p. 388The twelfth section gave authority to construct a road one hundred feet wide rfrom the • City of Baltimore to Port Deposit, &c.
The twentieth section declared that “ the shares of the capital stock of said company shall be deemed and considered personal estate.”
■ The act of 1831, ch. 296, entitled “ An Act to incorporate the Delaware and Maryland Railroad Company,” gave a perpetual charter, and authorized the construction of a road one hundred feet wide “from some point on the Delaware and Maryland line” “to Port Deposit, or any other point on the Susquehanna River.”
The nineteenth section, after giving authority to purchase property, charge tolls, &e., and declaring that the property-specified should be vested in said company and their successors for' ever, proceeds: “ And the shares of the capital stock of said company shall be deemed and considered personal estate, and shall be exempt from the imposition of any tax or burden by the State’s assenting to this law, except upon that portion of the permanent and fixed works of said company which may lie within the State of Maryland; and that any tax which shall hereafter be levied upon said section shall not exceed the rate of any general tax which may at the same time be. imposed upon similar real or personal property of this State for State purposes.”
The act of 14th March, 1836, ratifies and adopts the act of the General Assembly of Delaware, passed 24th July, 1835, which provided for the union of the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company (incorporated by the General Assembly of Maryland) into one company, to be styled “the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company,” and which also provided that “ the holders of the stock of the said railroad companies, so united as aforesaid, shall hold, possess, and enjoy all the property, rights, and privileges, and. exercise all the power granted to and' vested in the said railroad companies, or eitbér of them, by this or any other law or laws-of this State, or of the State of Maryland.”
The act of 1837, ch. 30, authorizes the union of the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad Company, and the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company, with the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, and provides that said “ body corporate so formed shall be entitled within this State to all the powers and privileges and advantages now belonging to the two first above-named corporations.”
The cause was argued by Mr. Meredith, for the defendant
p. 389in error, and submittéd on printed points by Mr. Reverdy John son, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Meredith, for defendant in error.
It will be contended- by the defendants in error, —1st. That the property asséssed for the State taxes, for the recovery of which this suit was brought, was, at the time of said assessment, liable to State taxation. Laws of Maryland, March Session, 1841, ch. 23; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 436; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 563, 564; Passengér Cases, 7 Howard, 402 ; Nathan v. State, of Louisiana, 8 Howard, 80 ; Battle v. Corporation of Mobile, 9 Alabama, 234; Howell v. State of Maryland, 3 Gill, 14 .2dly. That the property so assessed was not .exempted from taxation by any contract or agreement binding on the State of Maryland. Laws of Maryland, 1831, ch. 288; 1831, ch. 296; 1835, ch. 93; 1837, ch. 30; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 420; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 436; Bulow v. City Council, 1 Nott & McCord, 527; Angel and Ames on Corporations, 435, 459, 462, 467, and cases referred to; Blatchford v. Mayor of Plymouth, 3 Bingham, N. C. 691; Dwarris on Statutes, 9 Law Library, 50 et seq.; Kirby v. Potter, 4 Vesey, 751; Wildman v. Wildman, 9 Vesey, 177; Rawlins v. Jennings, 13 Vesey, 45; Page v. Leapingwell, 18 Vesey, 467; Reed v. McGrew, 5 Hammond, 380; Pembroke v. Duxbury, 1 Pickering, 199.There are several questions which might be raised in the court below, but which would not be properly raised here. The only question is that which gives this court jurisdiction;The Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad Company had granted to them a perpetual charter, without any bonus to the State. But the charter contained no exemption from State taxation.The act of 1831, ch. 296, gave to the Delaware and Maryland Railroad Company a perpetual charter. The nineteenth section declares that the shares of the capital stock shall be considered personal estate. There is obscurity in this section. The object would seem to have been to convert the shares into personal estate in order to subject them to execution, Maryland not having passed any law till after this charter subjecting stocks, &c., to execution. The same section also declares, that such shares shall be exempt from the imposition of any tax, &c. It would seem from this that the legislature meant to exempt stock in the hands of the stockholders. - Then comes the exception, that the legislature reserves the right to
