p. 218GRIFFIN et al . v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OFPRINCE EDWARD COUNTY et al .
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.
No. 592. Argued March 30, 1964.—
Decided May 25, 1964.
This litigation began in 1951 and resulted in this Court’s holding in
Brown v. Board oj Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), that Virginia
school segregation laws denied the equal protection of the laws
and, after reargument on the question of relief, the remand to the
District Court a year later for entry of an order that the Negro
complainants in Prince Edward County be admitted to public
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis “with all deliberate
speed.” Faced with an order to desegregate, the County Board
of Supervisors in 1959 refused to appropriate funds for the opera-
tion of public schools although a private foundation operated
schools for white children only, who in 1960 became eligible for
county and state tuition grants. Public schools continued to oper-
ate elsewhere in Virginia. After protracted litigation in the federal
and state courts, the District Court in 1961 enjoined the County
from paying tuition grants or giving tax credits as long as the
public schools remained closed and thereafter, refusing to abstain
pending proceedings in the state courts, held that the public
schools could not remain closed to avoid this Court’s decision while
other public schools in the State remained open. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court should have
awaited state court determination of these issues. Held:
1. Though the amended supplemental complaint added new
parties and relied on developments occurring after the action had
begun, it did not present a new cause of action but constituted a
proper amendment under Rule 15 (d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, since the new transactions were alleged to be part
of persistent and continuing efforts to circumvent this Court’s
holdings. Pp. 226-227.
2. Since the supplemental complaint alleged a discriminatory
system unique to one county, although involving some actions of
the State, adjudication by a three-judge court was not required
under 28 U. S. C. § 2281. Pp. 227-228.
p. 2193. This action is not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution since it charges that state and county officials
deprived petitioners of their constitutional rights. Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), followed. P. 228.
4. Because of the long delay resulting from state and county
resistance to enforcing the constitutional rights here involved and
because the highest state court has now passed on all the state
law issues here, federal court abstention pending state judicial reso-
lution of the legality of respondents’ conduct under the constitu-
tion and laws of Virginia is not required or appropriate in this
case. Pp. 228-229.
5. Under the circumstances of this case, closing of the Prince
Edward County public schools while at the same time giving
tuition grants and tax concessions to assist white children in pri-
vate segregated schools denied petitioners the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 229-232.
(a) Prince Edward County school children are treated dif-
ferently from those of other counties since they must go to private
schools or none at all. P. 230.
(b) The public schools of Prince Edward County were closed
and the private schools operated in their place only for constitu-
tionally impermissible reasons of race. Pp. 231-232.
6. Quick and effective injunctive relief should be granted against
the respondents, all of whom have duties relating to financing,
supervising, or operating the Prince Edward County schools. Pp.
232-234.
(a) The injunction against county officials paying tuition
grants and giving tax credits while public schools remained closed
is appropriate and necessary where the grants and credits have
been part of the county program to deprive petitioners of a public
education enjoyed by children in other counties. P. 233.
(b) The District Court may require the County Supervisors
to levy taxes to raise funds for the nonracial operation of the
county school system as is the case with other counties. P. 233.
(c) The District Court may if necessary issue an order to
carry out its ruling that the Prince Edward County public schools
may not be closed to avoid the law of the land while the State
permits other public schools to remain open at the expense of the
taxpayers. Pp. 233-234.
(d) New parties may be added if necessary to effectuate the
District Court’s decree. P. 234.
322 F. 2d 332, reversed.
p. 220Robert L. Carter argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the brief were S. W. Tucker and Frank D.
Reeves.
R. D. Mcllwaine III, Assistant Attorney General of
Virginia, and J. Segar Gravatt argued the cause for
respondents. With Mr. Mcllwaine on the brief for the
State Board of Education of Virginia et al. were Robert
Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, and Frederick T.
Gray. With Mr. Gravatt on the brief for the Board of
Supervisors of Prince Edward County was William F.
Watkins, Jr. John F. Kay, Jr. and C. F. Hicks filed a
brief for respondents County School Board of Prince
Edward County et al.
Solicitor General Cox, by special leave of Court, argued
the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging
reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney
General Marshall, William J. Vanden Heuvel, Louis F.
Claiborne and Harold H. Greene.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by
William B. Beebe and Hershel Shanks for the National
Education Association, and by Landon Gerald Dowdey,
T. Raber Taylor and C. Joseph Danahy for Citizens for
Educational Freedom.
Brief of amicus curiae, urging affirmance, was filed
by Geo. Stephen Leonard, Paul D. Summers, Jr., D. B.
