It is, therefore, a grave misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the amendment has reference exclusively to express prohibitions upon State laws or State action. If any right was created by that amendment, the

It is, therefore, an essential inquiry what, if any, right, privilege or immunity was given, by the nation, to colored persons, when they were made citizens'of thé State in which they reside ? Did the constitutional grant of State citizenship to that race, of its own force, invest them with any rights, privileges and immunities whatever? That they became entitled," upon the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, “ to all privileges and irqmunities of citizens in the several States,” within the meaning of section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution, no one, I suppose, will for a moment question. "What are the privileges and- immunities to which, by that clause of the Constitution, they became entitled? To this it may be answered, generally, upon the authority of the adjudged cases, that they are those which are fundamental in citizenship in a free republican government, such as.are “ common to the citizens in the latter-. States under their constitutions and laws by virtue of their being citizens.” Of that provision it has been said, with.the approval of this court, that no other one in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens' of the United States one people. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 ; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 ; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 ; Slaughter-house Cases, 16 id. 36.

Although this court has wisely forborne any attempt,, by a comprehensive definition, to indicate all of the privileges and immunities to which the citizen of a State is entitled, of right, when within the jurisdiction of other States, I hazard nothing, in view . of former adjudications, in saying that no State can sustain her: denial to colored citizens of other States, while within her limits', of privileges or immunities, fundamental in republican citizenship, upon the ground that she accords such privileges and immunities only to her white citizens and withholds them from her colored citizens. The colored citizens of other States, within the jurisdiction of that State, could claim, in virtue of section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution, every privilege and immunity

But what was secured to colored citizens of the United States —as between them and their respective States — by the national grant to them of State citizenship ? "With what rights, privi7 leges, or immunities did this grant invest them ? There is one, if there be no other — exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil right belonging to citizens of the white race-in the same State. That, surely, is their constitutional privilege when within the jurisdiction of other States. And such must be their constitutional right, in their own State, unless the recent amendments be splendid baubles, thrown out to delude those who deserved fair and generous treatment' at the hands of the nation. Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of civil rights among citizens of every race in the same State. It is fundamental in American citizenship, that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no discrimination by the State, or its officers, or by individuals or corporations1 exercising public functions or authority, against any citizen because of his race or previous condition of servitude. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , it was said- at page 555, that .the

The language of this court with reference to the Fifteenth Amendment, adds to the force of this view. In United States v. Cruikshank, it was said: “ In United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 , we held that the Fifteenth Amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right, which is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. From this it appears that the right of suffrage is. not a necessary attribute of national citizenship, but that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on account of race, &c., is. The right to vote in the' States comes from the States; but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States, but the last has been.”

Here, in language at once clear and forcible, is stated the principle for which I contend. It can scarcely be claimed that exemption from race discrimination, in respect of civil rights, against those to whom State citizenship was granted by the

If, then, exemption from discrimination, in respect of civil rights, is a new constitutional right, secured by the grant of State citizenship to colored citizens of the United States — and I do not see how this can now be questioned — why may not the nation, by means of its own legislation of a primary direct character, guard, protect and enforce that right ? It is a right and privilege which the nation 'conferred. It did. not .come from the States in which those colored. citizens reside. It has been the.established doctrine of this court during all its history, accepted as essential to the national supremacy, that Congress, in the absence of a positive delegation of power to the State legislatures, may, by its own legislation, enforce and protect any right derived'from or created by the national Constitution.. It was so declared in Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It Was reiterated in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 , where the' court said' that “rights and immunities created by and dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form arid manner of the protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its discretion, shall provide. These may be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected.” It was distinctly reaffirmed in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 310 , where we said that “ a right or immunity created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by it, even without any express delegation of power, may be protected- by Congress.” How then can it be claimed in view of the declarations of this court in former cases, that exemption of colored citizens, within their States, from race discrimination, in respect of the civil rights of citizens, is not an immunity created or derived from the national Constitution ?

