Majority — Fuller C.J.
Syllabus
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.delivered the opinion of the court.
On appeal to this court from a decree rendered under this act, it was contended on the part of the United States that the appeal could not be -heard, because there was not in the record “ any finding by the Court of Claims- of the facts in the case, in the. nature of a special verdict, with a separate statement of the conclusions of law upon such facts.” But this court held, through Mr. Justice Blatchford, that: “ The rule in regard to findings of fact has no reference to a case like the present, of equity jurisdiction conferred in a special case by a special act; and, in such a case, where an appeal lies and is taken under section 767 of the Revised Statutes, this court must review the facts and the law as in other cases in equity, appealed from other courts.’^
In the present case the Court of Claims filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and declined to send up the evidence. ¥e are of opinion, however, that the rule laid down in Harvey v. United States Is applicable. The claim was referred for adjudication, and jurisdiction was conferred on the Court of Claims to determine the amount, if any, justly due from the United States to the Western Cherokees, in a manner involving the statement of an account, upon the investigation of controverted items and complicated and involved facts, and it was declared that it was “ the intention of this act to allow
¥e concur in the statement of Mr. Justice Nott in the opinion of the court below, that the latitude conferred “ must bé deemed the unrestricted latitude of a court of equity in' stating an account, distributing a fund, and framing a decree, so comprehensive and flexible as to secure to each suitor his joint or individual rights.”
The remedy in equity in cases of account is generally more complete and adequate than it is or can be at law, 1 Story Eq. Jur. § 450; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505 , and we regard the language of the act of Congress as manifestly used with the intention that equity powers should be exercised in the disposition of the case. It was upon this view that we directed the certiorari to issue, and in arriving at our conclusions, while we have had the advantage of the findings of the Court of Claims, we have considered and determined the case for ourselves upon an examination of the entire evidence.
The pi^yer of the petitioners is in the alternative: First, that they be relieved from the provisions of the treaty of, 1846 on the ground of duress and fraud, and that the United States be decreed and adjudged to pay them the value of two-thirds of 13,610,795.24 acres of land at sixty-two and one-half cents per acre, being the sum of $5,671,164.727, together with the sum of $30,000 for property destroyed, and $9179.63|- for the agency reservation and improvements in Arkansas, less one-third of the amount of $500,000'for additional lands and of $500,000 permanently invested, and the payment in 1851 of $532,896.90, leaving a balance of $4,844,113.65, with interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from June 12,1838, until paid; second, that, if petitioners be not entitled to that relief, the United States be decreed to pay them the sum of $330,756.94, under the provisions of the fourth article of the treaty of 1846, together with the before-mentioned sums of $9179.167 and of $30,000, aggregating the amount of $369,936.107, with interest as aforesaid.
And while it was conceded that Congress might confer upon that court extra-judicial powers, yet the court was of opinion that this could not be held to have been done by the act authorizing the institution of' this suit, since it was therein provided that whatever judgment might be rendered, whether for the complainants or defendants, might be appealed to the Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitm tión, was strictly judicial, and could neither be enlarged nor diminished by legislative authority. Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 ; Taney, C. J., 117 U. S. 697 , Appx.; In re Sanborn, ante 222.
The contention of the petitioners is that,’ under the act of jurisdiction* the treaty of 1846 is to be considered as a contract in every- respect similar to one made between private parties, and that the United States has no other or greater privileges or advantages than a private party would have under a similar contract, and United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691 , 710, 711, 735, is cited. That was a suit for land claimed under a Spanish grant, and came to this court on appeal from the decree of the judge of the Superior Court for the Western District of the Territory of Florida, that court having been authorized by the ac.t of Congress of May 23, 1828, to receive and. adjudicate upon such claims, upon the petition of the claimant, “according to-the forms, rules and regulations, conditions, restrictions and limitations prescribed to the district judge, and claimants • in Missouri, by the act of the 26th May, 1824.”
