p. 643the appraised value per pound, calculated upon the quantity actually entered, as shown by the weigher’s return, and that they should find a verdict for the defendants.
To this charge of his honor, the judge, and every part thereof, the plaintiffs’ counsel then and there excepted.
Upon this exception the case came up to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Johnson (Attorney-General), for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Butler, for the defendants in error..
Mr. Johnson, for the plaintiffs in error,
made the following' points: —1st. That the .duties were properly assessed upon the amount of the invoice, under the eighth section of the Tariff Act of 1846.2d. That by the sixteenth and seventeenth sections of the Tariff Act of 1842, which are in force, the decision, of the appraisers is final, unless appealed from to two merchants, whose decision is also final. 5 Stat. at Large, 563, 564.3d. That if it were not, the duties were properly assessed, the loss of the sugars from drainage entering into the estimation of their value at the ..time _of purchase, and their cost to the importer at the time of landing in this country.4th. That the evidence introduced to show that drawback upon reexportation was always calculated upon the actual weight of the sugar at the time of reexportation was improperly allowed.Mr. Butler, for the defendants in error,
made the following ’ points: —I. It is conclusively shown; by the facts given in evidence upon the trial, that the difference between the invoice weight at the port of shipment, and the actual weight in New York (10,9971bs. Spanish); was caused by drainage during, the voyage of importation.'II. There being no question of fact to be submitted to the jury, the whole case resolved itself into a question of law, that is, the construction to be given to the- proviso in the eighth section of the Tariff Act of July 30, 1846 (Acts and Resolutions 1st Sess. 29th Cong., authorized pamphlet ed., pp. 69, 70), declaring, “that under no circumstances shall the duty be assessed upon an amount Jess than the. invoice value, any law of Con gf ess to the contrary; not withstanding.”In the interpretation of this clause, it is submitted that the following rules should be observed : —1st. If the words of the proviso be bbscure, the intent of its
p. 644makers is to be resorted to, in order to discover their meaning. 6 Bac. Abr., tit. Statute, 1.§ 6, pp. 384 — 386 ; Dwarris on Statutes, 688 - 690.2d. This intent is to be collected from the context; from the occasion, spirit, and reason of the law; from other acts in pari materia yet in force ; and from the general course of -legislation on the subject. 1 Bl. Com. 60, 61, 87, 88; 6 Bac. Abr., tit. Statute, 1 §§ 2, 3, pp. 380, 382; 1 Kent’s Com. pp. 461-464; The Sloop Elizabeth, 1 Paine, C. C. 11; Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Peters, 270-273; Lawrence v. Allen, 7 Howard, 793 .3d. While such a construction should be given to the proviso as will remedy the mis-, hief which led to its enactment, the words should not be -extended to. embrace cases not within such mischief. Authorities above cited; Reniger v. Fogossa, Plowden, 1, 20; Zouch v. Stowell, Plowden, 365, 366; 2 Coke’s Inst. 386; Williams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2.4th. Nor, if the words of the proviso can be otherwise satisfied, should they be so construed as to produce a consequence repugnant to reason or justice, even though such a consequence be within their literal meaning. Authorities above cited.6th. Repeals by implication are not favored (6 Bac. Abr., tit. Statute, D. p. 373; 2 Dwarris, 673, 674); and therefore a construction which will involve such a repeal of provisions heretofore always treated as an essential part of the revenue laws, and not plainly repugnant to the new statute, should be avoided.6th. A thing which, by the sound application of the foregoing rules, is found not to be within the intent of Congress, is not within the statute, even though embraced by its letter. The generality of the clause must,, in this case, be so restrained in its interpretation as to conform to the intent of its framers. Authorities above cited.7th. If, after applying all other rules, it be found that the clause equally admits of two constructions, the one imposing, and the other omitting to. impose, a burden on the importer, the former of these constructions is to be - preferred as the true one. Dwarris on Statutes, 743; Hubbard v. Johnston, 3 Taunt. 177, 220, 221; Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sumner, 387; Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Peters, 270, 273, 278.III. The claim of the United States, to collect duties on the invoice weight of the sugars in question, is founded on a construction of the proviso which makes it include the quantity as well as . the cost or value of the goods mentioned in the invoice. If this be its true construction, the following results are unavoidable : —
