Majority — Bbown J.
Syllabus
APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT .COURT OP fHE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP COLORADO.after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The object of this bill is to procure the surrender and cancellation of certain patents issued for a triangular tract of land of about 200,000 acres iii extent, lying upon the outside of the right angle, or elbow, made by the junction at Denver of the Nansas Pacific Railway, whose general course is east and west, with the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, whose general course is north and south. These roads are now consolidated under the name of the Union Pacific Railway Company.
In this condition of things tlie act of 18.69 was passed, which authorized this corporation, then, known as the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, to contract with the Denver Pacific, a Colorado corporation, for the construction of that portion of its line between ■ Denver and Cheyenne, (hereby clearly recognizing the validity of the change of location,) to adopt its road-bed, to grant to tlie Denver Pacific a “ perpetual use of its right of way and- depot grounds, and to transfer to it
The position of the government in this connection is that the act of 1869 separated the grant of lands to the Denver Pacific from that in aid of the Eastern Division of the Union Pacific, and thereby made them two distinct and independent lines of road, each with its own land grant. This construction would disentitle the Kansas Pacific Company to any lands west of its terminus at Denver, or west of a north and south line across its twenty-mile limit, and the'Denver Pacific to any lands south of its terminus at the same place, leaving a triangular piece of about 200,000 acres to revert to the government.. These are the lands in dispute.
We do not, however, so read the act. It did not declare that the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, should end at Denver or that the Denver Pacific should begin at Denver, but simply that the former might contract with the latter for the construction, operation and maintenance of a part of its line. Under the interpretation contended for, if that part had been between the one hundredth meridian and Denver, instead of between Denver and Chejmnne, it would thereby have made it a distinct and independent line of road, though running in the same direction.
It is true that, under the original act of 1862, the grant was limited to the odd-numbered sections “ on each side of said railroad, on the line thereof, and within the limits of ten miles on each side of said road,” but it does not follow that if the road makes a curve or right angle, the grant ceases in any way to be operative at that point. The railroad is entitled to its grant of ten alternate sections to each mile, of road, and is entitled to have it selected within the limits of twenty miles on each side; but there is no requirement that
Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the act of 1862, being a grant inprmenti, the rights of the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, to the lands upon each side of its road became fixed from the moment it proceeded, under the act of 1866, to establish its line of definite location so as to make the same extend from Kansas City ivestwardly to Denver, and thence northwardly to Cheyenne; and, in fact, that was practically the ruling of this court in Missouri, Kansas &c. Railway v. Kansas Pacific Railroad Company, 97 U. S. 491 , 496, 497, 498. But however this may be, it is entirely clear that the act of 1869 should not be construed to have the effect of breaking the continuity of the line unless its language impera
In- addition to all this, the facts set forth in the plea of Joseph Standley, which, for the purposes of this case, may be taken as true, indicate very strongly an acquiescence of the Interior Department from the date of the act of March 3, 1869, down to December, 1887, a period of over eighteen years, in the construction -of the act contended for by the defendant. The plea set forth that, in compliance with the act of 1866, the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, filed with the Secretary of the Interior a map of the general route of its line, from the western boundary of Kansas, through Denver, to Cheyenne; and that the Secretary of the Interior on the same day directed the withdrawal of lands in Colorado on the designated line of said route; that, in pursuance of said direction, the Commissioner of the Land Office prepared a diagram showing the line of route, and the map of thé land grant, and forwarded the same to the register and receiver of the land office at Denver,
The plea further avers that, in 1873, in a case then pending in the General Land Office between the Kansas City Pacific and one "William Hodge and John Tracy, the Commissioner of the Land Office formally decided that the act of 1869 did not sever the original grant to the Union Pacific; but that the grant was a continuous one through Denver to Cheyenne; that his ruling in that particular was affirmed in 1874 by the acting Secretary of the Interior; and that this was the uniform construction put upon the act until 1887, when the Department reversed its former decision, and for the first time held that the lands covered by the bill were not included within the land grant to either road.
If there were any doubts with regard to the interpretation of the act of 1869, the construction placed upon it by the Land Department for eighteen years, under which construction these lands have been put upon the market and sold, would undoubtedly be entitled to considerable weight.
"We have no doubt of the correctness of the conclusion reached by the court below, and its decree is, therefore,
Affirmed. -
Cases cited
- Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co. 97 U. S. 491 at 497 p. 570, p. 571, p. 572