Keviewing the two statutes, this court said: “ In conformity' with the principles of justice and rules of equity, then, the court is directed to decide all questions arising in the cause,
It will be perceived that that decision is not authority for the proposition that a court may. be clothed with power to annul a treaty on the ground of fraud or duress in its execution, nor does any such question arise in .the case before us. There is nothing in the jurisdictional act of February 25, 1889, inconsistent with, the treaty of 1846, (or any other,) and nothing to indicate that Congress attempted by that act to authorize the courts to proceed in disregard thereof. Unquestionably a treaty may be modified or abrogated by an act of Congress, but the power to make and unmake is essentially political and not judicial, and the presumption is wholly inadmissible that Congress sought in this instance to'submit the good faith of its own action or the action of the government to judicial decision, by authorizing the-stipulations in question to be overthrown upon an inquiry of the character suggested, and the- act-does not in the least degree justify any such inference.
The claim referred to the Court of Claims for adjudication is the claim set forth in the report of the Secretary of the Interior to Congress of February 3, 1883, and that report was made under the act of Congress of August 7, 1882, which provided that the Secretary should'- investigate and report to Congress what in his opinion would be-an equitable settlement of the matters in dispute between these Indians and the United States, “ arising from or growing out - Of treaty stipu-. lations, or the law's of Congress relating thereto; and what sum or sums- of money, if any, should in his opinion be paid under such settlement.” The same language is used in the act, and the court is “ to determine what sum or sums of money, if any, are justly due from the United States to said Indians arising from or growing out of treaty stipulations and acts of Congress'relating thereto.”
As a case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, whenever its decision depends upon the correct construction of either, Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 , 379 5 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 737 , 824, so a
The settlement of a controversy arising or growing .out of these Indian treaties or the laws of Congress relating thereto, ■ and the determination of what sum, if lany, might be justly due under them, certainly does not include a claim which could only be asserted by disregarding the treaties or laws, or holding them inoperative on the ground alleged.
The Court of Claims was indeed to have “ unrestricted latitude in adjusting and determining the said claim, sd that the. rights, legal and equitable, both'of the United States and of the said Indians may be fully considered and determined.” But this did not mean that either party was entitled to -have or receive by virtue of the act anything more than each was entitled to under existing stipulations, or to bring supposed moral obligations into play for the disposal of the case. \ The inquiry was not to be technically limited by rules of procedure, or restrained by the distinctions between law'and equity. Proceeding thus untrammelled, the court was to deduct “ all offsets, counter-claims, and deductions of- any and every kind and character which should be allowed to the United States under any valid provision or provisions in said treaties and laws contained, or to which the United States may be otherwise entitled.” And, therefore, if conflict existed between treaty provisions, or between any of them and subsequent acts of Congress, such provisions might necessarily give way and be held invalid; but the language used did not involve a confusion of the respective powers of the departments of the government, nor furnish a basis for an external attack upon the validity of executive or legislative action.
Again, the determination of what, if anything, was justly due, was to be arrived at upon a full consideration of “ whether or not the said Indians have heretofore adjusted and settled their said claim with the United States.” That claim was the claim referred to the court, the claim which was reported upon by the Secretary, the claim which arose and grew .out of treaty stipulations, the claim which -was preferred in the pro
The terms of the treaty of 1828, by which the seven million acres were guaranteed to the Cherokees, while the Western Cherokees were alone being dealt with, expressed that the purpose was to provide a home for the whole Cherokee people, including those East as well as those West. By article two of the treaty of 1835, the conveyance of land by the treaties of 1828 and 1833 is declared to have been to the Cherokee Nation of Indians, and eight hundred thousand acres additional was agreed to be conveyed in consideration of the sum of $500,000, that there might be no question as to there being a sufficient quantity of land for the accommodation of the whole nation on their removal West. That treaty -was wholly inconsistent with the attitude subsequently assumed. The patent of December 31, 1838, ran to the Cherokee Nation. There are many documents in the record indicative of the view of the Indian' Office that the Western Cherokees were only a contingently separate community, from the Eastern body, and were subject to increase by the immigration of those East; and that they did not have, as an- independent community, any ownership of the land, or rights therein, except what belonged to them in common with the whole Cherokee people. At the same time, the Western Cherokees did set up the opposite contention, and prosecuted it with the greatest vigor and ability before the political departments of the government, especially during the years 1812 to 1816. Indeed, prior to 1812, they seem to have acquiesced in the treaty-of 1835, and welcomed not only the treaty party, but the great body of the-Eastern Cherokees, to participation with them under existing laws. The papers presented in their behalf show, as stated by counsel, the most.careful preparation and noticeable ability. In a memorial bearing date June 16, 1813, their alleged grievances were set forth in extenso, and it was insisted that by the forcible removal of the Eastern Cherokee- Indians and their settlement among them, the Western Cherokees had
Upon the facts in this record we can discover no ground for the revival of controversy by the Western Cherokees as to their ownership of or rights in the lands west of the Mississippi, and hold that any such claim in respect thereof as is put forward in the petition cannot be successfully maintained from any point of view. ’ If any matter ever can be put ■at rest, that has been, and the treaty of 1846 has presented for nearly fifty years an insuperable bar to such a contention.
