Majority — IIaelaN J.
Syllabus
APPEAL FROM' THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA'.after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is suggested that no appeal has been taken' as to Charles F‘. Hall, and that this court is without jurisdiction over the cause as to him. In this view we do not concur. The cause was not finally disposed of as to Clark N. Hall, the remaining defendant, until the 14th of April, 1886, and on the 30th day of the same month the plaintiff was allowed an appeal “in the cause.” His appeal bond was executed September 9, 1886, and ran “ to the defendants.” The record was filed here on the 12th of October, 1886. It appearing, when the case was reached on our docket, that Charles F. Hall had not been served with notice of the appeal, a citation was directed to be served upon him, or, if he was dead, upon his representative. The citation was executed January 13, 1890, upon his widow, who is also administratrix of his estate. There is no ground to question the jurisdiction of this court to proceed to a hearing of the appeal. The record was filed in this court on the day to which the appeal was returnable. Our jurisdiction did not depend upon a citation being issued, Evans v. State Bank, ante, 330, although we could not properly proceed to hear the case until Charles F. Hall, as to whom the suit was dismissed
The first question, upon the merits, to be considered, relates to the demurrer and plea of Charles F. Hall. It is contended that he was not a necessary party to the suit to fix the amount of the indebtedness -of Clark N. Hall, and that the demurrer, for that reason, was properly sustained. If that had been the sole object of the suit the plaintiff could undoubtedly have proceeded at law against Clark N. Hall aloné. But such a suit would not have given the relief required. The plaintiff claimed a lien on the mortgaged property to secure the payment of the notes given by the mortgagor. The property was claimed by Charles F. Hall in virtue of a tax sale. • While the latter might have been' proceeded against alone for the purpose of determining whether his right to the land was not subordinate to the mortgage lien, it was competent, under the practice in equity prevailing in the courts of the United States, and in order that full and adequate relief might be had, to unite in the same suit both the mortgagor and the party claiming the property adversely to the lien of the mortgage, by virtue of proceedings had subsequently to its execution. If the plaintiff was entitled to have the.property sold in satisfaction of the debt secured by the mortgage, it was his right to have it sold freed from any apparent claim thereon wrongly asserted by the holder of the tax title. Such relief could not be had without making the latter a party to the suit.
In respect to the plea of Charles F. Hall, we are of opinion that it ought' not to have been sustained. .The constitutional provisions that. “ all deeds of sale made, or that may be made, by the collector of taxes, shall be received by the courts in evidence as prima facia valid sales,” and that “ no sale of prop
The case, in many respects, is like Austin v. Citizens’ Bank and, Sheriff, 30 La. Ann. 689 , in which it appeared that a mortgage creditor proceeded directly against the mortgaged property which had been sold for taxes, and the title taken in the name, of a third person. The holder of the tax title brought a suit-to enjoin such proceeding. The court said: “ The plaintiff [the holder of tax title] entrenches himself behind our ruling in Lannes v. Workingmen’s Bank, 29 La. Ann. 112 , and insists that his title must be held good until it ■is annulled in a direct action'. But that principle holds good only as to those titles that are Iona fide, and are acquired without fraud, or that are real and not simulated. Unquestionably á purchaser at a tax sale may acquire a good title to a valuable property for a small price, if the requisite formalities have preceded knd attended the sale.But no government will
All that was said in that case is pertinent to the one before us. The mortgagor had obtained liberal indulgence as to time from the mortgagee. He made such representations of his embarrassed financial condition as induced the mortgagee to forbear taking steps to enforce his lien upon the property. He gave positive assurances that he would make a payment of twenty-five hundred dollars on the mortgage debt by the fall of 1882. He knew that there, were taxes upon the property which it was his duty to pay, and that their non-payment endangered the security upon which his generous creditor depended for the payment of the notes given for the property. And his brother, with many expressions of friendship for the mortgagee and his family, joined in the appeals for time, assuring the mortgagee that he would himself assist in meeting the mortgagor’s engagements to pay, if the mortgagee would wait until January 1, 18S3. He voluntarily promised that he would keep the mortgagee “posted about things.” But neither the mortgagor nor his brother informed the mortgagee that the land was advertised to be sold for the taxes which the mortgagor was under a duty to pay. The way in
In respect to the credits allowed by the decree below upon his notes to the mortgagor, no error was committed. The credit of $1340.52, as of January 1,1879, was a trifling amount in excess of the aggregate interest that had been paid, by the mortgagor up to that date. The credit of $544.15 was for the amount of the two judgments rendered against Mendenhall by a justice of the peace in Ohio, of which Clark N. Hall became the owner on the 9th of May, 1879. The plaintiff being a non-resident of Louisiana, it was proper to allow that amount as a set off against the .notes. Spinney v. Hyde, 16 La. Ann. 250 ; Woolfolk v . Ship Graham's Polly, 18 La. Ann. 693 . As to the note for $1733.61, dated June 1, 1875, a¿id executed by the Delaware Paper Company, the court below properly disallowed it as a set off. The evidence clearly showed that it was not an enforceable obligation against that company. The attempt to use it against Mendenhall is only additional evidence of the purpose to defraud him. But, for the reasons stated, the court below erred in rejecting the plaintiff’s demand for recognition of the mortgage lien upon the property.
To the extent indicated the decree is reversed, with directions to enter a decree recognizing and establishing the mortgage of December 8J¡,, 1875, as against Clark H. Hall, and the succession of Charles F. Ilall, and as gi/oing a lien in behalf of the plaintiff superior and paramount to any right which the succession of Charles F. Ilall has in the mortgaged property by virtue of the sale for .taxes and the sheriff's deed to him, and ordering a sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy the above balance due the plaintiff upon the notes given by Clark H. Hall.