Majority — Washington J.
Syllabus
[Construction op Statute. Jurisdiction.}delivered the opinion ot' the f ioúrt.
This was a libel filed in the District: Court of the United States for the Southern District of New-York, in the name of the United States, against 350 chests of hyson skin tea. imported from Canton in • the ship Benjamin Rush, as forfeited to the use of the United States. The libel charges, that the chests of teas were seized by the collector of the customs, for the District of Philadelphia, on the 6th of December, in the year 1825, at the city of New-York, on waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, and alleges three distinct grounds of forfeiture. FDst, that the teas, being 'subject to pay duties, were imporfed into the United States at Philadelphia, and were there unladen without having been entered at any custom house, and without a permit from any collector and naval officer, or from any collector of the customs of the United States, the duties imposed thereon not having been paid, or secured to
To this libel a claim and answer were filed on behalf of Joshua Lippificott, William Lippincott, and Benjamin W. Richards, of Philadelphia, setting forth, that the said teas were imported into Philadelphia' by Edward Thomson, who had the sáme regularly entered, and unladen under a permit duly granted by the collector,'in the presence of the proper custom house officers of that port; and that the said chests of tea were duly inspected, weighed, marked, and numbered, as the iaw required. That bond was given by Thomson, and the teas were stored, as stated in the libel, in conformity with the 62d section of the law therein refer-: red to ; that a certificate, signed and sealed in due form of law, was issued to-accompany each of the chests of tea, which certificates were delivered to Thomson, and after-wards came to the possession of the claimants, to Whom a bill of sale of the said teas had been. made by the said Thomson, as a. security for certain large advances made
The District Court decreed the teas to be forfeited to the United States, from which sentence an appeal was praypd to the Circuit Court, where the same was reversed, aud restitution decreed to the claimants, from which last decree the cause comes before this Court by appeal; and the only question tobe decided is, whether, upon this libel, and the facts agreed upon in the District Court, the teas in question are liable to forfeiture for any of the causes stated in the libel.
The first ground of forfeiture alleged in the libel, is so satisfactorily disposed of by the facts agreed in the case, that it was not relied upon, or even noticed, in the argument of the cause in this Court. The charge is, that the teas in question, being subject to the payment of duties upon their importation, were unladen at the port of Philadelphia, without having been entered at any custom house, and without a regular permit to land the same having been first obtained.
Question as to ttlB &ll61[6u forfeiture, on the goods'1 being found concccilsdi “
The next.alleged cause of forfeiture is, that the' teas were found concealed on board a certain vessel, the duties thereon not having been paid, or secured to be paid. .
This charge is also negatived by the statement of facts, which admits, that the teas were not secreted, nor were they found secreted at the time of seizure, on board the vessel where they were seized, but were then and there stowed in the usual and customary manner of stowing such property, when put onboard for transportation. It is, nevertheless, * i ' ' insisted, on the part of the United States, that although the conclusion that the teas were not found secreted, must now he admitted as a fact not to be controverted in argument, ne~ ° y verthcless, the Court is bound to say that, upon a view of the facts agreed in the statement, which forms part of this record, they were concealed in point of law, and according to the true intent and meaning of the act of Congress,'under which the seizure was made. These facts are, that, after the teas were placed in the storehouse agreed upon by the collector and the importer, (hey were fraudulently removed from thence by some persons other than the claimants, and without their knowledge or consent; and after a regular entry and clearance at the custorn house in Philadelphia, were shipped on board the vessel in which they were seized, and transported to the port of New-York, the duties thereon not having been paid or secured, in any other manner- than by giving the general bond, and storing the teas according to the provisions of the 62d section of the Duty Act.
This question arises out*of the 68th section of the Duty Act, and depends.upon the true construction of that section. It declares, so far as concerns this particular case, i! that every collector, &c. shall have full power and authority to enter any ship or vessel in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, &c. subject to duties, are concealed^ and therein/ to search for, seize, and secure, any such goods,” &c. and “ all such goods, &c. on which the duties shall not have been paid, or secured to be paid, shall be forfeited.”
