Majority — Holmes J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirming the validity of a State tax and the constitutionality of the statutes under which the tax was imposed. 230 Ky. 182 .
Holders of stock in a corporation generally are required to list their shares for taxation, but it is provided that “ the individual stockholders of a corporation, at least seventy-five per cent (75%) of whose total'‘property is taxable in Kentucky, shall not be required to list their shares for taxation so long as the corporation pays taxes on all its property in Kentucky ” &c. Kentucky Statutes; § 4088. Ed. Carroll, 1930. Acts 1924, c. 116, § 2, pp. 402, 406. The appellant contends that this section makes the tax contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellant owned shares in the Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company, a New Jersey corporation, less than seventy-five per cent of whose total property was'taxable in Kentucky. He was taxed as contemplated and he says that , the discrimination between himself and holders of stock in a corporation paying taxes on more than seventy-five per cent of all their property is arbitrary and denies to him the equal protection of the laws.
This contention was so thoroughly disposed of by the Court of Appeals that it is not necessary to deal with the
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there could have been no question if the statute had said ninety per cent and that fixing seventy-five was equally plainly “a
The appellant, pursuing his notion that shares of stock represent an interest in the property of the corporation, insists that if taxed at all he should be taxed only in the ratio of the property in the State to the entire property of the corporation; that to tax him for the whole value is to tax property outside of the jurisdiction of the State. . But it leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be acted on as if true. The corporation is a person and its ownership is a nonconductor that makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its members. Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267 , 273. The stockholders in some circumstances can call on the corporation to account, but that is a very different thing from haying an interest in the property by means of which the corporation is enabled to settle the account. The principle of justice that leads to the exemption that has been dealt with could not be insisted upon as a matter of constitutional right and it is reasonable for the legislature to confine it to well marked cases, rather than to press it to a logical extreme. Of course it does not matter here that in an earlier year the exemption was greater than now.
It is alleged as a distinct point of objection, though perhaps less earnestly pressed, that appellant’s stock was assessed at its full selling price whereas land was taxed at seventy-five per cent of its- sale value. There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that requires land and stock to be taxed at the same rate or by the same tests and the Court of Appeals thinks that the Board of Tax Commissioners “judged that seventy-five per cent of the sale values represented about fairly the cash value of real estate.” Whether this be so or not we see no constitutional ground for complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Tennessee v. Whitworth 117 U. S. 129 p. 23
- Kidd v. Alabama 188 U. S. 730 p. 23
- Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter 209 U. S. 349 p. 23
- McLean v. Arkansas 211 U. S. 539 p. 23
- Booth v. Indiana 237 U. S. 391 p. 23
- Miller v. Strahl 239 U. S. 426 p. 23
- Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. 208 U. S. 267 p. 24