Majority — Brown J.
Syllabus
ERROR TO THE COURT OE CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Motion is made to dismiss the writ of error in this case upon the ground that it was issued and signed by the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, and was, therefore, insufficient to give this court jurisdiction, and the case of Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 278 , is cited as authority for the position. In that case, however, the writ ran in the name of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State, to the clerk of that court, was tested in the name of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State, signed by its clerk, 'and sealed with the seal of that court. “It had not,” said the court, “ a single requisite of a writ of this court.” Revised Statutes, § 999, provides that when a writ of error “is issued by the Supreme Court to a state court, the citation shall be signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor of such court, rendering ■ the judgment or passing the decree complained of, or by a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the adverse party shall have at least thirty days’ notice.” And by § 1003, “ writs of error from the Supreme Court to a state court in- cases authorized by law shall be issued in the same manner, and under the same regulations,
In this case the writ runs in the name of the President of the United States, to the judges of. the Court of Criminal Appeals, is tested in the name of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, signed by the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and allowed by its presiding judge. If there was any error, it was in the signature of the writ by the. clerk of the Court of Appeals, instead of by the clerk of this court, or of the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district, Ex parte Ralston, 119 U. S. 613 , and such error would be amendable under § 1005, which provides that the Supreme Court may allow an amendment of a writ of error in all particulars of form. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Kirk, 111 U. S. 486 . Of a similar mistake it was said in McDonogh v. Millaudon, 3 How. 693 , 707: “ If errors had been assigned by the plaintiff here and joined by the defendant, no motion to dismiss for such a cause could be heard.” But the court express no opinion .as to whether the error was, in itself, cause for dismissal. As was said in Ex parte Ralston, it has doubtless “ been the prevailing custom from the beginning for the clerk of this court, or of the Circuit Court for the proper district, to issue the writ, and for such writ to be lodged with the clerk of the state court,” but it has never been held that the signature of the clerk of the state court was fatal to the writ. On the contrary, it was held in Sheppard v. Wilson, 5 How. 210 , that the act of 1838, providing that writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the Supreme Court of a Territory, should be allowed in the same manner and under the same regulations as from the Circuit Courts of the United States, gave to the clerk of the territorial court the power to issue the writ of error, and to a judge, of that court the power to sign the citation, and approve the bond.
Without, however, expressing a decided opinion upon the invalidity of the writ as it now stands, we think there is no Federal question properly presented by the record in this
And if the Fourteenth Amendment limited the power of the States as to such rights, as pertaining to citizens of thé United States, we think it was fatal to this claim that it was not set up in the trial court. In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131 , 181, objection was made that a certain letter was obtained from the defendant by an unlawful seizure, and the constitutional' immunity was set up in the Supreme Court of Illinois, as well as in this court, but it was not made on the trial in the court of original jurisdiction. It was held, both
There was no .other question under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As the proceedings were conducted under the ordinary forms of criminal prosecutions there certainly Avas no denial of due process of law, nor did the law of the State, to Avhich reference was made, abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as such privileges and immunities are defined in the Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36 ; and in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 ; and Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 163 .
The writ of error is, therefore,
Dismissed.
Cases cited
- Bondurant v. Watson 103 U. S. 278 p. 536
- Ex parte Ralston 119 U. S. 613 p. 537
- Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Kirk 111 U. S. 486 p. 537
- McDonogh v. Millaudon 3 How. 693 p. 537
- Sheppard v. Wilson 5 How. 210 p. 537
- Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore 7 Pet. 243 p. 538
- Fox v. Ohio 5 How. 410 p. 538
- Twitchell v. Commonwealth 7 Wall. 321 p. 538
- Justices v. Murray 9 Wall. 274 p. 538
- United States v. Cruikshank 92 U. S. 542 p. 538
- Spies v. Illinois 123 U. S. 131 p. 538
- Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Southern Pacific Co. 137 U. S. 48 p. 539
- Caldwell v. Texas 137 U. S. 692 p. 539
- Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. 16 Wall. 36 p. 539
- Crandall v. Nevada 6 Wall. 35 p. 539
- Ward v. Maryland 12 Wall. 163 p. 539