p. 587pose of the same. The plaintiff further alleged that he was the owner in fee of the remaining one-third of the land above describedthat it would be necessary to sell or mortgage one-half of the lands to pay off the indebtedness and to provide a sufficient revenue for the support of the infants, and that he was willing to join in a deed or mortgage for the purpose of paying off the debts. He, therefore, asked for a decree authorizing him to sell or mortgage one-half of the lands, and. to declare the. equitable, as well as the legal, title to be in the plaintiff, as trustee for said infants.
To this petition was annexed as an exhibit a supplementary petition, signed by the appellant’s intestate, George EL. Hilton, his three sons and three daughters, certifying to the integrity, fidelity, and financial ability of the petitioner, William C. Lint-coin, husband of one of the daughters, and praying the cpurt to appoint him trustee for the two minor sons, under the original trust deed from George H. Hilton to his brother, John Hilton, with power to sell, and mortgage the premises, etc. A summons was issued upon this complaint, which was served upon the defendants, with the exception of George H. Hilton, Alice B. Duchkrme, and Augusta Hilton, and on January 21, 1874, the defendants George H. Hilton, Alice B. Ducharme, Augusta Hilton, and Nora M. Lincoln, by their attorney, Seth Kobinson, entered a disclaimer of all right, title, or interest in the lands described in the petition. Upon the same day a decree was entered, reciting the appearance of the parties, the filing of the disclaimer, finding that the plaintiff held the legal title to an undivided two-thirds in trust for the. infants, and that he was the owner in fee of the. other undivided oné-third of the same, ahd authorizing the sale of one-half of the property described.
This decree was never appealed from, and no attempt was ever made to impeach it.
Upon the hearing of the case upon pleadings and proofs, the bill was dismissed, and complainant appealed to this court.,
Mr. 8. 8. Gregory, Mr. William M. Booth, and Mr. James S. Harlan for appellant.
p. 588Mr. N. S. Harwood, Mr. John H. Ames, and Mr. Charles O. Whedon for. appellees.
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
This bill was brought by the original owner of the land, George H. Hilton, against John Hilton, his trustee; Alice B. Ducharme, the grantee of John Hilton; Augusta Hilton, grantee of her sister Alice; Smith B. Galey, grantee of George L. Hilton, one of the cestui que trusts, to whom his sister Augusta had conveyed the land upon his attaining his majority; William C. Lincoln, grantee of .Galey, and certain other parties who derive their title either as grantees or mortgagees of the undivided one-third interest conveyed by George L. Hilton to Galey and Lincoln. The bill deals particularly with the third interest conveyed to John Hilton for the benefit of George L. Hilton, who died September 16, 1877. Complainant now claims his interest either by descent, or, if his intestate’s son was only seized of a life estate, then as owner of the reversion.
We think it entirely clear that the proceeding taken by Lincoln to obtain á sale of one-half the property operates to estop the complainant from maintaining this suit. The petition in that case stated that Lincoln, the plaintiff, held two-thirds of the property in trust for James F.. and Joseph B. Hilton, and the. remaining one-third he claimed to own in fee. In accordance with these allegations the District Court found that he did hold the two-thirds in trust for the infants, and that he was the .owner in fee of the other undivided one-third, and authorized him to sell one-half of the entire. property. This decree contains every element of a res judicata. The plaintiff in that proceeding is one of the defendants in this. George H. Hilton, the original complainant in this proceeding, was one of the defendants in that. He certified to the ability and integrity of Lincoln, disclaimed all interest in the property, allowed the decree to be taken against him, and took no steps to have it set aside, appealed, or modified.
p. 589The principal criticism of it is that Eobinson was not the authorized attorney of the defendant in that case, and that his disclaimer of any interest of the complainant in the lands described in the petition was, therefore, not binding, upon him. There is no evidence of this, however, except the unsworn statement of the complainant in his amended bill, which is not even signed by him in person. Of course this cannot be considered as against the decree of the District Court, which must necessarily have found that Eobinson was authorized to make the disclaimer. There was certainly evidence from which the court might reasonably have-adjudged, as it did, that Lincoln was the owner of an undivided one-third of the property in question.. Not only does a statute of the State declare that “ the term ‘heirs ’ or other technical words of inheritance shall not be necessary to create or convey an estate in fee simple,” and that “ every conveyance of real estate shall convey all the interest of the grantor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used,” but on May 18, 1866, George H. Hilton and his wife conveyed the lands in question to Augusta Hilton, who then held the title from her sister Alice, with the declaration that the deed was made to perfect the title in Augusta, “ ás it appears that the deed made to above grantors dated 26th October, 1861, through which the said land vested in her has not been recorded and has been mislaid or lost.” Without expressing an opinion whether Lincoln did in fact hold the title to one-third, there was certainly evidence tending to show that the court might have made in perfect good faith the finding that it did. ■
In addition to this we have the' opinion of the Supreme. Court of Nebraska in a case brought by Hilton against one Bachman, (24 Nebraska, 490,) holding that complainant was bound by that judgment. In delivering the opinion the court observed: “All presumptions are in favor of the regularity of that proceeding. We must presume that the District Court which rendered the decree did so upon ample proofs of title, and that the decree being still in full- force is binding, and settles the question of’ title.”
p. 590The decree of the court below was clearly correct and is, therefore,
Affirmed.