Majority — Butler J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant maintains that a California statute authorizing an administrative board to levy special assessments on his land within a flood control district created by the legislature to pay cost of local improvements and facilities and of their operation, maintenance, and betterment, without providing him an opportunity to be heard on the question of benefits, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chapter 755, Statutes 1915/ creates the Los Angeles flood control district. Section 2 declares that the purposes of the act are to provide for the control of the flood and storm waters of the district, to conserve them for beneficial uses, and 'to protect the property within the district from damage by flood or storm waters. Section 16 empowers the board of supervisors, of the district to construct all improvements and to acquire all property that is necessary or useful for carrying out the purposes of the-act.
A map, that with appellant’s consent is included in ap-pellees’ brief, shows that the flood control district is within and nearly as large as Los Angeles county which contains almost 4,000 square miles and that within it there are eleven drainage districts, two of which were organized under Chapter 258, Statutes 1903, and amenda-tory acts, and nine of which were organized under Chapter 354, Statutes 1919, and amendatory acts.[1]
Appellant and the city of Los Angeles presented to the highest court of the State their petition for a peremptory writ of mandate. In substance it alleges: Petitioners own taxable real property within the flood control district, and .outside the drainage districts. December 1, 1937, the board of supervisors of the district accepted a transfer to the district of the improvements and systems of the eleven drainage districts. The board intends to levy aii-nual special assessments against all real estate in that
* The two districts organized under the act of 1903 and amenda-tory acts are No. 1, containing 2093 acres, and No. 3, containing 835 acres. The numbers, and areas of the nine organized under the act of 1919 and amendatory acts are as follows: 8, — 5785 acres; 9, — 503 acres; 11, — 3067 acres; 17, — 103 acres; 22, — 4017 acres; 23,-8786 acres; 25, — 72 acres; 26, — 2199 acres; 29, — 1261 acres.
Appellees demurred on the ground that the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The state court sustained that contention and denied the writ. It ruled: A finding by the legislature that lands within the flood control district would be benefited by that district’s acquisition of the works of the drainage districts is conclusive unless shown to be without reasonable foundation. It must be presumed that, by designating in § 13% the improvements authorized to be transferred, the legislature found that the entire flood control district would be specially benefited by the acquisition. The particularity of the description implies such a finding. The finding thus implied is as fully effective as if declared in express terms in the act itself.
Petitioners appealed to this court; appellees moved, as to the city, to dismiss or affirm on the ground that no federal question was involved; and, as to both appellants, on the grounds that no substantial federal question was presented, and that the decision below rests upon adequate non-federal grounds. We dismissed the city’s appeal for want'of a substantial federal question and postponed to the hearing on the merits further consideration
That motion is denied. The validity of tne statute under the federal constitution was by the petition appropriately drawn in question and in substance the decision of the state supreme' court is in favor of its validity. See Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 , 67-69. Its judgment does not depend upon characterization of the statute or mere interpretation of the language employed. Its decision is to the effect that the legislature found that the real property, within the flood control district would be specially benefited by the acquisition of the district drainage works and that therefore the appellant and other owners are not entitled to be heard on the question of benefits. Appellant contends there is no foundation for the ruling that the legislature made that determination and that, as put in operation and effect by the State, § 13y2 deprives him of his constitutional right to be heard. See St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 , 362. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 , 237. Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 264 U. S. 79 , 86. Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 302 U. S. 186 , 206-207. We are unable to say that the question is foreclosed by our decisions or that it is so clearly not debatable as to require dismissal for lack of substance. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 , 258. Alton Railroad Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 305 U. S. 548 . Nor do we find any merit in the contention that the judgment rests upon an independent non-federal ground.
But we are of opinion that the judgment is right and must be affirmed.
In the absence of flagrant abuse or purely arbitrary action, the State, consistently with the federal constitution, may establish local districts to include real property that' it finds will be specially benefited by drainage, flood
The legislature need not adopt any form of statement or finding for, in the enforcement.of restraints imposed by the federal constitution upon the power of States to assess and collect taxes, this Court regards the substance of their enactments as controlling rather than mere forms of expression employed. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 , 385. Appellant does not suggest that as a matter of fact his land is not by the drainage works specially bene
As shown by-the opinion below1, the state court long before the addition of § 13%, held that the. mere passage of the flood control act, which did not contain a direct statement to' that effect, “must be taken to import a finding by the legislature that the- proposed work will answer a public purpose and that its execution will benefit the land within the district to such an extent as. to warrant the imposition upon such land of the cost in the manner provided. The findings thus implied are as fully effective as if declared in express terms in the act itself.” Los Angeles Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 177 Cal. 119 , 124-125; 169 P. 1028 , 1030. The court deemed that language applicable in disposing of appellant’s contentions in this case. And we think that as the legislature had knowledge of that decision when enacting the challenged provision, it must be given great weight in determining the validity of § 13%. '
The flood control district had long been in existence and empowered to acquire property .necessary for its purposes. Section 13% limited the board’s authority to acceptance of “all, but not less than all” the drainage works and defined the tax burden to be imposed. The legislation is not to be distinguished from a measure to take effect upon an event unrelated to the creation of the district or the imposition of special assessments.'
No question is raised as to the validity' of the flood control district or its authority to levy special assessments, on lands within it. By the enactment-of the challenged section, the legislature unquestionably intended that the use of the drainage works should not be limited to the purposes for which originally they were intended but
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- 305 U. S. 564 305 U. S. 564 p. 463
- New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman 278 U. S. 63 p. 463
- St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Arkansas 235 U. S. 350 p. 463
- Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington 243 U. S. 219 p. 463
- Railroad Commission of Texas v. Eastern Texas Railroad 264 U. S. 79 p. 463
- Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington 302 U. S. 186 p. 463
- Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California 293 U. S. 245 p. 463, p. 465
- Alton Railroad v. Illinois Commerce Commission 305 U. S. 548 p. 463
- Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108 111 U. S. 701 p. 464
- Spencer v. Merchant 125 U. S. 345 p. 464
- French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324 p. 464
- Houck v. Little River Drainage District 239 U. S. 254 p. 464
- Parsons v. District of Columbia 170 U. S. 45 p. 464
- Phillip Wagner, Inc. v. Leser 239 U. S. 207 p. 464
- Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co. 249 U. S. 63 p. 464
- Hancock v. City of Muskogee 250 U. S. 454 p. 464
- Valley Farms Co. v. County of Westchester 261 U. S. 155 p. 464
- Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District 262 U. S. 710 p. 464
- Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley 164 U. S. 112 p. 464
- Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road District 240 U. S. 242 p. 464
- Browning v. Hooper 269 U. S. 396 at 406 p. 464
- Londoner v. City of Denver 210 U. S. 373 p. 464