Majority — Harlan J.
Syllabus
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TEE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ' KENTUCKY.delivered the opinion-of the court.
On the 28th of January, 1886, George T. Bliss and Isaac
The present proceeding was begun on the 18th of June, 1886, by á petition filed in the foreclosure suit by Charles "W. Keith, who was engaged in buying and selling on commission, as well as on his own account, live stock brought to and shipped from the city of Covington, Kentucky, over the Kentucky Central Railroad. The petition proceeded upon the ground that unjust and illegal discrimination had been and was being made against Keith by the recéiver acting under and pursuant to a written agreement made November 19, 1881, between the railroad company and the Covington Stock-Yards Company, a corporation created under the general laws of Kentucky ; the yards of the latter company located in Covington, and connected with the railroad tracks in that city, being the only depot of the railway company that was provided with the necessary platforms and chutes for receiving or discharging live stock on and from its trains at that city. The petition alleged that Keith was the proprietor of certain live-stock lots and yards in that city immediately west of those belonging to the Covington Stock-Yards Company, and separated from them b}7 only one street sixty feet in width; that he was provided with all the necessary means of receiving, feeding and caring for such stock as he purchased, or as might be consigned to him by others for sale; and' that his lots and yards were used for that purpose subsequently to March 1, 1886,. and until, by the direction of the receiver, the platforms connecting them with the railroad were torn up and rendered unfit for use. The prayer of the' petitioner -was for a rule against the receiver to show cause why he should not deliver to him at some convenient and suitable place outside of the-lots or yards of the said Covington Stock-Yards Company . free from other than the customary freight charges' for transportation, all stock owned by or consigned to him and brought over said road to Covington,
Eeferring to that agreement it appears that the'Stock-Yards Company stipulated that its yards on the line of the railroad in Covington should be maintained in good order, properly equipped with suitable fencing, feeding-pens and other customary conveniences for handling and caring for live-stock, and to that end it would keep at hand a sufficient number of skilled workmen to perform the operations required of it, and generally to do such labor as is usually provided for in stock yards of the best class, namely, to load and unload and care for “ in the best manner all live stock delivered to them by the party of the first part [the railroad company] at their own risk of damage while so doing, and in no event to charge more than sixty cents per car of full loads for loading and sixty cents per car for unloading, and no charges to be made for handling less than full loads, as per way-bills.” The Stock-Yards Company also agreed to become liable for those charges, and to collect and pay over to the railroad company, as demanded from time to time, such money as came into its hands, the charges for feeding and caring for live stock not to be more than was charged for similar services and supplies at other stock yards of the country. The railroad company, upon its part, agreed to pay the Stock-Yards Company the above sums for loading and unloading and otherwise acting as its agent in the collection of freights and charges upon such business as was turned over to it by the railroad company; that it would require all cars loaded at yards for shipment South or East to be carefully bedded, which the Stock-Yards Company was to do at the rates usually charged in other yards; that it would
In the progress of the cause E. W. "Wilson, by consent of parties, was made a co-petitioner and co-respondent with Keith.
. By the final decree it was found, ordered and decreed as follows: “ It is the duty and legal obligation of the Kentucky Central Kailroad Company, as a common carrier of live stock, to provide suitable and convenient means and facilities for receiving on board its cars all live stock offered for" shipment over its road and its connections from the city of Covington, and for the discharge from its cars of all live stock brought over its road to the said city of Covington, free of any charge other than the customary transportation charges to consignors or consignees ; and that the said petitioners, Keith and Wilson, live-stock dealers and brokers, doing business at the city'- oi Covington, and proprietors of the Banner'Stock-Yards at that place, are entitled to so ship and receive over said road such live stock without being subject to any such additional charges imposed by said receiver, said railroad company, or other person or corporation. The court further finds and decrees that
. The railroad company, holding itself out as a carrier of live stock, was under a legal obligation, arising out of the nature of its employment, to provide, suitable and necessary means and facilities for receiving live stock offered to it for shipment over its road and connéctions, as well as for discharging such stock after it reaches the place to which it is consigned. The vital question in respect to such matters is, whether the means and facilities so furnished by the carrier or by some one in its behalf are sufficient for the reasonable accommodation of the public. But, it is- contended, that the decree is erroneous so far as it compels the railroad company to receive live sto’ck • offered by the appellees for shipment and to deliver live stock consigned to them, free from any charge other than the customary one for transportation,'for merely passing into and through the yards of the Covington Stock-Yards Company to and from the cars of the railroad company. As the decree does not require such stock to be delivered in or through the yards of the appellant, except with its written consent filed in this cause; as such stock cannot be properly loaded upon or unloaded from cars within the limits of the city, except by means of inclosed lots or yards set apart for that purpose, and conveniently located, in or through which the stock may be received from the shipper or delivered to the consignee, with
When animals are offered to a carrier of live stock to be transported it is its duty to receive them; and that duty cannot be efficiently discharged, at least in a town or city, without the aid of yards in which the stock offered for shipment can be received and handled with safety and without inconvenience to the public while being loaded upon the cars in which they are to be transported. So, when live stock reach the place to which they are consigned, it is the duty of the carrier to deliver them to the consignee; and such delivery cannot be safely or effectively made except in or through inclosed yards or lots, convenient to the place of unloading. In other words, the duty to receive, transport and deliver live .stock will not be fully discharged, unless the carrier makes such provision, at the place of loading, as will enable it to properly receive and load the stock, and such provision, at the place of unloading, as will enable it to properly deliver the stock to the consignee.
