Majority — Brown J.
Syllabus
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The record in this case presents only questions of fact, in which are involved the ownership of a trade-mark devised by Dr. Eichmond in December, 1883, consisting of a portrait of himself, surrounded by four globes.. Plaintiff’s theory in this connection is that the trade-mark in • question was designed by Dr. Eichmond while acting as president and manager of the Medical Company; was adopted and, if not used, was advertised as about to be used, by that company prior to its
The theory of the defendant is, as stated in his testimony, that the Medical Company never acquired any property or assets; that he, the defendant, had arranged with his brother, with the two 6ther stockholders of the company, and his wife Eva, before the company was organized ; that the transfer of the property was for his own benefit, and the stock all issued in trust for him; that the sale to the Medical Company of the property mentioned was a mere form; that he decided in the fall of 1881 to change the trade-mark and wrapper from the old style to the new style; that he spoke to his brother about it, and stated to the company that he would lease his trade-mark, viz., the portrait of himself, surrounded by the four globes, to the company, provided they compromised with one Hubbard of New Haven, to whom the company had become indebted in the sum of $33,000 for advertising; that he had engravings made in Chicago on his own account, for his own benefit, and paid for them himself; that he subsequently went to Philadelphia, after the engraving was done, and ordered boxes, cartoons, caddies, etc., for himself, on his own account, and paid for them himself, though he may have used • the company’s money and signed the company’s check for the amount; that the money was in fact his; that the company made an assignment, but failed to lease his trade-marks owing to the claim of,Hubbard not being settled or arranged. If, as he swears, the Medical Company was but another name for hims.elf and belonged to him, it is difficult to see why he should have ordered the engravings, bottles, and cartoons on his own account and paid for them with his own money as distinguished from the money of the company, or why he should have talked as he did about separating from the company and entering into business on his own account.
There is a-large amount of testimony in the case which is manifestly irrelevant to the question in issue. While'it is entirely possible that the Medical Company may have been organized for the purpose of enabling Dr. Richmond to avoid individual liability, and. the stock which properly belonged to him put in the name of the nominal stockholders in pursuance of a scheme to defraud his creditors, the existence of this corporation cannot be ignored in this proceeding. Were the proof never so satisfactory that the 47 shares of stock of the Medical Company transferred by defendant’s brother to his wife Eva were in fact intended to be held in trust for him, we could not assume that she was not the bona fide owner of the stock standing in her name, as the object of this suit is not to impeach such ownership; nor could it be done in any suit to which she was not a party.
The real question is whether on May 13, 1884, the date of the general assignment to the Medical Company, it was then the owner of the trade-mark in question, since if it were, it passed to the assignee of the corporation as a part of its assets. Upon this point there is considerable conflict of testimony. Prior to 1884 the only trade-mark in use by the Medical Company was that of a man falling in a fit, and this it is admitted passed to the assignee, and is now the property of the plaintiff. There is no doubt that Dr. Richmond, in November or December,'1883, while acting as president and manager of the company, devised the trade-mark in question, and made all the necessary arrangements for the intended change in the size of the bottle and in the trade-mark; that advertisements were put into circulars notifying the trade that the change would take place on the first of May, 1884: that the
The testimony of Dr. Richmond, who was the main witness in his own behalf, is materially impaired, not only by his own confession-that the organization of the Medical Company -was procured by himself for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and that the first appraisement and sale of its assets were also'a fraud concocted by him for the same purpose, but by the further fact that, in a suit brought at Columbus, Ohio, against him for advertising, he swore - that he owned none' of the stock of the Medical Company, and that he had no interest in such stock. A witness, who at different times gives different versions of the same transaction, and blows hot or cold as his interest in the particular litigation may require, can scarcely complain if the court fail to give his testimony the weight to which it would otherwise be entitled.
In fine, we áre of the opinion that the Nervine Company is justly entitled to the use of the trade-mark in question.
The fact -that such trade-mark bears Dr. Richmond’s own name and portrait does not render it unassignable to another. Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 617 , 620; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S., 540 ; Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592 , 595; Fish Bros. Wagon Co. v. La Belle Wagon Works, 82 Wisconsin, 546.
The decree of the court below must be
Reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Cases cited
- Kidd v. Johnson 100 U. S. 617 p. 302