Marshall and Richard L. Hirsh.berg for the City of
Charlottesville.
Mr . Just ice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation began in 1951 when a group of Negro
school children living in Prince Edward County, Virginia,
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that they had
been denied admission to public schools attended by white
children and charging that Virginia laws requiring such
school segregation denied complainants the equal protec-
p. 221tion of the laws in violation of
the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. On May 17, 1954, ten years ago, we held that the
Virginia segregation laws did deny equal protection.
Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483 (1954). On
May 31, 1955, after reargument on the nature of relief, we
remanded this case, along with others heard with it, to the
District Courts to enter such orders as “necessary and
proper to admit [complainants] to public schools on
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
speed . . . .”
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294, 301 (1955).
Efforts to desegregate Prince Edward County’s schools
met with resistance. In 1956 Section 141 of the Virginia
Constitution was amended to authorize the General As-
sembly and local governing bodies to appropriate funds
to assist students to go to public or to nonsectarian private
schools, in addition to those owned by the State or by the
locality.1 The General Assembly met in special session
and enacted legislation to close any public schools where
white and colored children were enrolled together, to cut
off state funds to such schools, to pay tuition grants to
children in nonsectarian private schools, and to extend
state retirement benefits to teachers in newly created pri-
vate schools.1 2 The legislation closing mixed schools and
cutting off state funds was later invalidated by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which held that
these laws violated the Virginia Constitution. Harrison
v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.
p. 222called a “freedom of choice” program. The Assembly
repealed the rest of the 1956 legislation, as well as a
tuition grant law of January 1959, and enacted a new
tuition grant program.3 At the same time the Assembly
repealed Virginia’s compulsory attendance laws4 and
instead made school attendance a matter of local option.5
In June 1959, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit directed the Federal District Court
(1) to enjoin discriminatory practices in Prince Edward
County schools, (2) to require the County School Board
to take “immediate steps” toward admitting students
without regard to race to the white high school “in the
school term beginning September 1959,” and (3) to re-
quire the Board to make plans for admissions to ele-
mentary schools without regard to race. Alien v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 266 F. 2d 507,
511 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1959). Having as early as 1956
resolved that they would not operate public schools
“wherein white and colored children are taught together,”
the Supervisors of Prince Edward County refused to levy
any school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, explain-
ing that they were “confronted with a court decree which
requires the admission of white and colored children to
all the schools of the county without regard to race or
color.” 6 As a result, the county’s public schools did not
p. 223reopen in the fall of 1959 and have remained closed ever
since, although the public schools of every other county
in Virginia have continued to operate under laws govern-
ing the State’s public school system and to draw funds
provided by the State for that purpose. A private group,
the Prince Edward School Foundation, was formed to
operate private schools for white children in Prince Ed-
ward County and, having built its own school plant, has
been in operation ever since the closing of the public
schools. An offer to set up private schools for colored
children in the county was rejected, the Negroes of Prince
Edward preferring to continue the legal battle for deseg-
regated public schools, and colored children were without
formal education from 1959 to 1963, when federal, state,
and county authorities cooperated to have classes con-
ducted for Negroes and whites in school buildings owned
by the county. During the 1959-1960 school year the
Foundation’s schools for white children were supported
entirely by private contributions, but in 1960 the General
Assembly adopted a new tuition grant program making
every child, regardless of race, eligible for tuition grants
of $125 or $150 to attend a nonsectarian private school
or a public school outside his locality, and also authoriz-
ing localities to provide their own grants.7 The Prince
Edward Board of Supervisors then passed an ordinance
providing tuition grants of $100, so that each child at-
tending the Prince Edward School Foundation’s schools
received a total of $225 if in elementary school or $250 if
in high school. In the 1960-1961 session the major
source of financial support for the Foundation was in the
indirect form of these state and county tuition grants,
paid to children attending Foundation schools. At the
same time, the County Board of Supervisors passed an
ordinance allowing property tax credits up to 25% for
p. 224contributions to any “nonprofit, nonsectarian private
school” in the county.
In 1961 petitioners here filed a supplemental complaint,
adding new parties and seeking to enjoin the respondents
from refusing to operate an efficient system of public free
schools in Prince Edward County and to enjoin payment
of public funds to help support private schools which ex-
cluded students on account of race. The District Court,
finding that “the end result of every action taken by that
body [Board of Supervisors] was designed to preserve
separation of the races in the schools of Prince Edward
County,” enjoined the county from paying tuition grants
or giving tax credits so long as public schools remained
closed.8 Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 198 F. Supp. 497, 503 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1961).