A railroad company, it is true, is not a carrier of live stock with all the responsibilities that attend it as a carrier of goods. North Penn. Railroad v. Commercial Bank, 123 U. S. 727 , 734. There are recognized limitations upon the duty and responsibility of carriers of inanimate property that do not apply to carriers of live stock. These limitations arise from the nature of the particular property transported. “ But,” this court said, in the case just cited, “notwithstanding this difference in duties and responsibilities, the railroad company, when it undertakes generally to carry.such freight, becomes
1 Myrick v. Michigan Central Railroad, 107 U. S. 102 , 107; Hall & Co. v. Renfro, 3 Met. (Ky.) 51, 54; Mynard v. Syracuse & Binghamton Railroad, 71 N. Y. 180 ; Smith v. New Haven & Northampton Railroad, 12 Allen, 531 , 533; Kimball v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad, 26 Vermont, 247; South & North Alabama Railroad Company v. Henlein, 52 Alabama, 606, 613; Wilson v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio St. 722 , 740; Ayres v. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad, 71 Wisconsin, 372, 379, 381; McCoy v. K. & D. M. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 424 , 426; Maslin v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 14 W. Va. 180 , 188; St. Louis & Southeastern Railway v. Dorman, 72 Illinois, 504; Moulton v. St. Paul, Minneapolis &c. Ra ilway, 31 Minnesota, 85, 87; Kansas Pacific Railway v. Nichols, 9 Kansas, 235, 248; Clarke v. Rochester & Syracuse Railroad, 14 N. Y. 570 , 573; Palmer v. Grand Junction Railway, 4 M. & W. 749.
We must not be understood as holding that the railroad company, in this case, was under any legal obligation to furnish, or cause to be furnished, suitable and convenient appliances for receiving and delivering live stock at every point on its line in the city, of Covington where persons engaged in buying, selling or shipping live stock, chose to establish stock yards. In respect to the mere loading and unloading of live stock, it is'only required by the nature of its employment to' furnish such facilities as are reasonably sufficient for the business at that city. So far as the record discloses, the yards maintained by the appellants are, for the purposes just stated, equal to all the needs, at that citjq of shippers and consignees of live stock; and if the appellee had been permitted to use them, without extra, charge for mere “ yardage,” they would have been without just ground of complaint in that regard; for it did not concern them whether the railroad company itself maintained stock yards, or employed another company or corporation to supply the facilities for recéiving and delivering live stock it'was under obligation to the public to furnish. But as the appellant did not accord to appellees the privileges they were entitled to from its principal, the carrier, and as the carrier did not offer to establish a stock yard of its own for shippers and consignees, the court below did not err in requiring the railroad company and the receiver to receive and deliver live stock from and to the appellees at their own stock yards in the immediate vicinity of’ appellant’s yards, when the former were put in proper condition to be used for that pur-pose, under such reasonable regulations as the railroad company might establish. It was not within the power of the railroad company, by such an agreement as that of November 19, 1881, or by agreement in any form, to burden the appellees with charges for services it was bound to render without any
Decree affirmed.