American Express Co. v. United States Horse Shoe Co.

delivered the opinion of the court.

• The subject-matter of this suit is the liability, if any, of the plaintiff in error, the Express Company, for the failure to safely deliver a colt which was entrusted to it by' the agent of the defendant in error at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for transportation to,- Erie, Pennsylvania, and if there was any liability, the amount thereof. The controversy is here to review the action of the court below in affirming a judgment of the trial court rendered on a verdict of a jury finding that there was liability and fixing the amount at $1,916.70. 250 Pa. St. 527 . Jurisdiction to review rests upon the interstate commerce character of the shipment involving various alleged mis-, constructions of the -Act to Regulate Commerce and conse

The printed form of contract (express receipt) which was declared on and made a part of the complaint contained a caption under a title “Notice to Shippers” directing their attention to the fact that they must value their property to be shipped and that the charges for transportation and' the sum of recovery in case of loss would be based upon valuation. The contract itself was entitled “Limited Liability Live Stock Contract.” Its first clause described the carriage which was to be provided for with appropriate blanks to enable the insertion of the- livestock which it covered and the rate to be paid for the service with a proviso that the charge was based upon valuation fixed by the shipper. The second clause stated a demand by the shipper for rates to be charged for the carriage and that he was offered “by said Express Company alternative rates proportioned to the value of such animals, such value to be. fixed and declared by the shipper, and according to the following tariff of charges, viz:” This was followed by clause 3. which contained enumerations of various classes of animals fixing a primary valuation for each class, for instance:.“For . . . horses . .. . $100.”

There was filled in this blank contract, as signed by the parties and as sued on, in the first clause a statement of the animals shipped, a mare and colt, and of the rate, $75. In the third clause, containing the enumeration of classes, in the class as to horses valued at $100 there was written “$100” and in the class as to colts valued at $50 there was written “$50.” There was no filling of the blank at the end of the fifth clause stating the owner’s valuation and that space therefore remained vacant.

There was evidence tending to show that the shipper was experienced in shipping horses and was informed of the right to value and that the rate as well as the recovery would depend upon valuation. Evidence was also admitted over objection of the company tending to show that the shipper was unaware of the valuation clauses and that he signed the contract without reading it. There was further evidence that on the contrary the shipper was fully informed by the agent and declared his purpose to fix the primary valuation and not to exceed it. In addition, evidence was tendered by the defendant which was rejected and objection reserved, tending to show that in consequence of the desire of the shipper not to change the primary valuation, that is to adopt the same, the figures

Putting out of view the conflicting tendencies of the proof and looking at the subject-matter from the point of view of the contract, that it was one intended to limit liability, or in other words, to fix a rate according to value at the shipper’s election and to regulate recovery in case of loss correspondingly, would seem too clear for anything but statement. It is true the intimation is conveyed in the argument that the alternative rate depended exclusively upon the making of a valuation by the shipper and that where this was not done, there was no valuation and no limitation and a consequent limited rate and unlimited liability. But the suggestion disregards the stating of a value in the different clauses of § 3 which are susceptible of no other explanation than that they were intended as a primary value to control as the basis for fixing the rates and as a rule of limitation if the shipper did not by making another and increased value become liable for a higher rate and possess the right to a greater recovery. To adopt the suggestion would require a disregarding of the plain terms of the contract and would leave no basis upon which to explain the rate fixed which clearly rested upon the tariff as applied to the articles and the statement as to value fixed in the third clause.

That it was in the power of the carrier under the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended to limit liability even in case of negligence by affording the shipper an opportunity to pay a higher rate and secure a higher recovery-than the one initially fixed by the carrier, is so conclusively settled as to be beyond controversy. Adams Express

These rulings are decisive unless it be that for some reason they are inapplicable, and we briefly, consider separately the grounds relied upon as demonstrating that resült.

It is said the rate sheets filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission if they sustained the contract were not posted and therefore the contract must be treated as. having nothing to- rest upon. But the proposition is adversely disposed of by several of the cases above cited. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 , 652; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 , 111; Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319 , 327; New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U. S. 148 , 151.

But it is urged the contract of limitation was void because it is shown to have been illegal, that is, repugnant to the official tariff sheets filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission which, properly authenticated, were offered in evidence. But, turning to the official tariff sheets as found in the record, it is apparent that the terms of the contract are substantially identióal with the statement in the tariff sheets as to . the rates concerning the shipment of livestock and indeed, comparing the two, it- is impossible to reach any other conclusion than that the

Finally it is said that the right to' limit ought not to be recognized in the presence of a controversy and conflicting tendencies of proof as to whether the limitation of liability was called to the attention of the shipper and, if one aspect be accepted, of the possibility that the contract was signed by the shipper in ignorance of the clause. But here again the contention but overlooks the very foundation upon which the principle settled by the adjudged eases rests and disregards the express ruling in some of them that the effect of a contract made and signed by a shipper which is lawful from thfe point of view of the established rate sheets may not be avoided by the suggestion that by neglect or inattention the contract which was entered into was never read. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319 ; New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U. S. 148 , 151.

As from what we have said it follows that the shipper should not have been permitted, after obtaining the lowest possible rate based upon a valuation to which his right of recovery in case of loss was limited, to recover upon the happening of the loss an amount wholly disproportionate' and inconsistent -with the rate paid contrary to the express - terms of the contract,, it results that the judgment below must be and it is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings' not inconsistent with this opinion.

And it is so ordered.