p. 261and one night, and the Buckthorn two days and one night. The outside earnings of either- of these bdats, with- their appliances, is three hundred dollars per day, which, allowing as much for night work, would make the sum of twenty-one hundred dollars compensation, and double compensation is the sum of forty-two hundred dollars.
“ And the court finds the following as conclusions of law:
“1. The services rendered by the libellants’ boats, the Estelle and the Buckthorn, and their respective masters and crews, were salvage services of the lowest grade.
“2. That the court should award for said services the sum of forty-two hundred dollars.
“ 3. That libellants • should have judgment for the sum of forty-two hundred dollars and costs incurred in the District Court.
“4th. That the libellants should pay the costs of this court.”'
Thereupon a decree Avas made by the Circuit Court in favor of the libellants, for $4200 and the costs of both courts. ' 18 Eed. -Rep.. 696. Erom this decree the libellants appealed to this court. Their notice of appeal stated that they claimed, as their compensation for the salvage services to the vessel and cargo, one-fourth of the sum of $106,500, found' by the Circuit Court as the value of the Hesper and her cargo.
Mr. Eppa Hunton for appellants.
These services of salvage Avere rendered with skill and enterprise, and with a probable risk of lives and property. The vessels used by the salvors were steam vessels. In The Blackwall, 10 Wall. 1 , 13, it is said:“ Steam vessels are always considered as entitled to a liberal reward, not only because the service is usually rendered by a' costly instrumentality,-but because the service is generally rendered with greater promptitude and is of a more effectual'character. . . . Courts of admiralty usually consider the following circumstances as the main ingredients in determining the amount of the reward to be decreed for salvage service: (1) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering salvage ser
p. 262vice. (2) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the property. (3) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to which it was exposed. (4) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impending peril. (5) The value of the property saved. (6) The degree of danger from which the property was rescued.” •It will be found that every one of these circumstances formed ingredients in this case.Labor expended. — The salvors had two powerful and costly steam vessels engaged two or three days, one of which was injured in this salvage service.The prompUtmde, skill, and energy are apparent by the evidence and findings. The Estelle went to the rescue of the Hesper as soon as she was informed of her danger, and was followed by the Buckthorn as soon as it was apparent the Estelle needed further help. The skill and energy are apparent from the success of the efforts.The value of the property employed by salvors was greater than in most cases, — $35,000.The risk incurred. — This, as stated above, was the risk of wrecking the lighter and steam-tug, and the possible risk of life. Bisk of life is not a necessary ingredient, but it places the salvors in a higher position of merit and entitles them to a more liberal compensation. Spencer v. The Charles Avery, 1 Bond, 117 ; The William Beckford, 8 C. Rob. 356 ; The Emulous, 1 Sumner, 207.The valué of the property saved. — This is found to be $106,500.The danger from which the property was rescued. — This, according to the 11th finding, was very great, and involved the probable total loss of the ship.It -will be seen that all the ingredients for a liberal allowance existed in this case.In The Blackwall, the ship was on fire in the harbor of San Francisco; the owners of the tug got up steam; took two fire-engines on board with firemen enough to work them, and lay alongside the burning ship, and in a little more than half
p. 263an hour the flames were entirely extinguished. Decree for salvage for ten thousand dollars, — one-half to the owners of the tug.Now, compare this case of The Blaekwall with the one under consideration. In the former, the time was a half-hour; in the latter, two days and nights; in the former, there was but one tug; in the latter, a lighter and a tug; in the former, there was no danger; the only danger feared was the falling of the spars, which were supposed to be burning, but really were not; in the former but a small portion of the salvage service was performed by the libellants; in the latter, the whole service was performed by libellants, except in jettisoning the cargo.Judge Story, in Tyson v. Prior, 1 Gallison, 133, says: “ In general, salvage ought not to be less than one-third, unless the property saved be very valuable and the service very inconsiderable.”In the case of the ship Henry Ewbank, 1 Sumner, 400, the court says: “ In the distribution of salvage the owner of the salvor ship ought, under ordinary circumstances, to be allowed one-third, of the salvage.”In Bearse v. 340 Pigs of Copper, 1 Story, 314 , 326, the court says: “The maritime policy is to make a liberal allowance for salvage — the highest compensation in most meritorious cases being one moiety.”In the case of The Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240 , 266, Chief Justice Marshall lays down the doctrine of salvage with his usual force and clearness. He says : “ If we search for the motives producing this apparent prodigality in rewarding services rendered at sea, we shall find them in a liberal and enlarged policy. The allowance of a very ample compensation for those services (one very much exceeding the mere risk encountered and labor employed in effecting them) is intended as an inducement to render them, which it is for the public interests and for the general interests of humanity to hold, forth to those who navigate the ocean.”In Desty’s Shipping and Admiralty the doctrine of salvage and the rate of allowance is treated very clearly and all the
p. 264authorities cited. See §§ 318, 319, and . 320, and the authorities cited in the notes. These authorities are-yery numerous, and it will be seen that in no case, haying the -circumstances of this case, has less been awarded as salvage than oné-fourth. The allowance for salvage is in the discretion of the court, but this is a legal discretion, regulated and governed. by the law and the evidence.- If this discretion is not properly exercised, it is the duty of appellate courts to .correct its improper exercise.It is maintained that this discretion was not properly exercised by the Circuit Court for Texas; that great injustice was done to the libellants; and that this small allowance of salvage will discourage the efforts of salvors, and break up what has been declared very important to commerce.It is believed the “decision of the court below is erroneous, and that the same should be reversed with directions to decree to the -libellants one-fourth of the value of the ship and cargo saved.Mr. John H. Thomas for appellees.
