The Victory & The Plymothian

These vessels were approaching each other in such directions and with such bearings as required them to keep to the right. The distance between Craney Island Light and buoy No. 9 was about a mile and one eighth. When the Plymo-thian was at buoy No. 9 the Victory was somewhat to the north óf or near Craney Island. As the Plymothian straightened down the channel, opposite buoy 9, she was near the eastern side and heading straight down the channel course N. \ or £ E. She was obliged to swing, on leaving the pier, to round the buoy, but hacl steadied down as she passed it. The evidence thoroughly established that she was never on the westerly side of the channel. We think the District Judge was amply justified in finding as he did that the Plymothian had not, “ in coming out from Lambert’s pier, gone over to the west of the channel near to red buoy No. 22; and had not, after doing so, recrossed the channel to reach its position near buoy 9, as claimed by the Victory’s counsel. The tide was not strong enough to force her over there, and it would have been out of her course to have gone there. The testimony is conclusive to that effect.”

The Victory when in the neighborhood of Craney Island was either in mid-channel or to the westward of it, and on the Plymothian’s port bow. The Victory’s witnesses admitted starboarding twice for different schooners and hard-starboarding just before the collision; but both of the lower courts, in accordance with the great weight of evidence, found that the Victory was not prevented by other vessels in the channel, either from going on the westerly side or from stay

Moreover, as immediately after straightening down the Plymothian ported a little and then hard-ported, even if the Victory had been beading at a gradual angle across the channel all the’way from- Craney Island, the vessels would have been approaching each other from an oblique direction, which would have brought the inspectors’ second rule into play,, that vessels so situated “ shall pass to the right of each other as if head and head, or nearly so.”

The starboard-hand rule had no application. Although when the Plymothian started from the pier her starboard side must necessarily have been down stream as she turned, the vessels were never starboard to starboard after she had rounded buoy 9 and straightened down the channel and the Victory had passed Craney Island and straightened up S. •£• W. Indeed the rule applicable when two vessels “ aré crossing so as to involve risk of collision,” that “ the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way,” is ordinarily inapplicable to vessels coming around bends in channels, which may at times bring one vessel on the starboard of the other. It has often been held as a general rule of navigation that vessels approaching each other in narrow channels, or where their courses diverge as much as one and one half or two points, are bound to keep to port and pass to the right, whatever the occasional effect of the sinuosities of the channel. New York & Baltimore Transportation Co. v. Philadelphia & Savannah Steam Navigation Co., 22 How. 461 ; Union Steamship Co. v. New York Steamship Co., 24 How. 307 ; The Vanderbilt, 6 Wall. 225 ; The Johnson, 9 Wall. 146 ; The John L. Hasbrouck, 93 U. S. 405 ; The Berkshire, 33 U. S. App. 531, 540.

It is interesting to note that Union Steamship Co. v. New York Steamship Co. was a case of collision in the channel of the Elizabeth Eiver, where the steamship Jamestown, outward bound, took the eastern side of the channel, rounding

The -principle was embodied in Article 21 of the International Regulations, adopted by the act of March 3, 1885, c. 354, " 23 Stat. 438 , providing that “ in narrow channels every steamship shall, when it is safe and practicable, keep to that side of the fairway or mid-channel, which lies on the starboard side of such ship,” which is Article 25 of the Regulations adopted August 19, 1890, c. 802, 26 Stat. 320 , and put in operation, after some postponements and amendments, in 1897, 29 Stat. 885 , 893; and of the act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 96 , c. 4.

In The Pekin, (1897) App. Cas. 532, Articles 21 and 22 of these regulations were considered. Article 21 is given above and Article 22 reads as follows: “ Where by the above rules one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course.”

