Majority — Blatcheord J.
Syllabus
APPEAi EEOM THE - CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OE INDIANA.after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
It it alleged that the Circuit Court erred in decreeing the several claims of these five appellees to be liens.on the railroad
It is urged, in maintenance of'the decree below, that the relations which Crawford sustained towards the several appellees when their claims respectively accrued, and his relations to the railway company, were such as to preclude him from acquiring the mortgage bonds in controversy to the prejudice of the appellees; that, his construction contract was fraudulent arid void as against the appellees, as creditors of the company ; that, as between him and the appellees, he is estopped, by the provisions of his construction contract-, from claiming the right to a prior lien upon, or an equal distribution of, the proceeds of sale of the property of the company; that the legal situation was that of a nominal corporation vested with the legal title to its property for the use of Crawford as sole beneficiary; that Dull and McCormick received the bonds subject to the same equities against them which could be urged while they were in Crawford’s possession; that the equities of the appellees against the $1,000,000 of bonds, in the hands of Drexel, Morgan & Co., were precisely what they were while the bonds were in the hands of Crawford; that the appellees are entitled, in equity, to be paid out of the assets of the company the amounts of their respective claims in preference to Crawford; that all rights which Nickerson and Porter might have had to be subrogated to the position of Drexel, Morgan & Co. were lost by" the syndicate agreement of December 26, 1884; that the legal effect of that agreement was a purchase by Porter directly from Crawford; that the amounts in controversy on these appeals are a part of the purchase price of the securities on such purchase of them by Porter, reserved by him to be paid either to Crawford or to the appellees; that the real controversy here is between Crawford and the First National Bank of Chicago on the one hand and-the appellees
The considerations which seem to us to show “that the Circuit Court erred in awarding priority to ■ the claims of these creditors over the .mortgage bonds, are few and controlling.
The mortgages and the bonds are valid and binding as against the company; the company owes a large debt for the construction of its road, which is represented by the bonds; there was no bad faith, irregularity, deceit, or fraud in the execution of the mortgages or in the issuing of the bonds thereunder; the bonds in the hands of Porter represent actual values received by the company; they represent the entire purchase money that was paid for the Chicago and Block Coal railroad, extending south from Attica to Yeddo; they represent all the money that was'paid directly by Drexel, Morgan & Co., through their agent, for the construction of the railroad north of Attica, a considerable portion of which money was paid to these five áppellees; théy represent all the money that was paid by Crawford out o: .his own means for the construction of the new railroad north of Attica; in fact, they represent all the money that has ever been paid by the company for the Chicago and Block Coal railroad and for the construction of the sixty miles of new road from Attica to Fair Oaks,
To the objection, that, at the time the mortgage of November 1, 1881, was executed and the bonds were issued, Crawford owned the entire stock of the company and dominated the board of directors, and that the mortgage and bonds were issued under his dictation and coercion, even if such an objection could be legally tenable, it is a sufficient answer, that when the mortgage was made, and the $1,000,000 of bonds were issued and pledged to Dull and McCormick, Crawford was not a director or officer of the company. Foster was its •president, and he and his associates constituted the entire board of directors, and' they remained in full control until March 15, 1882. That this board was not dominated or controlled by' Crawford is shown by the fact that when, on February 7, 1882, eleven days after • Crawford had delivered in pledge to Dull & McCormick the $1,000,000 of bonds, Crawford asked the board to enter into a construction contract with him, and sent them a draft of the contract which he desired, the board unanimously rejected it. At the time the mortgage was executed, and at the time the bonds were issued and pledged to Dull and McCormick, Crawford held $50,250 par value of the stock, and Foster held $10,000 par value of it. The mere fact that Crawford owned a majority of the stock 'did not give him the legal control of the company; nor from such ownership can the legal inference be drawn that he dominated the board of directors. Pullman Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Co., 115 U. S. 587 , 596.
