Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser

delivered the opinion of the court.

In the 13th article of the constitution of the State of Illinois, adopted in 1870, all elevators or storehouses where grain or •other property is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separate or not, were declared to be public warehouses, and it was made the duty of the general .assembly to pass all necessary laws to give full effect to that article of the constitution. 1 Const. & Char. 490. By an act approved April 25, 1871, and entitled “An act to regulate public warehouses and the warehousing and inspection of .grain, and to give effect to article 13 of the constitution of the State,” the legislature of Illinois provided that those who •conducted such public warehouses located in cities containing not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants should procure licenses and should give bond conditioned for compliance with the law; prescribed maximum rates for storing and handling grain; and declared certain penalties for the failure to procure licenses.

The validity of this law was upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois, Munn v. People, 68 Illinois, 80; and that judgment was affirmed by this court. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 .

In June, 1888, the legislature of the State of New York passed an act entitled “An act to regulate the fees and charges for elevating, trimming, receiving, weighing, and discharging grain by means of floating and stationary elevators and warehouses in this State,” Act of June 9, 1888, c. 581, whereby maximum charges were fixed for elevating, receiving,

The legislature of the State of North Dakota, by an act approved March 7, 1891, c. 126, Laws of 1891, p. 321, and entitled “ An act to regulate, grain warehouses -and the weighing and handling of grain, and defining the duties of the railroad commissioners in relation thereto,” enacted, in the fourth section, thereof, that “ all buildings, elevators, or warehouses in this State, erected and’ operated, or which may hereafter be erected and operated by any person or persons, association, copartnership, corporation, or trust, for the purpose of buying, selling, storing, shipping, or handling grain for profit, are hereby declared public warehouses, and the person or persons, association, copartnership, or trust owning or operating said building or buildings, elevator or elevators, warehouse or warehouses, which are how or may hereafter be located or doing business within this State, as above described, whether said owners or operators reside within this State or not, are public warehousemen within the meaning of this -act, and none of the provisions of this act shall be construed so as to permit discrimination with reference to the buying, receiving, and handling of grain of standard grades, or in regard to parties offering such grain for sale, storage, or handling at such public, warehouses, while the same are in operation; ” and.in the fifth section, “that the proprietor, lessee, or manager of any public warehouse or elevator in this State -shall file with the railroad commissioners of the State a bond to the State of North Dakota, with good and sufficient sureties,

In October, 1891, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of North Dakota, in proceedings the nature of which sufficiently appears in the previous statement of facts, the validity of this statute was sustained, and the judgment of that court was, on error, duly affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. Brass v. North Dakota, 52 N. W. Rep. 408 .

In the cases thus brought to this court from the States of Illinois and New York, we were asked to declare void statutes regulating the affairs of grain warehouses and elevators within those States, and held valid by their highest courts, because it was claimed that such legislation was repugnant to that clause of the eighth section of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which confers upon Congress power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and to the. Fourteenth Amendment,- which ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property

In the case now before us the same contentions are made, but we are not asked to review our decisions made in the previous cases. Indeed, their soundness is tacitly admitted in the briefs and argument of the counsel of the plaintiff in error. But it is said that those cases arose out of facts so peculiar and exceptional,.and so different from those of the present case, as to render the reasoning there used, and the conclusions reached, now inapplicable.

The concession, then, is that, upon the facts found to exist by the legislatures of Illinois and New York, their enactments were by the courts properly declared valid, and the contention is that the facts upon which the legislature of North Dakota proceeded, and of which we can take notice in the present case, are so different as to call for the application of other principles, and to render an opposite conclusion necessary.

The differences in the facts of the respective cases, to which we are pointed, are mainly as follows : In the first place, what may be called a geographical difference is suggested, in that the operation of the Illinois and New York statutes is said to be restricted to the city of Chicago in the one case, and to the cities of Buffalo, New York, and Brooklyn in the other, while the North Dakota statute is applicable to the territory of the entire State.

It is, indeed, true that while the terms of the Illinois and New York statutes embrace in both cases the entire State, yet their behests are restricted to cities having not less than a prescribed number of inhabitants, and that there is no such restriction in the North Dakota law.

Upon this it is argued that the statutes of Illinois and New York are intended to operate in great trade centres, where, on account of the business being localized in the hands of a few persons in close proximity to each other, great opportunities for combinations to raise and control elevating and storage charges are afforded, while the wide extent of the State of North Dakota and the small population of its country towns and villages are said to present no such opportunities.