That was an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court for China and Japan, sitting in Admiralty, in which the steamship Normandie was alone held to blame for a collision which took place, between her and the steamship Pekin in the river Whangpoo on April 3, 1896. The case was thus stated by Sir Francis Jeune, delivering judgment in the Privy Council: “At Pootung Point the Whangpoo' makes a sharp bend towards the south, returning indeed on its course at something more than a right angle, and to the eastward of'that point the stream is divided by a line of buoys into two navigable channels, the northern being called the inside, and the southern the outside channel. The westernmost of these buoys is known- as the Old Dock buoy. The Pekin was proceeding up the inside channel, along the line of buoys, that is to say on the starboard side of that channel, and the Normandie was coming down the river to the southward of mid-channel. It

“The evidence is not clear as to the whistles given by the two vessels. The learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has found that ‘at the same time two blasts of the Nor-mandie’s whistle were blown as a signal to the Pekin, those on board the Pekin simultaneously blew one blast of her whistle.’ Those on the Pekin dispute the double blast of the Normandie; but their Lordships think that, accepting as they do the above finding-as correct, it may well be that one of the two whistles of the Normandie coincided with the one whistle of the- Pekin, and so those on the Pekin heard only one whistle from the Normandie, and believed that only one was given.”

The appeal raised the question of the conduct of both vessels. The Normandie was held manifestly in fault. As to the conduct of the Pekin two charges were insisted on by counsel, and after setting them forth, the opinion thus' proceeded: “ The first of these charges raises the question, were those two vessels crossing vessels within the meaning of art. 22? and also the further question whether the Pekin kept her course? The effect of art. 22 has been made clear by several authorities. The cases of. The Velocity, L. R. 3 P. C. 44; The Ranger, L. R. 4 P. C. 519, and The Oceano, 3 P. D. 60, have explained and illustrated the distinction which exists in the effect of this rule as regards vessels navigating the open sea and those passing along the winding channels of rivers. The crossing referred to. in art. 22 is ‘ crossing so as to involve risk of collision,’ and it is obvious that while two vessels in certain positions and at certain distances in regard to each other in the open sea may be crossing so as

“ Their Lordships have restated these propositions because they appear to them decisive of this part of the present case. They are advised by their assessors, and it appears to them clear, that, having regard to the features of the locality at the time the Pekin ported her helm, that is to say wdien she was near the Old Dock buoy, the vessels were not crossing vessels within the meaning of art. 22. It was reasonable for those on the Pekin, as, without fault on their part, they did not hear the double blast of the Normandie before they took action rvith their helm, to assume that the Normandie would take the outside channel, in which case their courses would not cross, or would take the southern side of the inside channel, in which case their courses would indeed cross, but not so as to involve risk of collision.”

We ought to add that, in the case before us, even if the steamers had been so far on the starboard of each other as to justify the pilots in considering that they Avere not meeting “ head and head,” or nearly so, there Avas no pretence of an agreement to go starboard to starboard under Inspectors’ Rule I; nor was this a case for the application of Rule III.

Testing the Yictory’s conduct by settled rules, she ivas

If she could not port and keep on her own side, she should have reversed at least as early as when her second two-blast signal was blown and not assented to by the Plymothian, yet it was the Plymothian that immediately reversed on hearing that signal and blew three danger signals, while the Yictory did not blow her danger signals until after that, and manifestly did not reverse as early as the Plymothian. At the collision the Plymothian’s headway had been stopped, but the Yictory had such headway on, that she threw the Plymo-thian’s bows around to starboard, while her own bows cut through the Plymothian’s three decks and stringer plates a distance of at least fifteen inches, and were damaged as far back as three feet.

None of the excuses the Yictory set up for being on the wrong side of the channel tended to palliate her guilt. The only time at which the Plymothian could have been on the Yictory’s starboard bow was when the Yictory was below Craney Island, and she was bound to govern herself by the bearings of the vessels as they were after she straightened up the channel course from the Craney Island south, and then the vessels were port to port. The Yictory met a few steam

"We need not elaborate in view of the concurrence of the courts below, and have gone so far into the evidence on this branch of the case because it illustrates the’ point on which those courts were at variance.

As between these vessels, the fault of the Victory being obvious and inexcusable, the evidence to establish fault-on the part of the Plymothian must be clear and convincing in order to make a case for apportionment. The burden of proof is upon each vessel to establish fault on the part of the other.

