Majority — Blatchford J.
Syllabus
IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.delivered the opinion of the court. After reciting the facts in the foregoing language, he continued :
The condition of the record is such, in the absence of an exception by either party to any ruling of the court in the progress of the trial,- and of a special finding of the court upon facts, that there is nothing open for our consideration outside of the questions embraced in the certificate of the judges. We accept the certificate as sufficient to warrant an answer to the fifth question, although it does not state, in the terms of § 652 or § 693 of the Revised Statutes, that the judges disagreed upon the points stated in the five questions, or that their opinions were opposed upon such questions, but only that they disagreed as to whether the judgment should be for the plaintiff or the defendant, notwithstanding all of said questions. Having arrived at the conclusion that the fifth question must be answered in the affirmative, and such result disposing of the writ of error taken by the defendant, we do not deem it necessary to answer the other four questions. The fifth question assumes that the bonds were originally illegal and void, and we so assume, ivithout so deciding, in answering that question.
It is contended for the defendant that the failure to give the four weeks’ notice of the election, as provided by § 26 of the act marked “ B,” and the failure to include in the vote the question of taxation, as provided by § 27, constituted such a want of power to issue the bonds that the legislature could not validate their issue.
The Territorial act of January 11th, 1861, the proceedings for the election and its result, and the State act marked “ D,” were before this court in Railroad Company v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667 , at December Term, 1872. After that act was passed, and in September, 1869, the commissioners of Otoe County issued to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, named in tha1 act, as a donation, the $150,000 of bonds mentioned in it, th< e having been no vote of the people, other than the one above mentioned, authorizing ,the issue of the bonds. The bonds ai 'ii their coupons were transferred for value, and before the 'maturity of any of the coupons,oy that, company, to the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy • Railroad Company, and it sued the county, on some of the coupons, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska. Upon the trial of that suit, two questions were certified to this court: 1. Whether the act marked “D,” authorizing the county to issue bonds in aid of a railroad outside of the State, conflicted with the Constitution of the State. 2. Whether the county commissioners, under that act, could lawfully issue the bonds without the proposition to voté the bonds for the purpose indicated, and also a tax to pay the same, being’ pr having been submitted to a vote of the people of the county, as provided by the Territorial act of January 11th, 1861. This court held,
' It cannot be doubted that the tAVo acts of February 15th, 1869, taken together, intended to legalize the $40,000 of bonds issued to the Council Bluffs and St. Joseph Kailroad Company. These bonds fall Avithin the description-of section 8 of the act marked “ C,” as bonds theretofore “ voted and issued ” by the county of Otoe to aid in the construction of a railroad. The vote AAras a vote of the county to issue $200,000 of bonds “ for the purpose of securing an eastern railroad connection for
The decision by this court in regard to the $150,000 of bonds leaves but little more, to say in regard to the $40,000. As the legislature had power to authorize the issue of bonds without any precedent action of the voters of the county, it could validate the issue of bonds by curing and legalizing defects in respect'to the voting. The bonds were assigned by the railroad company, and came to the plaintiff after the acts of 1869 were passed, and he became a bona fide holder of them on the faith of those acts. The doctrinó is well settled in this court, that the legislature of a State, unless restrained by its organic law, has the right to authorize a municipal corporation to issue bonds in aid of a railroad, and to levy a tax to pay the bonds and the interest on them, with or without a popular vote, and to cure, by a retrospective act, irregularities in the exercise of the power conferred. Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 ; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 Id. 194.
Much stress is laid by the defendant on the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227 , in 1877. That was a suit brought in February, 1871, by an owner of property .in Otoe County, to enjoin the county treasurer from collecting a tax levied on his property to pay the interest on these $40,000 of bonds and to have the bonds declared void. A judgment to that effect was rendered and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The question adjudged in the case was the power conferred on the county commissioners, by the acts of 1860 and 1861, to issue the bonds. It was held that the only authority, if any, given by the vote of the people, was to subscribe for stock in a railroad company. The act marked “ C ” was not considered. It was held that it was not the purpose of the act marked “ D ” to legalize the $40,000 of bonds, but only to authorize the issue of the $150,000 of bonds; and that the only subject or object expressed in its title was the issuing of bonds.
The adjudication in Hamlin v. Meadville is not set up as a judgment binding on the plaintiff. Nor can it be. He was no party to it, nor was a.ny holder of the bonds.
But it is objected that'the title of the act is limited to bonds issued or to be issued to aid works in Nebraska, while the body of the act extends to works anywhere; and that so the subject of the act is not expressed in its title. The first section of the act relates to the future issues of bonds by “any county or city in the State,” the seventh section relates to like issues by “ any precinct in any organized county of this State,” and the eighth section relates to “ bonds heretofore voted and issued by any county or city in this State.” The railroads and works of infernal improvement referred to in the body of the act are not limited to those situated in the State. It would, we think, be a strained construction, to hold that the title of the act is to be so interpreted as to be limited to works situated in the State, when such limitation does not exist in the body of the act, and when the words “ in this State,” in the title, may fairly be regarded as applicable to the prior words “ counties, cities, and precincts,” to which words they are applied in the body of the act. This principle of construction is sanctioned by the views expressed in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147 , and in City of Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. Louis Railroad Company, 110 U. S. 192 . See also Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 141, et seq. We have not been referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska which we regard as in conflict with these views.
The question sought to be raised by the writ of error of the plaintiff is, that the statute of limitations had not run against
The fifth question certified is answered in the affirmative, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Cases cited
- Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe 16 Wall. 667 p. 12
- Thomson v. Lee County 3 Wall. 327 p. 15
- Montclair v. Ramsdell 107 U. S. 147 p. 16
- Jonesboro City v. Cairo & St. Louis Railroad 110 U. S. 192 p. 16