Majority — TAN C.J.
Syllabus
The certificate of survey alleged to have been given by Trudeau, on the 14th of June, 1797, and brought forward to sustain a grant to the Marquis de Mai-son Rouge, declared ante-dated and fraudulent.delivered the opinion of the court..
This case is one of great importance, from the amount of property in dispute; and if the court-entertained' any doubt upon the questions of law of of fact which are presented by the record, we should regard it as our duty to hold it under advisement, and postpone the decision to another term. But the principles of law upon which it
The claim in question, arises upon two instruments of writing, executed by the Baron de Carondelet, civil governor of Louisiana; one in 1795, and. the other in 1797the latter of which is alleged, by the defendant in error, to be a grant to the Marquis de Maison Rouge, for the land included.in a plat made out by Trudeau, the surveyor-general of the .province, and dated the 14th of June, 1797, and which survey embraces the land ip controversy.- It is insisted, on the part of die United States, that this ¡certificate of Trudeau is antedated and fraudulent j and in order to determine the state of the facts upon which the questions of law will arise, the authenticity of this survey will be the first subject of inquiry.
Upon this point, a good deal of testimony , has neen taken upon both sides.' But it would extend this opinion to an unreasonable and unnecessary length,' to enter upon a minute comparison and •analysis of the testimony of the different witnesses, and of the other evidence contained in the record. It is sufficient to say, that, after an attentive scrutiny and collation of the whole testimóny, we think it is perfectly clear that this certificate of Trudeau is' antedated and fraudulent, and we refer to. the evidence of Filhiol, McLaughlin, and Pomier, as establishing conclusively that the .actual survey upon which this certificate was made out, did not take place until December, 1802, and January, 1803.; and that the one referred to by the governor,tin the paper of 1797; was for land ^ in a different place, and higher up the Washita river, We are entirely convinced that the survey now produced was not made in the lifetime of. the Marquis de Mriison Rouge, who died in 1799, but, after, his death, and at. the instance of. Louis Bouligny, who, according to the laws of Louisiana, was what is there termed the forced heir of the marquis; arid that it was made in anticipation and expectation.of .the cession of the country to the United States; the negotiations upon that subject being then actually pending, and the treaty of cession' signed on the 30th- day of April, 1803. We see no reason to doubt the truth of the witnessas to whom we have referred. On the contrary, they are supported, by the testimony of other witnesses, and by various circumstances detailed .in the record.
It has, however, been argued that, inasmuch as an attested copy of this certificate, with the two instruments executed by the Baron de Carondelet, were delivered to Daniel Clarke, in August, 1803, by the Spanish authorities-at New Orleans, upon his application for the documentary proofs of the title to this land, the 'authenticity of the paper in question ought not to be impeached; ■ and that it is inconsistent with the comity due to- the officers of a foreign govem
Regarding the case in this point of view, the right of the- defendant in error must stand altogether upon the instruments executed in 1795 and 1797, by the Baron de Carondelet; and it has not the aid of any authentic survey, to ascertain and fix the limits of the land, and to determine its location. -The instruments themselves contain no lines or boundaries, whereby any definite and Specific .parcel of land was severed.,from the public domain; and it has been settled, by repeated decisions in this court, and in cases, too, where the instrument contained clear words of grant, that if the description was
As relates to the claim of an equitable title arising from the number of immigrants alleged-to have been- introduced - under these instruments, it would not avail the defendant in error in this action, even if the proofs showed a performance equal to that contended for on his. part. For if these instruments were regarded, as grants, and it appeared that the-Marquis de Maison Rouge had originally selected this very district as the place where'the grant was intended tó be located; and the immigrants introduced.by him had been settled upon it in performance of the conditions of his contract; and if it should be held that he had thereby acquired an equitable right to have the quantity of land mentioned in the paper of 1797 laid off to him at this place, still it would -be no defence against the United States. For in the cáse of Choteau w. Eckhart, 2 How. 375 , this court decided that an imperfect title derived from Spain, before the cession, would not be supported against a party claiming under a grant from the United States, unless it had been confirmed by act of Congress. The same point was again fully considered and decided, at'the present term, in the case of Hickey and others n. Stewart and others. These decisions stand upon the ground that such'titles aré not confirmed by the treaty itself so as to bring them within judicial cognisance and authority: and that it rests with the political department of the government to determine how and by what tribunals justice should be done to persons claiming such rights. If, therefore, this controversy, was in a court of equity, and no suspicion of fraud rested upon the claim, yet it could not be supported against a grantee of thé United States, because Congress has not confirmed it,.nor authorized any other tribunal to determine upon its validity. This case, however, is in a court of law; the petitory action brought by
it has indeed been urged in the' argument, that the act of April 29, 1816, sect. 1, (3 Story’s Laws, 1604,) confirmed this grant to the claimants to its whole extent. Upon this point we do no.t think it necessary to go into a particular and minute examination of the acts of Congress upon this subject, nor indeed of the act referred to. Because the provision in this act, that the confirmation shall extend only to the quantity of land contained in a league square, is in the judgment of the court too clear and unambiguous to admit of serious cohtroversy. The restriction of the confirmation to the quantity above mentioned, appears to be as plainly stated in the proviso as language could make it; and Congress certainly, in a .claim of- this description, addressing itself to the political power,-had a right to confirm a portion of the claim, and, at the same, time, to refuse to give the claimant a title to the residue, if they supposed it just to do so.
Another question of more difficulty arises under this act of Congress, but as it has not been pressed in the argument,- we forbear to express an opinion upon it. It appears that the claimant has accepted a patent for a league square. In similar cases in Florida, the act of Congress upon that subject provided, that the'patent for the quantity confirmed should not issue unless the claimant released-all title to the residue. The law in relation to the land- in question does not, it is true, require this release, and the patent was issued and accepted under an understanding With the commissioner of the General Land-office, that the acceptance should not prejudice the claim to the residue. Yet it is a question worthy of serious consideration, how far the acceptance of the land proffered by Congress, even under these circumstances, must affect any title to the residue, which the party might be supposed to have had, and ought to influence the judgment of the court where the fact appears in the record. It is unnecessary, however, to pursue the inquiry, since, for the reasons before stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed.