p. 263CALHOUN et al . v. LATIMER et al .
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.No. 623. Argued March 31, 1964.—Decided May 25, 1964.
Subsequent to the argument in this Court, the Atlanta Board of
Education set forth in a resolution its pupil assignment and trans-
fer policy for the ensuing school year. The cause is remanded to
the District Court to test the nature and effect of the resolution
and the entire plan for school desegregation under considerations set
forth in Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526; Goss v. Board
of Education, 373 U. S. 683; and Griffin v. County School Board
of Prince Edward County, ante, at 218.
321 F. 2d 302, vacated and remanded.
Constance Baker Motley argued the cause for peti-
tioners. With her on the brief were Jack Greenberg,
E. E. Moore, Donald L. Hollowell and A. T. Walden.
A. C. Latimer argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief was Newell Edenfield.
Assistant Attorney General Marshall, by special leave
of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as
amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Cox, Louis F. Claiborne, Harold
H. Greene and Howard A. Glickstein.
Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, Alfred L.
Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and E. Freeman
Leverett, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, filed a
brief for the State of Georgia, as amicus curiae, urging
affirmance.
Per Curiam .
During the argument of this case, counsel for respond-
ents stated that after the decree below was entered the
Atlanta Board of Education adopted additional provisions
p. 264authorizing free transfers with certain limitations in the
city’s high schools. At our invitation both parties
filed supplemental memoranda dealing with this aspect
of the case. It appears therefrom that since the argu-
ment the Atlanta Board of Education on April 8, 1964,
adopted and promulgated a new formal resolution stating
the present policy of the Board and the factors it will con-
sider in making initial assignments of pupils and in per-
mitting transfers for the school year 1964-1965. Peti-
tioners deny that this resolution meets the constitutional
standards and assert that with respect to students in the
elementary schools the plan will not achieve desegregation
until sometime in the 1970’s.
In light of the developments at and since the argument,
we deem it appropriate that the nature and effect of the
Board’s resolution of April 8, 1964, be appraised by the
District Court in a proper evidentiary hearing. To this
end we vacate the judgment and remand the cause to the
District Court for further proceedings.
Although Atlanta’s commendable effort to effect deseg-
regation is recognized, the District Court on remand
must, of course, test the entire Atlanta plan by the con-
siderations discussed in
Watson v. City of Memphis, 373
U. S. 526, 529;
Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U. S.
683; and Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County,
ante, at 218, decided subsequent to the
District Court’s approval of the plan. In Goss, supra,
at 689, we said:
“[W]e are not unmindful of the deep-rooted prob-
lems involved. Indeed, it was consideration for the
multifarious local difficulties and ‘variety of ob-
stacles’ which might arise in this transition that led
this Court eight years ago to frame its mandate in
Brown in such language as ‘good faith compliance
at the earliest practicable date’ and ‘all deliberate
speed.’ Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S., at
p. 265300, 301. Now, however, eight years after this
decree was rendered and over nine years after the
first Brown decision, the context in which we must
interpret and apply this language to plans for deseg-
regation has been significantly altered. Compare
Watson v. City of Memphis, supra.”
Vacated and remanded.