Majority — McKenna J.
Syllabus
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented by the case is, did the loan made by petitioner and the taking for security the note and mortgage under the circumstances presented by the record constitute a doing of business in the State, within the meaning of the constitution and laws of the State \
It was said by the Supreme Court of Alabama, Beard v. The Union & American Publishing Company, 71 Alabama, 60, that to constitute a doing of business within the. State “ there must be a doing of some of the works, or an exercise of some of the functions, for which the corporation was created.” It was held, however, that receiving a subscription to a newspaper, or collecting the money therefor was not doing business in the State “ within the principle.” In a subsequent case, Dudley v. Collier & Pinckard, 87 Alabama, 431, the court announced that “ a loan or borrowing of money by or from ” a foreign corporation is a doing of business within the State, and “ is an unlawful act, subjecting both the agents and company to a heavy penalty.” The provisions of the statute prescribing penalties were considered, and their effect was declared to be not only to punish offenders against the statute but to render
In Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 88 Alabama, 275, it was said that the constitution prohibited the making of a single contract or the doing of a single act of business by a foreign corporation in the exercise of a corporate fhnction, as well as the engaging in or carrying on its business generally. To the same effect are Mullens v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., 88 Alabama, 280 ; Ginn v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Alabama, 135; Sullivan v. Sullivan Timber Co., 103 Alabama, 371.
These cases constitute an interpretation of the constitutional and statutory provisions, and clearly hold that any act in the exercise of corporate functions is forbidden to a foreign corporation which has not complied with the constitution and statute, and that the contracts hence resulting are illegal and cannot be enforced in the courts.
The petitioner is a building and loan association. Its corporate purpose is to lend money to its stockholders. The respond-' ent Denson was one of its stockholders, and manifestly, regarding the essence of the transactions between them, they constituted a doing of business within the State of Alabama. But, it is insisted, that on account of the form and terms of the instruments and by operation of law the loans must be regarded as having been made in Tennessee. It is said: “ The note and mortgage were drawn in Tennessee, and by their express terms were payable there. The note is dated on its face at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and expressly stipulates that it ‘ is made with reference to and under the laws of Tennessee.’ ” And further, that the petitioner’s part of all the transactions was performed in the State of Tennessee, “ and only those acts which the borrower was required to do as a condition precedent to the loan of the money to him were performed in Alabama.” It is hence deduced that the business done must be regarded as having been done in Tennessee,
The case of Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282 , does not relieve from the effect of the Alabama decisions and from the necessity of following them, The action was ejectment, to recover certain real property in Colorado. The title of one of the parties was derived through the Comstock Mining Company, a Missouri corporation, which, before its purchase of the property, had been ep
It is urged by petitioner that it thought it had complied with the law of Alabama, and it was not an inténtional offender against it, and, therefore, should not be “ repelled from court.” But the latter consequence has been decided to result from noncompliance with the statute, and we cannot grant an exemption from it. The statute makes no distinction between an inadvertent and a conscious violation of its provisions, and a familiar legal maxim precludes a defence based on that distinction. Nor can the payment of the license fee be urged as a justification for omitting to comply with the statute. Such payment was' one condition to be performed by a foreign corporation; the designation of a known place of business and an authorized agent was another, and was of so much importance as to be enjoined by the constitution of the State.
It is contended that this case cannot be distinguished from Bedford v. Eastern Building & Loan Association, 181 U. S. 227 , and must be ruled by that case.
Decree affirmed.
Mr. Justice Hablan dissents.
Cases cited
- Fritts v. Palmer 132 U. S. 282 p. 415, p. 416
- Bedford v. Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n 181 U. S. 227 p. 416