Again, it is said that the modes of carrying on the business of elevating and storing grain in North Dakota are not similar to those pursued in the Eastern cities ; that the great ele-vators used in transshipping grain from the Lakes to the railroads are essential; and that those who own them, if uncontrolled by law, could extort such charges as they pleased; and great stress is laid upon expressions used in our previous opinions, in which this business, as carried on at Chicago and-Buffalo, is spoken of as a practical monopoly, to which shippers and owners of grain are compelled to resort. The surroundings in an agricultural State, where land is cheap in price and limitless in quantity, are thought to be widely different, and to demand different regulations.

These arguments are disposed of, as we think, by the simple' observation, already made, that the facts rehearsed are matters for those who make, not for those who interpret, the laws. When it is once admitted, as it is admitted here, that it is competent for the legislative power to control the business of elevating and storing grain, whether carried on by individuals or associations, in cities of one size and in some circumstances, it follows that such power may be legally exerted over the same business when carried on in smaller cities and in other circumstances. It may be conceded that that would not be wise legislation which provided the same regulations in every case, and overlooked differences in the facts that called for regulations. But, as we have no right to- revise the wisdom or expediency of the law in question, so we would not be justified in imputing an improper exercise of discretion to the legislature of North Dakota. It may be true that, in the

Another argument advanced is based on the admitted allegation that the principal business of the plaintiff in error, in connection with his warehouse, .is in storing his own grain, and that the storage of the grain of other persons is and always has been a mere incident, and it is said that the effect of this law will be to compel him to renounce his principal business and become a. mere warehouseman for others. We do not understand this law tb require the owner of a warehouse, built and used by him only to store his own grain, to receive, and store the grain of others. Such a duty only arises when he chooses to enter upon the business of elevating and •storing the grain of other persons for profit. Then he becomes subject to the statutory regulations, and he cannot escape them by asserting that he also elevates and stores his own grain in the same warehouse. As well might a person accused of selling liquor without a license urge that the larger part of his liquors were designed for his own consumption, and that he only sold the surplus as a mere incident.

Another objection to the law is found in its provision, that the warehouseman shall insure the grain of others at his own expense. This may be burdensome, but it affects alike all

The plaintiff in error, in his answer to the writ of manda-, mus, based his defence wholly upon grounds arising under the constitution of the State and of the United States. We are limited by this record to the questions whether the legislature of North Dakota, in regulating by a general law the business and charges of public warehousemen engaged in elevating and storing grain for profit, denies to the plaintiff in error the equal protection of the laws or deprives him of his property without due process of law, and whether such statutory regulations amount to a regulation of commerce between the States. The allegations and arguments of the plaintiff in error have failed to satisfy us that any solid distinction can be found between the cases in which those questions have been’heretofore determined by this court and the present one. The judgment of the court below is accordingly

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Brewer, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice White, dissenting.

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case. Reliance is placed in that opinion on Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 , and Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517 . In the dissenting opinion I filed in the latter case, I expressed, so far as was necessary, my views in reference to the general propositions laid down in the two cases, and I do not desire to repeat what I there said. It is a significant fact that in Sinking Fund, Cases, 99 U. S. 700 , 747, and in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 , 569, Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr. Justice Miller, who concurred in the judgment in Murm v. Illinois, each sought to limit and qualify the scope of the language used by the Chief Justice in that case. These are the words of Mr. Justice Bradley:

“ The inquiry there was as to the extent of the police power

And this is the language of Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court:

“ And in that case the court was presented with the question, which it decided, whether any one engaged in a public business, in which ^11 the public had a right to require his service, could be regulated by acts of the legislature in the exercise of this public function and public duty, so far as to limit the amount of charges that should be made for such services.”

I desire, however, specially to notice the facts disclosed by this record, and to point out to what extent the decision of this court now goes. The case, coming from the. Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, must be determined upon the record as it is presented. Nothing can be added to or taken from the facts as established by that record. The case was heard and determined ■ upon a demurrer to the return made by the defendant to the petition and writ of mandamus, and of course upon such demurrer the facts stated in the return are to be taken as true. From that return it appears that along the line of the Great Northern Railroad in the State of North Dakota there are about six hundred grain elevators; that at Grand Harbor, a small way station on the line of that road, there are three elevators, one of them being that owned by the defendant; that defendant’s elevator is a small one, with a capacity of 30,000 bushels, and costing about $3000. For aught that appears, the elevator was on the private property of the defendant, though contiguous to the. railroad, and at the railroad station. It is further admitted :

“That respondent’s principal business is that of buying-wheat at Grand Harbor, North Dakota, and shipping the

“ That all grain purchased by respondent at his said elevator' is purchased for the sole purpose of being shipped to and sold at and is shipped to and sold at Minneapolis and Duluth, Minnesota.

