Union Pacific Railroad v. Mason City & Fort Dodge Railroad

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in the case is whether the decree of the United States Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska, rendered in a suit brought by appellee against the Union Pacific Railroad Company in 1903, which adjudged to appellee and to its lessee, the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, the equal and joint use of the main and passing tracks of the Union Pacific, means the use of such tracks in connection with the bridge of that company over the Missouri river between Omaha and Council Bluffs, or the tracks independently of such use, or, in other words, a general use of the tracks for business having no connection with the bridge or use of it, or, to be more specific and to bring forward the particular'.use claimed, whether, as facilities for elevators established by appellee, in Omaha "and generally for a grain terminal,” or as shall be necessary or convenient in its business as a common carrier, it may operate its own motive power and use the tracks of the Union Pacific to deliver cars to the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, which has connection with the tracks of the Union Pacific. The appellee contends that such right is given by the decree. The appellants assert that the Union Pacific alone has the right to deliver cars to appellee’s property or take .them from it to connecting carriers, as it does, it is con-, tended, for all other railroads, according to contracts which have obtained for many years.

The Circuit Court decided that the decree gave the use, contended for by the appellee, and adjudged appellants guilty of contempt for obstructing such use. The decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 165 Fed. Rep. 844 .

It is manifest that the rights of appellee and its lessee company which were adjudged by the decree are measured by the rights of the other railroads mentioned in the decree, and what they were are defined in certain cases in which they came up for consideration.

The first of. the cases was Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 163 U. S. 564 . It was brought by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company against the Union Pacific Railroad Company to compel specific performance of a contract in regard to the usé of the tracks of the latter. The following is a summary of the facts: The Union Pacific Company controlled and operated more than five thousand miles of railroad, and, among others, a main line extending from Council Bluffs, Iowa, by way of Omaha and Valley Station, Nebraska, to Ogden, Utah, a distance of about eleven hundred miles, and other roads not necessary to mention.

The Rock Island Company owned' and operated a line of railway extending from Chicago, by way of Davenport, Iowa, to St. Joseph, Missouri, and thence, through certain points, to Colorado Springs and Denver. It also operated other lines, amounting in the aggregate to more than three thousand miles. The St. Paul Company was operating more than six thousand miles of railroad, and one of its lines extended from Chicago to Council Bluffs.

The Rock Island Company determined to connect its lines from Chicago to Council Bluffs with its southerly line to Colorado Springs by constructing a bridge across the Missouri river at Council Bluffs and a railroad from that terminus, by way of Omaha and South Omaha and other points, thereby shortening its line from Chicago to Denver. The St. Paul Company, joined in the under

The specific and material provision was as follows, the italics being ours: “The Pacific Company hereby lets the Rock Island Company into the full, equal and joint possession and use of its main and passing tracks, now located and established,, or which may be hereafter located and "established, between the terminus of such tracks in the city of Council Bluffs, in the State of Iowá, and a line drawn at .a right angle across said tracks within one and one half (1^) miles southerly from the present passenger ■station of South Omaha, in the State of Nebraska, includ

Performance of the contract was entered into. Subsequently a change of management of the Pacific Company took pláce, and that company forcibly prevented the Rock Island Company and the St. Paul Company from using the tracks at Omaha, which they were entitled to use under the contracts, and absolutely refused to perform the contracts.

Suit wa? then brought by those companies to compel specific performance of the contracts, and the Pacific Company set up as a defense that the contracts were ultra, vires,1 and that the use of its road, as claimed, would deprive it of the means granted to it by the act of Congress,

The case in this court was considered on the appeal of the Rock Island Company, the court saying that if the decree in favor of that company be affirmed a like result must follow in the case of the St. Paul Company, and. stated the questions to be (p. 580) “whether these contracts are within the corporate powers of the parties; were duly authorized as respects the Union Pacific Railway Company; were such contracts as a court of equity can Specifically enforce; and were properly enforced on the merits.” More specifically, it was said (p. 581)' that it could be remarked “in the outset that the main contention of the Pacific Company concerns the tracks between Council Bluffs and South Omaha, including the bridge.” This, then, we must accept as the subject of the controversy to which the court addressed itself and by which the decision must be explained.

