Majority — Jackson J.
Syllabus
APPEAL EEOM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit in equity, in the usual' form, for the alleged infringement of letters patent' No. 267,192, issued' to the
The material parts of the specification and the claims based thereon are as follows:
“ My invention relates to a novel manner of winding silk or other thread upon the reels in a reeling-machine preparatory to its being dyed.
“The object of my invention is to provide an improved skein of silk whereby a greater quantity can be reeled upon the same machine in a given time, and to provide at the same time for making these skeins in a proper form to receive the dye in the best manner, and be ready after the dyeing to be placed upon the swift for unwinding upon bobbins in. the customary manner.
“In the present method of manufacturing silk the thread, previous to dyeing, is wound into, skeins upon a reeling-machine, in which some twenty or more small skeins containing generally one thousand yards, or less, are wound upon
• “ My improvement consists in winding the silk or other thread upon the reel in the form of a wide band, in which the thread crosses from side to side as it is wound, somewhat in the manner now employed, but so arranged as not to form single skeins by passing one layer over the other. I prefer to have the thread cross in five-sixths of - one revolution of the reel, although other proportions will answer. When the required quantity has been wound, I lace the skein or band, before it is removed from the reel, in one or more places, generally on opposite sides of the reel, so as to divide it into a number of parts and hold it in its fiat or band-like condition. This lacing constitutes the chief point of my invention, and is what preserves the skein in its shape, and prevents its becoming entangled in the process of dyeing. After lacing, the skein is removed from the reel, and passes into the hands of the dyer. After winding in the manner above described.the skein is so laid, one thread crossing the other, that its texture is more open even than the small skeins wound in the ordinary manner, and) although much larger the dye easily penetrates to every part and insures a uniform color. The sevgral threads cannot become matted together, as with the ordinary skein wound in the customary manner. ,
“By means of my invention a great saving is made in the expense of manufacture, the waste of silk is greatly .reduced, and less skill is required in the winding after the dyeing,
“ "What I claim as my invention is:
“ (1.) A skein of silk, or other thread, wound upon a reel diagonally from side to side, in the manner described, and laced back and forth across its width to preserve its form, substantially as set forth.
“ (2.) The combination of the lacing B with a wide skein of silk or other thread in which the strands are diagonally crossed, substantially as, described.”
At the hearing of the case a disclaimer was filed in the Patent Office by the appellant “ to so much of said claim as does or might make such claim apply to a, skein which by reason of being coated with gum, or by reason of the manner of its lacing, or for any other reason, is not in condition for dyeing for ordinary manufacturing purposes.” By stipulation of the parties it was provided “ that this disclaimer may be made a part of the record in this suit, nunc pro time, as of the date of hearing thereof, as if the same had been filed on that date, to indicate the willingness of the complainant to limit his patent by said disclaimer, and as an aid in the construction of his patent, but without prejudice to the rights of this defendant on the question of delay in filing said disclaimer.”
The Circuit Court held that the claims of the patent covered a product and not a process, and that the patent was void for want of patentable novelty, for the reason that the form of skein described in the specification and covered by the claims was well known and in use long prior to Grant’s invention, which consisted in the method of dyeing and winding silk by the use of such well-known form of skein and not in the skein itself, and if valid to any extent, it was only upon the process. The court further held that the disclaimer could neither operate to give validity to the patent for the skein, nor change it into one for the process, and accordingly dismissed the bill.
As found by the Circuit Court, the evidence fully and clearly • established the fact that skeins of silk diagonally reeled and laced across the width, so as to separate the skein into two or more sections, were in use and well known to the silk trade
The process of manufacturing silk thread is thus described by a witness for the complainant:
“ The silk in the shape in which it is formed by the silkworm exists in the shape of cocoons. These cocoons in the countries in which silk is grown are soaked in a suitable bath, and the filaments of^silk that compose the cocoons are unwound from the cocoons and formed in skeins on reels or
“ In this art the term ‘ winding ’ means the changing of the silk from the skein form to its form on a bobbin or spool, and by ‘ reeling ’ is meant the putting of the silk into the skein form.”