The recognized doctrine is thus stated by Mr. Justice Brown in The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404 , 409 : “Indeed, so gross was the fault of the Umbria in this connection that we should unhesitatingly apply the rule laid down in The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72 , 85, and The Ludvig Holberg, 157 U. S. 60 , 71, that any doubts regarding the management of the other vessel, or the contribution of her faults, if any, to the collision, should be resolved in her favor.”

“ Collision ” was an exception in all the bills of lading, and, laying out of view the “ negligence ” and “ flag ” clauses, as the damage was occasioned by collision and within the exception, it rested upon the underwriters in this case to defeat the operation of the exception, by proof of such negligence on the part of the Plymothian as would justify a decree against her if sued alone. Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272 , 280 ; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129 ; The City of Hartford and the Unit, 97 U. S. 323 , 325; The Ludvig Holberg, 157 U. S. 60 .

Apparently it is a hardship for the underwriters ■ on the Plymothian’s cargo to be compelled to bear a portion of their own loss, but if the Plymothian was free from fault, this is

The Circuit Court of Appeals and the District Court arrived at different conclusions in respect of the Plymothian’s entire freedom from fault. The District Court held that the Plymo-thian was without blame, while the Circuit Court of Appeals was of opinion that she was not wholly blameless, because she kept her course “without taking any precaution whatever until too late, and when the pending collision became inevitable.” Whether she may not have been slightly in fault may be a- close question. This is often so when subsequent knowledge of what might have prevented disaster tends to ■qualify the inquiry as to the prior duty to avert it. But, after all, the question is, as pointed out by Mr. Justice McLean in Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101 , whether it was the duty of the master, in the exercise of due care and caution in the management of his vessel, to give a particular order. And on a careful consideration of the evidence, we think that the Ply-mothian was not bound to change her course, or to stop and . reverse earlier than she did, and these are the only elements of fault .imputed to her.

Were the position and course and signals of the Victory such that the Plymothian was bound to- change her course or to stop and reverse sooner than she'did ?

The Plymothian in passing the buoy straightened down the channel course on the easterly side. The only change she made after straightening down was by porting her helm, which put her closer to the easterly edge of the channel at the time of the collision. She left her pier at four o’clock p.m., under half speed until she rounded the buoy, when the engines were put full speed ahead, 767 yards from the point of collision. The full speed of the Plymothian was seven knots. The tide was running against her with a force of two knots. She had her engines at full speed against the tide perhaps five minutes, and both the courts below found her speed over the ground was about four miles an hour. The Victory blew two' double-blast signals' and a three-blast signal before the collision.

The evidence largely preponderates that only one signal of two blasts and the signal of three blasts could be heard in the neighborhood of the Plymothian at the time the Yictory claims she repeated the two-blast signal and followed it up with three; and we think that the conclusion is sustained by the weight of evidence that the Yictory’s first two-blast signal was blown before she passed Craney Island, when the vessels were so far apart that the Plymothian would not have been bound to stop if she had heard or seen that signal, and as there were at least two river steamboats between the v vessels at the time, her pilot might well have supposed that the Yictory’s two blasts were intended for one of them rather than for him. However, the Plymothian did not see or hear that signal and cannot be held in fault as contributing to the collision because she failed to see or hear what would not have

The rule applicable to them was that each should keep to her own starboard side of the channel. So long as the vessels were port to port, the Plymothian, proceeding at moderate speed, was not bound to stop and reverse on the chance that the other vessel might depart from the rules of navigation.

The case of The Stephanotis and The Horton, cited to us ■ from the Shipping Gazette and Lloyd’s List, of- July 26, 1894, was similar in its main features to the one before us. The collision occurred on the river Tyne. On the part of the Stephanotis it appeared that she was bound up on the north-side of the channel, at a moderate speed, in a snow storm, when the Horton was observed about two hundred and fifty yards off, also on the north side of the river, in such a position as to make it impracticable for the Stephanotis to pass up between the Horton and the buoys. She thereupon • sounded two short blasts and starboarded her helm, afterwards repeating the signal. A short blast was then heard from the Horton, -yvhich was seen to be approaching as if under a port helm. The Stephanotis came ahead, helm a-starboard, her engines going full speed ahead, as the only means of avoiding a collision. The case for the Horton was that she was keeping to the south of mid-channel, going down the river at the rate of about four knots. The Stephanotis was seen coming up the river half a mile away, bearing right ahead. The Stephanotis thereupon blew one blast, and the Horton responded with one blast, and then ported and steadied her helm. When the vessels were in a position to clear port to port, the Stephanotis blew two short blasts, and the Horton, after replying with one short blast, again slightly ported her helm. The Stephanotis, however, blew two more blasts, and

