Toxaway Hotel Co. v. Smathers & Co.

after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The act of 1867 applied to “all moneyed business or com

The contention is that this was a corporation- principally engaged in “trading”.or “mercantile pursuits.”

For the present we shall only deal with the bare question as to whether inn-keeping is within a proper definition of “trading” or “mercantile pursuits.” The keeping of a bar, cigar and news stand are obviously but ordinary incidents, to the main business when conducted within the inn, and primarily for the convenience of guests. The maintenance of a livery and of small pleasure boats for the accommodation of guests may also be accepted-as merely incidental to that class of hotels called resorts. The significance of ,the fact that this company did, in addition to the ordinary business of hotel keeping, engage to a certain extent in an outside trading or mercantile business will later be considered.

Having thus harrowed the question, we must answer that a corporation engaged principally in running hotels is not a corporation engaged principally in “trading” or “mercantile-pursuits.” An innkeeper is one who maintains' a hoüse for the entertainment of strangers," for a reasonable compensation. To secure this compensation he-is given a' lien upon the property of his guests within the inn. For this property he is under liability much like that of a common "carrier. So long as 'he Jias room, he must receive all who may apply and are fit persons. He may .not discriminate. To say that he buys and sells articles of food and drink is only True in' a limited sense. " Such' articles are not bought to- be sold, "nor are they sold again, as in -ordinary commerce. They are bought to be served as food or drink, and the price includes

Until changed by a Parliamentary declaration in 1825, Act 6, George IV, c. 16, defining the persons included under the term “trader,” as used in the bankrupt and insolvency acts, it was held that an innkeeper was not a tradesman. Newton v. Trigg, 1 Showers, 96; Luton v. Bigg, Skinner, 276, 291; Willitt v. Thomas, 2 Chitty, 691.

In Luton v. Bigg it' was said of an innkeeper: “He is in the nature of a public person, and his house and occupation a thing of necessity, and his gain does not arise from the victuals which he sells, but from his furniture and attendance.”

In Newton v. Trigg, cited above, it was said: “An innkeeper cannot get his own prices, but is bound to a reasonable price. A tradesman may sell to whom he pleases. An innkeeper cannot refuse his guest. He doth not get by buying and selling. He gets by the price and hire of his lodging, also by the profit on the ale of kitchen. The profits from his stables do not arise from, hay alone, but from the standing.”

Congress having never by express legislation declared an innkeeper a “trader,” it must be presumed to have used the word in its well-understood public and judicial meaning, and cases based upon a Parliamentary meaning are not in point. See Hall v. Cooley, Fed. Case No. 5,928, and In re Cote, Fed. Case No. 3,267, where Judge Lowell, referring to the declaratory act giving a list of occupations which should constitute trading, said that Congress “had not defined a tradesman and the question was therefore addressed to the common usage of this country and to the judge’s knowledge of his own language.” He defined a tradesman “as substantially the same as shopkeeper.” In the case styled In re Smith, Fed. Case No. 12,981, the same learned judge adopted the definition of Bouvier, who defines a tradesman as “ one who makes it his business to buy merchandise or goods or chattels to sell again

But it is said that although this was a hotel company and engaged, in 'doing the business of an innkeeper, it was in fact • principally engaged in trading and mercantile pursuits. If so, that is the end of the matter, for liability under the act is dependent upon what it was actually doing rather than upon what it was organized to do or professed to be doing. See Friday v. Hall & Kaul Co., just decided.

It may have been engaged in doing two'distinct kinds of business.; But unless this corporation was “engaged principally” in mercantile pursuits, it was not amenable to the act. “Engaged principally” are plain words of'no ambiguous meaning; They need no construction. Amenability to the statute must turn upon the facts of the case where, as here, the same corporation was engaged in “mercantile pursuits” in addition to inn-keeping. There is no way to settle whether it'was “engaged principally”'in the one or the other but by a comparison of the two. When we do this it is easy to see that the mercantile business which it did was of minor character and was largely an incident to the location of the hotels of the company in a thinly settled mountainous region. The stores were country stores — that is, stores'dealing in a

The answer to the interrogatory of the Circuit' dourt of Appeals must, therefore, be in the negative.