Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Chatters

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent, a citizen of Louisiana, brought suit in the District Court for Eastern Louisiana against the Southern

Respondent purchased a through coupon ticket for the journey at the office of the Louisville & Nashville in New Orleans, which entitled him to passage over the line of the Louisville & Nashville from New Orleans to Montgomery, Alabama, over the Atlanta & West Point Railroad from Montgomery to Atlanta, Georgia, and thence to Washington over the line of the Southern. He took passage in New Orleans on a car of the Southern and proceeded in it on his journey until, while on the line of the Southern in Virginia, a window screen, attached to the outside of the car, became loosened and swung backward on.its hinges so ás to strike and break the car window behind it and injure respondent with pieces of flying glass. The train was made up by the Louisville & Nashville in New Orleans, and was operated under an agreement among the three carriers concerned, which was not offered in evidence. But it appeared that the cars composing the train were furnished by the three carriers on the basis of'their respective mileage; that each furnished locomotive power and train crews over its own line; and that each, while in possession of the train, was in exclusive control of it.

Process against both petitioners was served on their respective agents in Louisiana, designated by them to receive service of process as required by a state law exacting formal consent by the corporation that any “ lawful process ” served on the designated agent should be “ valid

It is urged by the Southern that, compliance with the Louisiana statute requiring a foreign corporation doing business within the state to designate an agent to receive service of process is, under the state decisions, a consent to suit only upon causes of action arising out of business conducted within the state, Watkins v. North American Land & Timber Co., 106 La. 621 ; Delatour & Marmouget v. Southern Ry. Co., 4 La. App. 658 ; Buscher v. Southern Ry. Co., 4 La. App. 653 ; see Missouri Pac. R. R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533 , which, it is insisted this is not, and that in any case, in the absence of an authoritative decision by the state court, this Court will give a like effect to the designation under the statute. Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213 . For present purposes we may assume that the effect of the designation of the statutory agent by the Southern is, as the state decisions cited seem to show, that a causo of action arising wholly outside and wholly unconnected with any act or business of the corporation within the'state may not be sued upon there, and we address ourselves to the question, decisive of this branch of'the case, whether the Southern, being present within the state of Louisiana, is amenable to suit, on this cause

The Southern does not deny that it is carrying on some business within Louisiana or that it is subject to suit there on some causes of action. Its relation to the through train service originating in New Orleans, so far as disclosed, has already been detailed. It carries on in the state, through an office and agents of its own there located, continuous solicitation of freight and passenger traffic. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 ; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 , 103; Block v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. R. Co., 21 Fed. 529 ; Walsh v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 256 Fed. 47 ; but see Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry., 205 U. S. 530 ; People’s Tobacco. Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79 . It maintains its own office there for the sale of tickets for passage over its own and connecting lines. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, at p. 585 . It has designated an agent there to receive service of “ lawful process,” which fact, being of significance in determining the extent of the jurisdiction when the corporation is doing business within the state, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., supra, is, we think, also of decisive weight in determining ^its presence for purposes of suit when coupled with its other corporate activities within the state. It is, therefore, as petitioner concedes, so far present in the state as to be amenable to suit there for some purposes. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Alexander, supra. We disregard the fact that the Southern, owns the stock, or most of it, of the New Orleans Railroad Company and the New ' Orleans Terminal Company, Louisiana corporations owning real estate and railroad equipment there, and that its officers and theirs are the same. Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 205 U. S. 364 ; Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243, U. S. 264.

