Majority — Bbeweb J.
Syllabus
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
While the title to any portion of the Mesa Canal may not have been changed by this contract, yet for convenience we shall speak of that portion thereof under the control of the appellant as its canal, and of the balance as the appellee’s canal.
In view of the finding of the Supreme Court we need not stop to consider any question in respect to the influence of the dam" placed by appellee upon the flow of -water in appellant’s canal, and this notwithstanding the fact that in the trial of the case much of the testimony, pro and con, was in reference to that matter. We are concluded as to the question of fact by the finding, 'and it is familiar law that injunction will not issue to.enforce a right that is doubtful, or to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling. Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Company, 2 Black, 545 , 552.
We pass, therefore, to the only substantial question, which is, whether the dam built by appellee, having the effect as it did of raising the flow of water in its canal so as to destroy the water pqwer obtained by appellant through the construction of
No right passed to the appellant except that which was expressly named. All other rights, titles, interests or privileges were retained by the appellee. The appellant was to deliver the 7000 inches of water out of the enlarged canal, and the appellee was to receive and pay therefor. The appellant was to increase the carrying capacity of the canal- not less than 10,000 nor more than 40,000 inches, and this surplus water it had a right to use. But the appellee reserved the right if it saw fit at any time to still further enlarge the carrying capacity of the canal, and the only limitation in respect to such enlargement was that it should not “interfere with or lessen the rights” granted to the appellant. What were those rights ? Obviously the right to take and use the surplus over 7000 inches of water flowing through the canal, as enlarged by appellant.
It may be that neither party to this contract could change the grade of its canal so as to compel the other to make a like
It does not appear that the appellee was acting maliciously and for the mere sake of injuring the appellant. On- the contrary, its purpose as disclosed was to irrigate lands .which it had not theretofore been able to irrigate from its former elevation, and we kno w of no reason why it had not a right to do so. It made no stipulation as to the lands which it should irrigate. It had the same right which it had before the contract of enlarging or reducing the number of acres reached by the flow of its water. It does not appear that the lands which it was seeking to irrigate by raising the elevation in the upper part of its canal could have been reached in any other way, and it was not bound to desist from any enlargement of its own business for the mere benefit of the appellant or to enable the latter to enjoy something which was not conveyed to it by the terms of the contract.
We need not'stop to inquire what are the rights of separate appropriators of water, in the absence of a contract. We are dealing with those which grow out of this contract, bearing in mind that all rights are' reserved to the appellee which are not in terms granted to the appellant. If 7000 inches of water was more than sufficient to supply the territory which it was then irrigating, there is nothing which forbade the appellee to enlarge that area, and in order to enable it to reach that larger area it might make any change in the construction of
We see no error in the decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona, and its judgment is
Affirmed.