The Court cannot yield its assent to either of these propositions. The act provides for, and defines, by express enactments, the various acts which should draw after them the. penalty of forfeiture of the goods imported. Thus, if they be unladen at any other time than in open day, unless by a special license, or at any other time, without a permit by the proper officer, they are subject to forfeiture under the fiftieth section ; and the like consequence follows as to distilled spirits, wines or teas, which are. landed without the special permit provided for by the 37th section, or other* wise than under the inspection of the surveyor or other officer acting as inspector of the revenue, contrary to the direction-ofthe 38fh section. These are all acts of illegal importation,' and, on that ground, the goods are made liable to forfeiture. But after they are regularly entered, landed, bonded and stored, there is no part of this act which exposes them to this penalty for being illegally withdrawn from the-place of their deposit, without a permit from the, proper officer, or without the duties thereon being first paid or secured to be paid. Nór would it seem, but forthe extraordinary circumstances which have attended these and the other teas mentioned in these proceedings,,to have been necessary to devise other- guards than those which the 62d section of the act has provided for securing to the United States the payment of the duties. The key of one of the locks to be placed on the store in which the teas are depo^ sited, is directed to be retained by ths inspector, who is for
Lien of the government for the duties*
In order, then,-to subject teas illegally removed from the storehouse in which they were deposited, to forfeiture, under this count in the libel, it is essential for the United States to prove, upon the trial, not only that the duties for which they Were liable were unpaid, or not secured to be paid, but that they were found concealed at the time they were seized.- A
Goods not Un‘“p^uíe 3ro“nd of the duties not baving been be®ul'Rd-
The argument, that goods subject to duties are, in thé A'iew of the law, and by a fair construction of this section, ••oncealed wherever and under whatever cifcumstances they may be found, is equally inadmissible. If that were the intention of the legislature, the offence would consist, not in the concealing óf such goods, but in having the possession of them; and the authority to seize, applying to such a ease, would, no doubt, have extended to all goods tohereverfound out of their place of deposit, on which the duties had not: been paid, or secured to be paid. The term concealed used in this section, is one of plain interpretation, and obviously applies to articles intended to be secreted and withdrawn from public view on account of their being so subject to duties, or from some fraudulent motive. '
jBut if the argument upon this part of the.case were well founded, the count in the libel which we are now examining could not be maintained, since we are all of opinion, that . _ . . 7 . 7 ‘ . the duties upon these teas were secured to be paid, within the fair construction of the 62d section of the duty' law. By this section, the duties upon all goods imported, and subject thereto, are to be paid, or secured to be paid, before a permit to land them can be granted. If the importer elect not to pay them, he is at liberty to secure them by bond with one • or more sureties to the satisfaction of the collector, or the collector may accept his own bond without sureties ; but, in the latter case, the goods themselves must be deposited with the proper custom- house officer pointed out in the section. These provisions apply, thus far. to all kinds of'
■ As to goods other than teas, if the importer elect, instead of paying the duties, or securing the same by giving bond with satisfactory sureties, to give his own bond without sureties, the collector is required, to accept such bond, together with a deposit of so much of the goods on which the duties are payable, as in his judgment shall he sufficient security for the amount of the duties for which such bond shall have been given, together with the charge of safe keeping, and seizing the same, which goods,,so deposited, are to be kept by the collector at the expense and risk of the party on whose account they were deposited, until the-sum specified in the bond shall become .due.: and if the same be not then paid, so much of th.e goods deposfted'as may be necessary to discharge the duties and expenses are to • be sold, and-the proceeds to be disposed of as in the former case."
The goods not feiture under the 43d sec-
In consequence of an intimation of the Attorney General, that, in case the decision of the Court should be against; unffe(i States upon what we have called the second count in the libel, he should move to amend the libel by-inserting a count under the 43d section of this law, the cause was argued at the bar as if such a count now formed a part of the libel. But, if the above opinion be correct, it manifest that such a count would not help the case, since, if the duties were secured to be paid according to the provi ■ sions of the 62d section, no forfeiture could be decreed under the 43d section. The facts agreed, present, besides, an additional reason why such a decree could not properly be made'under that section, since they admit, that each chest of the teas in question, at the time of seizure, was duly numbered, and had on it all the marks which the law requires, and that the certificates required by the act to accompany each of the chests, remained in the hands of the claimants at Philadelphia. Now, we are all of opinion, that, to authorize a seizure,of teas, and bringing them to adjudication, it'is necessary, under the 43d section, not only that the chests should be unaccompanied by the proper certificates, but also that they should be unaccompanied by the marks required to be placed upon them by the 39th section. Both must concur in order to justify a seizure, and to raise such a presumption that the teas are liable to forfeiture, as to throw upon the claimant the burthen of proving that they were imported according to law. and that the duties thereon were paid, or secured to be paid, in order to avoid a sentence of condemnation.
Enough has already been said to dispose of the, third couqt in the libel, even, if it had been pressed in the argument of the cause, since it is not pretended that there
Whether the ^ síate^for the duties, be. asserted in tbe present case?
The only remaining objection taken to the decree of the Circuit Court is, that the payment of. the duties to which these teas were subject, ought, to have-been made a condi- . . . , . . , , uon of their restitution to the claimants, or that they should have been decreed to be sold towards the payment of the duties for which the original bond of Thomson was given, and which remained unpaid.
Admitting that those duties wére even now due, which is not the. case, wé could not yield our asseiit to the correctness of this objection, even if the prayer of the libel had corresponded with such a decree, and even if the teas in question wereliable for duties beyond those properly chargeable against the quantity seized, which is by no means com ceded
By the 9th section of the Judiciary Act, the District Courts have exclusive original cognizance} amongst other subjects, bf all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation', or trade, of the Uhited States, where the seizures are made on waters navigable from tlie sea by vessels of a specified burthen, within their' respective Districts, as weil as upon the high seas ; and, also, of all seizures made on lancj, ot other wat.ers than as aforesaid, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States. They have, also,.cognizance concurrent with the State Courts, of all suits at common law where the United
Now, it is not pretended that this is á civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; and it has already been shown, that there is no law of the United States, of impost or otherwise, to warrant the seizure of the teas in question, or to subject them to forfeiture. But, even if there were such a law, the only proceeding which could have been instituted under.it, must have been, to forfeit the articles seized, and not to subject them to the payment of duties. If the case be not one of forfeiture, we can' perceive no ground upon which the District Court could entertain a suit, by way of libel, to enforce the payment of duties. No jurisdiction is conferred upon that Court in such a case, either by the above section of the Judiciary Act, or by any other act of .Congress. There is no doubt, but that a suit at common law-might be instituted in that Court, as well as in the Circuit Court, in the name of the United States, founded upon their legal right to recover the possession of goods upon which they have a lien for duties, or damages for the illegal taking or detaining of the same. But the remedy which has been . selected, is not one which can obtain the sanction of this Court.
The decree of the Circuit Court, reversing that of the Dis- ' trict Court, and awarding restitution to the claimants, must be affirmed.