“ That respondent in the conduct of his said business contraéis with millers and other purchasers of grain at said Minneapolis and Duluth to sell and deliver to said persons at a future and fixed date certain quantities of wheat, and operates and maintains his said elevator for the exclusive purpose of purchasing grain to fill said contracts.

“ That in seasons when the grain yield is light and railroad facilities are such as to enable grain to be moved rapidly there is space and storage capacity in respondent’s elevator in excess of that used by respondent’s grain, and particularly when respondent’s contracts for the sale of grain are small, while at other times, when the yield is enormous, as in the present year, respondent’s contracts large, and the quantities of grain presented for shipment are beyond the capacity of the railroads to move, there is not sufficient storage capacity in respondent’s elevator to hold and store the grain purchased by respondent in the conduct of his said business.

“That if chapter 126 of the Laws of 1891 is valid, and its effect is to compel respondent to receive all grain that may be tendered to him for storage by grain commission men, farmers, grain speculators, and others, without reference to the necessities or condition of respondent’s business at any particular time, the entire storage capacity of respondent’s elevator will be exhausted in storing grain for third persons, and the principal business of respondent, to conduct which his capital was invested in said elevator, will be utterly ruined and annihilated for want of storage capacity to contain wheat purchased by him to fill contracts made by him in the conduct of his said business, and respondent subjected to suits for damages for non-fulfilment of his said contracts.”

The rates which were established by law were as follows:

“ 2. After twenty days, one-half cent per bushel for each, fifteen days or part thereof, but not to exceed five cents for six months.”

' It appears from these admissions that the principal business of defendant was that of buying wheat and shipping it to Minneapolis and Duluth for sale, and that he operated and maintained his elevator for the exclusive purpose of purchasing grain to fill his contracts; and while at the time the elevator was not full and there was room for the storage of the grain tendered by the petitioner, and the defendant had at times used-vacant space in his elevator for the storage of grain of others, yet such use was a mere incident to and subordinate to his principal business of ■ buying and selling grain, for which principal business he exclusively maintained and operated his elevator.

Now, my first objection is that by this decision a party is compelled by the mandate of the court to engage in a business which he never intended to engage in, and which he does not desire to engage in, to-wit, the business of-maintaining a public elevator. His business- is that of buying and selling grain, and he operates and maintains the elevator,'which he owns, for the exclusive purpose of carrying on that business. That he may have sometimes accommodated his neighbors by the use of' his elevator for the storage of their grain, and thus to ,a limited extent engaged in that business, does not change the fact, as admitted, that his principal business was that of buying and selling, and that he operated and maintained that elevator exclusively'for the carrying on. of that business, or the other admitted fact that, if he is compelled, as he is compelled by this mandate, to receive grain as tendered so long as he has storage capacity unoccupied in his elevator, his principal business and that for which he built the elevator will be utterly ruined and destroyed.

The question is not whether, if he should receive and store in his elevator grain for others, he might not so far bring himself within the; scope of the law as tó be deemed for that

I dissent in the second place because the facts show, in the words of Mr. Justice Bradley, no “practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort, and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from the community.” Along the line of this single road within, the limits of this State there are about six hundred of these elevators, owned and operated by over one hundred and twenty-five different persons, varying in cost of construction from $500 to $5000; at every station there is land purchasable by any one at prices varying

I dissent in’ the third place because by this law the elevator man is bound not merely to receive, store, and discharge the grain which is tendered to him, but also to insure and pay the cost of insurance, it.matters not what that cost may be, whether more or less than he receives for the whole service. I do not care to enlarge upon this matter. If the legislature can compel a party, though confessedly to the disadvantage, injury, and even destruction of his own special business of buying and selling grain, to receive and store grain for whoever may demand it in an elevator which he is maintaining and operating for the exclusive carrying, on of his own business at any price which it sees fit to allow, and at the same time compel him to advance the money to insure the property thus forced upon him, I can only say that it seems to me that the country is rapidly travelling the road which leads to that point where all freedom of contract and conduct will be lost. For. these reasons, thus briefly stated, I am constrained to dissent from this opinion and judgment.

I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Justioe Jackson, and Mr. Justice White concur in this dissent.