The treaty declared “ that the land now occupied by the Cherokee Nation shall be secured to the whole Cherokee
In consideration of the premises, the Western Cherokees released and quitclaimed to the United States all right, title, interest or- claim they might have to a common property in the Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi River, and to exclusive ownership to the lands west of the Mississippi, including the outlet west, “ consenting and agreeing that the said lands, together with the eight hundred thousand acres ceded to the Cherokees by the treaty of 1835, shall be and remain the common property of the whole Cherokee people, themselves included.”
In order to arrive at the amount to be distributed per capita to the Western Cherokees, or Old Settlers, it was agreed that from the $5,600,000, the investments and expenditures properly chargeable thereon, and enumerated in the fifteenth article of the treaty of -1835, excluding all extravagant and improper expenditures, should be deducted, and that one-third of the residuum should constitute the value of their interest, and, consequently, the amount for distribution. An accounting was had accordingly, and the amount ascertained appropriated and paid over.
"We agree, as was said in the case of Choctaw Nation, 119 U. S. 1 , 29, that where, in professed pursuance of - treaties, statutes have conferred valuable benefits upon the .Indians, “ which the latter have accepted, they partake of the nature of agreements — the acceptance of the benefit,- coupled with the condition, implying an assent on the part of the recipient to the condition, unless that implication is rebutted by other and sufficient circumstances.” And it is also true that when a party, without force or intimidation, and' with a full knowledge of all the facts in the case, accepts, on account of an unliquidated and controverted demand, a sum less than what he claims and ■ believes to be due him, and agrees to accept that sum in full satisfaction, he will not be permitted to avoid his act on the ground of duress. United States v. Child, 12 Wall. 232 , 244.
But we think, under all the circumstances disclosed here, that Congress being convinced that a mistake had probably been made in the accounting in a matter which' the Indians from the first had called attention to, and desirous, as being the- stronger party to the controversy, that that superior justice, which looks only to the substance of the right, should be done in the premises, voluntarily waived any reliance upon lapse of time or laches, and, after attempts on its own part to arrive at a satisfactory result, determined to obtain a judicial interpretation of the treaties and laws bearing upon the subject, and to be bound by judicial decision in respect of the conclusions flowing therefrom, and arrived at upon equitable principles; and that the jurisdictional act passed in effectuation of such intention left it open to the courts to
As we have said, the investments and expenditures which were properly chargeable upon the $5,600,000 were to be deducted, and they were the investments and expenditures particularly enumerated in the fifteenth article of the treaty of 1835. That article provided for the. deduction of the amounts “actually expended for the payment for improvements, ferries, claims for spoliations, removal, subsistence, and debts and claims upon the Cherokee Nation, and for an additional quantity of land, and goods for the poorer class of Cherokees, and the several sums to be invested for the general national funds provided rfor in the several articles of this treaty.” The national fund of $500,000 embraced the items last mentioned, and no dispute arises here as to that sum or the sums of $500,000 for the additional quantity of land, $1,510,572.27 for improvements, $159,572.12. for ferries, and $261,891.09 for spoliations. Petitioners claim, however, that no deduction should have been made for subsistence, and that the sum allowed for removal should be limited to 2200 Indians at $20 per head; and they further insist upon an allowance of $30,000 for property destroyed, Avhile they abandon ’ their claim for $9179.164 as the value of the Arkansas agency land and improvements, and concede that the sum of $1179.26 therefor, as found by the court beloAV, may be accepted as correct. The Court of Claims disallowed the item of $30,000, and charged for the' removal of 16,957 Cherokees at $20 each, and an item for the expenses of the Cherokee committee of $22,212.76.
