Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co.

delivered the opinion of the court.

Suit was brought by the appellant, a corporation organized under the laws of Spain, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complainant set up that for more than twenty-seven years it had been engaged in the business of manufacturing cigars and cigarettes in the Philippine Islands. That its factory is known as “La Flor de la Isabela,” which name is used upon the packages and containers of the products manufactured by complainant and on the advertising matter in its cigar and cigarette business. That on April 5,1887, the Kingdom of Spain as the sovereign authority in the Philippine Islands issued to it, under laws then in force, a certificate of registration and ownership of certain trade-marks and trade-names and label: designs therein described and enumerated, including the trade-name “La Flor de la

The Court of First Instance found in favor of the complainant because of its exclusive ownership of the Spanish trade-mark, and in favor of the defendant on the question of unfair competition. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that court found in favor of the defendant upon both issues, and directed a reversal of the

This appeal was perfected before the Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726 , and is controlled by § 248 of the Judicial Code, which provided that this court should have jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in all actions, • casesr causes, and proceedings in which the Constitution, or any statute, treaty, title, right, or privilege of the United States is involved.

The contention is that the provisions of this treaty were involved in the decision of the Supreme Court, thereby authorizing this appeal.

By the Treaty of Paris of 1898, Spain ceded to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands. In Article VIII of. the treaty it is provided that' the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, ‘ ‘ cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.” Article XIII provides that “The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents ac

It is the evident purpose of these provisions, in view of the cession of territory made by Spain to the United States, to preserve private rights of property, and to provide that the change of sovereignty should work no impairment of such rights.

The Philippine Act of 1902, carried into the section of the Judicial Code which we have quoted, intended to give this court jurisdiction in cases involving rights secured by the Treaty of 1898 and other treaties of the United States. A good illustration of a case of this character is found in Vilas v. Manila, 220 U. S. 345 , where certain claims were made against the City of Manila, which it was contended survived, notwithstanding the cession to the United States. A -writ of error was sued out to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denying relief because of its holding that the municipality of Manila after the treaty was a totally different corporate' entity and in nowise liable for debts created under the Spanish sovereignty. Exception was taken to the jurisdiction, but this court held that the case involved the Treaty of 1898, as the question was made to turn in the court below upon the consequence of the change of sovereignty and the reincorporation of the city after the substituted sovereignty. Mr. Justice Lurton, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “This disposes of the question of the jurisdiction of this court grounded upon the absence from the petition of the plaintiffs of any distinct claim under the treaty of Paris, since under § 10 of the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902, this court is given jurisdiction to review any final decree or judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands where any treaty of the

In this case no such question is presented. The decision involved no consideration of treaty rights, nor were the same discussed in the judgment in the court below. The Philippine Supreme Court, in determining the issues, held that the name “Isabela,”' which appellee was charged with, using, was a geographical and descriptive term and incapable of registration as a trade-mark either under the Philippine Act No. 666, or the law as it existed under the Spanish regime; that the Spanish trade-name as registered consisted of the words “La Flor de la. Isabela” and the trade-mark of a shield with certain devices thereon. That the action was not for the infringement of the trade-name “La Flor de la Isabela,” but was for the violation of the trade-name “Isabela.” And that unfair competition was not shown.

Certainly the treaty, in providing that property rights of this class should be respected, did not intend to prevent the consideration by the courts of the nature and extent of the rights granted, or prohibit the application of laws for .the enforcement and regulation of such property rights when not in derogation thereof. Philippine Act No. 666, § 14, Comp. of the Acts of the Philippine Comm., § 68, itself provides that certificates issued under the Spanish sovereignty, unannulled under the royal decree of 1888, shall be conclusive evidence of the exclusive right of ownership of. súch trade-marks or trade-names.

Reliance is had by appellant, to sustain the jurisdiction, on the decision of this court in Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U. S. 452 . There suit was brought upon a trade-mark registered

. Certainly, this was far from holding that a right of appeal existed because a right seemed by the treaty was involved.

The present case was decided upon grounds entirely compatible with continued respect for the trade-mark and trade-name rights granted by the Spanish sovereignty. It results that in the sense of the statute, giving a right to review in this comt, no treaty of the United States was involved in the decree which it is sought to reverse.'

The appeal must be

Dismissed.