At this time the District Court did not pass on whether
the public schools of the county could be closed but ab-
stained pending determination by the Virginia courts of
whether the constitution and laws of Virginia required
the public schools to be kept open. Later, however,
without waiting for the Virginia courts to decide the
question,9 the District Court held that “the public schools
of Prince Edward County may not be closed to avoid the
effect of the law of the land as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, while the Commonwealth of Virginia permits other
public schools to remain open at the expense of the tax-
payers.” Allen v. County School Board of Prince Ed-
p. 225ward County,
207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. C. E. D. Va.
1962). Soon thereafter, a declaratory judgment suit was
brought by the County Board of Supervisors and the
County School Board in a Virginia Circuit Court. Hav-
ing done this, these parties asked the Federal District
Court to abstain from further proceedings until the suit
in the state courts had run its course, but the District
Court declined; it repeated its order that Prince Edward’s
public schools might not be closed to avoid desegregation
while the other public schools in Virginia remained open.
The Court of Appeals reversed, Judge Bell dissenting,
holding that the District Court should have abstained to
await state court determination of the validity of the tui-
tion grants and the tax credits, as well as the validity of
the closing of the public schools. Griffin v. Board of
Supervisors of Prince Edward County,
322 F. 2d 332
(C. A. 4th Cir. 1963). We granted certiorari, stating: 10
“In view of the long delay in the case since our deci-
sion in the Brown case and the importance of the
questions presented, we grant certiorari and put the
case down for argument March 30,1964, on the merits,
as we have done in other comparable situations with-
out waiting for final action by the Court of Appeals.”
375 U. S. 391, 392.
For reasons to be stated, we agree with the District Court
that, under the circumstances here, closing the Prince
Edward County schools while public schools in all the
other counties of Virginia were being maintained denied
the petitioners and the class of Negro students they
represent the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
p. 226Before reaching the substantial questions presented, we
shall note several procedural matters urged by respond-
ents in a motion to dismiss the supplemental amended
complaint filed July 7, 1961—ten years after this action
was instituted. Had the motion to dismiss been granted
on any of the grounds assigned, the result would have
been one more of what Judge Bell, dissenting in the Court
of Appeals, referred to as “the inordinate delays which
have already occurred in this protracted litigation . . . .”
322 F. 2d, at 344. We shall take up separately the
grounds assigned for dismissal.
(a) It is contended that the amended supplemental
complaint presented a new and different cause of action
from that presented in the original complaint. The sup-
plemental pleading did add new parties and rely in good
part on transactions, occurrences, and events which had
happened since the action had begun. But these new
transactions were alleged to have occurred as a part of
continued, persistent efforts to circumvent our 1955 hold-
ing that Prince Edward County could not continue to
operate, maintain, and support a system of schools in
which students were segregated on a racial basis. The
original complaint had challenged racial segregation in
schools which were admittedly public. The new com-
plaint charged that Prince Edward County was still using
its funds, along with state funds, to assist private schools
while at the same time closing down the county’s public
schools, all to avoid the desegregation ordered in the
Brown cases. The amended complaint thus was not a
new cause of action but merely part of the same old
cause of action arising out of the continued desire of
colored students in Prince Edward County to have the
same opportunity for state-supported education afforded
to white people, a desire thwarted before 1959 by segre-
p. 227gation in the public schools and after 1959 by a combina-
tion of closed public schools and state and county grants
to white children at the Foundation’s private schools.
Rule 15 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events
happening after suit,11 and it follows, of course, that per-
sons participating in these new events may be added if
necessary. Such amendments are well within the basic
aim of the rules to make pleadings a means to achieve an
orderly and fair administration of justice.
(b) When this action was originally brought in 1951,
it broadly charged that the constitution and laws of Vir-
ginia provided a state system of public schools which
unconstitutionally segregated school children on the basis
of color. This challenge was heard by a District Court
of three judges as required by 28 U. S. C. §
2281. When
in Brown we held the school segregation laws invalid as
a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Four-
teenth Amendment and remanded for the District Court
to fashion a decree requiring abandonment of segregation
“with all deliberate speed,” the three-judge court ceased
to function, and a single district judge took over. Re-
spondents contend that the single judge erroneously
passed on the issues raised by the supplemental com-
plaint and that we should now delay the case still further
by vacating his judgment along with that of the Court
of Appeals and remanding to the District Court for a
completely new trial before three judges. We reject the
contention. In Rorick v. Board of Comm’rs of Ever-
glades Drainage Dist.,
307 U. S. 208, 212 (1939), we said,
in interpreting the three-judge statute (then § 266 of the
p. 228Judicial Code of 1911, as amended, 28 U. S. C. (1934 ed.)
