Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harris

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case the plaintiff below (now defendant in error) recovered á judgment for three dollars and fifty cents damages for loss of certain freight that was shipped from St. Louis, Missouri, consigned to plaintiff at Como, Texas, and delivered by the initial carrier to defendant for transportation to destination; the loss having occurred on defendant’s line in Texas. The judgment includes an attorney’s fee of ten dollars, allowed by virtue of the local statute approved March 13, 1909, Laws p. 93, Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. 1911, Arts. 2178 and 2179, which was under consideration in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, decided May 11, 1914, 233 U. S. 642 , and is set forth verbatim in a marginal note to the opinion in that case. The controversy turns upon the allowance of the attorney’s fee, the same Federal questions having been raised in the state court and in this court that were raised in the Cade Case. So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, our opinion in that case renders further discussion unnecessary. But since the claim of the present plaintiff was based upon freight lost in interstate commerce, we must now pass upon the question whether the allowance of an attorney’s fees in such á case, pursuant to the Texas statute, is repugnant to the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution or the Act to Regulate Commerce and amendments thereof.

By way of preface, we should repeat that the state court of last resort has construed the act as relating only to the collection of claims not exceeding $200 in amount; that by its terms it applies to claims “against any person or corporation doing business in this State, for personal services rendered or for labor done, or for material furnished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or for any claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock killed or injured by such person or corporation, its agents or employés”; and

Such being the character of the statute, and it having a broad sweep which only incidentally includes claims arising out of interstate commerce, it follows that it cannot be held to constitute a direct burden upon such commerce and hence repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution, or otherwise in conflict with the Federal authority, in the absence of legislation by Congress covering the subject. To this extent, the case is controlled by the decision in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122 , where it was held that a South Carolina statute which required common carriers doing business in the State to settle claims for loss or damage to property while in the possession of the carrier within forty days, in case of shipments wholly within the' State, and within ninety days, in case of shipments from without the State, and that failure to adjust and pay a claim within the prescribed period should subject the carrier to a penalty of fifty dollars in case the full amount claimed was recovered, as the statute was applied to a claim for loss or damage to interstate freight while in the possession of the carrier within the State,- was not an unwarrantable interference. with interstate commerce, in the absence of legislation by Congress, but was rather a regulation in aid of the performance by the carrier of its legal duty. The decision was rested upon the authority and reasoning of Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 , 104; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 , 476; Nashville &c. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650 , 660; Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 , 137; Pennsyl

But the “Act to Regulate Commerce” (Act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 ), is now invoked, together with its amendments, and especially that part of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, known as the Carmack Amendment (c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 , 595); and it remains to be considered whether the Texas statute, as applied to claims for loss or damage to interstate freight while in the possession of the carrier in the State of Texas, is repugnant to this. Federal legislation. It is of course settled that when Congress has exerted its paramount legislative authority over a particular subject of interstate commerce, state laws upon the same subject are superseded. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 , 378; Erie Railroad Co. v. New York, decided May 25, 1914, 233 U. S. 671 . But it is equally well settled that the mere creation of the. Interstate Commerce Commission, and the grant to it of a measure of control over interstate commerce, does not of itself, and in the absence of specific action by the Commission or by Congress itself, interfere with the authority of the States to establish regulations conducive to the welfare and convenience of their citizens, even though interstate commerce be thereby incidentally affected, so long as it be not directly burdened or interfered with. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612 , 623; Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 , 437.

In the Larabee Mills Case it was held that the railroad company, by engaging in the business of a common carrier, had become subject to certain duties imposed upon it by general law, including the obligation to treat all shippers alike; that the enforcement of this duty and the regulation of matters pertaining to it were within the authority

On the other hand, it was held in the Reid Case that since Congress had taken control of the subject of the making of rates and charges, and by § 2 of the Hepburn Act had forbidden the carrier to engage or participate in transportation unless the rates, fares, and charges had been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of the act, a state law requiring railroad companies to receive freight for transportation whenever tendered at a regular station and to forward the same over the route selected by the person offering the shipment, under a penalty of fifty dollars a day besides all damages incurred, was in necessary conflict, since it required the carrier to do the very things forbidden by the Federal law.

So in Chicago, R. I. &c. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426 , it was held that since by the Hepburn Act, Congress had legislated concerning deliveries of cars in interstate commerce by carriers subject to the act, specifically requiring the carrier to provide and furnish “transportation” (cars being embraced within the definition of the term) upon reasonable request, the authority of the State of Minnesota to legislate upon the subject of the delivery of cars when called for to be used in interstate traffic was superseded. And see Yazoo & Mississippi R. R. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S. 1 .

These cases recognize the established rule that a state law enacted under any of the reserved powers — especially

With respect to the specific effect of the Carmack

It is true that in Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 , 208 (a case arisiñg since the Hepburn Act), it was held that '§ 8 of the act' of February 4, 1887, does not authorize the allowance of a counsel or attorney’s fee in an action for loss of property entrusted to the carrier for purposes of transportation. But that is far from holding that it is not permissible for a State, as a part of its local procedure, to permit the allowance of a reasonable attorney’s fee, under proper restrictions. In claims of this character, based upon the-ordinary liability of the common carrier, although regulated by the Commerce Act, the state courts have full jurisdiction, and some differences respecting the allowance of costs and the amount of the costs are inevitable, as being peculiar to the forum. And we think that where a State, as in this instance, for reasons of internal policy, in order to offer a reasonable incentive to the prompt settlement of small but well-founded claims, and as a deterrent of groundless defenses, establishes by a general statute otherwise unexceptionable the policy of allowing recovery of a moderate attorney’s fee as a part of the costs, in cases where, after specific claim made and a reasonable time given for investigation of it, payment is refused, and the claimant succeeds in establishing by suit his right to the full amount demanded, the application of such statute to actions for goods lost in interstate commerce is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Commerce Act and its amendments. The local

Judgment affirmed.