Majority — Butler J.
Syllabus
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT’ OF ARKANSAS.delivered the opinion of the Court.
October 21,1920, at Earle, Arkansas,-defendants in error delivered to plaintiff in error seventy-five bales of cotton for transportation to Liverpool, England. The carrier issued to the shippers an export bill of lading in two parts: the first covered the inland haul from Earle to Brunswick, Georgia, designated as port A, and the second covered the ocean carriage from Brunswick to Liverpool, designated as port B.- The inland route specified was over the lines of railroad of plaintiff in error, the Mobile and Ohio, and the Atlanta, Birmingham and Atlantic. The inland rate for the railroads named was 98.5 cents per hundred pounds. The ocean transportation was to be by the Leyland Line for the rate of $1.95. The bill of lading contained, as applicable in respect of the service and delivery at Brunswick, a provision that, “No carrier or party in possession of . . . the property, herein described, shall be liable for any loss thereof ... by fire . . .” After the bill of lading was issued, while the cotton was on the cars of the carrier and before they were moved from Earle, it was destroyed by a fire originating at the compress and which was not set by plaintiff in error. Sections 843 and 844, Crawford and Moses’ Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, declare that it is unlawful for any railroad to enter into an agreement with any shipper for the purpose of limiting or abrogating its statutory and common law duties or liability as a common carrier; that all agreements made for that purpose and any rule or regulation limiting the common law rights of shippers are void. Defendants in error brought this
There is no' claim that the loss was caused by any fault or negligence of the carrier; and, if the Arkansas statute does not apply to the shipment, the clause in the bill of lading exempting the carrier from liability is valid. Cau v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427 . The power of Congress under the commerce clause to regulate bills of lading in respect of such shipments is not questioned; and, if it has entered the field of such regulation, the state statute is thereby superseded. The Interstate Commerce Act extends to the plaintiff in error and to the other railroads named in the bill of lading over which the cotton was to have been transported from Earle, Arkansas, to the port of Brunswick, Georgia, and it also extends to the interstate transportation over the inland route constituting a part of the movement in foreign commerce. § 1 (1), (2) and (3). 41 Stat. 474 . Among other things, the Act requires all carriers subject to it to establish and enforce just and reasonable regulations affecting the issuance, form and
The question is whether Congress has entered upon the regulation of provisions in bills of lading affecting liability of railroads for loss of property received by them for transportation over an interstate'inland route to a seaport for delivery to a foreign vessel for ocean carriage to a non-adjacent foreign country. All of the provisions referred to were in force when the cotton was delivered-to plaintiff in error. No Act of Congress or order of the commission prescribed a form of bill of lading for this shipment. Cf. In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 64 I. C. C. 347 , et seg.; Alaska S. S. Co. v. United States, 259 Fed. 713 ; same case, 253 U. S. 113 . The defendants in error rightly say that the Carmack Amendment, the Cummins Amendment, or § 25 does not apply to such a shipment. But that does not sustain their contention that Congress has not evinced an intention to regulate ■bills of lading for transportation such as is here involved. Section 1 (6) extends to all carriers and to all transporta-tionsubject to the Act; it prescribes a general rule applicable to all regulations and practices affecting the form or substance of bills of lading in order that they may be just and reasonable. And the commission is empowered and directed to enforce the rule.
The general regulation of the “ issuance, form, and substance ” of bills of lading is broad enough to cover contractual provisions, like the one involved in this case, exempting railroads from liability for loss of shippers’ property by fire. Congress must be deemed to have determined that the rule laid down and the means provided
Judgment reversed.
Cases cited
- Cau v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. 194 U. S. 427 p. 343
- United States v. Alaska Steamship Co. 253 U. S. 113 p. 345
- Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad 272 U. S. 605 p. 346
- Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Washington 270 U. S. 87 p. 346
- Pennsylvania Railroad v. Public Service Commission 250 U. S. 566 p. 346
- Adams Express Co. v. Croninger 226 U. S. 491 p. 346
- Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Washington ex rel. Atkinson 222 U. S. 370 p. 346
- Prigg v. Pennsylvania 16 Pet. 539 at 618 p. 346
- Houston v. Moore 5 Wheat. 1 at 22 p. 346