Majority
After 16 years of service, appellant’s employment in the Philadelphia Fire Department was terminated because he moved his permanent residence from Philadelphia to New Jersey in contravention of a municipal regulation requiring employees of the city of Philadelphia to be residents of the city. He challenges the constitutionality of the regulation and the authorizing ordinances[1] as violative of his federally protected right of interstate travel. The regulation was sustained by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania[2] and review was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.[3] His timely appeal is here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
The Michigan Supreme Court held that Detroit’s sim
1 § 7-401 (u) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter of 1951 ; § 20-101 of the Philadelphia Code (as amended); and § 30.01 of the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations.
2 19 Pa. Commw. 383 , 339 A. 2d 634 (1975).
3 In an unreported order entered on September 2, 1975, that court denied a petition for review.
We have not, however, specifically addressed the contention made by appellant in this case that his constitutionally recognized right to travel interstate as defined in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), is impaired. Each of those cases involved a statutory requirement of residence in the State for at least one year before becoming eligible either to vote, as in Dunn, or to receive welfare benefits, as in Sha.piro and Memorial Hospital.[5] Neither in those cases, nor in any others, have we questioned the validity of a condition placed upon municipal employment that a person be a resident at the time of his application.[6] In this case appellant claims a constitutional right to be employed by the city of Philadelphia
4 Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519 , 190 N. W. 2d 97 (1971).
5 Although there is a durational residence requirement in the Philadelphia ordinances, appellant does not have standing to challenge that requirement.
6 Nor did any of those cases involve a public agency’s relationship with its own employees which, of course, may justify greater control than that over the citizenry at large. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 568 (1968); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973).
We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. Thus in Shapiro, supra, at 636 , we stated: “The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites.”. And in Memorial Hospital, supra, at 255 , quoting Dunn, supra, at 342 n. 13, the Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question “ ‘the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.' ”
This case involves that kind of bona fide continuing-residence requirement. The judgment of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is therefore affirmed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument.
7 Appellant seeks review of other alleged errors as if presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari. We decline to review those issues.
Cases cited
- 405 U. S. 950 405 U. S. 950 p. 646
- Hicks v. Miranda 422 U. S. 332 p. 646
- 529 F. 2d 625 529 F. 2d 625 p. 646
- Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U. S. 618 p. 646, p. 647
- Dunn v. Blumstein 405 U. S. 330 p. 646, p. 647
- Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County 415 U. S. 250 p. 646