We concur in the rejection of .the claim for $30,000, which finds its basis in a resolution of a council of the Western Cherokees of November 16, 1816, asking .the government to
It was agreed by article four of the treaty of 1846 that, so far as the Western Cherokees were concerned, in estimating the expenses of removal and subsistence of an Eastern Cherokee to be charged to the aggregate fund, the sums for removal and subsistence stipulated in the eighth article of the treaty of 1835 as commutation money should be adopted. That commutation was placed in the eighth article at $20 per capita for removal and $33.33 for subsistence. The persons composing the treaty party voluntarily emigrated to the Indian Territory prior to 1838 to the number of 2200, and they took with them 295 slaves of African descent. The Court of Claims properly considered that the expenses to be deducted could only apply to Cherokees, and, therefore, that the slaves could not be included iu making the deduction as between the Western Cherokees and the United States, but. to the 2200 the court added the 14,757 Eastern Cherokees, who were removed in 1838, and, rejecting any deduction for subsistence, charged the commutation price of $20 for 16,957 persons. "We are satisfied from a careful examination of the evidence that the number was determined with all the accuracy possible, and should not be disturbed. And in view of the decision of the Senate by the. adoption, September 5, 1850, of the first resolution, reported August 8, 1850, it is obvious that the expense of subsistence should not have been and \ould not be deducted.
T •courth article of the treaty of 1846 fixed a commutation ior subsistence as well as for removal, but the eleventh article provided that whereas the Cherokee delegates contended that the amount expended for one year’s subsistence was not properly chargeable to the treaty fund, it was thereby agreed that that question should be submitted to the Senate for its decision, which should decide whether the expense
In the account stated by the accounting officers of the \ Treasury, December 3, 1849, the sum of $101,348.31 was deducted from the fund for debts and claims upon the Cherokee Nation, made up of these items: For national debts, ■ $18,062.06; for claims of United States citizens, $61,073.49, and for the Cherokee committee:, $22,212.76. This sum of $101,348.31 was also deducted in the account stated in the report of the Senate committee of August 8, 1850, in the report-of the Secretary of the Interior of February 23, 1883, and in the findings of the Court of Claims under the reference in February, 1884.
In view of these considerations we find and state the account as follows:
The treaty fund........................................... $5,600,000 00
less —
For 800,000 acres of land..................... $500,000 00
For general fund ............................. 500,000.00
For improvements......'............'......... 1,540,572 27
For ferries.................................. 159,572 12
For-spoliations..................■............ 264,894 09
For debts, &c.........1....................... 60,000 00
For removal of 16,957 Cherokees at $20 each.. 339,140 00
x $3,364,178 48 3,364,178 48
Giving as the residuum to be divided $2,235,821 52'
Less payment September 22, 1851 .......................... -532,89(5 90
Leaving a balance of................................ $212,37(5 94
A-nrl the recovery should also include the sum of $4179.26 for the Arkansas agency.
By the second resolution adopted by the Senate, as umpire, September 5, 1850, it was decided that interest should be allowed, at the rate of five per centum per annum, upon the sum found due the Western Cherokees, from June 12, 1838, until paid. As. before stated, our conclusion is that the sum then found due was less than should have been found by the amount of $212,376.94.
Under section 1091 of the Kevised Statutes, no interest can “ be allowed on any claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment thereon by the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest”; and in Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43 , it was held that a recovery of interest was not authorized under a private act referring to the Court of Claims a claim founded upon a contract with the United States, which did not expressly authorize such recovery. But in this case, the demand of interest formed a subject of difference while the negotiations were being carried on, the determination of which was provided for in the treaty itself; that determination was arrived at as prescribed, was accepted as valid and -binding by the United States, and was carried into effect by the payment of $532,896.90, found due, and of $354,583.25 for interest. 9 Stat. 556 , c. 91.
In view of the terms of the jurisdictional act and the conclusion reached in reference to the amount due, it appears to us that the decision of the Senate in respect of interest is controlling, and that, therefore, interest must be allowed from June 12, 1838, upon the balance we have heretofore indicated, but not upon the item of $4179.26, which stands upon different ground.
