Majority — Brandeis J.
Syllabus
ERROR TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action to recover damages for injuries to cattle in the course of an interstate shipment. The cattle were delivered on August 23, 1912, by J. R. Ward to the Houston and Texas Central Railroad Company at Llano, Texas, for transportation by it to Elgin, Texas, and over connecting lines, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas, and the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, to Winona, Oklahoma. The Houston Company issued a through bill of lading in the form of the “live stock contract” in common use, and charged a through rate; which was paid by the shipper as agreed. The cattle arrived at destination in a crippled and debilitated condition, alleged to have resulted from the
The record is silent as to the circumstances under which this second bill of lading was executed; and although it is alleged to have been issued in consideration of a special reduced rate theretofore duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, there is nothing to indicate that it affected the through rate already agreed upon in
A jury trial having been waived, the case was heard by the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the Houston Company, but against the other two defendants in amounts which were found to represent the damage suffered in the course of the transportation through the negligence of their respective agents. Upon appeal by these defendants, the Court of Civil Appeals of the Third Supreme Judicial District affirmed the judgment, on the ground that the liability of the connecting carriers must be governed by the provisions of the bill of lading issued by the initial carrifer (which did not require a written claim in thirty days) and that the second bill of lading was void under the Carmack Amendment. 169 S. W. Rep. 1035 . Upon denial of a petition for rehearing the case was brought here on writ of error.
The purpose of the Carmack Amendment has been frequently considered by this court.[3] It was to create in the initial carrier unity of responsibility for the transportation to destination. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 ; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wall, 241 U. S. 87 , 92. And provisions in the bill of
The Railway Companies contend that while the Car-mack Amendment makes the receiving carriers pay for all liability incurred by the connecting lines, the question of whether there is any such liability or not must be determined by reference to the separate contracts of each participating carrier, and not to the contract of the initial carrier alone. If, as contended, a shipper must, in order to recover, first file his “verified claim” with the connecting carrier who caused the injury, as provided in a separate bill of lading issued by such carrier, the shipper would still rest under the burden of determining which of the several successive carriers was at fault. Such a construction of the Carmack Amendment would defeat its purpose, which was to relieve shippers of the difficult, and often impossible, task, of determining on which of the several connecting lines, the damage occurred. Fór the purpose of fixing the liability, the several carriers must
1 Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190 , 194, 196; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 , 648. See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632 ; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588 .
The Railway Companies also contend that the acceptance of the second bill of lading operated as a waiver of all rights thereafter accruing' under the first. The record discloses no evidence of intention to make such a waiver and there was no consideration for it. Furthermore as stated in Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190 , 197, “the parties could not waive the terms of the contract under which the shipment was made pursuant to the Federal Act. ... A different view would antagonize the plain policy of the Act and open the door to the very abuses at which the Act was aimed.”
Judgment affirmed.
Footnotes
- 1 The rights of the parties are not affected by the Act of March .4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196 , dispensing with the necessity of notice of claim in certain cases.
- 1 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 ; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 ; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 ; Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190 ; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592 .
Cases cited
- Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Riverside Mills 219 U. S. 186 p. 386, p. 388
- Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Wall 241 U. S. 87 p. 386
- Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co. 228 U. S. 593 p. 387
- Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Wallace 223 U. S. 481 p. 388
- Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co. 241 U. S. 190 p. 388