The Master of the Rolls, Lord Esher, said :

“ The advice which we have received from the gentlemen who assist us is precisely that which struck me the moment I heard the circumstances of this case. The advice to us is that there was time and distance for the Stephanotis to have ported after the Horton blew one blast, and that the master of the Horton might reasonably have expected that he would do so. When the master or pilot of the Horton heard the first two whistles which were the beginning of the other man’s starboarding, and when at that moment starboarding could have but little effect, he had a right reasonably to suppose that the man who at that .moment was starboarding his helm, or .was beginning to do so, seeing him there, and being told by him that he was porting, would have a¡mple time'and distance, if he did not choose to persist in starboarding, to have put his helm to port, or to have ceased starboarding, and then they would have gone clear. But he persisted in star-boarding. Then com’es the question, ought the pilot or captain of the Horton to have stopped or reversed, or stopped even, at that moment when the other was beginning to starboard % The answer is that his beginning to starboard could hardly have been for the Horton,- but must have been for some other reason, and that th.e master and pilot of the Horton might reasonably have supposed that when, if anybody had looked, they must have seen the Horton, and must have known that the Horton was porting — they had a right to suppose that the Stephanotis would -stop starboarding immediately, and would have ported her helm. If so it was not unreasonable and unseamanlike, I think, for the Horton to keep on as she did. By-the time that two ship’s lengths were passed over by the two vessels approaching each other — that is, the time of .the second blast — the. collision was inevitable. It seems to me that the judgment of the President, and the advice of his Trinity Masters, was too severe. It was requir

ing men to do what no man ought to be expected to do under such strange circumstances. Therefore, with great deference, I disagree with the severity of their sentence, and think.the Stephanotis ought to be held solely to blame.”

Similar views were expressed by Judge Brown of the Southern District óf New York in The Florence, 68 Fed. Rep. 940 .

In respect of both these vessels, the captain was acting as lookout on the bridge, but there was no lookout stationed on the bows. Can it be said that the absence of such a lookout on the Plymothian contributed to the injury? Her captain, pilot and third officer were all on the bridge and the view was clear and unobstructed. Would a lookout on the bows have heard or seen more than they did ? The bearing of this inquiry is, of course, on the failure of the Plymothian to detect the first alleged two-blast signal blown by the Yictory. We have already indicated that the evidence is to our minds satisfactory that that two-blast signal was blown when the Yictory was below Craney Island Light House. If so, the vessels were a mile and one eighth apart and the Yictory was on the Plymothian’s port bow. The Plymothian blew three single-blast signals after that time, and neither of them was dissented from by the Yictory until the last one, and the proper manoeuvres to avoid the risk then created were promptly taken. But, if it were assumed that the first two-blast signal was blown when the Yictory was half way between Craney Island and buoy No. 7, the vessels were still half a mile apart, with room to correct the proposed erroneous course. And if the Yictory blew her second two-blast signal inside of a half minute after the first, as her witnesses testified, and the Plymothian upon hearing one of the two immediately acted on it, the failure to hear the other cannot be considered a fault under the circumstances.

We are of opinion that the Plymothian was on her proper course; that she was not bound to anticipate the conduct of the Yictory; and that she took all proper precautions as soon as chargeable with notice of risk of collision. The result is that we agree with the District Court in the conclusion that

Decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, the costs of that court to be equally divided betmeen the owners of the Victory and the underwriters; decree of the District Court affirmed; costs in this court for preparing and printing the record to be paid by the owners of the Victory, all other costs in this court to be divided equdll/y bet/ween the owners of the Victory and the underwriters.