p. 390tax the permanent and fixed works of the company, which would indicate that every thing else was exempted. And yet that would be a grant of an exemption by implication, there being no express words.The plaintiffs claim an exemption which was not originally granted to them, but was granted to another company, which was subsequently merged in the present company. How was this exemption- transferred ?The act of 1835, chap. 93, incorporates the legislation of Delaware on the same subject. That act creates a- new corporation. In 1837, when the last union was asked for, Maryland provided that the three corporations should be merged in and form one body corporate, and that it should have all tne powers, privileges, and advantáges of the two former companies, namely, the Baltimore and Port Deposit- Railroad Company, and the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company. Now the only exemption which could be transferred was that of the Delaware and Maryland Railroad Company, (because the other company had no exemption,) which had been merged in the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company. But the exemption of the former was gone necessarily, because it'was only the .stock of that company which was exempted. The moment, then, the stock was destroyed by the merger of that company in another, or. the transfusion or intermingling of it with that of the other companies, its distinctive character was. destroyed. Reed v. Me Grew and Pembroke v. Duxbury are full to the point. And in the Charles River Bridge case, this court held,- that, by the charter to the Charles River Company, the franchise which had originally existed in Harvard College was extinguished. So here, by these néw charters, the original exemption was extinguished., But suppose it to have been transferred, how will it avail the present company? The property here assessed was not that which originally belonged to the Delaware and Maryland Company, but 'to the Baltimore and Port Deposit Company, which latter had, as I have shown, no exemption at all.The only doubt is as to the steamboat. But it has been decided that a tax of this kind does hot interfere with the regulations of commerce. It does not appear that this steamboat ever belonged to the exempted company. On the contrary, from .the kinds of property authorized by the charter, it would seem otherwise. The charter was to construct, a road from the divisional line to the Susquehanna River, and no farther. The property to be used was such as was required for this road, not for crossing the river. Non constat, then, that this steamboat ever "belonged to the exempted company.
p. 391Mr. Johnson, for the plaintiff in error.
The only question is, whether, by contract between the plaintiff in error and the State, the plaintiff was not exempt from the taxation, the amount of which it was the purpose of the suit-to exact. The judgment being against the plaintiff in error, who claimed the exemption under the alleged contract, and its protection under the Constitution of the United States, it must be reversed if their ground can be maintained.First, Was there a contract, and second, Is it impaired by. the tax in question ?This is to be ascertained by referring to the several acts of Maryland, Under which the plaintiff’s franchise is held. If these contain the contract relied upon, the point is made out. That a State may contract in the form of a legislative act, and so as to deprive herself in a particular instance of the right to exercise her taxing power, are not now open questions. It is the settled doctrine. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518 ; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 .Is there, then,' such a contract in this case ?Before the present company existed, the right to make the road from Baltimore to Philadelphia was in various companies, chartered for certain portions of the road, by Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. These-, by an agreement authorized by laws of the same States, were united into one on the 5th of February, 1838, under the name of the plaintiff in error; the agreement is in the record.By the terms of this association, and the several acts legalizing it, it will be seen that all the privileges and exemptions possessed by any one of the companies under its own charter became vested in the united body, and coextensive with the entire route of the road.The act of Maryland of 1831, chap. 288, contains the exemption from taxation upon which reliance is plaeed. The tax levied is not on the real or fixed property only, owned by plaintiff in error, and béing within the limits of .Harford County, but upon the iron rail, &c., and the steamboat at Havre de Grace.The land is taxed, and also three other items; this, it is submitted, is a clear violation of the exemption referred to. That the exemption, but for its qualification in the section making it, would have embraced the entire'property, real and personal, of the company, is perfectly clear: The question then is, Was it the object of the qualification to take out cf the exemption any thing else than the new land ? It is submitted, that' the rail-track, iron and wooden, and the steataboat, are the fixed property, within the meaning of the exemption. To give it
p. 392that interpretation, would be to make the exemption annul the entire section, and. render the exemption altogether nugatory.delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error is a corporation composed of several railroad companies, which had been previously chartered by the States of Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.; and which, by corresponding laws of the respective States, were united together, and form one corporation under the name and style of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company. The road of this corporation extends from Philadelphia to Baltimore.
One of the companies which now forms a part of this, corporation was originally the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad Company, and was chartered by Maryland by an act passed in 1831, chap. 288. The road constructed by this company extended from Baltimore to the Susquehanna, lying altogether on the west side of the river.
