Majority
Syllabus
[N ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.delivered the opinion of the court. He recited the facts as above stated, and continued :
The right of removal from the State court, which is contested in this case, is founded on the last clause of the second section of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 , Richardson’s Supplement, 173: “ And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a -controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, thén either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district.”
It is accordingly argued in its support that the sole and real controversy disclosed by the pleadings is between the plaintiff below and the plaintiff in error, to which the Des Moines and Minneapolis Railroad Company is a merely nominal party.
The action, it is said, is brought in pursuance of § 3373 of the Iowa Code, which is as follows :
“ The action of mandamus is one brought in a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain an order of such court commanding' an inferior tribunal, board, corporation or person to do or not to do an act, the performance or omission of which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.”
And by § 3379, it is further provided, that “ the pleadings and other proceedings in any action in which a mandamus is claimed, shall be the same in all respects as nearly as may be, and costs shall be recovered by either party as in an ordinary action for the recovery of damages.”
The proposition that the Des Moines and Minneapolis Railroad Company is a merely nominal and not a real and substantial party to the controversv, is maintained on two grounds:
1. That the relief sought, against it rests upon the force of the alleged agreements in reference to the location of its line, which constitute the conditions of the taxes voted, lands granted, and stock subscriptions paid to it, and that mandamus will not lie for the purpose of enforcing the specific performance of personal contracts. 2. And that the Des Moines and Minneapolis Railroad Company is not only exonerated but disabled from the performance of the duty sought to be enforced against it, if for such it were amenable to the process of mandamus, by virtue of the lease of its road, property and franchises to the plaintiff in error, that lease being authorized by § 1300 of the Code of Iowa, as follows:
“ Any. such corporation may sell or lease its railway property and franchises, or make joint running arrangements with any corporation owning or operating any connecting railway, and the corporation operating the railway of another shall, in all respects, be liable in the same manner and extent as, though such railway belonged to it, subject to the laAvs of this State.”
But to sustain the first point, it is necessary to decide the controversy in favor of the Des Moines and Minneapolis Railroad Company, one of the defendants sought-to be charged, upon its merits. That necessarily affirms that such a contawersy exists; and that, in its turn, proves that the Circuit Court did not err in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it.
But that section of the statute already quoted has no such ■ effect. It does not discharge the lessor company from any of its corporate liabilities. It merely imposes a liability upon the lessee while operating it. And if this liability extends, as is claimed, to obligations of the lessor antecedent to'the lease, such as that sought to be enforced in the present proceeding, there is nothing in the' statute to exclude the idea that it is a' joint liability, enforceable against both. .
If it be said that the liability is that of the lessor, but that it is disabled by the lease from ifs performance, and that that duty is cast by the lease and the law upon the lessee, then the necessity for a joinder in the action is still more apparent. For to obtain a judgment against the plaintiff in error, requiring it to perform a duty devolved upon it merely because it has assumed under the law to perform the duties of another, makes it necessary, upon well-settled rules of pleading, also to obtain
In any view we are justified in taking of the nature of the controversy disclosed by the pleadings in this proceeding, we conclude that both the original defendants are necessary parties to its determination, and that, consequently, the plaintiff in error was not entitled to remove the suit from the jurisdiction of the "State court.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is accordingly
Affirmed.