But the sale.in Louisiana of the ticket for transportation over the Southern was made by the .Louisville & Nashville under the filed joint tariff as the agent and for account of the Southern. In its legal effect it was the act of the Southern within the jurisdiction by which its obligation to respondent on the contract of carriage over its own lines became complete. It was out of this

This was none the less the case because such a transaction would not of itself have been regarded as a doing of business within the state sufficient to establish the presence of the Southern there for the purpose of suit. Cf. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 . Since the Southern was present and subject to suit in Louisiana, we are concerned, not with the question whether the sale of the ticket was sufficient to bring it there, but only with the. question whether, being there, its liability extended to all causes of action, arising out of its corporate acts within the state, including this one. No case, either in the Louisiana courts or in this Court, has held that it did not. Where jurisdiction has been denied, the cause of action not only arose outside the state, but it was not shown to. have arisen out of any business conducted by the corporation within it or to have had any relation to any corporate act there. Cf. Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n v. McDonough, supra; Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., supra; Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., supra. In such a case, whether the jurisdiction invoked be deemed to depend upon the presence of the corporation within the state through the doing of business there, or on its consent by the designation of an agent, the implication is that the liability to suit does not extend to causes of action which have nothing to do with any .act of the corporation within the state. Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., at p. 216. But where the cause of action does arise out of a corporate act within the jurisdiction, the presumption would seem necessarily to be the other way.

In the absence of express language limiting the authority of the designated agent, there would certainly be no

We decide only that, in the absence of an authoritative state decision giving a narrower scope to the power of attorney filed under the state statute, it operates , as a consent to suit upon a cause of action like .the present arising out of an obligation incurred within the state although the breach occurred without. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., supra.

2. The requested instruction to the jury of the Louisville & Nashville, which was refused, and the actual charge complained of, related to the alleged joint liability of the petitioners. The complaint contained .no allegation that respondent’s injury was due to the negligence of the Louisville & Nashville. He contented himself with alleging and proving at the trial the accident and injury while he was traveling over the line of the Southern-on a through ticket purchased of the Louisville & Nashville. As already indicated, it appeared that the Louisville & Nashville had no control of the train after

At the close of the whole case, the Louisville & Nashville moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. The trial .judge also denied its request for an instruction that if the jury found the ticket contained the clause referred to, the accident did not occur on the line of the Louisville & Nashville, and its negligence did not cause or contribute to the accident, the verdict should be for that carrier. The court also charged, in . a variety of ways, that the liability of petitioners for the safe delivery of the respondent at his destination was joint and that if petitioners “.failed to satisfactorily explain the accident, then negligence, will be presumed and they will therefore be liable to the passenger for whatever damage he sustained.”

But there was no basis, either in. pleading or proof, for a joint liability of both petitioners for the negligence of one. Neither of them, as a common carrier, was under any duty, either by the common law or statute, to transport or assume any responsibility for the transportation of respondent beyond its own line. Insurance Company v. Railroad Company, 104 17. S. 146, 157; see Railroad Company v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318 , 324. The Louisville & Nashville, therefore, might, by stipulation on the through ticket, provide that it should not be so responsible, Missouri

The court of appeals, in commenting on petitioner’s requested charge, to which we have referred, said that such a. charge would ,not have been proper because it was calculated to divert the jury from the consideration of the question whether the accident was attributable to the negligence of the Louisvillé & Nashville.' Even if for this reason the requested instruction should have been refused, the charge, to which proper exception was taken, that petitioners were jointly liable and that on this theory the jury might find a verdict against the Louisville & Nashville for an accident occurring on the line of the Southern, was plainly erroneous, as it indicated to the jury that they might find a verdict for respondent against the Louisville & Nashville," even though it had exercised due care in the preparation and inspection of the train while on its own line.

We think also tVre was no evidence for the jury of negligence of the Louisville & Nashville and that the motion

The charge ás to the joint liability of petitioners was also excepted to by the Southern “ in so far as it makes the Southern Railway Company responsible for the negligence of the Louisville & Nashville.” To that extent it was clearly erroneous and prejudicial to the Southern. The jury was in effect told to return a verdict against both petitioners on a finding of negligence on the part of either.

3. As there must be a new trial, it is unnecessary to consider the rulings on the evidence which the court below thought erroneous, but not prejudicial. The order overruling the Southern’s exception to the jurisdiction is affirmed. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed.