Majority — Fuller C.J.
Syllabus
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Louisiana Code contains these articles (Rev. Civil Code. La. 187-5, 473):
“Art. 2175 [2171]. The surrender does not give the property to the creditors; it only gives them the right.of selling it for their benefit and receiving the income of it, till sol'd.
“Art. 2178 [2174]. As the debtor preserves, his ownership of . the property .surrendered, he may divest the creditors of their possession of the same, at any time before they have sold it, by paying the amount of his debts, with the expenses attending the cession.”
Sections 1781 to 1822, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of Louisiana constitute a system of insolvent laws. Rev. Stat. La. 1870, 353 et seq.
Section 1791 reads: “ From and after such - cession and • acceptance, all the property of the insolvent debtor mentioned in the schedule, shall be fully vested in his creditors; and the syndic shall take possession of, and be entitled to claim and recover, all the property, and to administer and sell the same according to, law.”
' These provisions have formed part of the laws of -Louisiana for -many years, and the Supreme Court of that State has
It is therefore immaterial that title may not vest absolutely in the syndic or creditors. It is enough that the surrender operates as a transfer for the specific purpose of the disposal of the property and the distribution of the proceeds in concurso among the creditors, and is protected accordingly. Laforest v. His Creditors, 18 La. Ann. 292 ; West v. His Creditors, ubi supra.
In Nimick v. Ingram, 17 La. Ann. 85 , Nimick & Co., judgment creditors of Ingram, issued execution against him from the Fourth District Court of New Orleans, where they had recovered their judgment, and caused property to be seized thereunder after Ingram had gone into insolvency and made a surrender in the Fifth District Court. The proceedings in Nimick & Co.’s suit were transferred to the Fifth District Court and cumulated with the insolvent proceedings. Thereupon, Ingram took out of the latter court a rule on Nimick &.
“ What these rights are it is not necessary for us to decide, . . . being satisfied, as we are, that they can only be determined contradictorily with the mass of the insolvent’s creditors, before the court seized of the concurso, as the whole proceedings in the suit pending originally in the Fourth District Court were . . . properly ordered to be cumulated with the insolvent proceedings in the Fifth District Court. '. . .
“Any informality in the proceedings, when questioned, must be by direct action. No creditor will be permitted to disregard and treat as an absolute nullity a judgment accepting a surrender made by his debtor, and granting a stay of proceedings.
“ The acceptance for the creditors by the court of the ceded estate, vests in them all the rights and property of the insolvent, whether placed on the schedule or not; and the syndic may sue to recover them.
“ But any creditor may show, provided it be contradictorily with the mass of the creditors, or their legal representative, that any particular object or fund is not embraced in the surrendered estate, but is subject exclusively to his individual clairfi.. And this is the remedy of the plaintiffs, if any they" have.”
’ Nimick v. Ingram is quoted from and approved in Tua v Carriere, 117 U. S. 201 , 207.
■ In- the case in hand, the order of the court in insolvency stayed all judicial proceedings against the insolvent and'his property, and, by the acceptance of the cession, passed all the insolvent’s assets to the syndic for the benefit, of creditors; but its operation was not confined to the property specifically named, nor did the acceptance by the creditors have that effect.
The property was named in the schedule as belonging to the wife individually and therefore not claimed by. the debtor; but any creditor, by inquiry, Could have ascertained, the circumstances and been informed of its liability under the law. There is nothing to impugn the good faith of the syndic; and if there were, he could have been compelled to act and was liable to removal. Rev. Stats. La. § 1814. Nor was there any element of estoppel involved in the action of the’creditors who signed the consents to Green’s discharge. The surrender which they accepted covered all the insolvent’s assets, and even if they were laboring under the erroneous belief that this particular property was not subject to their claims, they would be entitled, so far as appears from this record, to share in its proceeds when' the mistake was discovered. No other creditor was misled to his injury by their action, and no adjudication foreclosed their rights.
And in addition to this, as Geilinger & Blum and the bank in Winterthur recovered their judgments after the insolvency proceedings were commenced and the surrender made by Green, if they wished to attack those proceedings they should have done so, as we have seen, “ contradictorily with the mass of the’ insolvent’s creditors, before the court seized of - the oonoursoP
It is said, however, that insolvency proceedings and laws can have no extra-territorial effect, and do not affect or control non-resident creditors, unless they voluntarily make themselves parties to the proceedings.
- And it is argued that as these were foreign, creditors, who
By the insolvency proceedings Green’s assets were placed in gremio legis, and could not be seized by process from another, court. Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368 , 375; Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201 , 208. What the rights of the appellants might, be if they declined to prove their claims or intervene in the state court, upon the termination of the administration there, it is not necessary to consider. Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107 , 112; Union Bank v. Jolly’s Administrators, 18 How. 503 ; Green's Administratrix v. Creighton, 23 How. 90 , 107. The conclusion that under the particular circumstances disclosed, this property formed part of the assets belonging to an administration pending when the writs of fi. fa. were issued, determines the invalidity of the seizure under them. Rio Grande Railroad Company v. Gomila, 132 U. S. 478 .
The judgment of the Circuit Court released the' property upon condition that the costs in the making of the seizure be-paid by-the syndic, and that he present and file an order from the State District Court authorizing and directing him to take possession of the property and administer the same as part óf the insolvent estate of Green. This was an eminently, judicious and proper order apparently effectual to secure the appropriation of the property to the claims to which it was subject, while these judgment creditors were absolved from the expensp incurred in emphasizing the fact of its liability.
We see no error in the record and the judgment is therefore
Affirmed.
Cases cited
- 17 How. 517 17 How. 517 p. 250
- Ogden v. Saunders 12 Wheat. 213 p. 251
- Baldwin v. Hale 1 Wall. 223 p. 251
- The Moses Taylor 4 Wall. 411 p. 251
- James L. v. Carryl 20 How. 583 p. 252
- Freeman v. Howe 24 How. 450 p. 252
- President of the Bank of Tennessee v. Horn 17 How. 157 p. 254
- Tua v. Carriere 117 U. S. 201 p. 255, p. 257
- Peale v. Phipps 14 How. 368 p. 257
- Williams v. Benedict 8 How. 107 p. 257
- President of the Union Bank v. Vaiden 18 How. 503 p. 257
- Green's Administratrix v. Creighton 23 How. 90 p. 257
- Rio Grande Railroad v. Gomila 132 U. S. 478 p. 257