§ 380):
“ ‘Despite the generality of the language’ of that Sec-
tion, it is now settled doctrine that only a suit in-
volving ‘a statute of general application’ and not one
affecting a ‘particular municipality or district’ can
invoke § 266.”
While a holding as to the constitutional duty of the
Supervisors and other officials of Prince Edward County
may have repercussions over the State and may require
the District Court’s orders to run to parties outside the
county, it is nevertheless true that what is attacked in
this suit is not something which the State has commanded
Prince Edward to do—close its public schools and give
grants to children in private schools—but rather some-
thing which the county with state acquiescence and co-
operation has undertaken to do on its own volition, a
decision not binding on any other county in Virginia.
Even though actions of the State are involved, the case,
as it comes to us, concerns not a state-wide system but
rather a situation unique to Prince Edward County. We
hold that the single district judge did not err in adjudicat-
ing this present controversy.
(c) It is contended that the case is an action against
the State, is forbidden by
the Eleventh Amendment, and
therefore should be dismissed. The complaint, however,
charged that state and county officials were depriving peti-
tioners of rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It has been settled law since Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908), that suits against state and county
officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional
rights are not forbidden by
the Eleventh Amendment.
(d) It is argued that the District Court should have
abstained from passing on the issues raised here in order
to await a determination by the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia as to whether the conduct complained
p. 229of violated the constitution or laws of Virginia. The
Court of Appeals so held,
322 F. 2d 332, and this Court
has, in cases deemed appropriate, directed that such a
course be followed by a district court or approved its
having been followed. E. g., Railroad Comm’n of Texas
v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496 (1941);
Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25 (1959). But
we agree with the dissenting judge in the Court of Ap-
peals, 322 F. 2d, at 344-345, that this is not a case for
abstention. In the first place, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia has already passed upon the state law
with respect to all the issues here. County School Board
of Prince Edward County v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S. E.
2d 565 (1963). But quite independently of this, we hold
that the issues here imperatively call for decision now.
The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the
state and county level, by legislation, and by lawsuits.
The original plaintiffs have doubtless all passed high
school age. There has been entirely too much deliberation
and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional
rights which we held in Brown v. Board of Education,
supra, had been denied Prince Edward County Negro
children. We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment remanding the case to the District Court for
abstention, and we proceed to the merits.
In County School Board of Prince Edward County v.
Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S. E. 2d 565 (1963), the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld as valid under state
law the closing of the Prince Edward County public
schools, the state and county tuition grants for children
who attend private schools, and the county’s tax con-
cessions for those who make contributions to private
schools. The same opinion also held that each county
had “an option to operate or not to operate public
p. 230schools.” 204 Va., at 671, 133 S. E. 2d, at 580. We ac-
cept this case as a definitive and authoritative holding of
Virginia law, binding on us, but we cannot accept the
Virginia court’s further holding, based largely on the
Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case,
322 F. 2d 332, that
closing the county’s public schools under the circum-
stances of the case did not deny the colored school children
of Prince Edward County equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Since 1959, all Virginia counties have had the benefits
of public schools but one: Prince Edward. However,
there is no rule that counties, as counties, must be treated
alike; the Equal Protection Clause relates to equal pro-
tection of the laws “between persons as such rather than
between areas.”
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545,
551 (1954). Indeed, showing that different persons
are treated differently is not enough, without more, to
show a denial of equal protection. Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Comm’rs,
330 U. S. 552, 556 (1947). It
is the circumstances of each case which govern. Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U. S. 535, 539-540
(1942).
Virginia law, as here applied, unquestionably treats the
school children of Prince Edward differently from the way
it treats the school children of all other Virginia counties.
Prince Edward children must go to a private school or
none at all; all other Virginia children can go to public
schools. Closing Prince Edward’s schools bears more
heavily on Negro children in Prince Edward County since
white children there have accredited private schools which
they can attend, while colored children until very recently
have had no available private schools, and even the school
they now attend is a temporary expedient. Apart from
this expedient, the result is that Prince Edward County
school children, if they go to school in their own county,
must go to racially segregated schools which, although
p. 231designated as private, are beneficiaries of county and state
support.
A State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding
whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only
in certain counties, the legislature “having in mind the
needs and desires of each.” Salsburg n . Maryland, supra,
346 U. S, at 552. A State may wish to suggest, as Mary-
land did in Salsburg, that there are reasons why one
county ought not to be treated like another.