This court has always given a broad and liberal construction to the Constitution, so as to enable Congress, by legislation, to

Must these rules of construction be now abandoned? Are the. powers of the national legislature to be restrained in proportion as the rights and privileges, derived from the nation, are valuable? 'Are constitutional provisions, enacted to secure the dearest rights of freemen and citizens, to be subjected to that rule of construction, applicable to private instruments,

The opinion of the court, as I.have said, proceeds upon the ground that the power of Congress to legislate for the protection of the rights and - privileges secured by the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be brought into activity except with the view, and as it may become necessary, to correct and annul State laws and State proceedings in hostility to such rights and privileges. In the absence of State laws, or State action adverse to such rights and privileges, the nation may not actively interfere for their protection and .security, even against corporations and individuals exercising public or quasi public functions. Such I understand to.be the position of my brethren. If the grant to colored citizens of the United States of citizenship in their respective States, imports exemption from race discrimination, in their States, in respect of such civil rights as belong to citizenship, then,' to hold that the amendment remits' that right to the States for their protection, primarily, and stays the hands of the nation, until it is assailed by State laws or State proceedings, is to adjudge that the amendment, so far from enlarging the powers of Congress^ — as we have heretofore said it did— not only curtails them, but reverses the ■ policy which the general government has pursued from its very organization. Such an interpretation of the amendment is a denial to Congress of the power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce one of its provisions. In view of the circumstances under which the recent amendments were incorporated into the Constitution, and especially in view of the peculiar character of. the new

It does not seem to me that the fact that, by the second, clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, the States are expressly prohibited from making or enforcing laws abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, furnishes any sufficient reason .for holding or maintaining that the amendment was intended to deny Congress the power, by general, primary, and direct legislation, of

Such an interpretation of the .amendment is plainly' repugnant to its fifth section, conferring upon Congress power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce not merely the provisions containing prohibitions upon the States, but all of the provisions of the amendment, including the provisions, express and implied, in the first clause of the first section of the article granting citizenship. This alone is sufficient for holding that Congress is not restricted to the enactment of laws adapted to counteract and redress the operation of State legislation, or the action of State officers, of the character prohibited by the amendment. It ivas perfectly' well known thac the great danger to the equal enjoyment by citizens .of their rights, as citizens, was to' be apprehended not altogether from unfriendly State legislation, but from the hostile action of corporations and individuals m the States. And it is to be presumed that it was intended, by that section, to clothe Congress with power and authority to meet that danger. If the rights intended to be secured by the act of 1875 are such as belong to the citizen, in common or equally with other citizens in the same State, then it is not to be. denied that such legislation is peculiarly appropriate to the end which Congress is authorized to accomplish, viz-., to protect the citizen,fin ;respect of such rights, against discrimination on account of his race. Recurring to the specific prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment upon the making or enforcing i of State laws abridging the privileges of citizens of the United .States, I remark that if, as held in the Slaughter-House Oases, the privileges here referred to were those which belonged to citizenship' of the United States, as distinguished from those belonging to State citizenship, it was impossible for any State prior to the adoption, of that amendment to have enforced laws of that character. The judiciary could have annulled all such legislation under the provision that the Constitution shall be the, supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any. State to the contrary notwithstanding. The States .were

It is said that any interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment different from that adopted by the majority of the court, would imply that Congress had authority to enact a municipal code for all the States, covering every matter affecting the life, liberty, and property of the citizens of the several States. Not so. Prior to the adoption of that amendment the constitutions of the several States, without perhaps an exception, secured all persons against deprivation of life, liberty, or property, otherwise than by due process of law, and, in some form, recognized the right of all persons to the equal protection of the laws. Those rights, therefore, existed before that amendment was proposed or adopted, and .were not created by it. If, by reason of that fact, it be assumed that protection in these rights of persons still rests primarily with thé States, and that Congress may not interfere except to enforce, by means of corrective legislation, the prohibitions upon State laws or State proceedings inconsistent with those rights,-it does not at all follow, that privileges which have been grcmted by the nation, may not • be protected by primary legislation upon the part of Congress. The personal rights and immunities recognized in the prohibitive clauses of the amendment were, prior to its adoption,

This construction does not in any degree intrench upon the just rights of the States in the control of their domestic affairs. It simply recognizes the enlarged powers conferred by the recent amendments upon the general government. In the view which I take of those amendments, the States possess the same authority which they have always had to define and regulate the civil rights which their own people, in virtue of State citizenship, may enjoy within their respective limits ; except that its exercise is now subject to the expressly granted power of Congress, by legislation, to enforce the provisions of such amendments — a power which necessarily carries with it authority, by national legislation, to protect and secure the privileges and immunities which are created by or are derived from those amendments. That exemption of citizens from discrimination based on race or color, in respect of civil rights, is one of those privileges or immunities, can no longer be deemed an open question in this court.