The Delaware and Maryland Railroad Company was another of the original corporations, and was also chartered by Maryland by the act of 1831, chap. 296. It extended from the Delaware line to the Susquehanna, and lies on the east side of the river.' This company was. afterwards, by the act of 1835, chap. 93, and a corresponding law passed by the State of Delaware, united with the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company, .which had been previously chartered by Delaware ; the two'companies when united taking the corporate name of the latter.
Afterwards; by an act of Assembly of Maryland, of 1837, chap. 30, and corresponding laws passed by Delaware and Pennsylvania, the last-mentioned company, together with the Baltimore- and Port Deposit Railroad Company, was authorized to unite with the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, which had been previously chartered in the States where it was situated; and these united companies were incorporated into one, under the name and style of the last-mentioned company, and the corporation thus formed is the plaintiff in error.
In 1841, since the union of these companies, an act of Assembly of Maryland was passed, imposing a táx for State purposes upon the real and personal property in the State. Under this law, the portion of the road which belonged to. the Baltimore and Port Deposit rpad, before the union last above mentioned, has been assessed as a part of the taxable property iii the State, in the manner set forth in the schedule contained in the record.. It is admitted that it has been assessed at the
p. 393same rate with- that of individuals, and as prescribed by the law.
The question submitted to this court is, whether this property of the plaintiff in error is liable to be so taxed, under the grants contained in the different charters above referred to.
The charter of the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad declared that the property in this road whén constructed should be vested in the company, and that the shares of the company should be deemed and considered as personal property. But there is no provision in the law exempting its stocks or its property, real or personal, from taxation. And certainly there is no reason why the property of .a corporation should be presumed to be exempted, or should not bear its share of the necessary public burdens, as well as the property of individuals. This court on several occasions has held, that the taxing power of a State is never presumed to be relinquished, unless the intention to relinquish is declared in clear and unambiguous terms. In the act incorporating this company, there is nothing from which such an inference could possibly be drawn; and, standing upon this charter alone, the tax was without doubt lawfully imposed.
Neither can such an inference be drawn from any thing contained in the subsequent law by which this company became finally consolidated with the plaintiff in error. It remained a separate corporation, without any alteration in its charter in this respect, until the union was formed by the act of 1837. It was situated altogether' in the State of Maryland. The Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad Company was partly, in Maryland and partly in Delaware, and owed its existence to a separate charter.. And the law which authorizes these two companies to unite themselves with the plaintiff in error declares that this new corporation, that is, the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, shall be entitled within this State to all the- powers and privileges and advantages at that time belonging to these two companies. It grants it nothing more.
Now, as these companies held their corporate privileges under different charters, the evident meaning of this provision is, that whatever privileges and advantages either of them possessed should in like manner be held and possessed by the new company, to the extent of the road they had respectively occupied before the union ; that it should stand in their place, and possess the power, rights, and privileges they had severally enjoyed in the portions of the road" which had previously belonged to them. And this intention is made still more evident by the fourth section of the law, which makes the new corpo
p. 394ration responsible for the contracts, debts, obligations, engagements, and liabilities at law or in equity of the several companies, and declares that it shall hold and be entitled to all the estate, real, personal, and mixed, choses in action, &c., belonging to- or due to the several companies. The plaintiff in error, therefore, took the . property of the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad Company with all the liabilities to which it was subject.in the hands of that company.
The act which incorporated the Delaware and Maryland Railroad provided that the shares in that company should be deefned and considered personal estate, and should be exempt from .any tax or burden, “ except upon that portion of the permanent and-fixed works which might, be in the State of Maryland.” . And the law of 1835, which authorized the union of this company with the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad-Company,-secured to the united company the property, rights, and privileges which that law or other laws conferred on them or either of them. The original exemption, therefore, of the Delaware and Maryland Railroad Company, as far as it went, was extended to the Wilmington and Susqúehanna Railroad Company, and has been continued to the plaintiffs in error. But as the right of taxation on that part of the road is not in question in this suit, we forbear to express an opinion upon it. For if this restriction could be supposed to exempt from taxation the description of property enumerated in.the schedule, or any part of it, it could not affect the question before us. The provisions of this charter have never been extended to the portion of the road on the west side of the river, which was constructed under the charter of the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad. As that company held it, so it is now held by the plaintiff in error, with the same privileges, powers, and liabilities. And as the prpperty assessed was liable to taxation in the hands of the original corporation, it is equally liable in the hands of the company with which it is now consolidated.
The judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals for the Western Shore of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Court of Appeals in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate, of six pbr centum per annum.