It was decided that the contracts were not ultra vires, the court basing its decision upon the general powers of the Pacific Company in relation to the subject-matter andits duties as a common carrier, and decided that there was no reasonable ground upon which it could “be held invalid as an unlawful assumption of power.” But the court, going beyond such general operation and relation, said: (p. 585) “But the determination of the existence of the power to grant running rights in this instance does not rest on these considerations,” and based its decision

These propositions were announced: The original charter of 1862 required the construction of the Pacific road from the east bank of the river, and so impliedly authorized the company to bridge it. The implication was made express by the amendatory act of 1864; and the company given authority “to construct a bridge, over said Missouri river.” The bridge was for the company’s road, and no provision was made for other roads, nor were special means provided for the construction of the bridge. By 1871, several roads had been built from the East to Council Bluffs, and others were in process of construction in. Nebraska, with Om'aha as their terminus. On February 24 of .that year the Omaha Bridge Act was passed (February 24, 1871,- 16 Stat. 430 , c. 67), in which it was provided that “for the more perfect■ connection of any railroads that are or shall be constructed to the Missouri river, at or near Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska,” the company was authorized to issue bonds not exceeding two and one-half million dollars and to “secure the same by mortgage on the bridge and approaches and appurtenances, as it may deem needful to construct apd maintain its bridge over said river, and the tracks and depots required to perfect the same, as now authorized by law of Congress.”

The act further provided that for the use and protection of the bridge and property the company should be governed and limited by the act of Congress of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 244 , c. 246, in regard to the construction of cer

The court said (p. 587): “The common object of both-these acts plainly was the more perfect connection of roads running to the bridges, on either side of the river;” and this, it was further said, was in harmony with the numerous acts-of Congress referred to in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Answering thé objection that if these acts justified the granting of the use of the bridge it did not justify the granting of the use of .the . tracks, the court remarked that the authority was given to place a mortgage “on the bridge and approaches and.appurtenances,” and that it would seem clear that the approaches on both sides of the river must be regarded as a part of the structure. And it .was further said (p. 588): “Moreover, the act refers to ‘the tracks and depots required to perfect the same.’ ■ A railroad bridge can b'e of no use to the public-unless united with necessary appurtenances, such as approaches, tracks, depots and other facilities for the public accommodation. And we consider Council Bluffs, Omaha and South Omaha, under the facts, as necessarily embraced in the intention of Congress. It is true that it appears that from the depot to the point in South Omaha where the tracks of the companies connected, is about four miles; but the scheme of Congress was to accomplish the more perfect connection ‘at or near Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska,’ and we think this distance reasonably within the terms

The next case which came to this court was Union Pacific Company v. Mason City Company, 199 U. S. 160 . The Mason City Company was complainant in the suit L_ the Circuit Court, and operated a railroad having its western terminus at Council Bluffs, and sought in that suit to connect with and use the bridge, approaches and tracks of the Union Pacific Company upon the same terms and conditions as the roads which were parties to the suit in 163 U. S., supra. It based its claim upon the acts therein set out and considered, it having no contract with the Union Pacific as the other railroads had. The Circuit Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained its claim. 124 Fed. Rep. 409 ; 128 Fed. Rep. 230 .

In this court, the Mason City Company contended that its right to the use of the bridge and approaches was determined by the decision in 163 U. S., and, further, that if mistaken in that, it had such right under the statutes of the United States and by the terms of the contract between the city of Omaha and county of Douglas, with which contract we are not concerned. To the contention the Union Pacific replied that so much of the opinion as dealt with the statutory obligation was obiter dictum.- It also urged that the statutes were misconstrued, and that the status of the present Union Pacific Company differed so much from that of the then defendant as to make them inapplicable.

Disposing of the contention that the reference to the statutory obligation of the Union Pacific was obiter, the court said (p. 165):

“While the claim of the plaintiffs in that case was founded directly upon contracts, yet if there were a statutory duty to let them into the joint use' of the bridge and its approaches that was enough to sustain a decree in their favor, and the contracts might be regarded as

To the contention that the statutes had been misconstrued, the court replied (p. 166) that, “We see no reason to question the conclusion announced in the former opinion.”- The other contentions were -also held untenable. The decree against the Union Pacific was affirmed, with some minor reservations which it is unnecessary to notice.