The circumstances attending the issuing of the $1,000,000 of bonds show that they were issued by Foster and his board of directors in good faith, and largely for indebtedness of the company then existing. There is no foundation for the suggestion that the mortgage and the bonds were without consideration, nor does it lie in the mouths of these appellees to raise the objection as to the absence of a legal board of directors of the company; for, if the mortgage and the bonds are invalid for want of such legal board, and for want of the legal existence of the corporation, the contracts between these'
The claims of the appellees are for the original construction of the railroad. • This is not a case Avhere the proceeds of the sale of the property of a railroad, as a completed structure, open for travel and transportation, are to be applied to restore, earnings which, instead of having been applied to- pay operating expenses and necessary repairs, have been diverted to pay interest on mortgage bonds and the improvement of the mortgaged property, the debts due for the operating expenses and repairs having remained unpaid when a receiver Avas appointed. The equitable principles upon which the decisions rest, applying to the payment, out of the proceeds of the sale of railroad property, of such debts for operating expenses and necessary repairs, are not applicable to claims such' as the present, accrued for the original construction of a railroad Avhile there was a subsisting mortgage upon it. These five appellees gave credit to the company for their work. It was construction work, and none of it was for operating expenses or repairs, and none of it went towards keeping a completed road in operation, either in the Avay of labor or of material. When these claims accrued, the road of the company had not been opened for use. The claims accrued after the mortgage had been executed and recorded, and after $1,000,000 of the bonds secured by it had been issued and pledged to innocent Iona fide holders for value. We are not aware of any well-considered adjudged case which, in -the absence of a statutory provision, holds that unsecured floating debts for construction are a lien on a railroad superior to the lien of a valid mortgage duly, recorded, and of bonds secured thereby, and held by bona fide purchasers for value. The authorities .are all the other way.
Moreover, it is a well settled principle, that subsequent creditors cannot be heard to( impeach an executed.nontract, where their dealings with the conypany, of which they claim the benefit, occurred after the contract became an executed contract. Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148 . The claims ol all the appellees except the Cleveland Rolling Mill Company áccrued after the construction contract was madel As to that company, it, after thé construction contract was made, and while Crawford was carrying on the work of construction under it, knowingly received on account of its claims money which came directly from Drexel,'Morgan & Co., as a result of the pledge of the bonds to that firm.
Dull and McCormick, Drexel, Morgan & Co., and Porter were respectively,- in succession, purchasers in good faith of these bonds, as negotiable commercial securities, without -notice of any irregularity or infirmity in them; and are entitled to the benefit of the principles applicable under such circumstances. Porter paid, to Drexel, Morgan & Co. more than $392,000 in money for the bonds, and, under all circumstances,, is entitled to protect his title by that of Drexel, Morgan & Co.,, and, through them, by the title of Dull and McCormick.
