Majority — Gray J.
Syllabus
IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.after making .the foregoing statement-of ■ facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
General laws authorizing the drainage of tracts of swamp and low lands, by commissioners appointed upon proceedings instituted by some of the owners of the lands, and the assessment of the whole expense of the work upon all the lands within the tract in question, have long existed in the State of New Jersey, and have been sustained and acted on by her courts, under the Constitution of 1776, ás well as under that of 1844. Stats. December 23,1783, Wilson’s Laws, 382; November 29, 1788, and November 24, 1792, Paterson’s Laws, 84, 119; Jones v. Lore, Pennington, 1048 ; Doremus v. Smith, 1 Southard, 142; Westcott v. Garrison, 1 Halsted, 132; State v. Frank & Guisbert Creek, Co., 2 J. S. Green, 301; State v. Newark, 3 Dutcher, 185, 194; Berdan v. Riser Drainage Co. cited 3 C. E. Green, 69; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54, 68, 518, 531; State v. Blake, 6 Vroom, 208 , and 7 Vroom, 442 ; Hoagland v. Wurts, 12 Vroom, 175 , 179.
In Coster v. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54, 518, tbe same view was strongly asserted in tbe Court of Chancery and in tbe Court of Errors. Tbe point there decided was that a statute providing for tbe drainage of a large tract of land overflowed by tide water, by a corporation chartered for tbe purpose, none of tbe members of which own'ed any lands within tbe tract, if it could be maintained as ^an exercise of tbe right of eminent domain for a public use, yet could not authorize an assessment on tbe owners of such lands for anything beyond tbe benefits conferred upon them. But the case was clearly and sharply distinguished from tbe case of the drainage of lands for tbe exclusive benefit of tbe owners upon proceedings instituted by some of them.
Chancellor Zabriskie said: “ But there is another branch of legislative power-that may be appealed to, as authorizing the taking of the lands required for the works to drain these meadows. It is the power of the government to prescribe public regulations for the better and more economical management of property of persons whose property adjoins, or which, from some other reason, can be better managed and improved by some joint operation, such as the power of regulating the building of. party walls; making and maintaining partition fences and ditches; constructing ditches and sewers for the draining of uplands or marshes, which can more advantageously be drained by a common sewer or ditch. This is a well-known legislative power, recognized and treated of by all jurisconsults and writers upon law through the civilized world; a branch of legislative power exercised by this Sta^e before and since the Revolution, and before and since the adoption of the present Constitution, and repeatedly recognized by our courts. The legislature has power to regulate these subjects, either by general law, or by particular laws for certain localities or particular and defined
Chief Justice Beasley, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Errors, enforced the same distinction, saying: “ This case, with regard to the grounds on which it rests, is to be distinguished from that class of proceedings by which meadows and other lands are drained on jhe application of the land owners themselves. In the present instance, the State is the sole actor, and public necessity or convenience is the only justification of her intervention. But the regulations established by the legislative power, whereby the owners of meadow lands are compelled to submit to an equal burden of the expense incurred in their improvement, are rules of police of the same character as provisions concerning party walls and partition fences. To these cases, therefore, the principle upon which the decision of the present case rests is not to be extended.” 3 C. E. Green, 531.
These full and explicit statements have been since treated by the courts of New Jersey as finally establishing the constitutionality of such statutes.
In State v. Blake, 6 Vroom, 208 , and 7 Vroom, 442 , a statute
The constitutionality of the statute of 1871, under which the proceedings in the case at bar were had, was upheld by the Supreme Court and the Court of Errors upon the' ground of the previous decisions. In re Lower Chatham Drainage, 6 Vroom, 497 , 501; In re Pequest River Drainage, 10 Vroom, 433 , 434; 12 Vroom, 175 , 179; 13 Vroom, 553 , 554, and 14 Vroom, 456 . The farther suggestion made by the Supreme Court in 6 Vroom, 501 , 506, and 10 Vroom, 434 , that this statute could be maintained as a taking of private property for .a public use, was disapproved by the Court of Errors in 12 Vroom, 178 .
In Kean v. Driggs Drainage Co., 16 Vroom, 91 , cited for the plaintiffs in error, the statute that was held unconstitutional created a private corporation with power to drain lands without the consent or application of any of the owners; and the Supreme Court observed that in the opinions of the Court of Errors in the present case and in Coster v. Tide Water Co., the distinction was clearly drawn between meadow drainage for the exclusive benefit of the owners, to be done at their sole expense, and drainage undertaken by the public primarily as a matter of public concern, in which case the assessment upon land owners must be limited to benefits imparted. 16 Vroom, 94 .
This review of the cases clearly shows that general laws for
It is also well settled by the decisions of the courts of New Jersey that such proceedings are not within the provision of the Constitution of that State securing the right of trial by jury. New Jersey Constitution of 1776, art. 22 ; Constitution of 1844, art 1, sec. 7; Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., Saxton, 694, 721-725; In re Lower Chatham Drainage, 7 Vroom, 442 ; Howe v. Plainfield, 8 Vroom, 145 .
The statute of 1871 is applicable to any tract of land within the State which is subject to overflow from freshets, or which is usually in low, marshy, boggy or wet condition. It is only upon the application of at least five owners of separate lots of land included in the tract, that a plan of drainage.can be adopted. All persons interested have opportunity by public notice to object to the appointment of commissioners to execute that plan, and no commissioners can be appointed against the remonstrance of the owners of the greater part of the lands. All persons interested have also opportunity by public notice to be heal’d before the court on the commissioners’ report of the expense of the work', and of the lands which in their judgment ought to contribute; as well as before the commissioners, and, on ’any error in law or in the principles
As the statute is applicable to all lands of the same kind, and as no person can be.assessed under it for the expense of drainage without notice and opportunity to be heard, the plaintiffs in error have neither been denied the equal protection of the laws, nor been deprived of their property without due process of law,-within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 , 31; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 ; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 .
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Wurts v. Hoagland 105 U. S. 701 p. 610
- Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. 113 U. S. 9 p. 614
- Barbier v. Connolly 113 U. S. 27 p. 615
- Walker v. Sauvinet 92 U. S. 90 p. 615
- Davidson v. New Orleans 96 U. S. 97 p. 615
- Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108 111 U. S. 701 p. 615