It was this decree that the Union Pacific Company was, in the present case, adjudged guilty of contempt for violating. The decree we have already set out.

The parties-are in sharp controversy as to its meaning, but, necessarily, whatevér ambiguity arises from some of its parts, its extent must be determined by what preceded it and what- it was intended to execute — in other words, that the bridge act of 1871 is the measure of the rights given by decree in connection with the act of 1866 providing for a bridge across the'Mississippi River at Quincy, Illinois, and other bridges. 14 Stat. 244 .. The latter act, as we have seen, provided that “all trains of all roads terminating at said river at or opposite said point shall be allowed to cross said bridge for reasonable compensation.” And, as we have also seen, the act of 1871 was passed “for the more perfect connection of any railroads that are or shall- be constructed to the Missouri River at or near Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska.” And the powers conferred and the use and protection of-the bridge that should be erected were “governed and limited” by the provisions of the act of 1866. The two: acts, therefore, express the powers conferred and the oblir gations imposed on the Union' Pacific Company. . And this court so construed them, saying, as we have seen,- that

“It is true that- the object of the requirement of the acts of congress was to bridge the transportation gap and to facilitate the transfer Of Cars passing between railroads east and railroads west of the Missouri river, but this fact did not deprive the court which was called upon to enforce this legislation of its jurisdiction to prescribe the limits and the terms of the use which the Pacific Company should allow, nor of its power and duty to exercise a wide and wise judicial discretion in fixing those limits and terms.”

Of cpurse the court had power to pass on the issues presented to it, and we might have to yield to its decision as res judicata if its decree was as broad as asserted, but we do not so understand its decree. It- gave only what the Chief Justice, in 163 U. S., called “running rights.” As we have already pointed out, the original charter of the Pacific road only impliedly authorized the building of a bridge across the river. The act of 1864 expressly authorized it, but the bridge contemplated was for the use of the Pacific Company only. No provision was made for other, roads.- The act of 1871 enlarged the powers qf the

The Mason City Company would upset this order and make paramount- the use of the tracks; indeed, make the use of the tracks independent of any use of the bridge, though the only rights it possesses are given by the act authorizing the construction of the bridge. It was because its railroad connected with the Union Pacific at Council Bluffs that it was enabled to invoke the provisions of that act. It now-, claims a right on the west side of the river to the use of tracks in connection with what it terms “a grain terminal” in Omaha, for which purpose it has purchased certain real estate. And it represents “that, in order to provide the necessary elevators and other.special facilities, it has purchased other real estate, the title to which it has caused to be conveyed to the Omaha Grain Terminals, a corporation of the State of Nebraska, every share of the capital stock of said corporation being owned by” it. It sets forth, in detail, length of tracks and their connection with those of the Union Pacific, and the number and capacity of the elevators which are necessary to accommodate “the grain business naturally tributary

The court, therefore, decided that the decree authorized the use of the Union Pacific track for local switching purposes and enjoined the prevention of such use.- As we have pointed out, we do not think the decree justified the conclusion of the court. The rights asserted transcend anything given by the bridge act. The tracks of the Union Pacific Company, as urged by its counsel, are its property, and the supervision and control thereof cannot be taken from it and given to its connections except to the extent expressed in the bridge act, which gave, as we have seen, the use of the bridge and of the main and passing tracks as necessary approaches to the bridge. And it is of special significance that none of the “tenant companies” (parties

We are, therefore, of opinion that the decree admitted appellee to the use of the “main and passing tracks” of the Union Pacific Company from their eastern terminus at Council Bluffs, only to a physical connection with the roads and at the places mentioned therein, including the bridge over which the tracks extend across the Missouri river between Council Bluffs and Omaha. And that such use was all that was necessary to constitute the road’s continuous lines from east to west or from west to east.

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the order of the Circuit Court adjudging the appellants guilty of contempt of the decree entered August 12,1908, is reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.