after stating the case as reported above, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is assigned for error, that the Circuit Court erred in deciding that the services rendered by the Estelle and the Buckthorn were salvage services of the lowest grade. This is found by the Circuit Court both as a conclusion of fact and a conclusion of law. Regarding it as a conclusion of fact, it is not reviewable here. Regarding it as a conclusion of law, it is based upon the finding of fact that the salvage services involved “neither risk of property, peril of fife or limb, nor unusual expense, nor gallantry, courage or heroism.” The Estelle having been engaged in the services three days and one night, and the Buckthorn two days and one night, the" court, treating the whole service as a service for seven days, and finding that the outside earnings of either of the .boats, with its appliances, was $300 per day, being $2100 for seven days, doubled the compensation, and made it $4200,'
p. 265stating that that would be a full compensation, on the basis of towage and lighterage services.
The Circuit Court, in its opinion, 18 Fed. Rep. 698 , says: “Proctor- for respondents in this case admits in argument, that, by reason of the service of the extra anchor furnished by. the libellants, the service amounts to salvage service. But for this admission I have grave doubts whether. I could- have found as a fact that the services ranked above towage and lighterage service, to be compensated on the principle of a quantum meruit. But salvage services being taken as established, the question is one solely of amount. As a fact in the case, I have found that there was neither risk of property, peril of life or limb, nor unusual expense, nor gallantry, courage or heroisiñ. The .evidence shows there was no enterprise in going out-in tempestuous weather, as the weather was moderate and the . libellants’ tug. only went out when called upon and employed so to do. The labor and skill furnished were of. the ordinary kind, such as libellants’ boats were seeking as ordinary employment. Salvage, then, is to be determined entirely' by the distress in which the salved property , was. The distress of the Hesper was the salvors’ opportunity, and the. amount of salvagej on this point, determines the whole case.”
The principle upon which the Circuit Court proceeded, as-stated in its opinion, was, that, although storms might have come which' would have destroyed the Hesper, the services actually rendered to her by the tug. and the lighter were ordinary services, and that, if storms had come, the tug and the lighter might easily have sought safety.
"We recently had occasion to fully consider the question of salvage in the case of The Connemara, 108 U. S. 352 , where it was contended that the facts found by the Circuit Court did not constitute salvage service, and that, if a salvage service^ it was salvage of the lowest grade, and the amount "allowed was exorbitant. Holding the services to have been salvage services, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Gray, said, (p. 359): “ The amount of salvage to be awarded, although stated by the Circuit Court in the form'of a conclusion of law, is largely
p. 266a matter of fact and discretion, which cannot be reduced to precise rules, but depends upon a consideration of all the circumstances of each case.” It is further there said, that, by the uniform course of decision in this court, during the period in which it had jurisdiction to reverse decrees in admiralty upon both facts and law, the amount decreed below was. never reduced unless for some violation of just principles, or for clear and palpable mistake, or gross over-allowance; and that, since the act of Congress of February 16, 1875, c. 77, restricting the appellate power of this court within narrower bounds, and limiting its authority to revise any decree in admiralty of the Circuit Court to questions of law, this court may, in cases of salvage as in other admiralty cases, “ revise the decree appealed from for matter of law, but for matter of law only; and should not alter the decree for the reason that the amount awarded appears to be too large, unless the excess is so great that upon any reasonable view of the facts found, the award cannot be justified by the rules of law applicable to the case.” The decree appealed from in that case was affirmed, upon the ground that this court could not say, upon the findings of facts, that the amount awarded was so excessive as to violate any rule of law. The same principle was applied in
The Tornado,
109 U. S. 110 , 115.
These views are equally sound in the case of an alleged under-allowance. We cannot say, from the facts found in the case- at bar, that the Circuit Court did not properly exercise its discretion in making the allowance it did, even though that amount was less than the amount allowed by the District Court.
The claimants not having appealed to the Circuit Court, it is suggested that they are liable for at least the amount awarded by the District Court and that the Circuit Court could not reduce that amount, but had jurisdiction, on the actual appeal, only to increase it. It is well settled, however, that an appeal in admiralty from the District Court to the Circuit Court vacates altogether the decree of the District Court, and that the case is .tried de novo in the Circuit Court. Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281 ; Anonymous, 1 Gallison,
p. 26722;
The Roarer, 1 Blatchford, 1;
The Saratoga v.
438 Bales of Cotton, 1 Woods, 75 ;
The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73 ;
The Charles Morgan, 115 U. S. 69 , 75. "We do not think that the fact that the claimants did not appeal from the decree of the District Court alters the rule. When the libellants appealed, they did so in view of the rule, and took the risk of the result of a trial of the case
de novo. The whole case was opened by their appeal, as much as it would have been if both parties had appealed, or if the appeal had been taken only by the claimants.
The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs, and without interest to the libellants on that decree.