346 U. S,
at 553-554. But the record in the present case could not
be clearer that Prince Edward’s public schools were closed
and private schools operated in their place with state and
county assistance, for one reason, and one reason only:
to ensure, through measures taken by the county and the
State, that white and colored children in Prince Edward
County w’ould not, under any circumstances, go to the
same school. Whatever nonracial grounds might sup-
port a State’s allowing a county to abandon public schools,
the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of
race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as
constitutional.12
In Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board,
197 F. Supp.
649 (D. C. E. D. La. 1961), a three-judge District Court
invalidated a Louisiana statute which provided “a means
by which public schools under desegregation orders may
be changed to ‘private’ schools operated in the same way,
in the same buildings, with the same furnishings, with the
same money, and under the same supervision as the pub-
lic schools.” Id., at 651. In addition, that statute also
provided that where the public schools were “closed,” the
school board was “charged with responsibility for furnish-
ing free lunches, transportation, and grants-in-aid to the
p. 232children attending the ‘private’ schools.” Ibid. We
affirmed the District Court’s judgment invalidating the
Louisiana statute as a denial of equal protection.
368
U. S. 515 (1962). While the Louisiana plan and the Vir-
ginia plan worked in different ways, it is plain that both
were created to accomplish the same thing: the perpetua-
tion of racial segregation by closing public schools and
operating only segregated schools supported directly or
indirectly by state or county funds. See
Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U. S. 1, 17 (1958). Either plan works to deny
colored students equal protection of the laws. Accord-
ingly, we agree with the District Court that closing
the Prince Edward schools and meanwhile contributing
to the support of the private segregated white schools
that took their place denied petitioners the equal
protection of the laws.
We come now to the question of the kind of decree
necessary and appropriate to put an end to the racial
discrimination practiced against these petitioners under
authority of the Virginia laws. That relief needs to be
quick and effective. The parties defendant are the Board
of Supervisors, School Board, Treasurer, and Division
Superintendent of Schools of Prince Edward County, and
the State Board of Education and the State Superintend-
ent of Education. All of these have duties which relate
directly or indirectly to the financing, supervision, or
operation of the schools in Prince Edward County. The
Board of Supervisors has the special responsibility to levy
local taxes to operate public schools or to aid children
attending the private schools now functioning there for
white children. The District Court enjoined the county
officials from paying county tuition grants or giving tax
exemptions and from processing applications for state
tuition grants so long as the county’s public schools re-
mained closed. We have no doubt of the power of the
p. 233court to give this relief to enforce the discontinuance of
the county’s racially discriminatory practices. It has
long been established that actions against a county can
be maintained in United States courts in order to vindi-
cate federally guaranteed rights. E. g.,
Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 (1890); Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Comm’n,
327 U. S. 573, 579 (1946). The in-
junction against paying tuition grants and giving tax
credits while public schools remain closed is appropriate
and necessary since those grants and tax credits13 have
been essential parts of the county’s program, successful
thus far, to deprive petitioners of the same advantages of
a public school education enjoyed by children in every
other part of Virginia. For the same reasons the District
Court may, if necessary to prevent further racial discrimi-
nation, require the Supervisors to exercise the power that
is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen,
operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a
public school system in Prince Edward County like that
operated in other counties in Virginia.
The District Court held that “the public schools of
Prince Edward County may not be closed to avoid the
effect of the law of the land as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, while the Commonwealth of Virginia per-
mits other public schools to remain open at the expense
of the taxpayers.” Allen v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County,
207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. C.
E. D. Va. 1962). At the same time the court gave notice
that it would later consider an order to accomplish this
purpose if the public schools were not reopened by Sep-
tember 7, 1962. That day has long passed, and the
schools are still closed. On remand, therefore, the court
may find it necessary to consider further such an order.
An order of this kind is within the court’s power if re-
p. 234quired to assure these petitioners that their constitutional
rights will no longer be denied them. The time for mere
“deliberate speed” has run out, and that phrase can no
longer justify denying these Prince Edward County school
children their constitutional rights to an education equal
to that afforded by the public schools in the other parts
of Virginia.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the
judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the cause
is remanded to the District Court with directions to enter
a decree which will guarantee that these petitioners will
get the kind of education that is given in the State’s
public schools. And, if it becomes necessary to add new
parties to accomplish this end, the District Court is free
to do so.
It is so ordered.
Mr . Justic e Clark and Mr . Justi ce Harlan disagree
with the holding that the federal courts are empowered to
order the reopening of the public schools in Prince Ed-
ward County, but otherwise join in the Court’s opinion.