The contention of 'the appellant is that the skein of the patent should be .considered iff connection with the specification and knowledge of the art possessed by the person's to whom the specification is addressed, and if the prior art requires limitations in order to leave validity in the patent, then it is right and proper for the court to read such limitations into the claims by construction, and on the basis of this proposition it is urged that Grant’s skein differed from the earlier skeins shown by the testimony in at least two particulars-: First, that the earlier skeins were gummed, and Grant’s skeins are ungummed, which prevented the former from being dyed,
The court below properly held that the disclaimer did not give any increased validity to the patent for the skein, or change it into one for a process. And the simple question presented is whether Grant’s skein possesses features of patentable novelty over the-earlier skeins shown by the testimony. The cross-reeling and lacing in the skein of the patent perform substantially the same function in substantially the same wray as in the earlier skeins, but at a later and different stage or condition of the silk thread forming the skein. It is perfectly manifest that if a patent had existed on the earlier skein, the skein of the patent would be an infringement thereof, as being simply for a double or analogous use. Such analogous use, under the authorities, is not patentable. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 ; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Locomotive Truck Co., 110 U. S. 491 ; Miller v. Force, 116 U. S. 22 ; Dreyfus v. Searle, 124 U. S. 60 . And the same result must follow, although the earlier skein is not patented, if it embodies substantially the same form, and for a like use.
The function and purpose of the prior skein and the patented device were exactly analogous, operated in the same way, and were serviceable in both cases to preserve the skein from entanglement, the patented skein being applicable to a later stage of the thread. This, within the principle announced in Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112 , would constitute simply a mere carrying forward or extended application of the original device with the change only in degree, but doing substantially the same thing in the same way by substantially the same means with some better results, and would not, therefore, be patentable.
It is settled that distinct and (formal claims are necessary to ascertain the scope of the invention. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568 ; Western Electric Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 114 U. S. 447 .
If, therefore, the elements of “ boiling off,*’ or, ungumming the silk, or the dyeing thereof, and of improving the winding facility, were patentable, in' view of the prior skeins, they should have been covered by the clahns of the patent. James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356 , and authorities cited above.
The disclaimer takes away nothing from the claims except what is not in condition for dyeing, and no. silk thread is in condition for dyeing by simply being cross-reeled and laced. The- patent, notwithstanding the disclaimer, is still for an old „ device of a cross-reeled and laced, skein for whatever purpose •> it may be designed, and .is void for want of patentable novelty. The counsel for the appellant, while claiming the benefit of h|s disclaimer, and insisting that Grant’s skein is distinguishable from the earlier ariticipating skeins, for the reason that the latter were coated with gum and were not loosely laced, states that
The most that can be said of this Grant patent is that it is a discovery of a new use for an old device which does not involve patentability. However .useful the nature of the new use to which the skein is sought to be confined by the disclaimer, compared with the former uses to which the old skein was applied at the date of the improvement, it forms only an analogous or double use, or one so cognate, and similar to the uses and purposes of the former cross-reeled and laced skein as not to involve anything more than mechanical skill, and does not constitute invention, as is well settled by authorities already referred' to.
The advantages claimed for it, and which it no doubt possesses to. a considerable degree, cannot be held to change this result, it being well settled that utility cannot control the-language of the statute,- which limits the benefit of the patent laws to things which' are new as well as- useful. The fact that the patented article has gone into general use is evidence of its utility, but not conclusive of that and still less of its patentable novelty. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419 , 425, and authorities there cited.
, Our conclusion is that there was no error in the decree of the court below, and the same is accordingly
Affirmed.
Cases cited
- Brown v. Piper 91 U. S. 37 p. 553
- 110 U. S. 491 110 U. S. 491 p. 553
- Miller v. Foree 116 U. S. 22 p. 553
- Dreyfus v. Searle 124 U. S. 60 p. 553
- Smith v. Nichols 21 Wall. 112 p. 553
- Estey v. Burdett 109 U. S. 633 p. 554
- Merrill v. Yeomans 94 U. S. 568 p. 554
- Western Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. 114 U. S. 447 p. 554
- James v. Campbell 104 U. S. 356 p. 554
- McClain v. Ortmayer 141 U. S. 419 p. 556