But if it were conceded that the power of Congress could not be brought into activity until the rights specified in the act of 1875 had been abridged or denied by some State law or State action, I maintain that the decision of the court is erroneous. There has been adverse State action within -the Fourteenth Amendment as heretofore interpreted by this court. I allude to Ex parte Virginia, supra. It appears, in that case, that one Cole, judge of a county court, was charged with the duty, by the laws of Virginia, of selecting grand and petit jurors. The law of the State did not authorize or permit him, in -making such selections; to discriminate against colored citizens because of their’ race. But he, was indicted in the federal court, under the act of 1875, for making such discriminations.

“ The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdic- ' tiori the equal, protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives- another of property, life, or liberty without due process of law, or denies or takes away .the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition ; and, as he acts under the name and for the State, and is clothed with' the State’s power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the State has clothed one of its agents with power to annul or evade it. But the constitutional amendment was ordained for a purpose. It was to secure equal rights to all persons, and, to insure to all persons the enjoyment of such rights, power was given to Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. Such legislation must' act upon persons, not upon the abstract thing denominated a State, but upon the persons who are the agents of the State, in the denial of the rights which were intended to be secured.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 346 -7.

In every material sense applicable to tbe practical enforcement of tbe Fourteenth Amendment, railroad'corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of tbe State, because tbey are charged with

But the court says that Congress did not, in the act of 1866, assume, under the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races in the community. I agree that government has nothing to do with social, sis distinguished from technically legal, rights of individuals. No., government ever has brought, or ever, can bring, its people into social intercourse against their wishes. Whethér one person will permit or maintain social relations with another is a matter with which government has no concern. I agree that if one citizen chooses not to hold social intercourse with another, he is not and cannot be made amenable to the law for his conduct in that regard ; for even upon grounds of race, no legal right of a citizen is violated by the refusal of others to maintain merely social relations with him. What I affirm is that no State, nor the officers of any State, nor any corporation or individual wielding power under State authority for the public benefit or the public convenience, can, consistently either with the freedom established by the fundamental law, or with that equality of civil rights which now belongs to every citizen, discriminate against freemen or citizens, in those rights, because of their race, or because they once labored under the disabilities of slavery imposed upon them as a-race. The rights which Congress, by the act of 1875, endeavored to secure and protect are legal, not social rights. The right, for instance, of a colored citizen to use the accommodations' of a public highway, upon the same terms as are permitted to white citizens, is’no more a social right than his right, under the law, to use the public streets of a city or a town, or a turnpike road, or a public market, or a post office, or his right to sit

The court, in its opinion, reserves the question whether Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another. I beg to suggest that that precise question was substantially presented here in the only one of these cases r dating to rail roads — Robinson and Wife v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company. In that case it appears that Mrs. Robinson, a citizen of Mississippi, purchased a railroad ticket entitling her to be carried from Grand Junction, Tennessee, to Lynchburg, Virginia. Might not the. act of 1875 be maintained in that case, as applicable at least to commerce between -the States, notwithstanding it does not, upon its face, profess to have been passed in pursuance of the power of Congress to regulate commerce ? Has it ever been held that the judiciary should overturn a statute, because the legislative department did not accurately recite therein the particular provision of the Constitution authorizing its enactment? We have often enforced municipal bonds in aid of -railroad subscriptions, where they failed to recite the statute authorizing their issue, but recited one which did not sustain their validity. The inquiry in such cases has been, was there, in any statute, authority for the execution of the bonds ? Hpon this branch of the case, it may be remarked that the State of Louisiana, in 1869, passed a statute

My brethren say, that when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to'be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are pro-* tected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws. The statute of 18-75,- now adjudged to be unconstitutional, is for the benefit of citizens of every' race and color. What the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race, is — what had already been done in every State of the Union for the white race — to secure and protect rights belonging to them as -freemen and citizens; nothing more. It was not deemed enough “to help the feeble up, but to support him after.” The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens. The • difficulty has been to compel a recognition' of the legal right of the black race to take the rank of citizens, and to secure the enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government is ordained.

Eor the reasons stated I feel 'constrained to withhold my assent to the opinion of the court.