The question remains as to the character in which petitioners come into court and to whom the amount awarded should be distributed.
The “ Old Settlers,” or Western Cherokees, are not a gov
The lands west of the Mississippi wére held as communal property, not vested in the Cherokees as individuals, as tenants in comm ji or joint tenants; but by the treaties of 1835 and 1846 the communal charactér of the property was terminated as to both Eastern and Western Cherokees, and the fund, taking the place „of the realty, was invested in the various ways we have mentioned, leaving the remainder to be distributed per capita. The Western Cherokees were paid under the treaty of 1846, simply as citizens of the Cherokee Nation, entitled to receive the money, as having emigrated prior to 1835, or the descendants of such..
The Court of Claims at first decided that the decree should be in the form usually used where a suit is prosecuted by individuals for themselves and others,' that is to say, that the general liability should be established, and then provision
It was said in Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288 , 302, 303, that “the rule is well established that where the parties interested are numerous and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and all the others”; but that “in all cases where exceptions to the general rule are allowed, and a few are permitted to sue, or defend, on behalf of the many, by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried.” And, notwithstanding the suggestion that' these so-called commissioners ' do not bring themselves as strictly within the rule upon this subject as they should, yet we think that .they do so far represent the interests or rights involved that the case may be allowed to proceed to judgment.
The Court of Claims, after delivering its opinion, suspended the entry of the decree which it had indicated its intention to render, and after argument had upon the question, modified that opinion, and held that the fifth article of the treaty of 1846 applied as to the distribution, and entered a decree accordingly. The court wras quite right in holding that the amount found due should not be decreed to be received and disbursed by the three petitioners as a commission, and that it was not necessary that the decree should require the'beneficiaries to come into that tribunal and prove up against the fund. The fifth article of the treaty provided that the per capita allowance to be given to the Western Cherokees should be held in trust by the United States, and “paid out to each individual belonging to that party, or head of family, or. his legal representatives,” and “be paid directly to the persons entitled to it, or to his heirs or legal' representatives,” and that the persons entitled to it should be ascertained by a committee of five appointed by the President of the United States from the Western Cherokees, and an agent of, the United States. The court was of opinion that the rule thus prescribed should be followed as to this balance of the amount
We approve of this disposition of the matter as just and appropriate under the circumstances, and a competent exercise of judicial power. The court decides and pronounces the decree to be carried into effect as between the persons and parties who hate brought the case before it for decision, and none the less so, because it leaves the mere matter of distribution to be conducted in the manner and through the agencies pointed out in the treaty.
The result is that we concur substantially in- the conclusions reached by the Court of Claims, whose laborious and painstaking examination of the case has been of great assistance in' the investigation we have bestowed upon it; ahd in respect of the difference in the amount found, we direct the decree to be modified so as to provide for the recovery pf the defendants of the sum of two hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and- seventy-six dollars and ninety-four cents ($212,-376.94) instead of the sum of two hundred and twenty-four thousand nine hundred and seventy-two dollars and sixty-eight cents, ($224,972.68,) in full of the per capita fund provided by the fourth article of the treaty between the United States and the Western Cherokees, dated August 6, 1846, together with interest thereon at the rate of five per centum per annum from the 12th day of June, .1838, up to and until the modification of the decree, in addition to the sum of four thousand one hundred and seventy-nine dollars and twenty-six cents, ($4,179.26); and as so.modified to be ■
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson did not sit in this fcse or take atiy> part in its decision.
Cases cited
- Harvey v. United States 105 U. S. 671 p. 464
- Kilbourn v. Sunderland 130 U. S. 505 p. 465
- Ex parte McCardle 7 Wall. 506 p. 466
- Gordon v. United States 2 Wall. 561 p. 466
- Gordon v. United States 117 U. S. 697 p. 466
- United States v. Arredondo 6 Pet. 691 at 711 p. 466
- Cohens v. Virginia 6 Wheat. 264 p. 468
- 9 Wheat. 737 9 Wheat. 737 p. 468
- Choctaw Nation v. United States 119 U. S. 1 p. 473
- United States v. Child & Co. 12 Wall. 232 p. 473
- 100 U. S. 43 100 U. S. 43 p. 478
- Smith v. Swormstedt 16 How. 288 at 303 p. 480