p. 165made by the hostile house, as the agents,' and bona jMe exclusively on the account and risk of the neutral house. On no other ground whatever can this case be extracted from the principle of the St. Indiano ; and, upon that ground, the whole of the pro*perty ought to be restored, according to the limitations of the principle stated by. the learned judge in the case of the St. Indiano. It is the domicil of the house, and the nature of its trade, and not the belligerant character of one of the partners, that avails to condemn: And it is a doctrine that may be vindicated upon every principle of reason and justice. Upon what principle is the property of a neutral subject, personally domiciliated in the enemy’s country, liable to condemnation ? Not upon the ground that his original national character is lost, but that his .property is undistinguishably incorporated with that of the enemy, and employed exclusively in carrying or* his trade, and strengthening his resources. Is not - the property of a house of trade, established in the enemy’s country, wheresoever the partners nay reside, in the same predicament ? It is believed that the decisions cited to support these principles* will be sanctioned by this tribunal; that they are corollaries from the rules of prize law which have already been sanctioned by itthat they are supported by all the analogies of that law, and are essential to its perfection as a system of jurisprudence impartially administered between belligerants and neutrals. The interest which a power at war has in maintaining the principles of these decisions, is. obvious. What interest hag a fair and just neutral
p. 166in contesting it ? His subjects may carry on their usual trade through its accustomed channels, untouched .'by the flames of war spreading on every side. Do they wish to export their commodities to the enemy’s country ? They may consign them to commission merchants there, or to their own supercargoes on board., Do they wish to import the production^ of the enemy’s country into their own? They may purchase them by the same instrumentality. ■ Do they wish to become the carriers of both to every region of the globe ? They may do it with imp mity. A neutral merchant cannot, therefore; wish to be a partner in'a house of trade in the enemy’s country, unless for the purpose of lending his national character as a shield against .the just rights of the other belligerant. It is by a more remote application, of the same principle now contended for* that the property of persons taken in breach of blockade, as contraband of wax’, or sailing under an enemy’s license, is liable to be considered as enemy’s property, pro hac vice. It is taken adhei’ing to the enemy, clothed with his character, and inseparably blended with his interests. This rule is precisely Settled by the positive adjudications of the British prize Courts, and there is reason to believe is practised in those of France and other countries. It is not one of those interpolations into the code of public law, of which that great civilian, by whom' it is expounded, has been .accused. This is not like the rule which prohibits , to neutrals, in timé of war, all trade not open in peace; nor like the rule which declares whole coasts and countries in a state of block
p. 167ade, without investing or besieging a single port; nor like that which extends the infection of contraband to a return voyage; nor that which swells the list of contraband, with every article however remotely useful in war. Nor is it a rule of recent invention ; at least, there is no evidence that the cases mentioned in the Vigilantia were decided contrary to the practice and opinions maintained by the British courts of prize, when this country was a portion of the British empire. 3. The remaining claims are said to be verified by the papers, found on board. But how are these papers verified ? It is well known that papers are a mere dead letter, unless supported by the testimony of living* witnesses. When it is considered that the cargo was laden in the enemy’s country, and the papers put on board by enemy shippers, only one of whom the master knows any thing about, so as to be able to swear, even as to his belief, it is nót toó much to say, that this part of the case requires farther proof to justify restitution of the goods as claimed.delivered the opinion of the court, and, after stating the facts, proceeded as follows:
Upon the argument no specific objection was t&ken to the restitution of any of the. property claimed, excepting that included iii the claim of Messrs. Ivens & Burnett. This shipment was made by Messrs,
Burnett & Co. of London, to Messrs. Ivens & Burnett of St. Michaels, and the invoices declare the goods to be by order, and for áccount and risk; of the lattey gentlemen.' It is contended, in behalf of the
p. 168captors, that both houses are composed of the same persons, viz. William Si,' Burnett, who is domiciled at London, and William Ivensj who is domiciled at St.
Michaels; and that the documentary evidence,, and private correspondence, show that the shipment was made on account of the hostile house. If the fact of . the identity of the two houses were material to a decision of the cause, it might furnish a proper ground for ¿n order for farther proof. But admitting the fact to be as the captors contend, we are satisfied that it can be of no avail to them. It is clear, from the whole documentary evidence, that this shipment was not made on the account and risk of the hostile housej but
bona fide on’ the account and risk of the neutral house. It does not, therefore, present a case for the application of the principle, that the property of a house of trade in . the enemy’s country is condemnable as prize, notwithstanding the neutral domicil of one of its partners. On the contrary, it presents a' case for the application- of the ordinary principle which subjects to confiscation,
jure belli, the share of a partner, in a neutral house, where his own domicil is in a hostile country. And, on this view, the decision of the circuit court is entirely correct, arid is consistent with the doctrines established in the cases cited at the. argument.
The next inquiry is, as to the freight decreed to the master. As no appeal was interposed to the decree of the district court, allowing the whole freight for the whole voyage, the question, whether more than a pro rata freight was due, (a question which would otherwise have deserved grave cbpsi
p. 169deration,), does not properly arise. The only dis* mission which can now be entertained, is,, whether the freight so decreed ought not to have been o ° . charged upon the whole caygo, instead of being charged upon a portion of it. And tve are all of opinion that it was properly a charge upon the whole cargo. Although capture. be deemed, in the prize courts, in many cases, equivalent to delivery, yet the captors cannot be liable for more than the freight of the goods actually received by them. The capture of a neutral ship, having enemy’s property on board* is a strictly justifiable exercise of the rights of war; It is no wrong done, to the neutral, even though the voyage be thereby defeated. The captors are not, therefore, answerable in pennant to the neutral fob the looses which he may sustain by á.lawful exercise of belligerant rights.' It is the misfortune of the neutral, and not the fault of the belligerant. By the capture, the captors are substituted in lieu of the original owners, and they take the property cuni emere. They are, therefore, responsible for the-freight which then attached upon the property, of which the sentence, of condemnation ascertains them to be the rightful owners succeeding to the former proprietors. So far the rule seems perfectly equitable ; but to press it farther, áftd charge them with the freight of goods which they hate never received, or with the burden of a charter party into which théy have never entered, would be unreasonable in ■ itself, and inconsistent with the admitted principles of prize law. It might, in a case of justifiable capture, by the condemnation of á single bale of goods,