p. 6451st. The operation of the clause cannot be limited to Muscovado sugars, the article now in question, but must equally apply to all other imported articles, the cost or value of which is stated in the invoice in- reference to, and by the computation of, the quantity .of such article.,2d. The merchant will be compelled to pay duties on the quantity mentioned in his invoice, how much soever it may exceed the quantity actually imported, and no matter to what cause the difference may be referrible.3d. As the eleventh section of the act of 1846 (pamphlet ed., p. 70) repeals all acts and parts of acts repugnant to its provisions, the construction claimed by the government, if adopted, must of necessity involve the repeal of all former laws making allowances for damage, deficiency, or loss occurring, by whatever cause, during the ;voyage of importation.4th. It will also render nugatory many acts still required of •the importer, and of the officers of the customs.IV. The proviso in the eighth section of the Tariff Act of July 30th, 1846, under which the United States claim to collect duties on the invoice weight of the sugars in question, does not, on its fair and true construction, warrant such claim. It relates merely to the cost or value of the goods mentioned in the invoice ; it leaves the quantity of such goods to be ascertained according to the preexisting laws; and in cases where quantity enters into the valuation, it forbids the assessment of the duty upon an amount less than that, produced by calculating the true quantity of the' goods actually imported, according to the price or value stated in the invoice,; but it does not require or authorize the collection of duties on goods which, though described in the invoice, are never brought into the country.V; The proof given on the trial, that the. loss in weight on Muscovado sugars, by drainage during the voyage of importation, is well known to the importing merchants, and enters into their calculations, has no bearing whatever on the construction of the act of Congress, nor can it invalidate the construction given to it by the Circuit Court. Nor is the fact, in any other respect, material or relevant to the,decision of this cause.VI. The fact, that the government appraisers, on their examination of the sugar, added to its cost or value one quarter of a cent per pound, amounting, on the invoice weight, to $ 479.28 in the currency of the invoice (Macuquino currency, 87\ cents to the dollar, Invoice and Entry, Record, pp. 6, 7), and that this appraisement was submitted to by the defendants, has no bearing whatever on the questions presented by the record.delivered the opinion of the court.
This case was an importation of both sugar and molasses, under circumstances raising no question, except one, which has not been settled in the preceding case of Marriott v. Bruñe et al.
The additional point here arises on the evidence of several witnesses,, that, when sugars of this .kind are purchased abroad, the buyer usually takes into-consideration in fixing the price, that the drainage or waste in weight will probably equal near five per cent, on the whole. It is argued, that the price abroad is, therefore, lower in this proportion on this account; and hence, that no deduction should be made here for what is taken into consideration there.
But the first answer to this position is, that if the price is fixed too low there, or lower than-it should be on the quantity likely to be saved and to arrive here, it is the duty of the appraisers to raise the price ;. and it must be presumed they would raise it, if required by all the facts.
In the next place, this calculation by the .merchant abroad in fixing the price is a mere speculative or commercial one, Connected with profit and loss, and not with a view to the duties to be assessed here.
Again, the duty here is regulated by law, and not by any es-* timates of such a character by men of business; and by law it is imposed on the quantity entered here, and not the quantity shipped abroad; and on the true price abroad as estimated by the appraisers, and not necessarily as estimated by the owners.
Again, if the owner was benefited by this drainage in the improved quality of the sugars or molasses left, and to the extent of the- loss in weight, there might be some equity in considering him liable for the weight abroad. But, as explained in the preceding case, such does not seem to be the current' of the evidence,
There are cases, likewise, of imports here, made by the producers of the article abroad. ' In those, this supposed element in the price to prevent the justice of a reduction in the weight here could hardly existías there is no sale abroad ; and this shows the incongruity and want of applicability of such a fact to constitute a rule, in any case’, for estimating ad valorem duties.
■ There is another-objection in the argument of this case, that some matters of fact were not submitted to the jury; But as no request was made on that point below, and the questions seem, by ácqúiesc.ence on both sides, to have been ruled on the law only, so as to be reconsidered here, it is too late, we think, for objections like those.
Judgment affirmed.
p. 647Order.This cause came on to be heard on the transeript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for. the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.