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Dunphy v. Sullivan

117 U.S. 346 Court SCOTUS Decision date 1886-03-22 English

Delivered by Waite C.J.

Contents

Majority — Waite C.J.

p. 346
DUNPHY v. SULLIVAN.

Syllabus

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF .THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA.
Argued March 16, 1886.
Decided March 22, 1886.
Possession of land in Montana under claim of title for more than three years prior to August 1, 1877, perfected title as against adverse claimants.
Ejectment for a town lot in Montana. Defendant in error as plaintiff below claimed under a deed from the Probate Judge as trustee and mesne conveyances, and relied on a continued possession under claim of title from August, 1870, to October, 1877. The defendant below also claimed title from the Probate Judge as trustee through mesne conveyances. Judgment for plaintiff,' which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory. The defendant brought this writ' of error.
Mr. M. F. Morris for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Jose-ph K. Toole for defendant in error. Mr. Edwin W. Toole was with him on the brief.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This judgment is affirmed. The jury has found as a fact that Mrs. Sullivan, the defendant in error, was in the actual possession of the property, under á claim of title, from August 2, 1870, until October 4, 1877. This, of course, 'includes the time from the 22d of February, 1873, when it is claimed the adverse, title of Dunphy began, to October 4, 1877. It sufficiently appears that the court directed the jury to find upon the special issues submitted, and no complaint is made of the charge as to what was necessary to create a title by adverse possession. We are not permitted to inquire whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. From a time prior to February 22, 1873, until August 1,1877, a title could be acquired, under the statutes of Montana, by three years’ adverse •possession. After that it required five years. It follows that

p. 347
Mrs. Sullivan’s title to the property was perfected by her adverse possession before Dunphy entered into actual possession, and that the judgment in her favor on the special findings, as vrell as on the general verdict, was right.

Affirmed.