It is contended for the appellees that Porter did not purchase the bonds from Drexel, Morgan & Co., but bought them directly from Crawford. The evidence shows that Crawford,, after January 21, 1882, the date at which he pledged the $1,000,000 of bonds to Dull and McCormick, never had one of those bonds in his possession or under his control. Dull and McCormick, not Crawford, delivered the bonds to Drexel,. Morgan & Co., upon the payment to them by Drexel, Morgan & Co. of the debt due to1 them on account of the purchase of the Chicago and Block Coal railroad. The $200,000 of bonds issued after the negotiation of the loan from Drexel, Morgan & Co. were at once delivered to them, under their contract of pledge. This pledge vested in them the legal title to the
These clauses do not create the hen or equity .supposed. They leave the question as to the existence of any such . “ claims, hens, and other possible- indebtédnéss,” mentioned in the agreement, to be adjudicated by the court, and also leave to be decided by the court the question of the priority of such claim's over the bonds, and merely provide for the rights of the parties as between themselves in case the court establishes such priority. As before said, the purpose of Grawford, in making the agreement of December 26, 1884, was to protect the second pledge of the bonds and stock to the First National Bank of Chicago, he having put into the construction' of the railroad about $100,000 of the money which he had borrowed from the bank ; and he immediately assigned to the bank all his interest in the contract with Porter. The contract between Porter and Crawford, and that between Crawford and the bank, having been entered into in contemplation of the purchase of the bonds from Drexel, Morgan & Go. by Porter, the legal relation of the' appellees to the company and to its property, as unsecured holders of construction claims-, was not affected by these transactions, so as to give them any greater rights against the mortgaged property than they had previously had. In any event, as before said, the bonds would- be
It is- contended, however, that Crawford was all the time substantially the owner of the entire railroad property, and that the claims of the appellees were debts due to them from Crawford for work and material in constructing his railroad, and that these claimants have a lien, in this way, superior to the lien of the mortgage bonds. In answer to this viewy in addition to the suggestions already made, and treating Crawford as the owner of the railroad, it may be said, that the rights of Porter would be no different from his rights as dealing with the company as owner of the property. The delivery by Crawford of the bonds secured by a mortgage made by himself on the railroad, to a third person, for a valuable consideration, made the mortgage a valid security, and made the bonds in the hands of Dull and McCormick a valid hen on the railroad. An owner of a railroad, though he may be in debt to those who aid in constructing it by furnishing materials, may still execute a mortgage on it which will be good against unsecured creditors. No more than this was done, upon-the theory we are now considering. The creditors would have no lien superior to the lien of the bonds. The mortgage was recorded, and the $1,000,000 of bonds were issued before the
It has been contended for- the appellees, that the appeals by Porter now under consideration are appeals only from the decree of October 9, 1886; that he did not perfect any appeal from the decree of February-16, 1886 ; that the -latter decree was a final decree; that the errors which Porter, now insists on were errors committed in entering the decree of February 16, 1886; and that none of the errors now assigned can be considered by this court, because of the want of any appeal from the decree of February 16, 1886, and because the adjudications novf complained of were made by that decree,, and not by the decree of October 9, 1886.
It is a sufficient answer to these contentions to say, that the decree of February 16, 1886, though a final decree of foreclosure and sale as respected the interest of the mortgagor, and in some other respects, was not a final decree in respect of the matters involved in these appeals. The sixth clause of that decree merely provided that all unpaid, valid claims against the company for right of way, lands, labor, rolling-stock, and material used in the construction and betterment of the railway, were prior, superior, and paramount to the lien of the mortgages and the bonds ; but determined nothing as to who were the holders of such claims, or as to what were their amounts. It designated no persons who could be appellees in any appeal by Porter in respect of such claims, and it provided for a .reference to ascertain who were the several claimants under, the sixth paragraph of the decree, and what were the amounts due. to them severally. The first and only decree from which Porter could appeal, in respect of the. claims of these appellees, was the decree of October 9, 1886. The sale made under the decree of February 16, 1886, was
The various questions above stated as being raised by the appellees, which are not particularly adverted to, have been fully considered, and it is not regarded as necessary to further remark upon them, or upon the special points made in regard to the particular .claims of the appellees, as the views on which we have rested the case seem to us to be controlling on those questions and points.
The decree of the Circwit Court, made October 9th, 1886, is reversed, in so far as it decrees that the claims of the five appellees are prior, superior, andparamount to the lien of the mortgages or deeds of trust mentioned in the decree of February 16th, 1886, and of the bonds secured thereby ; and in so far as it provides for the payment to the appellees, out of the fund in the registi'y of the court, of the several sums of money specified in. the sand decree of the 9th of October, 1886 / and the case is remanded to the Circuit Court, with a direction to take such further proceedings as shall not be inconsistent with this opinion.
Cases cited
- Pulllman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. 115 U. S. 587 p. 670
- Thomas v. Brownville, Fort Kearney, & Pacific Railroad 109 U. S. 522 p. 673
- Graham v. Railroad Co. 102 U. S. 148 p. 673